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I. TurEE TEmMPEsTuous Days . : ; i : : I 
II. Ca#sar’s FUNERAL . : - : ; F : ES 

IV. Czsar’s Son . é : : : : : : a £58 

V. THE Lanp Law oF Lucius ANTONIUS . : . 5 AGS) 
VI. THe “ LEx DE PERMUTATIONE” . : : - 5 fe 

VIII. THe “ DE OFFiciis”’ : ; : 5 : : LO 7, 
IX. THE PHILIpPics . : : : : 4 : eG 

PHILIPPI : , ; 5 : ‘ : : 5 AGG) 
XIII, Eastwarps : : ; . f : 5 2230 
XIV. Pompey’s Son . : : E . ; ; : + 259 
XV. Tue DISASTER OF SCYLLA . : : : ; ees 
XVI. THE GEzorRGIcs. : ; : 4 : ; : eEZOr 


A.—TueE Events AT RoME ON MARCH 15,16 AND 17, B.C. 44 309 
B.—TuHE Provinces oF Brutus, Cassius, ANTONY, AND 
DOLABELLA . . 6 : : . . é es 2d 

INDEX 5 ; ’ , ‘ ; é i : : ega0) 


Meeting of the conservatives on the Capitol—The delibera- 

tions of Antony and Lepidus—Antony’s visit to Calpurnia— 

The night of March 15-16—Negotiations on the morning of 

the 16th—Speech of Brutus in the afternoon—Antony’s action 

on the evening of the 16th—The night of March 16-17— 

Discussion in the Senate on the morning of the 17th—Pro- 

posals and objections. 
Tue conspirators, the chief personages in Rome and Antony The situation 
speedily recovered from the stupefaction into which they had eee 
been thrown by the unexpected assassination of Cesar. Dur- 
ing the progress of the conspiracy the assassins had been forced 
to exchange messages in secret and to observe a caution which 
precluded any complete harmony of design. Upon Cesar’s 
assassination and the manner of it they had been agreed: but 
as concerned their future action they had no more definite 
design than to lay immediate proposals before the Senate for 
the restoration of the republic. ‘This project had failed; and 
they now found themselves in the deserted Capitol, overcome 
by the reaction which follows great excitement, dismayed by 
the panic which they had witnessed in the streets, doubtful 
of the view which the city would take of their action and un- 
certain what attitude would be adopted by the veterans and 
the mob. What then, was to be done? It is not surprising 
that under such circumstances and swayed by such considera- 
tions, the conspirators thought it advisable to secure an under- 
standing with the most influential members of the conservative 
party before taking further action. They resolved to send 
down the slaves who had accompanied them to the houses of 
their most powerful friends, inviting their presence in the 

IIL : A 

Mar. 15, 
44 B.C. 

The discussion 
in the Capitol. 


Capitol. At the same time the leading members of the aristo- 
cratic party had recovered from their first bewilderment and 
were attempting to secure information concerning the con- 
spirators: Cicero, in the utmost excitement and anxiety, wrote 
a laconic note to Basilus, * offering his congratulations and 
asking what he and his friends proposed to do, Antony was 
no less anxious for immediate news; who had killed Cesar 
and who should be consulted in so dangerous a crisis? ‘Thus 
messengers began to speed through the streets of Rome upon 
that afternoon, collecting news and carrying letters and 
messages in every direction. 

So profound an animosity towards Cesar had been gathering 
in the depths of men’s minds during recent years, that it was not 
difficult to find a number of senators who were bold enough to 
accept the conspirators’ invitation to the Capitol. Among 
them was Cicero, who arrived almost beside himself with de- 
light ; the excitement of the crisis had at length aroused the 
weary and dissatisfied scholar from his long inactivity. 
Deliberations were at once begun. It was clear that the 
Senate must be assembled as soon as possible: the question 
then arose, who should convoke it. By the laws of the con- 
stitution, this was the function of the surviving consul, and 
some senators proposed to apply to him: the idea was by no 
means so irrational as has been supposed by modern historians, 
who are too prone to forget that the conspirators could not 
criticise the proposal in the light of subsequent events. Onlya 
few months earlier Antony, with Brutus, Cassius and Trebonius, 
had been a moderate Cesarean. He had eventually joined 
the opposite faction; but his debts, the slights to which the 
dictator had exposed him, and the solicitations of his wife, 
Fulvia, might serve as his excuse and lead his former friends 
to hope that he would cease this temporary aberration now that 
Cesar was dead. Cicero, on the other hand, was delighted to 
find among the conspirators his best friends and the most 

* Cic. F. vi. 15. (To Basilus) Tibi gvatulor : mihi gaudeo: te amo: 
tua tueov: a te amari et quid agas, quidquid agatur certior fievt volo. 
This note is generally thought to have been written on March 15, 
immediately after the news of Czsar’s death. 


conspicuous figures in the parties which had hitherto been 
opposed ; he offered a more daring proposition: it was not 
safe to trust Antony : it would be better to turn the situation to 
account by an immediate coup d'état: Brutus and Cassius, 
as pretors, should usurp Antony’s powers to convoke the 
Senate, to call the citizens to arms as had been done in the 
time of Catiline’s conspiracy, and to seize control of the 
State: meanwhile all should remain in the Capitol and form 
‘a Senate in miniature, pending the convocation of the whole 

How opinions were divided in the course of the discussion 
we cannot tell: Brutus and Cassius seem to have supported 
the first proposal; in any case Cicero’s advice was not adopted. 
The soldiers were more timorous than the man of letters: 
they feared that the people were either too deeply attached 
to Cesar or too apathetic to rise at their call, or possibly 
might rise against themselves. All offered profuse congratu- 
lations to the assassins, but none were willing to remain and 
support the coup-d’état. Discussion was prolonged and the hours 
went by: the days of March are short and dusk was drawing 
near. Eventually it was decided that as the enterprise of the 
assassination had been successful, its results should not be 
endangered by a new and hazardous.attempt. It was there- 
fore resolved to open negotiations with Antony and to invite 
him to the Capitol for discussion upon the convocation of the 
Senate and the peaceful restoration of the republic : upon what 
conditions or by what means this object was to be achieved, 
no one had any clear statement to make: it was merely resolved 
that Antony should not be deprived of any honours granted him 
by Cesar. Further discussion dealt with the organisation of 
popular demonstrations on the next day for the purpose of 
turning public opinion in favour of the murder and several 
senators were commissioned to open negotiations with Antony. 
In this task, however, Cicero declined any share. 

Meanwhile, Antony’s position was equally embarrassing. 
Lepidus, Czsar’s magister equitum, was apparently the only man 
who ventured to visit him that afternoon, and at the time of 
his arrival, the consul had received no reliable information 

Mar. 15, 
44 B.C. 


Mar. 15, 
44 B.C. 


concerning the conspirators. Such news as could be derived 
at the moment from servants and apparitors was naturally 
vague and confused. At the same time it was impossible for 
Antony to form a definite view of the situation, until he knew 
by what persons Cesar had been killed. Thus it is likely 
enough that while the conspirators were debating in the Capitol, 
Lepidus and Antony spent an anxious time together in the 
attempt to reconcile conflicting rumours, until the evening, 
when their doubts were dispersed by the blaze of the torches 
accompanying the ambassadors of the tyrannicides. The latter 
naturally began by giving the names of the conspirators in order 
to lend weight to the peace proposals which they brought : 
Antony was then able to realise to his dismay the extent and 
importance of the conspiracy and to understand why none 
but Lepidus had come to his house. Cesar had been killed 
by the leading members of the Cesarean and Pompeian parties, 
who had formed a coalition for the purpose. Historians are 
generally agreed that, upon Casar’s death, Antony’s sole 
design was to seize his place and power. It is far more 
probable that when he had learned the true nature of the 
conspiracy, he must have feared, during that evening at 
least, that he would speedily follow Cesar to the grave. 
Cesar’s death was for him an unmixed evil: not only did it 
destroy such temporary advantages as he had derived from 
his recent change of attitude, but it made them so many 
possibilities of ruin. The conservatives and the moderate 
party had been encouraged and strengthened by the success 
of the conspiracy and would attempt once more to secure the 
supreme power: if they succeeded, what chance was there for 
him, who would be regarded as a traitor by the conspirators? 
The ambassadors had certainly made friendly overtures; but 
these must have seemed rather ominous than reassuring to 
Antony, who imagined the conspirators to be a fierce and 
determined party and not a timorous and hesitating group. 
These proposals certainly seemed to veil some treachery. Why 
should he go to the Capitol, to the midst of the conspirators, 
whose chief desire must be to slaughter him as they had slaugh- 
tered Cesar? It would be madness to entertain the idea. 



Meanwhile he could not afford to reject the peace proposals Mar. 15, 
without more ado and to break definitely with the conspirators, 44 B.C. 
for he was helpless and could look only to Lepidus for support. 

In this great dilemma, he fell back upon the usual resource 

of indecision and asked to be allowed to consider the matter 

until the following evening. 

To his great relief, the ambassadors accepted this proposal and Asteay 6 ozs 
when they had gone, Antony and Lepidus could resume their oe 
deliberations in the light of their better knowledge of the 
situation. They now knew that the conspiracy had been 
organised by the leaders of the conservative party and speedily 
agreed upon the following plan. All the conspirators, whether 
Cesarean or conservative, were to be branded alike ; Czsar’s 
murder was to be denounced to the people as the outcome of a 
plot, intended to destroy all the dictator’s work: by this means 
they might collect the remnants of the collegia of Clodius, unite 
the most important members of their party who had remained 
faithful to Cesar, call up such veterans as were in the neighbour- 
hood, and thus forma small force which Lepidus would com- 
mand and which might serve to defend themselves and their 
position in case of need. When this policy had been arranged, 
Lepidus went off to collect troops and Antony, at length 
remembering his dead colleague, betook himself to the forum 
under cover of the night with an escort of slaves, and made 
his way to the domus publica whither three slaves had carried 
Cesar’s body on a litter. There he looked upon the slender 
and motionless frame of the man whose astonishing energy he 
had witnessed almost daily for the past ten years; he saw and 
spoke with Calpurnia. Probably he had little difficulty in 
securing from her Czsar’s letters, a sum of 100 millions of 
sesterces and the valuables which he kept in his house: indeed 
Calpurnia herself probably offered them to him. A helpless 
woman was not competent to guard these treasures under the 
very eyes of the conspirators upon the Capitol, and probably 
both she and Antony were surprised that the conspirators had 
not thought of seizing this booty ; this oversight is but another 
proof of the frantic haste with which the conspiracy was 
bungled. Moreover Antony was within his rights, as consul, in 


Mar. 15-16, taking possession of Czsar’s archives: indeed, Cesar himself, 

44 B.C. 

Events of the 

as a preliminary to his departure, had entrusted him with many 
documents containing arrangements for dealing with public 
business during his absence. Be this as it may, Antony carried 
these effects to his house and then proceeded with astonishing 
alacrity to despatch slaves, freedmen, and clients in every 
direction : he sent messengers through Rome to warn the heads 
of the collegia and the electioneering agents: through Rome 
and to the neighbouring towns to beat up the veterans and 
invite them to the house of Lepidus, to find the most influen- 
tial of Czsar’s friends, to discover his colonists and adherents, 
and in every case to urge their immediate departure for Rome, 
telling them that the conservative party was attempting to 
annul all Czsar’s actions, to resume possession of the property 
which he had sold, of the gifts he had distributed and of the 
rights he had conceded. At the same time the conspirators 
in the Capitol, though they had failed to grasp the significance 
of Antony’s reply, were busy with preparations for the popular 
demonstrations of the next day, sending out slaves, freedmen, 
clients and friends to ask support of any and every one and 
to buy the help of the election agents. Ancient cities were 
not artificially lighted, and Rome was usually silent and 
deserted after sunset: but her streets were full of rumours 
and commotion throughout that night, the first that Cesar 
slept in peace, 

It was not, however, easy for either party to stir public 
feeling. Czsar’s few implacable enemies rejoiced and his few 
devoted friends lamented his death: but the public at large 
remained undecided. To many the assassination brought 
satisfaction of long-standing enmity, of bitter memories of the 
civil war, or of the envy which invariably pursues the possessor 
of place and power. Many again, as is constantly the case 
in such tragedies, pitied the man who had been attacked 
and slain by sixty fierce assassins, forgetful of the fact that he 
was the head of a party and also of an empire and could have 
exterminated his enemies in an hour if he had lived. However 
these feelings of pity and sympathy were then overwhelmed by 
a great and dominating sense of fear. No one could realise that 


conspirators and Czsarians were alike bewildered and per- Mar. 16, 
plexed: all believed that the conspirators had long been 44 B.C. 
collecting money, troops and partisans for their attempt. 
Hence no one could decide which of the two parties to join. 
With great difficulty the conspirators succeeded in buying the 
support of a few agitators during the night, while Lepidus was 
recruiting a small band of soldiers. He was able, however, to 
occupy the forum with his little band on the morning of the 
16th and enable Antony to appear and perform his consular 
functions as usual, together with a few officials who had taken 
no part in the conspiracy. On the other hand, the two pretors 
and the other magistrates who were in the Capitol did not 
appear, and events in the forum induced the public that 
morning to believe that the power was in the hands of the 
Cesarean party. This was a definite advantage: indeed the 
sight of the soldiers and of the consul induced many veterans, 
heads of collegia and adherents of Cesar to abandon their 
hesitation. Some ran home to get their weapons: others 
began to persuade their friends and the members of their 
collegia to join their cause. At that moment the first detach- 
ment of the demonstrators hired by the conservatives appeared 
in the forum and met the patrols of the veterans. This 
spectacle chilled the enthusiasm of the mercenaries forthwith 
and no one ventured to applaud Czsar’s murderers in the 
presence of his veterans. Only the pretor Cinna was bold 
enough to throw down his insignia and declare that he wished 
to hold them from the people and not from a tyrant: the 
trembling hearers barely ventured to cry, peace! peace! 
The crowd soon turned in different directions and dispersed, 
in fear that the veterans might begin some act of violence. 

Once more the senators began to come and go between Negotiations 
Antony’s house and the Capitol. Antony had been able to pei: 
examine the situation more calmly during the night and had and the 
come to the conclusion that the chief danger to his party was to aa 
be feared from Decimus Brutus, one of the most distinguished 
conspirators ; if he should take over the command of Cisalpine 
Gaul, as Cesar had arranged for that year, he would then be 
at the head of an army in the valley of the Po, a fortnight’s 

Mar. 16, 
44. B.C. 


march from Rome. Antony readily perceived that the army 
of Gaul would be the most solid of all foundations for the new 
government, and the instrument which would best enable the 
conspirators to terrorise the Senate into compliance with 
their wishes. Hence it is likely that during the night of 
March 15-16, he resolved to strain every nerve to induce 
Brutus to surrender his command. Although Cezsar’s veterans 
and colonists had begun to come in from the surrounding 
country on the morning of the 16th, it seems that none of the 
leading Czsareans could be found except Hirtius and that the 
others, Balbus, Pansa, Oppius, Calenus and Sallust were in 
hiding in the neighbouring country seats. Great astuteness 
would be required if Antony, in his present state of isolation, 
was to secure the required renunciation from the conspirators. 
It seems, indeed, that Antony proceeded during the morning 
to make friendly overtures to the conspirators, assuring them 
that he was disposed to give them such help as he could towards 
the restoration of the republic: he apparently added that they 
should appoint his old friend and comrade, Decimus Brutus, 
as their plenipotentiary, authorise him to leave the Capitol 
and come to the consul’s residence. Antony perhaps thought 
that he would be able more easily to intimidate Brutus and 
induce him to resign his province, if he could separate him 
from the other conspirators. These overtures were well- 
timed ; though many leading men had gone to meet the 
conspirators in the Capitol during the morning, the party 
was discouraged by the failure of the first demonstration 
and the apathy of the people, and was also apprehensive of 
Lepidus and his veterans: their fears were increased by the 
constant arrival of veterans and colonists. ‘Thus perplexity 
was again predominant in the Capitol. Many plans were 
discussed, including a proposal for sending Brutus and Cassius 
down to the forum to harangue the crowd: but much hesita- 
tion was displayed: there was a risk that they might all be torn 
in pieces. Hence, Antony’s overtures were readily received : 
Decimus Brutus left the Capitol at once to begin negotiations, 
and the party walked blindly into the snare which the consul 
had laid. Neither party had the courage to take the offensive : 


and both remained upon their guard, waiting for the gloom Mar. 16, 
which obscured the situation to disperse. 44 B.C. 
It was, however, impossible for the conspirators to conceal Brutus and 

their vacillation or the fears by which they were beset : Antony pias see 
must have been surprised to find them and Brutus in so con- 
ciliatory a temper, and in the course of the morning his sus- 

picion was confirmed and he realised that their attitude was 
dictated by their fears. But a little later in the morning the 
situation was further complicated by a wholly unforeseen 

event. Dolabella, Cesar’s favourite, suddenly appeared in 

the forum, with the insignia of consulship and accompanied 

by a crowd of veterans and agitators: he there delivered a 

speech in favour of the tyrannicides and then went up to the 

Capitol to pay his respects to them. This was an event of 

much significance: Cesar had appointed Dolabella consul 
suffectus and he would have become consul on the dictator’s 

death, if Antony had not prevented the performance of the 
religious ceremonies necessary to the validity of an election. 
Dolabella was not the man to abandon his consulship on a 

mere question of form, and had resolved during the night to 

ratify his election himself, hoping to maintain himself in office 

with the help of the conspirators and conservatives: they 

would have regarded a consul, however doubtful his title, 

as a valuable ally. Indeed, this little coup-d’etat caused con- 
siderable excitement in the city and seemed to rouse the energy 

of the conspirators. The demonstrators, whose operations 

had failed that morning, now gathered courage and began 

a second demonstration in the forum, shouting for Brutus, 

Cassius and their friends. The spirit of the conspirators 

revived and they decided that Brutus and Cassius should go 

down and harangue the crowd; this course of action would 

suspend the progress of the negotiations or deprive them of 

all reality. ‘The question then arose, who would accompany 

Brutus and Cassius to the forum? Upon this point dis- 

cussion and hesitation seem to have been renewed, Eventu- 

ally it was arranged that Brutus and Cassius should go down 

alone, and that the most distinguished of the senators and 

knights who were then in the Capitol should escort them in 

Mar. 16, 
44 B.C. 

determines to 
convoke the 


solemn form, as they had escorted Cicero at the time of Catiline’s 
conspiracy, to protect them, if necessary, from popular violence. 
No sooner was their decision known in the forum, than it was 
regarded with general uncertainty and suspicion: no one could 
forget how many times the conservatives had intimidated the 
popular party by means of some such artificial demonstration. 
Antony and Lepidus had every reason to desire the failure 
of the demonstration, but could not venture to employ force, 
least of all after Dolabella’s treachery: they, therefore, pre- 
ferred to wait and watch the progress of events. Eventually 
the solemn escort was formed upon the Capitol during the 
afternoon, descended slowly to the forum and made its way 
through the crowd which had gathered to meet it. When the 
procession reached the rostra, Marcus Brutus mounted the 
steps and a great silence fell upon the multitude as he appeared 
before them. Brutus gave an explanation of the murder and 
the motives which had prompted it: he was allowed to speak 
without interruption. Though the mob hated the nobles 
in theory, they respected them in person: Brutus enjoyed 
high consideration, and the Czsareans in the audience followed 
the lead of their political opponents. But the conclusion of 
the speech was marked neither by hisses nor by applause : 
the audience remained unmoved, the effect of the meeting 
was indecisive and the conspirators with their conservative 
escort returned to the Capitol. 

The uncertainties of the situation were now at an end. 
Every one was now as well aware as Antony of the fears to which 
the conspirators were a prey. For a whole day Rome had 
waited to see them take the initiative: but the majority of 
the conspirators had not dared to descend to the forum, while 
those who came had hurried back to their refuge upon the 
instant conclusion of the speech. On the other hand, a steady 
stream of veterans and colonists was coming in: the rabble 
adherents of Clodius and Cxsar were growing bolder and those — 
about Antony had not only forgotten the defection of Dolabella 
but were even beginning to discuss the vengeance to be exacted 
for Cesar’s murder. Meanwhile the evening was approaching 
and with it the time-limit which Antony had fixed for the 


conspirators’ reply. Encouraged by the timorous attitude Mar. 16, 
of the conspirators and by the enthusiasm of the veterans 44 B.C. 
and colonists, the consul resolved to break off negotiations 
and to convoke the Senate for the next morning, not in the 
Curia, which was too near the Capitol, but in the temple of 
Tellus, which stood by his own house: he determined to send 
a friendly invitation to the conspirators, to call a meeting of 
the Cesarean party before the session began, to send Hirtius 
to Decimus with a message regretting his inability to grant 
him his province in view of the hostility of the people and the 
veterans, and urging the conspirators for their own good, to 
leave Rome ina body. By thus precipitating a crisis, he hoped 
to intimidate the conspirators and prevent their appearance 
at the following day’s session; he might then induce the 
Senate to approve such measures as he thought best calculated 
to weaken the power of the conservatives, while avoiding any 
open violence and sheltering himself behind the legal authority 
of the assembly. ‘This menace was so opportunely delivered 
that the resolution of Decimus was shaken for the moment : 
believing that all was lost, he declared himself ready to leave 
Rome provided that a safe-conduct was forthcoming. 

Night fell and all the narrow ways were growing dark : Preparations 
the feverish activities of day had given place, as usual, to the pena 
dark and silent solitude of a city without lamps, broken only 
from time to time by the passage of some company with 
torches, some solitary wayfarer with his lantern, or some one 
lost and groping his way in the darkness. But in the Capitol 
no one was inclined to descend to the temple of Tellus: all 
had instantly realised the meaning of the policy which had 
induced Antony to break off negotiations and suddenly to 
refer the whole question to the Senate, where it was impossible 
for the conspirators to appear. Spurred to greater resolution 
by the imminence of the danger, they determined in 
wrathful trepidation to strain every nerve in order to send to 
that session a majority favourable to themselves. At the same 
time Antony and Lepidus were equally determined to secure 
a majority for their own purposes: they proposed to station 
about the temple as many veterans and colonists as could be 


Mar. 16-17, collected in order to intimidate the conservatives. Hence 

44 B.c, 

The arrival of 
the senators. 

it was necessary to continue throughout the darkness of the 
night the watchings and workings of the day: the Consul had 
great fires lighted in the squares, cross-roads and streets to give 
some light to those who had no slave torch-bearers: by this 
fitful glare could be seen the messengers of the conspirators 
in urgent haste upon their way to the houses of the senators 
to beg their attendance at the morning session ; belated troops 
of veterans arriving from the surrounding districts; magis- 
trates and eminent citizens on their way to meetings and 
consultations; military patrols, bands of artisans, freedmen 
and plebeians gathering to their collegia. It was probably in 
Antony’s house that the meeting of the Czsareans was held at 
a late hour: apparently the only leaders of the party there 
present were Antony, Lepidus and Hirtius and the discussion 
was protracted. Some advised that the conspirators should be 
allowed to leave Rome, upon promising that they would make 
no attempt to foment disturbances: MHirtius advised that 
they should make peace and accept the proposal of the con- 
spirators for united action and a joint attempt to restore the 
republican government, final decision being left to the Senate. 
Lepidus, on the other hand, who seems to have been unduly 
elated by the favourable events of the previous day, advanced 
a plan analogous to that which Cicero had proposed to the 
conservatives: he wished to attempt a coup-d’état, to storm 
the Capitol and to slay the conspirators, among whom was his 
brother-in-law, amid the plaudits of the people. As Brutus 
and Cassius had rejected Cicero’s proposal, so Antony declined 
the plan of Lepidus in favour of that supported by Hirtius. 
He was aware that the rich and leisured classes throughout 
Italy favoured the conspirators and he thought that violent 
measures were highly imprudent, when the threats and out- 
cries of the crowd of veterans made it possible to bend the legal 
powers of the Senate to his will. 

Thus the solution of the problem was reserved for the 
Senate and there no one could say in which direction the 
majority would go. Lepidus and Antony believed that they 
had the game in their own hands and continued to bring up 


veterans and colonists to the temple of Tellus: the con- Mar. 17, 
spirators were still dominated by their fears and in dread of an 44 B.€ 
adverse decision, earnestly besought their friends to be present 
at the session. Every party and every senator proposed to 
appear, though none had any definite proposal to offer or any 
concerted plan to pursue. The outcome of this perplexity 
and the possible results of the session were problems which 
harassed many a senator on the morning of the 17th as he made 
his way to the temple amid the soldiers which Antony and 
Lepidus had stationed to maintain order and amid the uneasy, 
seething crowd of Cesar’s admirers. The ferment broke out 
in cries and hisses as the senators passed by: within the temple 
they fell into groups and anxiously discussed the situation, 
with ears alert to the tumult without the building, and with 
forebodings of ultimate disaster. Suddenly a tremendous uproar 
broke out : doubtless some one had been torn in pieces. This 
commotion greeted the arrival of Cinna, the pretor who had 
insulted Czsar’s memory in the forum the previous evening. 
The crowd, however, had refrained from violence and Cinna 
reached the temple unharmed, as did all the senators. Dola- 
bella arrived and boldly occupied the Consul’s seat. Then, 
amid general applause, came Antony and Lepidus; but none 
of the conspirators ventured to appear. 

The moment, however, that the session began, Antony The debate in 
was forced to realise that he had been mistaken. Notwith- ‘he Sent 
standing the presence of the veterans and soldiers and the 
absence of the conspirators, a majority of the Senate was so 
obviously favourable to Czsar’s murderers that Antony deemed 
it impossible to secure the ratification of measures which would 
be objectionable to this majority and prejudicial to Decimus. 

The proposal to invite the conspirators to take part in the 
session, in other words, to sit among their judges, met with 
ready and immediate approval. Hatred of Caesar was wide- 
spread and profound: republican traditions were still vigorous, 
even in this Senate which Cesar had himself remodelled: not 
only were the tyrannicides a numerous body but they possessed 
very many friends and relatives among the senators. Antony 
and Lepidus had been able to surround the meeting with a 

Mar. 15, 
44 B.C. 

Was Cesar a 
tyrant ? 


crowd of Cesar’s friends, but within the temple were practically 
none but his enemies: his friends had not come or would not 
venture to speak. However, when the murder came up for 
discussion, debate speedily became confused in the mass of 
conflicting opinions. Some senators, including ‘Tiberius 
Claudius Nero, declared that the murder should be regarded 
as tyrannicide, and that rewards should be decreed to the 
authors of it, according to ancient custom, as exemplified in the 
case of the murderers of the Gracchi. Others, with greater 
prudence, were ready to admit that the conspirators had 
accomplished a notable exploit, but considered that the case 
was not one for rewards and that praise would suffice. Others 
again attempted to find a compromise between their horror 
of the assassination and their respect for the opinion of the 
majority, declaring that even praise was inadvisable and that 
immunity from punishment would be an adequate return. 
The first speakers replied by propounding an obvious dilemma : 
either Caesar had been a tyrant or his murderers deserved 
punishment. This difficulty became the subject of long 
argument, a clear proof that the proposals of the extremists 
did not entirely satisfy the meeting, in spite of the applause 
with which they had been received: by degrees the course 
of the debate brought the disputants to the vital point upon 
which all else depended. Was Cesar a tyrant or was he not? 

The assembly eventually realised the importance of settling 
this vexed question and resolved to discuss it impartially, 
considering as null and void all the oaths which Cesar had 
exacted from the senators. ‘The debate was resumed: nume- 
rous orators spoke while the roar of the tumultuous crowd 
and its imprecations against Cesar’s murderers grew ever 
louder without the doors. The most divergent views were 
propounded and agreement seemed impossible. Antony, 
however, who had kept silence hitherto and allowed the 
speakers to wander as they pleased, now intervened and with 
great dexterity brought the debate back to the point at issue : 
if the Senate should declare that Casar had been a tyrant, 
it must consider the consequences of such a pronouncement : 
the law would require that the body should be thrown into the 


Tiber and that all Cesar’s acts should be declared null and 
void. In other words, the State would resume possession of 
all the lands which Cesar had sold or granted: all his official 
appointments, even in cases where his murderers were con- 
cerned, would be cancelled, and the very numerous body of 
senators whom Cesar had chosen would lose their seats. 
This argument could not fail to make a great impression ; 
Cesar’s enemies, as well as his friends, had almost without 
exception made some personal profit during the last few 
years: Brutus himself, for instance, was pretor and his mother 
had accepted a huge estate in Campania from Cesar. Antony’s 
arguments were reinforced by the increasing uproar outside 
the temple: it was feared that the crowd might attempt 
to storm the building. Antony and Lepidus were obliged to 
come out to calm the people, and Antony began a speech: 
but his words were scarcely audible and a general shout arose, 
“To the forum! To the forum!” Antony and Lepidus 
were obliged to go to the forum, where Antony continued his 
speech and promised the people that their wishes should be 
granted. However, the discussion in the Senate continued 
under the presidency of Dolabella: but Antony’s well-timed 
intervention had encouraged various opportunists to make 
proposals, which, in spite of their absurdity, were capable 
of reconciling self-interest and animosity and were far more 
likely to satisfy the Senate as a whole than any extremist 
denunciations. Were they to throw into the Tiber the body 
of the man whose death the crowd was burning to avenge? 
The aristocracy had been strong enough thus to treat the bodies 
of the Gracchi: but eighty years later vacillation and fear 
characterised this feeble club of business men, politicians and 
dilettanti, severally pursuing their own interests and ambitions ; 
moreover, Dolabella, fearing to lose his consulate for the second 
time, threatened to revert to his admiration for Cesar, if the 
dictator’s acts were not ratified. So strong was the feeling 
that vested rights must be respected, that at this moment the 
conspirators, impatiently awaiting the end of the session, 
circulated letters among the people, in which they promised 
to respect all Casar’s measures. In vain did one irreconcilable 

Mar. 15, 
44 B.C, 

Mar. 17, 
44 B.C. 

The amnesty. 


propose to annul the grants which the tyrant had made and 
to have them restored by the people: after the first blush, 
the conciliatory party gained courage and the extremists 
lost ground. 

Antony and Lepidus had now returned, but the discussion 
was continued, though all were agreed that Cesar’s measures 
could not be annulled, whether his assassination were a criminal 
act or not. Some form of words was required which would 
remove the absurdity of this contradiction, and the task of 
finding it was by no means easy. At length Cicero, whose 
revolutionary ardour had cooled somewhat since the 15th, 
happened to remember that the Athenians used to bring their 
civil wars to an end by means of an amnesty, providing that all 
illegal actions should be forgiven and forgotten. He therefore 
proposed for the public welfare, to ratify all the measures of 
the dictator, not only those which had been already promul- 
gated, but also such as might be found in Cesar’s papers, 
provided they were drawn up in legal form and justified by 
the powers which the Senate or the comitia had conferred 
upon him. He also proposed that the task of selection from 
the papers should be entrusted to Antony, that an amnesty 
should be proclaimed and all prosecutions arising out of 
Cesar’s murder forbidden. This proposal was adopted with 
an amendment referring to the colonies which Cesar had pro- 
jected. It seems that the senatus consultus declared, in order 
to pacify the veterans, that the foundation of these colonies 
would be carried out. The senators then dispersed: their 
decisions were communicated to the conspirators and approved 
by them, and towards the evening, when Antony and Lepidus 
had sent their sons into the Capitol as hostages, Brutus, Cassius, 
and the other conspirators came down. 

Cesar was dead: but though the conspirators had thus 
achieved what they considered the most difficult part of their 
enterprise, they had found their progress suddenly barred by 
an obstacle of his raising: this was the coalition of interests 
which had been formed during the civil war and the dictator- 
ship. Unable to surmount this barrier, they had been obliged 
to circumvent it: but by what means! The attempt to restore 


the constitutional republic upon the ruins of the dictatorship, March 17, 
had been begun by so revolutionary a measure as an amnesty, 44 B.C. 

an idea borrowed from Greece, alien from the laws and legal 
principles of Rome and introduced by the Senate with un- 
considered haste, for the purpose of solving a political 


Il B 

The republi- 
canism of the 


The Senate and the republic—Mark Antony—The senatorial 
session of March 19—Cesar’s will—His bequests to the people 
—The preparations for Czsar’s funeral—Anarchy during the 
days following the funeral—The general confusion of parties 
—Reappearance of Herophilus—His execution, 
Att modern historians are agreed that the old republican 
institutions of Rome were decaying or dead in Cesar’s time, 
that his contemporaries should have appreciated this fact and 
that in consequence every attempt to restore the republic 
or even to show respect for its institutions and ancient tradi- 
tions should be regarded as utter foolishness. ‘This is, in my 
opinion, a very serious mistake, for the reason that it removes 
almost every possibility of understanding the last revolution 
of the Roman republic. I believe—and I hope to show proofs 
of the fact in the course of this narrative—that the republic 
possessed greater vitality than is supposed. Even admitting 
that it was dead, we must remember that men constantly 
fail to perceive the progress of social and political transforma- 
tions until long after they have become accomplished facts 
and that people are always inclined to consider any existing 
institution as indispensable, especially in politics. It is there- 
fore highly probable that the fundamental institutions of the 
old republic, which had preved so entirely successful, were 
regarded by contemporaries as immortal. Especially was this 
true of the Senate, which had conquered and governed an 
immense empire, was a visible symbol of the victorious power 
of Rome, and finally, had killed Julius Caesar because, even 

after its many victories, he had failed to show due respect to 


it at the close of his life. Surely any intelligent man was bound 
to realise that he could not afford to disregard so formidable 
an institution? Surely no man, whatever his audacity, would 
attempt to combat it under any compulsion but that of dire 
necessity ? 

It is, then, not surprising that the session of March 17 and 
the decision which ended the uncertainties and vacillations 
of the 15th and 16th should have left Antony in great anxiety. 
His position was by no means satisfactory. Notwithstanding 
his efforts and the absence of the conspirators, a majority of 
the senators had been proof against the menaces of the veterans 
and had approved the murder of Czsar. The conspirators 
were now free to take their seats in the Senate, and would 
form a coalition with the remnant of the Pompeians: this new 
party would become supreme in the republic with the support 
of the upper classes, a consul, several pretors, numerous 
governors and the Senate. Among those of Cesar’s chief 
adherents who had taken no part in the plot, Dolabella had 
joined the opposition and the remainder had disappeared, 
with the exception of Hirtius. The Roman mob was uneasy 
and irritated: but neither Antony nor any one else could 
place much reliance upon this agitation, which he regarded as 
a mere flash in the pan, like many other commotions of the kind. 
In short, on March 17, Antony regarded the Pompeian party 
as masters of the situation. ‘The conciliatory speeches delivered 
at the morning session had gained him the goodwill of the 
Pompeian leaders * and he therefore began to consider whether 
he could not discover some means of recovering his influence 
with this party, which he had abandoned at the moment when 
it was recovering its old prestige. 

Antony was certainly one of the most remarkable figures 
among the politicians of the old and ruined nobility, who then 
entered political life as a career of glorious piracy. A man of 
powerful frame and active mind, daring and generous, but 
sensual, imprudent, proud and violent; intelligent but far 
from cunning, prone to commit the worst mistakes under the 
impulse of passion and impetuosity, he had hitherto led an 

* Plutarch, Ant, 14; See Plutarch, Brut, 19, 

Mar. 18, 
44 B.C, 


His character. 

Mar. 18, 
44 B.C. 


unsettled career of wild and lawless adventure, appalling 
danger and extraordinary turns of fortune, from the clandestine 
expedition of Gabinius in Egypt to the siege of Alesia, from the 
revolutionary tribunate of 49 to the passage of the Adriatic 
in 48, from Pharsalia to the Dictatorship of 47. But the most 
daring characters, if not utterly foolish, can realise upon 
occasion the necessity for prudence and self-restraint, when 
they find themselves upon the brink of the precipice. This 
was precisely Antony’s position : he had to face the discouraging 
admission, that all his efforts, like the toil of Sisyphus, had 
hitherto failed upon the verge of success. He had amassed a 
large fortune, but had squandered it so effectually that on the 
Ides of March his possessions consisted chiefly of debts: he 
had risked his life upon several occasions for the popular party 
and also his reputation among his own adherents by sudden 
outbursts of extravagant or violent action; one such occasion 
had occurred in 47 after the great victory of the popular party, 
when he had suppressed the disorders caused by Dolabella 
with an energy worthy of a consul in the time of the Gracchi. 
Thus at the age of thirty-nine * he found his affairs embarrassed, 
his friends scanty and his enemies numerous, his popularity 
weak and threatening to disappear entirely amid the uncer- 
tainties of the situation. Age and misfortune had sobered 
him, as his final reconciliation with Cesar proves: the sudden 
catastrophe of the Ides of March and the immediate danger 
of his position imperatively dictated the necessity of greater 
prudence. Contrary to his habits of rapid decision he there- 
fore resolved to temporise and await the outcome of events: 
to declare war upon the new conservative party was in- 
advisable: it was better to use conciliation and preserve the 
possibility of retreat in that direction, in case the popular 
party seemed doomed to destruction. On the other hand, 
he must keep in touch with the popular party which might 
return to power at any time; so many strange and unexpected 
reversals of fortune had been seen in recent years, 

On the 18th Antony and Lepidus invited Brutus and Cassius 

* Antony must have been born in 671~83. See Gardthausen, 
Augustus und seine Zeit, Leipzig, 1891, ii, Pp. 5, N. 22, 


to a great dinner and on the 19th the Senate met once more * Mar, 18-19, 
to discuss certain points which had inevitably arisen during 44 8.c. 
the last two days out of the amnesty proclaimed on the 17th. 

Cesar’s arrangements had been approved as'a whole, but it confirmation 
was now necessary to ratify without delay those which dealt ue 
with the provinces and the magistracies: some of these had , 
been already published and others were contained in the 

papers sent by Cesar to Antony. Further, Cesar’s relatives, 

and especially Piso his father-in-law, though they had kept 

silence on the 17th, now recovered their courage and demanded 

that Cesar’s will should be opened and that a public funeral 

should be given him.t The demand was well-timed, as it 
thwarted the Pompeian plan of confiscating Czsar’s property, 

which had been almost entirely acquired from the spoils of the 

civil wars. It was, moreover, by no means easy to reject this 

demand when once it had been put forward. If Cesar was not 

to be regarded as a tyrant why should his funeral be that merely 

of a private individual? If all his measures were ratified, 

how could his will be set aside? ‘The Senate therefore pro- 

ceeded to confirm the appointments of pro-consuls and pro- 

pretors, who were already in their provinces or on the way to 

them: Lucius Munatius Plancus in Gallia Comata, Asinius 

Pollio in Further Spain, Manius Acilius Glabrio in Achaia, 

Quintus Hortensius in Macedonia, Publius Vatinius in Illyria 

and possibly Lucius Statius Murcus in Syria. Similar pro- 

cedure was followed with reference to the governorships for 

the coming year: the occupants of these were still at Rome 

and included certain of the conspirators in their number. 
Decimus Brutus was governor of Cisalpine Gaul, Quintus 
Cornificius of Africa, Tullius Cimber of Bithynia, Trebonius of 

* Plutarch, Brut. 19-20 gives much valuable information upon 
this session which Ihne, Rom. Gesch. Leipzig, 1898, vii. 265, considers 
with much probability to have taken place on the 19th. It ratified 
Cesar’s decisions regarding the provinces and the magistracies and 
discussed the question of the funeral. App. B. C., ii, 135, 136, places 
the debate upon the funeral in the session of the 17th, but he is by 
no means clear. Plutarch’s date seems to me more probable, as the 
funeral must have seemed a secondary matter, until some general 
agreement had been secured. 

} Suetonius Ces; 83. 

Mar. 19, 
44 B.C. 

Cesar’s will. 

Asia, Lepidus of Gallia Narbonensis and of Further Spain. 

Czsar’s arrangements for future offices and commands were also 
confirmed: Hirtius and Pansa were to be consuls in 43, 
Decimus Brutus and Munatius Plancus in 42; other persons, 
including the conspirator Publius Servilius Casca, were to be 
tribunes in 43 or 42; Antony was to have the province of 
Macedonia and Dolabella that of Syria. Unfortunately, 
Cesar had selected no provinces for Brutus or Cassius before 
his death. The questions of the will and the funeral were then 
considered. No one dared to propose that the will should be 
annulled: but Cassius and many other senators opposed 
the idea of a public funeral. They remembered but too 
vividly the riots which had accompanied the funeral of Clodius. 
If the plebs had raised such tumults for Clodius, what would 
they not do for Cesar? * Cesar’s relatives protested and 
Antony judiciously observed that the refusal of a public 
funeral was likely to rouse the mob to yet greater excesses. 
Brutus, of weaker fibre than Cassius, was at length persuaded ; 
it was decided that Antony should open the will, which Czsar 
had placed in the custody of the chief vestal virgin and that a 
public funeral should be held.t 

The same day, probably in the presence of Cesar’s friends 
and relatives, Antony opened in his house, before this astounded 
company, what was probably the most extraordinary will ever 
made in Rome. ‘The chief heirs were Cesar’s three nephews, 
the sons of his two sisters, Caius Octavius receiving three- 
quarters of the property, Lucius Pinarius and Quintius Pedius 
the other quarter. Several conspirators were appointed 
guardians of his son, if one should be born to him: Decimus 
Brutus, Mark Antony and some others were named as legatees 
in case one of the nephews was unable to inherit. A huge 
legacy was left to the people, 300 (according to another autho- 
rity, 120) sesterces to each individual and the vast gardens 
beyond the Tiber, with the artistic collections there gathered. 
Finally, in a codicil, Cesar adopted Caius Octavius as his son.t 

* See Cicero, A. XIV. xiv. 3, for the opinion of Atticus, which was 
certainly that of many other conservatives. 

{+ Plutarch, Brut. 20. 

+ Suetonius, Cas, 83; Vell. ii. $9; Liv. Pey. 116; Dion, xliv. 35 ; 


During the 17th, 18th and 19th, popular excitement seemed Mar. 19, 
to have died away, but the publication of this will stirred itto 44 8°: 
‘ : ‘ eis Effect upon 
extraordinary vigour.* Nor is the fact surprising. ‘The crowd the plebs. 
of artisans, freedmen and small shopkeepers, who led a hand 
to mouth existence in Rome, most of them without family 
cares, were never sure of food or lodging unless they could 
look to the public institutions to tide them over the difficulties 
of life: they had therefore very special and cogent reasons for 
excitement at such a will. To provide this plebs with the 
means of livelihood and amusement was henceforward an 
indispensable preliminary to assuring the peace of the world. 
The leaders of the popular party, especially Caesar and Clodius, 
had fully realised this fact and to meet the necessity both 
at their own expense and at that of the State, had emptied 
the public treasury, plunged Rome into dangerous wars and 
demoralised the republican institutions. Apprehension of 
these dangers and hatred of the popular party had induced 
the conservatives to oppose even the most necessary measures 
of relief, such as the organisation of collegia and the distribu- 
tions of corn. Hence, for the last twenty years these miserable 
galley slaves of the ship of State had been in receipt of inter- 
mittent relief, given sometimes with excessive lavishness, 
sometimes with niggard hand: they had come to regard the 
aristocrats as their natural enemies and the popular leaders, 
Clodius, Crassus, Pompey and Cesar as their protectors. 
Cesar had won the confidence of the mob by money, entertain- 
ments and great promises : of recent years he had been the only 
man able to restrain the anger and discontent of this plebs 
who were burning with animosity against the rich, poverty- 
stricken and galled by long-standing want and exasperated 
by the civil war. Their chief protector was now gone and 
the multitude found itself thrown upon its own resources, 

Plut. Gazs. 68; Brut. 20; App. B. C. ii, 143; Cic. Phil, ii, xliis 
1o9. According to Dion, xliv. 35, Augustus, perhaps in his memoirs, 
said that the legacy was 120sesterces, In the Mon, Anc, 3, 7, Augustus 
says, on the other hand, that he paid 300. Ihne, Rom. Gesch. vii, 
263, n., attempts to reconcile the two statements by supposing 
that Augustus paid 300 sesterces to indemnify the people for the 
teblut. (B7ut..20-, Dion) xliv, 35; App. B.C. ii, 143, 

Mar. 19-20, 
44 B.C. 

for the funeral, 


without leaders or other support than the feeble remnants 
of Clodius’ associations, which were now devoid of vigour or 
coherence. Hence it is easy to imagine the impression which 
Cezsar’s will made upon the people: they had been already 
stirred on the 16th by the intrigues of Antony and Lepidus 
and agitated throughout the following days by the colonists 
and veterans who had hastened to Rome to defend their rights. 
Never before had an aristocrat showered such wealth upon the 
people: apart from the magnificent gardens, there were 300 
sesterces for each individual, a small fortune considering the 
prevailing scarcity of money and a highly appreciated and 
opportune help. Thus the last act of Czsar’s life had been 
the infliction of an additional rebuke upon the oligarchy, 
whom the people accused of avarice and ferocity, who had 
killed Cesar as they had killed Clodius and the Gracchi, as 
they had proscribed Marius and persecuted every champion of 
the poor. The agitation fomented by Antony and Lepidus 
on the 16th swelled rapidly, with the special aid of the veterans : 
all bewailed the cowardly murder of Cesar at the hands of 
men whom he loved, as his will declared: all uttered curses 
upon his murderers and began to declare that the poor should 
attend the funeral of their great benefactor in a body and give 
him such a burial as Clodius had had.* 

The conservatives were not slow to take alarm and Antony 
found himself in a most perplexing situation. If popular 
excitement increased and riots broke out, how was he to steer 
a middle course between the popular and the conservative 
parties ? He therefore strove to reassure the conservatives 
by speeches and by expressions of the most respectful considera- 
tion for their interests during the proceedings of the Senate : 
he consulted the leading senators upon every occasion and did 
nothing without asking the Senate’s approval: he was able 
even to satisfy those senators who questioned him upon the 
subject of Czsar’s papers. He assured them that there was no 
reason for anxiety; the papers dealt with nothing of serious 
importance; no amnesties had been granted by them, and of 

* Plutarch, Brut. 20, points out that the chief reason for the dis- 
turbances at Casar’s funeral was the recollection of the funeral of 
Clodius, and the statement seems to me highly probable. 


the numerous exiles banished by the conservative party after 
the funeral of Clodius, one alone was recalled.* At the same 
time Antony was careful not to wound the feelings of Cesar’s 
relatives and friends, whose resentment increased as their 
fears diminished ; he allowed them to make such arrangements 
for the funeral as would produce a great demonstration of 
sympathy for the victim and of hatred for the murderers. 
The corpse was to be placed upon an ivory bier, covered with 
a purple pall embroidered with gold: at the head upon a 
trophy, would be placed the blood-stained toga in which he had 
been slain: magistrates of long standing would bear the body 
from the domus publica to the rostra where the eulogy would be 
delivered ; a vast procession composed of veterans, friends, 
freedmen and the people would then take the body and carry 
it to the Campus Martius, where it would be burned; those 
who were to carry the trophies of his campaigns would be sent 
beforehand to the Campus Martius in succession in order to 
shorten the procession: they would take their stand around 
the pyre and the body of the great captain would disappear 
surrounded by the trophies of his victories.f But who was 
to deliver the eulogy ? Czsar’s adopted son, Octavius, was 
in Macedonia ; the other heirs were men of no reputation and 
most of the secondary heirs had been involved in the conspiracy. 
Nor was it an easy matter to speak of Czsar before his murderers 
and his veterans, after the amnesty had been agreed upon. 
It was finally decided that this pious duty should be undertaken 
by Antony, as consul, friend, and secondary heir, and Antony, 
much against his will, was forced to consent, lest he should lose 
the approval of the popular party. However, the audacity 
of the veterans and of the mob steadily increased: many 
wealthy and peaceable citizens resolved to abandon Rome to 
the mob during the day of the funeral. This event soon became 
the dominating thought of every mind and every one expected 
some grand or terrible display when the day arrived (the nearest 
date that can be given is one of the days between March 
20-23). Antony was aware that it would be an exhausting 

* Cicero, Lyi. 1. i. 2—3. fT Suet., C@s, 84, 
t Cesar’s funeral could not have taken place before the 2oth, 
because the 19th was a day of fevi@ publice when funeral ceremonies 

Mar. 20-30, 
44 B.C. 

Mar. 20-30, 
44 B.C. 

The funeral. 


day for him: he had to deliver a eulogy under very difficult 
conditions and to repress undue disturbance without enraging 
the mob: the more conspicuous of the conspirators foresaw 
scenes of violence and fortified their houses; * the conserva- 
tives feared a revolution ; the mob were anticipating a glorious 
period of licence and a magnificent conflagration, at least 
equal to that which had been lighted for Clodius. 

At length this day of hopes and fears dawned upon Rome, 
The forum, the steps of the temples, the monuments and the 
neighbouring streets were speedily thronged by crowds of 
people and veterans : it was an excited crowd, ready for violence, 
moved by no definite purpose but that of burning Cesar’s 
body in some public building, as the body of Clodius had been 
burnt. Some considered the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus 
most suitable for this purpose; others preferred the Curia 
Pompeii. Czsar’s friends, however, gradually filled the 
domus publica, while without, between the domus publica and 
the rostra, those who were to form the procession were drawn 
up in such order as the narrow space permitted. It appears 
that Antony had stationed a small force hard by, though the 
spot is not precisely known. Eventually the ivory couch 
appeared in the forum, borne upon the shoulders of the friends, 
and the procession slowly advanced in much confusion, to the 
lamentations of the singers who repeated a verse of Accius, 
aptly chosen by the organisers of the ceremony, “ I saved those 
who have given me death.” ‘Thus the body was carried to 
the rostra, the remains of which the Roman archeologist 
Boni believes have been recently discovered.f The moment 
had come for Antony to mount the steps and speak. The 
consul showed much adroitness in evading this difficult task : 
he ordered the public crier to read the decree passed by the 
Senate at the beginning of the year, detailing the numerous 
and splendid honours awarded to Cesar and the form of oath 

could not be held. After the 20th any date is possible, but as Cesar 
was killed on the 15th, it is obvious that the 22nd or 23rd must be the 
latest day of burial. 

* Plutarch, Brut. 20. 

t But there are strong objections to the theory. See Vaglieri, Gli 
scavi rvecenti nel Foro romano, Rome, 1903, p. 152, ff. 


which the senators had undertaken to swear to the dictator, Mar. 20-30, 
He added a few words and left the rostra.* By thusemploying 44 8. 
the vefy terms in which the Senate had eulogised the dead 

man, he satisfied the popular party and gave the conservatives 

no pretext for dissatisfaction, as they had themselves approved 

these decrees some months previously. 

It had been arranged that upon the conclusion of the speech The outbreak 
the procession should reform and proceed to the Campus %"** 
Martius ; the magistrates therefore prepared to raise the bier. 

But at that moment some of the spectators began to shout, 
“To the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus! To the Curia 
Pompeii!” Answering shouts arose, the cries were taken up 
and soon all was noise and confusion; at length some one 
moved forward, others followed the example and speedily 
the whole crowd surged forward to the bier. The bearers 
and the escort offered resistance and a great tumult began: 
some one conceived the idea of building the funeral pyre in 
the forum itself, the people were driven back and pieces of 
wood were thrown into the space thus cleared. The crowd 
instantaneously grasped the nature of the plan: a rush was 
made across the forum in search of wood: benches, tables, 
chairs and anything combustible were carried off as material 
for the funeral pyre, which was speedily raised upon the spot 

* Suetonius, C@s. 84. ‘‘ Laudationis loco consul Antonius per 
preconem pronunciavit Senatus consultum, quo omnia et divina simul 
atque humana decreverat ; item jusjurandum, quo se cuncts pro salute 
unius adstyinxerant ; quibus perpauca a se verbis addidit.”’ Suetonius 
thus gives a version very different from that of other historians, who 
represent Antony as delivering a long speech against the murderers 
which was a direct incitement to the riots which followed. It is, 
however, certain that Suetonius and no other gives the true account. 
Cicero makes no allusion to a great inflammatory speech by Antony in his 
letters of this time: he refers to it only in his Philippics, that is, after 
Antony had definitely broken with the conspirators’ party. It is, 
moreover, highly improbable that Antony would have made a great 
speech at that moment: as consul he had more important matters 
to consider; nor could he possibly have given such clear provocation 
to the conspirators, at a time when he was anxious not to compromise 
himself with any party. In short, the disturbances which followed 
Czsar’s funeral were the result of long-standing political tension: 
when the conspirators’ party had broken with Antony, they accused 
him of provoking the riot by his speeches and intrigues. Such is the 
origin of this legend, which was greatly embellished by later historians 
and especially by Dion Cassius. 

Mar. 20-30, 
44 B.C. 


now marked by the remains of the Temple of Divus Julius. 
Many of those around Ceasar’s body retreated in apprehension 
of the temper of the rioters and the body was left in the hands 
of the mob, who carried it to the pyre: fire was applied, the 
flames rose and the people in wild frenzy began to hurl their 
property into them; the veterans cast in their weapons, the 
musicians their instruments and the rest their clothes.* Soon 
the body of the conqueror of Gaul disappeared in a vast con- 
flagration of fire and smoke, amid the shouts of the crowd 
which thronged the steps of the temples, climbing upon pillars 
and monuments to gain a sight of the spectacle. Excitement 
was increased by the success of these efforts, by the fire, the 
turmoil and the shouts; the funeral-pyre was not enough ; 
bands of rioters left the forum and marched to the houses of 
the conspirators with the object of setting them on fire. Those 
who remained, overcome by increasing frenzy, continued to 
feed the flames with wood. Alarmed by the progress of 
events, the magistrates and dignitaries retired precipitately : 
the consul was left at the head of a few soldiers to confront 
a riot which seemed to have spread from the forum throughout 
the city. Antony did not wish to repeat his mistake of the 
year 47 by using violent measures: he resolved, however, to 
prevent such destruction of buildings as had happened at the 
funeral of Clodius and eventually ordered his soldiers to seize 
certain refractory rioters and to hurl them from the Tarpeian 
rock.t ‘This severity intimidated the incendiaries to some 
extent: but at that moment furious bands were rushing to 
burn the houses of Brutus and Cassius and attempted to storm 
the doors, while the occupants of the neighbouring houses 
ran out among the crowd, begging them not to use fire, lest 
their houses should be destroyed with those of the conspirators.} 
With much difficulty these madmen were pacified and induced 
to disperse. One gang, however, happened to meet a tribune 
of the people, who, unfortunately for himself, bore the name 
of Cinna, the name of the praetor who had spoken against 

* Suet. C@s. 84 gives the best account of the funeral. Dion, xliv, 
50, gives important details. App. B. C, ii. 143-148 is full of inaccuracies. 
+ Dion, xliv. 50. t Appian, B.C. ii. 147. 


Cesar in the forum on the 16th. Mistaking the tribune for Mar. 20-30 
the pretor, the rioters tore him in pieces and carried his head 44 B.¢. 
on the point of a pike.* The funeral pyre continued to burn 
throughout the night, fed by the crowd which would not 

leave the forum,t and every quarter of the city was disturbed 

by outbursts of disorder and violence. 

The next day, Cesar’s freedmen came to seek the half-burned Disorder 
remains of the body among the ashes of the pyre ; | these were pepoeee ve 
piously collected and placed in the family tomb,§ the situation 
of which is unknown. ‘Thus Cesar reached his last resting- 
place after a life of toil and danger, of errors and successes, and 
after so tumultuous a funeral. The mob, however, was by no 
means satisfied ; its fury was stimulated by the rioting during 
the funeral and the night, by lack of restraint and by the sup- 
port of the veterans, whose irritation increased daily under the 
fear of losing their promised rewards. The day after the 
funeral, disorder reigned throughout the city, though without 
leaders or organisation, without unanimity of method or 
design. A second attempt was made to storm the houses of 
the conspirators ; || a vast crowd thronged to see the remnants 
of the funeral pyre and so general was the disturbance that the 
conspirators again deemed it more prudent to remain at home 
throughout the day. Antony, in pursuance of his policy 
to reassure the conservatives without provoking the popular 
party, issued a stringent edict, forbidding any one to wear arms 
except the soldiers ; {1 however, he took no serious steps to secure 
the enforcement of his orders. The riot therefore continued 
and assumed even greater proportions during the third and 
fourth days: the example of the citizens was followed by the 
foreigners, crowds of whom visited the spot where Cesar had 
been burned, to do homage in their own way: in particular, 
the Jews came in numbers to show their respect for the memory 
of the man who had defeated Pompey, the conqueror of 

* Concerning this Cinna, see Groebe, App. to Drumann, 12; Dp: 420; 
+ Appian, B,C. ii, 148. 

t Cicero, Phil. Il. xxxvi. 91, semustulatus tlle. 

§ Dion, xliv. 51. 

|| Appian, B.C. iii. 15. 

@ Dion, xliv. 51. 

Mar. 20-30, 

44 B.C, 

Perplexities of 
the situation, 


Palestine, and had granted them numerous privileges.* The 
conspirators waited in vain for an opportunity of leaving their 
houses in safety and what had seemed a temporary precaution 
now became forced confinement. Brutus, Cassius and the other 
conspirators who held magistracies were unable to appear 
in the forum to fulfil their duties and the public services were 
in many cases interrupted or suspended. By degrees every 
one began to realise the great perplexities of the situation. 
The leading members of the Cesarean party had made their 
fortunes t and wished only to be left in possession of what 
they had gained: their fears daily increased that they might 
see the conservatives recover their power in consequence of 
these disturbances, as had happened in the time of Saturninus 
and Catiline: yet they had not the courage to offer any 
resistance, as they were both ashamed and afraid to confront 
Czsar’s party, which was now identified with the lawless rioters. 
Nearly all of them continued to absent themselves from Rome : 
the members of the college which Cesar had formed for the 
annual celebration of the games of Victory could not venture 
to begin their celebrations.| Oppius asked Cicero for his 
support ;§ Hirtius himself seems to have gone away very 
hurriedly : || even Lepidus was bewildered. One day he feared 
that he might be assassinated like Cesar: the next day, under 
the entreaties of his wife Junia, the sister of Brutus, he wrote 
friendly letters to the leaders of the conspiracy./ Eventually 
Antony, in order not to lose his support, promised to secure 
his election as pontifex maximus, in place of Cesar.** 

Antony was thus left in isolation: he would not use repres- 
sive measures against the mob; he did not wish to be crushed 
by a rising of exasperated conservatives, as had happened to. 
Marius in the year 100. He therefore abandoned Rome to 
the rioters and the frenzied veterans and strove to win the 

* Suetonius, C@s. 84: 

t The wealth of Sallust was proverbial ; on that of Cornelius Balbus 
see Dion, xlviii. 32. 

{ Dion, xlv. 6; Suet. Aug. ro: § Cicero, F.. Xl ixxix. 2} 

|| After the notice of him in Nic. Dam. 27, we hear nothing of Hirtius 
until Cicero’s letter to Atticus XIV. xi, 2 (of April 12), when Hirtius 
seems to have been at Puteoli. 

{| See Cicero, A. XIV. viii. 1. ** Dion, xliv. 53, 


favour of the nobles, by gifts of flowers to men who needed Mar, 20-30, 
swords. In the Senate he supported a proposal advanced 44 8. 
by Servius Sulpicius, to annul all privileges and immunities 
granted by Cesar, unless these had been in force before March 
15 ; * he went further and himself proposed a senatus consultum 
declaring the permanent abolition of the dictatorship to the 
great delight of the conservatives, who thus thought twice 
to slay the slain.t But while the Cesarean party were thus 
afraid of the conservatives, the latter were no less agitated by 
the continuance of the riots. Forced confinement to their 
houses and long inaction destroyed the courage of the conspira- 
tors, especially of Brutus, who was a weak and impressionable 
character and had probably fallen by now from the heights of 
the enthusiasm which he displayed on the Ides of March to 
the depths of that depression in which we shall speedily find 
him. ‘The disturbances in the city intimidated a large number 
of people and made interviews and discussion impossible : 
the senatorial sessions were few and far between; all parties 
were waiting for the agitation to die away, when calmer action 
in all matters of urgency might be taken: however, the days 
went by and nothing was done. Dolabella feared to meet 
Cinna’s fate, doubtless in consequence of his treachery f and 
went into hiding. Cicero’s delight at the assassination and 
his subsequent excitement had now given way to impatience 
with these dilatory methods, although every party was attempt- 
ing to win his support. Numerous Cesareans even altered 
their wills in order to leave him some bequest and were careful 

pics 77. 1.01, 3 -  Ilxxxvi ore Dion, xliv, 53. It'should be 
said that the text of the senatus consultum is not identical in the two 
passages of Cicero ; and Dion does not help us to a knowledge of the 
exact text or the object of the measure, which is by no means clear. 

7 Cicero, Pm. I. i. 3; Il. xxxvi. 91; Liv. Per. 116, Historians 
have attempted to explain Antony’s action as a clever device to deceive 
and pacify the conservative party ; but it seems to me simpler and 
more probable to regard it as the effect of the disturbances which 
forced Antony, in doubt of his power to deal with them, to make 
further overtures to the conspirators, lest he should be suspected 
of supporting the rioters.. A passage in Cicero, Phil. II., xxxvi. 91, 
shows that these decrees were issued subsequently to Cesar’s 

t An inference from the fact that nothing more is heard of Dolabella 
until the end of April, 


Mar. 20-30, to inform him of their action.* In a word, the leading members 

44 B.C. 

Arrears of 

of either party were alike overcome by a sense of weariness, 
abandoning themselves to gloomy forebodings and selfish 
efforts to secure their property, while they concealed their 
fears beneath expressions of general disgust. “If Cesar, 
with all his genius, was unable to solve the difficulty, who else 
would be likely to succeed?”t These are the words of a 
loyal friend to the dictator. In any case there was a general 
opinion that a governmental cataclysm was at hand. It was 
said that the news of Czsar’s death would induce the Gauls 
to revolt,f the Gete to invade Macedonia § and the legions 
to mutiny in the provinces. 

Exasperation and despondency were general: in the uni- 
versal fear of some great disaster, men thought only of saving 
what they could from the imminent wreck of their fortunes : 
Antony, who was left to govern the republic alone, became 
the object of numberless visits, flatteries and prayers. Czesar’s 
death and the ratification of his measures had brought crowds 
of men to Rome; some had suffered material loss by their 
support of Pompey and they now attempted to secure indem- 
nity by intrigue with the restored conservative party and 
with the consul, who seemed inclined to listen. Others, and 
these were even more numerous, came to claim fulfilment of 
promises which Cesar had made to them: proof of their 
statements might be found among the papers which Antony 
held. Atticus, for instance, required the abolition of the 
colony of Buthrotum and appealed to the papers. ‘The repre- 
sentatives of Deiotarus, King of Galatia, and the citizens of 
Marseilles demanded the restitution of the territory which 

* Cicero, A. XIV., iii. z. Another passage, A. XIV. xiv. 5, shows 
that these were chiefly Cesareans. 

ft Cicero, A. XIV. i. 1. I/le is Matius, as is proved by Cicero, A., 
XIV. iii. 1. It should be noted that in the early days of April a devoted 
friend and a warm admirer of Casar admitted that Cesar himself 
exitum non repeytebat. 

pUCiceto, As 200Ve iy. taece oe ly weer Sy 

§ App. B. C, iii. 25, where the facts are given out of order, since 
it results from the narrative that the rumour of an invasion of the 
Get gradually spread almost at the moment when Antony proposed 
the senatus consultum concerning the dictatorship, that is, at the time 
when the other alarming rumours reported by Cicero were in circulation. 


Cesar had taken from them, because they had declared for 
Pompey. Sicilian ambassadors, who had already obtained 
Latin rights from Cesar, now required that the inhabitants 
of the island should be declared Roman citizens.* The mass 
of claims, demands and protests increased daily ; in the prevail- 
ing confusion the majority of the claimants were sent from one 
official to another and eventually found their way to Antony. 
Every one was entering claims, but no one was inclined to risk 
the smallest trouble or personal danger for the benefit of the 
republic: the governmental machinery, which had seemed 
to be in working order on the morning of the 17th, was 
completely deranged five or six days later. Antony worked 
single-handed and indefatigably from morning to night,t 
but was unable to cope with the mass of business before him, 
as no leading man would take the least initiative in the Senate 
and as the most urgent measures were neglected. Apparently 
no one had even thought of sending official information of 
Cezsar’s death and of the change of government to the provincial 
~ governors.{ Rumours of a Getic invasion of Macedonia seem, 
indeed, to have roused the Senate for a moment. Unable to 
leave the legions under the command of a pro-praetor in such a 
crisis, the Senate resolved to send a commission to Macedonia 
to study the situation ; meanwhile the army which Cesar had 
intended for the Parthian campaign was placed under the 
command of Antony, the consul, who was to be proconsul 
in Macedonia the following year.§ Thus, if the Getz should 

* It seems probable to me that Antony’s decrees upon this question 
during the second half of April were preceded by pourparlers which 
must have been held at this moment. 

+ Cicero, A. XIV. xiii. A. 1; a letter from Antony in which he refers 
to numerous occupationes which prevented him from seeing Cicero. 

ft See Cicero, F. X. xxxi. 4. 

§ App. B. C. iii. 25, which is partly confirmed by a statement 
made in the pseudo-speech of Calenus in Dion, xlvi. 24, I follow 
Appian’s version which states that this senatus consultum was passed 
at that moment, #.¢., after the senatus consultum upon the dictatorship. 
It seems to me impossible that there could be any such connection as 
historians have attempted to find between the current rumours about the 
Getz and the law which gave Gaul to Antony. In that case Antony 
would have been working against himself, for the fear of a Getic in- 
vasion of Macedonia would have been an excellent argument for the 
opponents of the law dealing with the Gauls. How could the legions 

II Cc 

Mar. 20-30, 
44 B.C, 


To April 10, invade the province, the consul would be able to take immediate 

44 B.C, 

from Rome. 

measures of defence. 

It was soon felt that this painful uncertainty could no longer 
be endured: towards the end of March Antony saw that the 
dissolution of the two parties was imminent. A large number 
of the conspirators fled one after another from Rome ; Decimus 
Brutus and Tullius Cimber went to their provinces,* rejoicing 
in so excellent a pretext for leaving the city. During the early 
days of April, many senators withdrew to their villas in Latium 
and on the bay of Naples: Cicero, the most important per- 
sonage in the Senate, also started for Puteoli on the 6th or 
7th. Contrary to the general expectation, there was to be no 
conservative reaction against the rioters on this occasion. 
The strength of the conservative party had been exhausted 
in the civil war by its losses of men and money and even 
more by the loss of that most precious possession, its self- 
confidence. ‘The Cesarean party was reduced equally low, 
for it now consisted merely of a band of rebels and infuriated 
veterans, without leaders or definite objects, spreading confusion 
through Rome. So true it is that Casar’s foundations were 
devoid of all permanence and that when he passed away he 
left the State as a great ruin tottering on the edge of a precipice. 
To crown these misfortunes, when the disturbances were at 
their height, on the 8th or 9th, the mob succeeded in finding 
a leader. This was Herophilus, the pretended nephew of 
Marius; he had been banished by Cesar, but had returned 
to Rome immediately after the assassination, built an altar 
on the spot where Czsar’s body was burned and collected a 
handful of adventurers : with these he went about Rome calling 
on the mob to avenge Ceasar and to kill Brutus and Cassius.t 
The agitation became so vehement that Brutus and Cassius 

be withdrawn from Macedonia, if the Geta were about to invade the 
province ? Yet this measure was carried out at a time when Antony 
had no views concerning Gaul. 

* App. B. C. iii. 2, a passage which must be corrected by Cicero, As 
XIV. x. 1, which shows that Trebonius started a little later at the 
same time as Brutus and Cassius. The fact that Decimus Brutus 
had reached his legions was known at Rome on April 19. See Cicero, 
An XLV eit. 2s 

{ Cicero, A. XIV. vi. 1; 

Liv. Pey. 116; Appian, B. C. iii. 3. 


had fortified their houses; at length they grew weary of con- To April 12, 
stant imprisonment and continual fear of attack and resolved 44 3-<- 
to leave Rome, if Antony would promise to gain the necessary 
leave of absence for Brutus. As pretor urbanus he was unable 
to leave the city for more than ten days without the special 
permission of the Senate. They therefore sent for Antony, 
who showed himself well disposed towards the leaders of the 
conspiracy and promised to perform their wishes: * before 
leaving Rome they made a further attempt to win over the 
most violent of the disaffected, namely the veterans. They 
issued an edict promising Czsar’s colonists relief from their 
obligation not to sell for a term of twenty years the grants 
of land which they had received.t ‘This measure was no more 
effectual than a bucket of water upon a lava-stream. The 
popular adoration of Cesar increased and actually degenerated 
into religious fanaticism. Among the Roman mob were many 
Orientals who were accustomed to worship kings as gods: 
during these days of madness their strange superstition infected 
_even the Romans, so that crowds came daily to the altar to 
_ make vows, offer sacrifice and settle disputes by taking oaths 
upon Cesar’s name:{ Cesar thus became a tutelary deity 
of the poor and wretched. The disturbances increased and 
affairs became so critical, that after four or five days, 
probably on April 11 or 12,§ Antony seized and executed 

* Cicero, A. XIV. vi. 1. Antonti conloquium cum heroibus nostris 
pro ve nata non incommodum: That the authorisation to be asked of 
the Senate was discussed during this conversation is a supposition 
rendered probable by the fact that Antony secured the authorisation 
shortly afterwards, as we shall see, 

+ Appian, B. C. iii. 2. t Suetonius, C@s. 85. 

Shiv. Per. 116: Appian, B.C. ii. 3; Cicero, Phik I. ii. §: 
The date as given, the twelfth, is arrived at as follows. According to 
Cicero, A. XIV. viii. 1, Cicero received a letter from Atticus at Sinuessa 
on the fifteenth, announcing the death of the false Marius, but making 
no reference to the departure of Brutus and Cassius from Rome, of 
which fact Atticus informed Cicero in a subsequent letter : see Cicero, 
A. XIV. x. 1; Brutus and Cassius did not, therefore, leave Rome 
until the false Marius had been put to death, that is, at least one day 
later. For Atticus, between the letter which Cicero answers in his 
8th, and that which he answers in his roth, had time to write another 
letter, to which Cicero replied in his 9th. On the other hand, it is 
clear (Cicero, A. XIV. vii. 1), that by the morning of the 15th Cicero 
had learnt from other sources that Brutus and Cassius had been seen 
at Lanuvium, which implies their departure from Rome on the 12th 


To April 12, Herophilus to prevent any more dangerous development of 

44 B.C, 

the situation. 

or 13th. See Ruete, Die Corvespondenz Cicevos in den Jahven 44 und 
43, Marburg, 1883, p. 18. Herophilus was therefore executed on the 
1ithor 12th. The 14th of April, the date assumed by Lange, Rémische 
Alterthiimer, Berlin, 1871, iii. 483, is too late. 


Brutus and Cassius flee from Rome—Cicero at Puteoli— 
Lucius Antonius and Fulvia—Antony’s change of front— 
First falsification of Cesar’s measures—The arrival of Caius 
Octavius—Brutus and Cassius in Campania—Antony collects 
the veterans—Brutus and Cassius at Lanuvium. 
Tue conservatives loudly praised the severity of Antony,” Flight of 
. : -, Brutus and 
who was congratulated by Brutus t on his action. ‘The respite Cassius from 
was, however, of short duration. Popular excitement increased ; Rome. 
demonstrations were made against the murderer of Hero- 
philus ; the mob went so far as to burn the shop of a sculptor 
where the heads of Czsar’s statues were being changed. Antony 
was obliged to use further severity, and such slaves or freed- 
men as he caught openly rioting were crucified or thrown 
from the Tarpeian Rock.t However, these measures proved 
ineffectual; the next day, April 13, Brutus and Cassius, 
weary of living in a state of continual fear, and unnerved by 
the inactivity and solitude to which they were condemned, 
left Rome for Lanuvium. Antony proceeded to make further 
overtures to the conservatives, as he saw the disturbances 
in Rome increasing ; he proposed that Brutus should be given 
leave of absence from Rome for a space of more than ten days.§ 
He also proposed that Lepidus should be commissioned to 
* Appian, B. C. iii. 3. } Cicero, A. XIV. viii, 1. 
t Appian, B. C. iii, 3 
§ Cicero, Phil. IJ. xiii. 31. This passage would seem to show 
that this authorisation was given before the Ludi Apollinares. This 
was before July, as the catalogue of favours granted by Antony to 
Brutus evidently runs in chronological order, It seems to me probable 
that the authorisation was given at that time, as Brutus was never 

charged with illegal absence. 


April 15-30, negotiate a peace with Sextus Pompeius, who was still all- 

44 B.C, 

The situation 
at Rome. 

powerful in Spain with his seven legions, and should offer him 
the possibility of a return to Rome,* He further pleased 
the conservative party by passing a senatus consultum to abrogate 
the election of the pontifex maximus by the people.t Lepidus 
was thereupon recognised as pontifex maximus by the College 
of Pontiffs. In spite of this, when Brutus and Cassius had gone, 
the exodus of the nobles became a precipitate flight, and the 
conspirators who remained secured one after another a safe 
retreat. Trebonius decided to start for his province, going 
thither unannounced and incognito, as he feared some violence 
from the mob.{ Cleopatra also fled from Rome, and Lepidus, 
after his election as pontifex maximus, went off to Gallia 
Narbonensis. Antony was almost the only leader remaining at 
Rome to observe the smokings and rumblings of the volcano 
which seemed to menace a frightful eruption. 

Great and unexpected had been the change during the last 
month, since the Ides of March. The project of a party 
reconciliation and the restoration of a reasonable republican 
government had utterly failed, and distrust and disorganisation 
reigned supreme. For a moment, indeed, this disorganisation, 
following a month of riot and disturbance, might bear an 
illusory appearance of calm, and induce the belief that peace 
was about to be restored. The conservatives who fled from 
Rome were hardly out of the city when they felt the relief 
of the traveller who reaches a mountain-summit and breathes 
a fresher and purer air after a day of overpowering heat. 

* Appian, B. C. iii. 4. The decision on the subject of the fleet 
was, however, taken at a much later date than he says, as we shall see. 

y+ Dion, xliv. 53, gives some ground for supposing that the election 
took place at that moment, but no information whatever upon the 
manner of its accomplishment. I do not think, as Lange supposes, 
that Antony proposed a law to the people. Evidently he did not 
wish to see the pontifex maximus elected by the Comitia, as he could 
not trust the attitude of the people. How then could he trust them 
to pass so reactionary a law as this? Moreover, if the suspension 
of election by the people had been approved by law, it would not 
have been possible afterwards to assert that the pontificate of Lepidus 
was illegal, See Mon. Anc. (Gr.) 6, t and 2. For these reasons I 
assume that a senatus consultum was passed. 

t Cicero, XIV. x. 1. Appian, B. C. iii. 6. 


In such little Italian towns as Lanuvium the working classes April 15-30, 
were by no means numerous and did not possess the collegia, 44 8-¢- 
the leaders, or the turbulent audacity which made the Roman 
mob both numerous and powerful; the wealthy landowners 
and rich merchants were almost entirely supporters of the 
party of order, that is, of the conservatives and conspirators, 
particularly at this moment, when a revolution at Rome was 
to be feared.* The conspirators, indeed, after the violent 
animosity to which they had been exposed at Rome, found 
themselves the objects in these towns of the respect and ad- 
miration which they desired, and were easily deluded into the 
belief that the danger was past. Brutus and Cassius themselves 
showed no great energy; they stopped at Lanuvium and 
confined themselves to sending a manifesto through all the 
municipia of Latium to the younger members of those families 
with whom they were connected by ties of relationship, friend- 
ship, and patronage, inviting them to form a kind of guard 
which would enable them to return to Rome.t ‘Trebonius, 
Decimus Brutus, and Tullius Cimber were travelling. The 
other conspirators and leading conservatives were scattered 
about in the villas and small towns. ‘They remained entirely 
inactive and did not even write. 

At Rome also popular excitement gradually died away Cicero at 
as the people found no objects remaining for their threats Pte! 
or persecution. The only man who gave any sign of life or 
activity was the old Cicero; after a pleasant journey of a week 
amid general acclamations he had reached “ his domains of 
Cumz and Puteoli!” ‘There he found numerous members 
of the high society of Rome and almost all the leaders of 
Cesar’s party, Balbus, Hirtius, and Pansa.[ He was, however, 
unable to enjoy the sunshine, the spring weather, and the 
flowers, by reason of his extraordinary agitation, which even 
at his age, and he was sixty-two, inspired him with all the 

* See Cicero, As XIV. vi. 2. Jullian, Les transformations politiques 
@ Italie, pp. 11-13, has shown with much detail that the wealthy classes 
in Italy were favourable to the conspirators throughout this crisis. 

+ A passage of Cicero, A, XIV. xviii. 4, shows that during the 
first half of May the friends of the conspirators were still hoping that 
Brutus and Cassius would return to Rome by June 1. 

t Cic, As XIV; xi, 2; F. IX. xiv. 1. 


April 15-30, enthusiasm and impetuosity of a young and inexperienced 

44 B.C. 

man. With indefatigable energy he maintained a large 
correspondence, paid visits, received his friends and admirers, 
hastily wrote a book upon Divination, and another upon 
Glory; he read Greek books and ordered others from Rome, 
made notes, looked into his private business, projected a large 
treatise upon Duty, which was to expound a theory for the 
moral and political restoration of the republic in a frame- 
work of Greek philosophy ; he discussed the political situation 
with everybody, both in private conversations and in letters. 
Now that the veterans were out of sight, he became the most 
furious, irreconcilable and fanatical of conservatives, retaining 
some prudence in public, but throwing off all restraint in his 
letters and conversation. He regretted that he had received 
no invitation to what he ferociously termed the “ magnificent 
banquet of the Ides of March”; he invariably referred to 
Brutus and Cassius in Greek style as “‘heroes;”* he 
would have liked to exterminate the riotous Roman mob 
to the last man; everywhere he saw the Cesarean party 
preparing fresh carnage and plunder ; t he suspected Antony 
of playing a double game and spoke of him as a “ reckless 
gamester ;” [| he lamented that Czsar’s murder had produced 
no effect and that the wishes of the Dictator were still obeyed. 
Finally, he continually urged the necessity for arms and money, 
asserting that the republic was going to ruin with its indolent 
magistrates, its rebellious veterans, and with numerous Cesa- 
reans in the State offices.§ He was infuriated by the sight of 
upstart landowners who had bought the property of his friends, 
and of Cesar’s centurions in the enjoyment of wealth ;]| he 
was angry that Brutus and Cassius should have gone into semi- 
exile,’ and strangely enough, he actually expressed his disgust 
with the legacies which Cesareans had left him.** From time 
to time, in depression and discouragement he thought of 

* Cic, A. XIV. iv. 2; XIV. vi. te 

fT Cic. A, XIV, iv. 1; XIV. xiii. 2) 

t Cic. A, XIV. v. 1; ab aleatore huppos modis. 

§ Cic, As XIV. iv. 2; XIV. v. 2; XIVe x, 1; XIV? xiii 1 

|| Cic, As XIV. vis 1; XIV: x. 2. » 4. Cic: As XIV. xi 4, 
ee Cic A. IV. dil, 25° RIV, sees, 


taking refuge in Greece.* But any trifle, the smallest scrap of 
good news or the least incident, was enough to change his temper 
and enable him to paint the future in more glowing colours. 
Upon such occasions things were going admirably; the 
legions were not in mutiny and Rome was not in revolt; t 
Antony was merely a harmless drunkard.{ Cicero however 
did nothing but talk and write; these outbursts, invectives, 
and exaggerations did not go beyond the little circle of his 
intimate friends, and in no way contributed to revive the fire 
of civil hatred. 

April 15-30, 
44 B.C. 

A superficial observer might have thought that the situation Lucius, 

Antonius and 

was improving. On the contrary, this apparent calm was Fulvia. 

merely the preparation for a decisive change in Antony’s 
political intentions. There is every reason to suppose that 
the constant changes of the past month had persuaded Antony 
that neither party was capable of governing the republic. 
He then found himself at the head of a mutilated government, 
deprived not only of many magistrates, but even of the pretor 
urbanus ; the members of his party had gone to the seaside, 
while his colleagues would not venture to appear in public ; 
the Senate was timorous and vacillating, and its ranks were daily 
thinned not only by fear but by the attractions of spring. 
Thus, when Antony found himself master of the republic 
which all others had abandoned, he speedily resolved upon 
a new change of front even more audacious than any of the 
various manceuvres by which he had succeeded in keeping touch 
with the stronger party throughout the preceding month. 
Two persons who had hitherto been insignificant seem to have 
worked on this occasion to overcome his last scruples; these 
were his wife, Fulvia, and his brother Lucius. It has constantly 
happened that great historical figures like Antony have been 
overcome by hesitation when about to stake their fortunes 
upon one supreme cast, and that they have decided to act, 
merely under the persuasion of lesser known and less intelligent 
characters, whose obscurity and ignorance had enabled them to 
preserve greater coolness and courage at a critical moment. 

* Cic. A. XIV. xiii. qu + Cic. A. XIV. ix. 3. 
t Cic. A. XIV. iii, 2. 


April 15-30, Such was Antony’s position at this moment. Lucius seems to 

44 B.C. 

change of 

have been a young man of very similar character to his brother, 
full of audacity and ambition, but less experienced and therefore 
less prudent. Fulvia, on the contrary, was one of those women 
who seem to be totally unsexed by the passion for power, 
a passion which merely accentuates the defects of such a cha- 
racter as hers. Self-willed, intriguing, avaricious, cruel, arbitrary 
and audacious, she had first been the wife of Clodius, then of 
Curio; both her character and her training had made her, 
so to speak, the stormy petrel of revolution; she had then 
married Antony, as if it had been her destiny to become the 
wife of every leading agitator in Rome in turn. She had 
soon gained that influence over him which such women in- 
pvariably exert upon violent, ill-balanced, and sensual characters. 
' Hence it is not surprising that in the last of these disturbances, 
something of the spirit of Clodius should have been aroused 
in her, and that she should have joined Lucius in the attempt 
to spur Antony onwards; she would not allow him to miss 
this opportunity of seizing a lofty and peculiar position in the 
State, as Cicero had done in §9.}/ Herophilus, by merely 
flattering the ardent desires of the veterans and the mob to 
avenge the death of Czsar, had been able to accomplish what 
every one had thought impossible a month before, and in a 
few days had driven the conservative party out of Rome at 
the moment when their grasp of the republic was generally 
thought secure. It is not likely that such a man as Antony 
would fail in the easier enterprise of reintroducing to the 
republic those who had formerly occupied the chief positions 
in it. 

Moreover, by a piece of good fortune, one of his brothers, 
Caius, was now pretor, while the other, Lucius, was tribune. 
It was impossible to follow Czsar’s example and to use the 
proletariat societies to overpower the republic. These 
associations were now too weak; but the veterans provided 
far more effective support. ‘They were a numerous and 
resolute body, exasperated with the murderers of their general, 
and afraid of losing their rewards; they had in large measure 
been responsible for the disturbances of the preceding month, 


and for the consequent rout of the conservative party. If April 15-30, 
Antony would appear as Cesar’s executor and possibly as his 44 Bc. 
avenger, he would be certain to secure the general support of 

the veterans. Rome was not indeed the empire, nor did 
possession of the metropolis imply possession of the pro- 

vinces. But rumours were now in circulation calculated both 

to intimidate the conservatives and to encourage Antony 

and his counsellors; it was reported that the armies of the 
provinces, in a fury at the death of Caesar, were upon the point 

of mutiny. /Encouraged by the persuasions of Fulvia and 

Lucius, by his own ambition, and by the course of events, 

Antony speedily resolved about the middle of April, if not 

upon an open and entire change of policy, at any rate upon a 

series of manceuvres which are apparently confused and contra- 

dictory, but which become entirely clear when we assume 

him to have entertained these designs; he did not propose 

to continue Cesar’s dictatorship, which had latterly been 

almost monarchical, but to imitate, as far as he could, his first 

of power “than a mere consul couldcommand. To the prose- 
cution of these designs he brought, however, a measure of 
prudence, which shows that he was not so certain of success 
as his advisers, and that he did not consider the conservative 
party definitely overthrown. 

Between April 15 and 20 the conservative party observed The first 
the first indications of the change. A speech was addressed fongeiies. 
to the people by the consul in sis Bees was made to 
Cesar as “the most noble citizen”;* then two strange 
documents ‘were said to have been Pond among Cesar’s 
papers about the 18th of the month. One of these granted 
the rights of citizenship to the Sicilians, and the other restored 
to Deiotarus the possessions which Cesar had taken from him. 

No great penetration was required to conjecture that these docu- 
ments were forgeries. Did Antony suppose that any one would 
believe in Czsar’s wish to restore what he had taken from 
Deiotarus, the faithful friend of Pompey ? The fact was that 

er Cic. A. XIV. xi. 1: XV. xx. 2. Regarding this speech, see 
Greebe, App. to Drumann I?, p. 417 ff. 


April 15-30, to follow the methods of Cesar’s first consulship a large 

44 B.C. 

Arrival of 

amount of money was required; to procure this sum, Antony 
had eventually yielded to the solicitations of Fulvia, had 
induced Faberius, Czsar’s secretary, to forge these two docu- 
ments, and had received in exchange a large sum of money 
from the Sicilians and from the representatives of the King 
of Galatia. These latter seem to have given him a syngrapha, 
a bond in modern parlance, for ten millions of sesterces on the 
King’s treasury.* The imposture was so flagrant that Cicero 
was astounded when the news reached him at Puteoli,t while 
at Rome the senators immediately resolved that Czsar’s 
papers should be no longer left in the sole charge of Antony, 
but should be handed over to two consuls assisted by a com- 
mission, and that nothing further should be issued until 
June 1 when the Senate could resume its sessions and thus 
keep an eye upon the commission: f in short, Cesar’s papers 
were not to be touched during the vacation. 

However, on the Bay of Naples, where Rome was spending 
the vacation, the impression produced by this news had been 
somewhat diminished by the arrival of Caius Octavius, the 
adopted son of Cesar, a young man not yet nineteen years 
of age. As soon as he heard at Apollonia of the events of the 
Ides of March, he had contemplated for a moment the possibility 
of raising the legions of Macedonia in revolt ; then abandoning 
this project, he had started for Italy. Upon disembarking at 
Lupiz, he heard of Cesar’s will and of his own nomination as 
adopted son. He had immediately gone to Brundisium, and 
from thence to Rome, accompanied by certain young friends 

* Cics As XIV. xis 1; Cic. Phil, Il. xxxvii. 93 ff 

7 Cic. As XIV. xii. 1, 

t Cic, A. XVIv xvi. 11; Cic, Phsl. Il. xxxix, 100> Dion, xliv. §34 
T cannot agree with Groebe, App. to Drumann I’, p. 423, that this 
senatus consultum had been already issued in March. The motive for 
it is then by no means obvious, nor is there any explanation of the fact 
that the commission was to begin its functions on June 1. The cir- 
cumstance can only be explained upon the supposition that the law 
was approved by the Senate during the days immediately preceding 
the vacation, and was an attempt to prevent abuses which might easily 
have been committed during the vacation of the Senate. Hence it 
seems to me probable that the senatus consulium should be placed at 
this time, and it should be regarded as a reaction against Antony’s 
first abuses. 


whom Cesar had sent with him to Apollonia, including a cer- April 15-30 
tain Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, and Quintus Salvidienus Rufus, 44 8-c- 
both of obscure origin.* Everybody was naturally curious to 
see Cesar’s heir, and to learn his intentions. As Czsar’s 
son, tradition would oblige him to prosecute his father’s 
murderers ; on the other hand, the amnesty of March 17 for- 
bade any action of the kind. Was the young man inclined to 
accept the legacy and the name of the dictator? Did he under- 
stand the serious obligations which the amnesty laid upon him ? 
Octavius reached Naples on April 18 and declared in a conversa- 
tion with Balbus that he accepted the inheritance ;t he went 
to Puteoli to see his father-in-law, Lucius Marcius Philippus 
and Cicero; he had already seen the latter at Rome on several 
occasions, and now showed him marked courtesy.{ He either 
avoided the subject of the amnesty or referred to it with the 
greatest tact. But though the young man produced a good 
impression upon Cicero, a deplorable effect was made by the 
suite which he had collected during his journey; this was 
composed of a band of colonists and genuine or pretended freed- 
men of Cesar, who displayed much discontent with Antony 
because he did not avenge the dictator, and urged Octavius 
to advance, appealing to him continually with the title of 
Cesar, as if the name was already an object of adoration. On 
the other hand, Cicero and his father-in-law confined them- 
selves to the use of the name Octavius.§ His father-in-law 
even advised him not to accept so dangerous an inheritance.|| 

Octavius, however, did not delay at the Bay of Naples, Cicero's 

* Nic. Dam. 17-18; Appian, B.C. III. ix.11; Dion, xlv. 3; Velleius 
ii. 59. The stories of the offers which the legions of Macedonia 
are said to have made to induce him to lead them, seem to me to 
be exaggerations fabricated in order to show his moderation. I regard 
as more probable the version of Suetonius, Aug. 8, which states that 
Octavius did not venture to rouse the legions in revolt: consilium 
ut preceps immaturumque omisit. 

facics Ax XIV..x. 3. 

RECIC Avex UY. Xd, 23 SIV. xii. 2. 

§ Cic. A. XIV. xii. 2; Appian, B. C. ili. 12. 

| Nic. Dam. 18 ; Suetonius, Aug.8; Appian, B. C. ili. 13. Cicero’s 
letters prove that Philippus was then at Puteoli; hence we may 
conclude that this advice was given to Octavius at Puteoli, and not 
at Rome, as writers say. At Rome Octavius found his mother. 

44 B.C. 


but continued his road to Rome, leaving Cicero to his books, 
to his changeable temper, and to the surprises which came to 
him from Rome. On April 19, Atticus had delighted him with 
a piece of good news; Decimus Brutus had been at once recog- 
nised as general by the legions upon his arrival in Cisalpine 
Gaul. Thus the rumour that the soldiers were about to 
mutiny against the conspirators was false. If Sextus Pompeius 
declined to make peace as Atticus expected, the conservatives 
would have two powerful armies at their disposal.* Another 
surprise of a very different nature reached Cicero at the same 
time; Antony wrote him a very friendly letter, asking if he 
would authorise the execution of a measure on which Cesar 
had decided, recalling from exile Sextus Clodius, the client of 
the Clodius after whose funeral he had been condemned.t The 
fact was that Antony had once again yielded to Fulvia, who 
wished for the pardon of her first husband’s friend ; at the same 
time he had thought it well to write this letter, lest for such a 
trifle he should rouse the anger of the old and powerful enemy 
of Clodius. Cicero was greatly astonished by this request that 
he would arbitrate upon a measure of Czsar’s, which, if genuine, 
only required to be put into force ; though he might very well 
have learnt from Hirtius, Balbus, and Pansa that Cesar had 
never contemplated this recall,t he graciously replied that he 
had no objection to offer.§ He also was not anxious to quarrel 
about atrifle. At that moment Atticus was in great perplexity, 
for Cnacus Plancus, who had been commissioned by Cesar to 
found a colony at Buthrotum, was already starting. Atticus 
requested Cicero to plead his cause with Antony, and Cicero 
could not neglect so excellent an opportunity of obliging a 
man who had done him such numerous and important services. 
Thus he was forced to respect the consul’s feelings. However, 
towards April 27, Atticus sent him more serious news ; not only 
was Antony taking great sums from the public treasury laid up 
in the Temple of Ops and referring to pretended decrees of 
the Dictator as his authority, but a rumour was abroad that 
upon June 1 when the Senate reopened, he would demand 

* Cic. A: XIV. xiii. 2. Tt Cic, A. XIV; xiii. 
Tt Cie, A. XIV. xiv. 2. § Cic. A. XIV, xiii. By 


Cisalpine Gaul and Gallia Comata, in exchange for Macedonia, _ April, 
and the prolongation of his and of Dolabella’s pro-consulship.* 44 8.¢. 

Cicero once more deplored the fact that Casar’s murder 
had led to so little result; he was convinced that without Antony's 
arms and supported only by legal fictions, nothing could be pair 
‘done; he abandoned his proposed journey to Greece and 
wrote to Atticus stating that he would be at Rome on June 1, 
if Antony made no objection.t He thought that Antony 
would alter his demands before the Senate. Antony and 
Fulvia, however, were working for very different ends. During 
Cesar’s lifetime, Antony had been satisfied with the province 
of Macedonia for two years; but, like Cesar in his first consul- 
ship, he was now anxious to secure a longer term of administra- 
tion in a larger province, and had marked as his own these 
provinces of Gaul which had formerly fallen to Cesar, and 
which he had learnt to know very well during the long years 
of military service which he had passed in them. In other 
words, he wished the people to approve a new lex Vatinia de 
provincia Cesaris. It was necessary first, however, to discover 
some method of organising the veterans as Cesar had organised 
the people in 59, that their services might be more easily 
available for elections or forcible measures; their numbers 
must also be increased, as those who had come to Rome 
spontaneously were too few. Hence he must now take into 
his pay those veterans whom Cesar had wished to settle in the 
colonies of Southern Italy and especially in Campania. These 
men, who were now waiting for their promised estates, must 
be brought to Rome and enlisted in some kind of military 
organisation with those who were on the spot. Antony further 
resolved to visit Southern Italy in person, and started probably 
on April 24 or 25 after the concluding session of the Senate.f{ 

This journey aroused general astonishment; even Cicero Antony's 
was surprised. No one could understand Antony’s object, Peat hee 
or the purpose of these movements. It was clear that the 
welfare or the service of the republic was not his aim.§ 

* Cic. A. XIV. xiv. I-5. 

+ Cic. A. XIV. xiv. 4-6. 

£ See Groebe, App. to Drumann, G. R. I’, p. 427; 
S7@ic. Ay SIV. Xvily A 

44 B.C. 


Atticus wrote that henceforward prudence was of no account, 
and that all depended upon chance ; * however, in his own 
business dealings he did not trust solely to chance, but at- 
tempted to turn Antony’s journey to his own advantage, and 
wrote to Cicero asking him to meet the consul and speak to 
him upon the burning question of Buthrotum. Shortly 
afterwards, however, Antony and his journey were completely 
forgotten, as Dolabella profited by the absence of his colleague 
to emerge from his retirement and make an uproarious return 
to public life. On April 26 or 27 he appeared in the forum 
with a band of armed men, pulled down the famous altar which 
Herophilus had built, killed a large number of rioters, and gave 
orders that the place should be repaved. ‘The conservatives 
were well satisfied with this action, and Cicero also wrote a most 
congratulatory letter to the “marvellous Dolabella,” for- 
getting for the moment that this individual had shortly before 
robbed the State treasury of a considerable sum, by means 
of forged documents in Czsar’s name,t and that he still owed 
him the portion of Tullia’s dowry which was payable in January. 
He also wrote a letter to Cassius in which he made no mention 
of Antony, but stated that the situation was improving, that 
they need only pluck up courage, and should not leave half- 
performed the enterprise begun upon the Ides of March.t But 
while Cicero was thus delighted by this small success, Antony, 
before beginning to recruit his veterans, had written to Brutus 
and Cassius requesting them politely but firmly to stop the 
recruiting of the friends whom they were attempting to collect 
as an escort for their return to Rome.§ Antony was in no way 
to blame for the departure of Brutus and Cassius from Rome ; 
before his change of policy, their departure on April 13 had 
certainly caused him much trouble, as it increased his responsi- 
bility ; but at the present moment their absence was necessary 

* Cic, A. XIV. xviie ee 

JT Cic. A. XIV. xv. 2-3. (This letter begins with §2 and the words 
O mirificum Dolabella ; the first paragraph is obviously a post-script 
to the preceding letter.) Cic. A. XIV. xvii. A. Dolabella’s action 
must have taken place on April 26 or 27, as Cicero knew of it on May 1, 
A; XIV. xv. 4. 

{ Cic. F. xii. 1, written on May 3, as has been proved by Ruete, 
Die Correspondenz Ciceros in den Jahren 44 und 43, Marburg, 1883, p. 20. 

§ Cic, F, xi, 2. 


for his own designs, and he did not wish them to return. Then 
he proceeded to collect the veterans in Campania, frightening 
them with the announcement that Casar’s decisions would be 
annulled if they were not careful.* He declared that he was 
ready to support them in any attempt to secure the performance 
of Czsar’s promises and in proof of his zeal he busied himself 
with the foundation of a new colony at Casilinum where Cesar 
had previously founded a colony. He offered money to those 
whom he could not immediately provide with land in Cam- 
pania on condition that they would come with him to Rome, 
and support him in his defence of Casar’s measures; they 
were to bring their weapons with them, to promise ready 
service, and to submit to an inspection every month by two 
inspectors who would see that they were keeping their promise.t 

May I-10, 
44 B.C. 

Brutus and Cassius, on the other hand, had yielded to the Brutus and 

consul’s request and had published an edict to the effect 
that they dismissed their friends of their own free will.t In 
reality they had not ventured to resist Antony by continuing 

attempts at recruiting which were extremely difficult, as the 

Italian middle classes, though conservative and republican 
in feeling, were very apathetic. Moreover, though Cassius 
was a far-sighted, resolute and energetic character, his friend 
was more fitted for study than for revolution. His vacillation 

* In my account of Antony’s proceedings in Campania, I have 
passed over all the accusations brought against him by Cicero in his 
Second Philippic, accusations which are obviously so exaggerated 
that in the absence of other documentary evidence it is impossible 
to extract from them any measure of truth. 

+ Cicero, A. XIV. xxi. 2. In this passage I follow the emendation 
of Lambinus which seems to me very happy, ut “arma” omnes haberent. 
The reading ut‘ vata’? omnes makes no sense. The reading proposed 
by Schmidt, Rh. Mus. I. ili. p. 223, ut ‘ rata omnia’’ haberent seems to 
me impossible. It is probable that the veterans had sworn to observe 
all Cesar’s arrangements, but it seems ridiculous that they should 
have appointed two commissioners to inspect Cesar’s papers every 
month. Such continual oversight of Casar’s archives was not neces- 
sary; on the other hand with ‘“‘avma”’ the sense is quite clear; 
Antony was anxious that the veterans should have their weapons 
ready in any case, but as he could only bring them to Rome as private 
individuals, and could not subject them to the military oath, he thought 
it advisable to have the dwumviri to see that they carried out their 
part of the bargain, to be ready with their weapons in any emergency. 

t Cic. F. XI. ii. 1. The edictum in question is certainly that to 
which Cicero refers in A, XIV. xx. 4; 

Ill QD 

Cassius at 


May 10-20, and want of nerve continually hampered his associates, and in a 

44 B.C, 


fit of depression he would abandon an enterprise when it had 
hardly been begun. He asked advice of everybody, including 
his wife and his mother, and to the counsel of the latter he paid 
particular respect, a fact which greatly irritated Cicero, who 
would not trust Servilia, the old-time friend of Czsar.* At 
this moment Brutus was so despondent that Cicero received a 
letter from him in answer to one written to Cassius on May 
3, in which Brutus told him that he was ready to go into exile.T 
With such a colleague the efforts of Cassius were wholly futile, 
and the conservative party remained without a leader. Their 
consternation was correspondingly increased towards May 7 
or 8 { when they learnt of Antony’s proceedings in Campania, 
and the transitory delight which Dolabella’s attempt had 
inspired disappeared entirely. If Antony succeeded in gather- 
ing a large number of these veterans, who might accuse him of 
indifference in the cause of vengeance, and demand the death 
of Czsar’s murderers, he would necessarily wish to annul the 

This news produced a general panic at Rome which spread 
from Latium as far as Naples. Servius Sulpicius left Rome, 
telling Atticus that the situation was now desperate. Cicero 
was also panic-stricken, and once more contemplated the 
advisability of a journey to Greece ; his correspondence, which 
might have been opened in transit, became more cautious, 
and he confined himself to vague allusions to Antony’s actions, 
but he would not see him, and wrote to Atticus saying that he 

* Cic. As XVu x: 16 yy Cie AL XIV. xaxe ae 

+ On May 3, when he wrote the letter to Cassius, F. XII. i, Cicero 
did not know that Antony was recruiting; in his catalogue of the 
misfortunes of the republic in §1, he makes no allusion to the recruits, 
not even in the somewhat vague phrase which he uses further on; 
arma ad cedem parantuy, On the contrary, in A. XIV. xix. Cicero 
says that Brutus is thinking of retiring into exile, that he himself 
longs for death, that Atticus thinks civil war probable (§1), that Servius 
was terrified and that perterriti omnes sumus (§4). In A. XIV. xviii. 
3, he says that Servius has left Rome in despair; in A. XIV. xviii. 4, 
he says that he himself would like to go to Greece. That this alarm 
was caused by the recruiting of the veterans is certain, and the re- 
cruiting was therefore known at that time. The nineteenth letter 

was written about May 8 and the eighteenth letter about May 9. See 
Ruete, Die Correspondenz Cicero’s, p. 8. 


had never been able to meet him.* ‘Old age is making me 
peevish ; life is a burden to me, but fortunately draws to its 
close,” t he wrote to Atticus. Dolabella made a fierce reply 
to the “ frightful speeches” of Lucius Antonius,t who was 
paving the way at Rome for his brother’s new policy, but he 
was the sole opponent; the rest of the party, and especially 
the leading Cesareans who had hitherto left Antony to himself 
now made overtures of friendship, thus playing a double game 
which disgusted Cicero. Pansa disapproved of Antony’s 
conduct in the affairs of Deiotarus and Sextus Clodius, but he 
also disliked Dolabella, who had ordered the destruction of 
Cesar’s altar.§ Balbus had no sooner heard of Antony’s 
enlistments than he hastened to Cicero in extreme anxiety to 
gain information and to complain of the unjust hatred which 
the conservative party cherished for himself; but he had been 
unwilling to break with Antony, at any rate, as openly as 
Cicero would have liked.|| Hirtius had once more become 
a declared Cesarean, and asserted that all these measures were 
- necessary, because the conservatives would have annulled 
all Cesar’s decisions if they had returned to power. He 
admitted that Antony’s enlistments constituted a danger to 
the public peace, but not more so than those of Brutus and 
Cassius.** Cicero continued to blame everybody, and to declare 
that civil war was imminent; at the same time he lent a 
ready ear to certain disquieting rumours; the veterans were 
marching upon Rome to restore the altar which Dolabella 
had destroyed, and it would be very inadvisable for himself, 
for the conspirators, and for the leading conservatives to be 
present at the opening of the Senate on June 1, unless they 

were prepared to go at the risk of their Atticus went 

* Cicero constantly writes (A: XIV. xvii. 2; XIV. xx.2; XV.i. 2] 
to Atticus saying that he has been unable to meet Antony because 
of the consul’s early departure. It may be assumed that he was by 
no means anxious for the meeting, and thus attempts to hide his 
reluctance from his friend. 

fT Cic. A. XIV. xxi, 3. t Cics A. XIV, xx. 2: 

Su@icw A, XIV xix: 2, || Cie. Az XIV, xxi. 2: 

q Cic. As XIV. xxii. 1. The meus discipulus is certainly Hirtius 
as is shown by Cic. F. XI; xvi. 7. 

Pe CIGD ALLAN 1, 3¢ TT Cic, A. XIV. xxii, 2, 

May 10-20, 
44 B.C, 


May 10-20, so far as to write on March 18 declaring that for the safety of 

44 B.C, 

the republic the senatus consultum ultimum and a state of siege 
must be proclaimed, as in 49 before the Civil War.* 

However, Antony returned to Rome on May 19 or 20f 
bringing with him a final band of veterans apart from the 
thousands whom he had sent in advance;{ but at Rome he 
found Caius Octavius already at work and waiting for him. 

* Cic. A: XV. itis 1 

t+ The passage in Cicero, A. XII. iii. 1, 2, shows that Atticus sent 
him two letters, one on May 18, the other on May 21. There is no 
reference to Antony in the first but there is in the second, as may be 
seen by the brevity of the reply. Atticus was describing how Antony 
had been welcomed by public opinion on his return (Antonio, quoniam 
male est, volo pejus esse). The passage in Cicero, A. XV. iv. 1, shows 
that Atticus wrote to him on May 22 or 23, telling him of Antony’s 
actions and intrigues at Rome; hence we may conclude that Antony 
returned to Rome on May 19 or 20. 

t Agmine quadrato, says Cicero, Phil. II, xlii. 108, with habitual 


The disorganisation of Italian society—Class antagonism— 

Cicero’s financial position in 44 B.c.—Antony’s return to Rome 

—tThe first interview between Antony and Octavianus—The 

last ten days of May—The senatorial session of June 1—The 

“lex de provinciis’’? approved on June 2—The meeting at 

Carus Octavius was not yet nineteen years of age. It is Character of 
difficult to say how far the fragmentary information which has 0*t4¥i¥s- 
reached us of his character and habits at this time may be 
correct. His actions, however, induce us to suppose that 
this favourite of Cesar was not only a young man of keen 
intelligence, but also one of those vewreoq, as Cicero called 
them with complete disdain, one of the young men who 
affected a general scorn of old Roman tradition and an admira- 
tion for foreign manners and customs. Favoured by the most 
powerful man in Rome, given patrician rank and high office, 
even that of magister equitum, the young man might well 
have conceived lofty aims and have grown to consider many 
matters as easy and trivial, the difficulty and importance of 
which he could only learn by time and experience. 

Octavius had arrived at Rome most opportunely. The His action 
conspirators had fled, the most eminent senators were away, "?" wishes 
the Senate was in vacation, the conservative party had practi- 
cally disappeared, and the veterans and the plebs, satisfied 
with their triumph and somewhat pacified thereby, were the 
masters of Rome. As he arrived during this short interval of 
peace and satisfaction, Czsar’s son was joyfully welcomed by 

all who had demonstrated against the conspirators, by Antony’s 

44 B.C. 


two brothers, who wished to curry favour with the veterans, 
and by the people who had been expecting the dictator’s 
heir for some time as the man who was to pay each one of them 
the three hundred sesterces of Czsar’s legacy. At last the 
money would be forthcoming. The advice of his father-in- 
law, though repeated to him at Rome by his mother, had not 
shaken the resolution of Octavius.* He lost no time in appear- 
ing everywhere as Czsar’s son; one morning he came before 
the pretor, Caius Antonius, with a large following of friends 
to declare his acceptance of the legacy and the adoption ;t 
without waiting for the formalities of adoption, he assumed the 
name of Caius Julius Cesar Octavianus (we shall henceforward 
call him Octavianus to avoid confusion between the father and 
his adopted son) ; he also desired to address the people. He 
held no office, but as he was to pay the three hundred sesterces 
to all the plebeians, Lucius Antonius had readily consented 
as tribune to present him to the people. Octavianus made a 
speech in which, without alluding to the amnesty, he exalted 
the memory of the dictator and declared that he would pay 
Cesar’s legacies without delay, and that he would immediately 
take in hand the preparations for the games in honour of 
Czsar’s victories to be held in the month of July; this was his 
duty, as a member of the College responsible for the celebration 
of these games.[ Atticus and Cicero seem to have been vexed 
by the lack of allusion to the amnesty.§ But the speech, 
on the other hand, caused the utmost satisfaction to the mob. 
At last the three hundred sesterces were to be paid down. 
For this purpose ready money was necessary. Octavianus hada 
fortune of his own, for his grandfather, as we have said, had been 
a rich usurer of Velletri, and Czsar’s will gave him possession 
of three-quarters of the huge fortune which the dictator had 
accumulated in recent years by means of the plunder of the 

* Appian, B. C. iii, 13; Suetonius, Aug. 8; Dion, xlv. 3, 

+ Appian, B. C. iii. 14: 

t Dion, xlv. 6. He is, however, mistaken in the name of the 
tribune and confuses this with later occurrences which we shall notice 
below. The tribune who presented Octavianus was Lucius Antonius, 
as is proved by a passage in Cicero, Av XIV. xx. 5. 

§ Cic. A. XV, ii. 3. 


civil wars. This fortune probably included a large number 
of houses in Rome, vast estates in Italy, and perhaps more 
valuable still, numbers of slaves and freed-men, as the rights 
of their master passed to his heir. But the only ready money 
which Cesar had left was the hundred millions of sesterces 
which Calpurnia had handed to Antony. Octavianus was 
therefore obliged to await Antony’s return in order to ask 
him for the money 

44 B.C. 

The satisfaction, however, with which Octavianus had been Strained 

received could not be of long duration. The struggle between 
the conservatives and the popular party had diminished in 
intensity since the flight of the conspirators, but suspicions 
and animosities had been revived by the recent tumults, and 
were soon to restore the former state of tension. The arrival 
of large numbers of veterans with many litter-loads of weapons * 
and the plundering of the public treasury roused the anger of 
the conservatives; the good feeling towards Antony, which 
they had entertained after March 17, now became animosity 
increasingly violent and bitter.t Others, again, especially 
the numerous relatives and clients of the conspirators, had been 
exasperated by the initial action of Octavianus, and feared that 
he would not respect the amnesty. Thus, even during these 
days of comparative calm, events followed each other in rapid 
succession. One day Dolabella appeared in the theatre after 
the destruction of the altar, and was saluted by enthusiastic 
acclamations from the upper classes ; { another day Octavianus 
appeared at certain games which the edile Critonius seems to 
have given a month later than was intended owing to the 
disturbances of the month of April; he then wished to bring 
Czsar’s golden chair, but was prevented by some tribunes, 
amid the applause of the senators and the knights.§_ In short, 

* Cic. Phil. II. xlii. 108. Scutorum lecticas portart videmus.* 

+ Cicero, A. XV. iii. 2, replying to a letter of Atticus of May 21, 
which informed him of Antony’s return, says Antonio quam est (or, 
as emended, male quoniam est), volo pejus esse. It seems to me that 
these words allude to the general ill-feeling for Antony of which Atticus 
had spoken in a letter. t Cie. Pyila tl. xi, 30. 

§ From the passage in Cicero, A. XV. iii. 2 (de sella C@saris bene 

wibuni .. .), we may assume that during the last third of May before 
Antony’s return, or after his return and before his legal disputes with 


44 B.C. 



the situation was now so strained that though temporary 
intervals of peace might be possible, any prospect of a final 
pacification was out of the question. 

The oligarchy, now supreme in the great republic, was 
composed of two hostile groups ; one of these was discontented 
with its share of the booty, while the other was disturbed by 
the continual clamour of the malcontents ; both were suspicious 
and ready for violent action; they were restrained merely 
by mutual fear and by a kind of malicious fanaticism, which 
induced them to interchange accusations and to regard one 
another as capable of the basest measures. The first group 
included the remnants of the small landholders from such 
districts as Apulia, who still farmed their lands by their own 
labour in the manner of the legendary Cincinnatus, the last 
representatives of a bygone age; * it included also the free 
labourers from the country who were hired for the vintage, 
for the harvest, or for unhealthy occupations.t To these 
must be added the peasants, the colont, or small farmers who 
cultivated the lands of others in different districts on a system 
of lease not unlike the modern metayer system ; t the poverty- 
stricken proletariate, capite censi, who lived at Rome and in the 
small towns by intrigues, shop-keeping or beggary, and included 
obscure victims of the Roman conquest and miserable freedmen 
of every nationality and every language. ‘These were amalga- 
mated with the residuum of the victorious nationality which had 
provided Cesar with military power and votes for the comitia. 

Octavianus, an incident respecting Cesar’s chair and certain tribunes of 
the people took place. To this Appian, iii, 28, may allude, when he 
speaks of the games of Critonius in honour of Ceres. This does not 
seem to me an improbable explanation, although these games should 
have been celebrated between April 12 and 19 (C. I. L., 12, p. 315); 
but it is more than probable that they were delayed during that year 
by the disturbances which occupied the month of April. Appian’s 
narrative must therefore be corrected by Cicero’s and we must admit 
that Antony was not concerned in the matter, and that it was not 
Critonius but certain tribunes of the people, as Cicero says, who thus 
opposed the action of Octavianus. The explanation is probable because 
Critonius was a Caesarean. The tribunes acted alone under conser- 
vative influence. Appian may have confused this matter with the 
incidents of the /udi victori@ C@saris with which we shall deal later, 

*' Varro, R. R, i xvii 2% I xix, 3, t+ Varro, R. R. I. xvii. 2. 

} Allusion is made to these coloni in Cic, Pro. C@c.94 ; Ces. B. G, I. 34. 


The other group included the true aristocracy of the triumph- 
ant nationality. In every country subjugated by Rome this 
society had taken possession of public lands on lease; it had 
bought vast estates in the provinces; it had lent large sums 
of capital to sovereigns, to cities, and to private individuals 
in every direction. This group held the State magistracies 
and commanded the legions; it possessed the larger part 
of the Italian lands and cultivated them either by slaves 
or colonists. At the same time it must not be imagined that 
this oligarchy was entirely composed of wealthy men. It was 
a society marked by numerous gradations and included small 
landowners, knights and merchants of good position living 
in the secondary towns; these rubbed elbows with the great 
landowners who composed the Senate, and with capitalists, 
who were either knights like Atticus or senators like Marcus 
Crassus or freed-men, like many of the wealthy usurers who 
set up business at Rome and plundered the plunderers of the 
world. Many members of the party, in their haste to acquire 
wealth and to enjoy it, had been caught in the network of debt 
and credit which enmeshed the whole of Italy. The great 
aristocratic families possessed vast estates, but for the most 
part were short of money, and not only Octavianus, but even 
Brutus, Cassius and their friends were greatly in want of hard 
cash ; * existing capital was almost entirely in the hands of a 
small group, and the shortness of money and the weight of 
debt was a heavy burden upon many of the knights and senators, 
in other words, upon the class of landowners, merchants, 
politicians and thinkers who should have formed what is 
now the upper middle class standing half-way between the 
plutocracy and nobility on the one hand, and the poorer 
classes on the other. 

Cicero’s financial affairs provide us with valuable information 
concerning the economic conditions in which the upper classes 
lived at that time. Cicero had increased his fortune by every 


44 B.C, 


means then possible within the limits of the law; he had ac-: 

cepted large gifts from sovereigns, foreign towns and clients 
whom his eloquence had defended before the courts; he had 

* Cornelius Nepos, Adi. 8. 


May 20-30, received legacies from friends and unknown admirers. He 

44 B.c, 

return to 

had also speculated in the sale and purchase of land and houses ; 
he had lent a little money, but rather to oblige his friends than 
to make profit ; he had also borrowed a great deal from regular 
money-lenders and from such friends as Atticus and Publius 
Sylla, who had required no interest.* Thus he had a consider- 
able fortune, including houses at Rome and valuable estates 
and rich villas in Italy. Yet he found himself entangled in a 
labyrinth of debt and credit from which he could find no issue, 
a task attempted with equal ill-success by his careless secretary 
and slave, Eros. ‘This secretary had just presented him 
with a fine balance-sheet showing that on April 15, when his 
loans had been called in and his debts paid, he should have 
had a balance in his favour.t But either because the loans 
were not called in, or because the accountant was mistaken, 
Cicero was at that moment extremely short of money; yet 
he had a number of debts to pay, including several instalments 
of Terentia’s dowry, the fees for his son who was studying 
at Athens, and a debt to the inhabitants of Arpinum who were 
demanding a sum which they had previously lent him at a time 
when the town was looking for an investment.{ © Cicero 
however, could turn for help to his reputation and his friends ; 
but many other people were in similar straits, racking their 
brains to meet their difficulties and deprived of his resources ; 
most of them belonged to that middle class which should have 
been the mainstay of the republic and its defence against 
the irreconcilable conservatives and the revolutionary dema- 
gogues. As things were, its condition was becoming critical ; 
it was disunited and despondent, diminished in numbers, 
discontented with the situation, and without money, courage, 
or confidence in the future. 

Antony’s return increased this agitation. Ten days yet 
remained before June 1 and every one was anxious to learn 
what were the real proposals of the consul for the first session 
of the Senate. Conjecture was rife, and Antony’s every 

* On Cicero’s fortune see Lichtenberger, De Ciceyonis re privata, 
Paris, 1895. La fortune de Cicéron in the Revue internationale de 
Soctologie, 1896, p. 90 ff. 

fT Cic, A. XV. xv. 3. Cic. A. XV. xv. 


gesture was watched by anxious eyes. He, however, seemed May 20-30, 
anxious on his arrival to withdraw from public notice. He 44 3. 
never appeared in public without an escort of veterans and 
Arabs of Iturza, which latter he had bought in the slave 
market ; a careful watch was kept on the gates of his residence, 
and strangers only secured admission with much difficulty.* 
The public were anxious to know the reason for these precau- 
tions. The uncertainty was great, and at the end of two or 
three days a serious rumour spread through Rome which 
terrified the conservatives and the relatives or friends of the 
conspirators. Antony, it was said, not only desired the pro- 
vinces of Gaul, but wished to secure them immediately without 
even waiting until the following year; he was returning to his 
proposal of March 16 to deprive Decimus Brutus of his province 
and thus to deprive the conservative party of its chief support.t 
Rumour declared that in spite of the amnesty, Lucius Antonius 
was about to begin legal proceedings against Decimus Brutus 
for Czsar’s death and that others would accuse Brutus and 
Cassius.[ The anxiety of the upper classes increased, every 
one forgot the intrigues of Octavianus, and began to ask if the 
real danger was not elsewhere, and whether Antony in his 
efforts to secure popularity was not working even more secretly 
than Czsar’s so-called son against the amnesty of March 17. 
These were, however, exaggerations which represented as 
definite projects the confused echoes of those discussions which 
had taken place in the consul’s house since his return. It is 
probable that Lucius and Fulvia had been emboldened by 
the success of the enlistment, and were urging Antony to take 
advantage of the general disorganisation of the nobles to 

* Cic. A. XV, viii 1; aditus ad eum (Antonius) diffictlor. 

+ A passage in Cicero, A. XV. iv. 1, shows that Atticus wrote 
on May 23 to the effect that this intention was rumoured in Romes 
Si quidem D. Bruto provincia eripitur. 

t Cic. A. XV. v. 3 (written May 27 or 28; Ruete, Corr. C. p. 20): 
Quod st, ut scribis, L. Antonius in D, Brutum, reliqui in nostros, ego 
quid faciam? The excessive brevity of this phrase alludes to legal 
proceedings against the conspirators and not to war or expeditionss 
Why was Lucius Antonius to march against Decimus Brutus when 
everybody was saying that Marcus wished to secure the province of 

Gaul? And how could there be any question of making war upon 
Brutus and Cassius, who possessed no army ? 

May 20-30, 
44 B.C. 



disavow the amnesty, to bring the tyrannicides to judgment 
and to come forward as Cesar’s avenger; in favour of this 
course they argued that if Antony could succeed in driving all 
the conspirators into exile, he would find himself, with the 
support of the veterans, even more powerful than Cesar had 
been in $9 at the head of the collegia of Clodius. The moment, 
moreover, seemed admirably chosen, for Antony could dis- 
pose of the Macedonian legions which the Senate had placed 
under his orders ; he could also recruit as many soldiers as he 
liked from Czsar’s veterans so soon as he chose to invite them 
to avenge their general and defend his work, if the conspirators 
ventured to use the army of Decimus Brutus for resistance. 

Though Fulvia and Lucius thus urged him forward, Antony’s 
hesitation was much greater than the public believed. His 
fear of the conservatives was still considerable; he regarded 
Dolabella’s enmity as a great obstacle, and he knew that of the 
tribunes of the people some had declared against him, Lucius 
Cassius, Tiberius Cannutius, and even Carfulenus, one of Cesar’s 
bravest soldiers.* He saw that the resolution of Hirtius 
himself had been shaken by his thefts from the public treasury,t 
while Fufius Calenus, who had been on bad terms with Cicero 
for some time, was now writing to him to propose a reconcilia- 
tion.t Moreover, there was a rumour abroad that Brutus 
and Cassius were about to leave Italy and to raise a revolution 
in the provinces.§ Antony strove to win the confidence of 
Dolabella, and to spread discouraging rumours which might 
deter the senators from returning to Rome. But he could 
not help asking himself how many senators would be sufficiently 
intimidated, whether Cicero would come, and whether he could 
venture to annul the amnesty, in other words, to provoke a civil 
war at the end of seven or eight days, in the coming session of 
Juner. Atan earlier date he would not perhaps have hesitated 
before so rash an action; now that he was alone at the head 

* Cic. A. XV. iv. 1; PAil, III. ix. 23 (it is, however, uncertain 
whether Cannutius and Cassius turned against him at this moment). 

+ Cic, A. XV. ii. 4. Tlevrédouros is Hirtius (notwithstanding the 
ambiguity of the term), as is proved by Cic. A. XIV. xxi. 4. 

t Cic, A. XV. iv. 1. 

§ A rumour transmitted by Hirtius: Cic. A. XV. vi. 2-3. 


of the government, unexpectedly involved in danger and May 20-30, 
responsibility, and exposed to general criticism and hatred, his 44 3-¢ 
resolution wavered, and possibly for the first time in his life, 

he followed the dictates of prudence and common sense. 

While engaged in these considerations, Antony received a The first 
request for an interview from Octavianus. Whether the young pe” 
man had explained his purpose or not, it was one that Antony peer and 

. ° . c as 
could easily guess. There is nothing to show that he was 
prepared to restore Czsar’s money to his legal heir, and it is 
not in the least likely that he regarded the young man with 
his claims and his intrigues as a serious factor in the situation. 
On the contrary, it is probable that the claims of Octavianus 
inspired him with another idea; Casar had appointed him 
and Decimus Brutus as secondary heirs; Decimus Brutus 
would never be able to prosecute his claim, and Antony hoped 
to induce Octavianus to abandon his inheritance, of which he 
would then take his share.* He therefore attempted to intimi- 
date the young man by some show of discourtesy; when 
Octavianus appeared at Pompey’s Palace, he was kept waiting 
for a long time, and when he was at length admitted to Antony’s 
presence, the consul barely allowed him to state his business, 
but sharply interrupted him, telling him that he was mad if he 
thought himself capable of accepting Czsar’s legacy at so early 
an age. Antony then went away without giving his visitor 
time to answer and leaving him confused and mortified.t 
Antony had something better to do than to trouble himself 
with the affairs of this young man. Days went by and the end 
of May arrived; Antony had succeeded in bringing over 
Dolabella to his side by the gift of a considerable sum from 

* Florus IV, ivs 1: 4 

+ The story of his interview, given by Appian, B. C. ili. 14 ff. is 
drawn, according to Soltau, Suppl: to the Philologus, vii. p. 604 ff. 
from the Memoirs of Augustus, and the facts are therefore true, while 
the humiliating details are suppressed. The whole truth must be 
sought in Velleius II, lx. 3, and in Nicolas of Damascus, 28, where 
allusion is made to the first interview between Antony and Octavianus 
the narrative of which was given in an earlier text now lost, and in 
which Antony’s rudeness was somewhat marked. The first interview 
is certainly that to which Velleius alludes. Plutarch Ant. 16, gives a 

summary of the conversation between Antony and Octavianus, which 
seems very probable. 


May 20-30, the public treasury, and by the promise that his pro-consulship 

44 B.C, 

The last days 
of May. 

should also be prolonged; though every one thought that 
he would propose his demands to the Senate on June 1, he 
had not yet decided so important a matter as the moment 
when his action should begin. At the end of May he received 
a letter from Brutus and Cassius asking for what reason he was 
recruiting the veterans; they asserted that the pretext of 
securing for the troops the rewards promised by Cesar was 
futile, because no member of the conservative party had any 
anxiety to deprive them of these gifts.* Antony was then 
anxious to calm their minds, and informed them through 
Hirtius and Balbus, that when the Senate opened, he would 
arrange that the provinces to which they had a right should be 
granted them; these provinces, however, he did not specify.t 
The fact is that he was not ready to begin open war with 
Cesar’s murderers, as he still feared the power of the con- 
servative party. Cicero, however, wrote to Atticus to the 
effect that the conservative party was unfortunately not 
what it had been five years before when it had so boldly declared 
war upon Cesar.} 

The orator judged the situation better than the consul. 
The presence of the veterans and the alarming rumours in 
circulation intimidated those who had remained; Hirtius, 
who had returned to Rome, left the city for Tusculum,§ on 
the advice of Balbus, to continue Czsar’s Commentaries; || 
it was said that the consuls elect would not be present at the 
session of June 1.4 All this was not likely to encourage those 
who had left Rome to return, and Cicero was urged from several 
quarters not to set foot in the city. However, he went in that 
direction; he had gone to Arpinum and then to Tusculum 
after the 25th, and wrote to Atticus saying that he wished some- 
how to gain an idea of what was likely to happen ;** at Tusculum 

MGR As wo ieee. tT Cic. A: XV. v. 2. 

t Cic. A. XV. iii. 1: nec causa eadem est nec simile tempus. Causa 
here means ‘‘ political party’? as in A. XV, vi. 1; caus@ ius 
amicissumus, and in A. VII. iii. 5, cawsam solum illa causa non habet. 

§ Cic. A. XV. vi. 2; XV. v. 2, for which I follow the happy 
emendation, qui quidem se afuturum. 

|| Hirtius, B. C. viii. pref. 4 Cic. Phtt. 1. ii. 6, 
ICOM AM EG titi ky 


however, he met Hirtius, who urged him to go no further.* 
Brutus and Cassius were also in a state of great vacillation 
during the last days of May and were swayed in contrary 
directions by the discrepant rumours in circulation. At one 
time they were told that Antony intended to give them the 
provinces they desired, and at another time that he was spread- 
ing a snare for them; they asked advice from everybody, 
brought Servilia from Rome, sent letters directly and indirectly 
to their friends, to Cicero, and to Atticus, urging them to 
come to Lanuvium for a conference; t at length they decided 
to ask Atticus to open negotiations with the rich knights of 
Rome for a loan to provide Brutus and Cassius with the sinews 
of war. A friend of Brutus, Caius Flavius, had gone to Rome 
to treat with the leading financier.[ Cassius, on the other 
hand, wrote letter after letter to Cicero,§ urging him to use 
his influence on their behalf with Hirtius and Pansa, the two 
consuls for the following year. Cicero did not know what 
advice to give and was inclined to go to Lanuvium on the 29th 
or 30th,|| though he feared that his movements might give rise 
to excessive gossip ;@ Atticus also consented to go; ** he had 
previously refused to open negotiations for a loan ; tf possibly 
he was not anxious to compromise himself too far; possibly 
also he doubted the success of such an effort, because, though 

weCic. AY XV. v..2. T Cic. A. XV. iv. 2 and 5: 

¢t Cornelius Nepos, Att, 8. That these negotiations took place 
at this time is a matter of conjecture. The fact that the third party, 
Cassius Flavius, went to Atticus, seems to show that Brutus and 
Cassius were not at Rome. There is possibly an additional allusion 
to the refusal of Atticus in Cicero XV. iv. 5 (a letter written at this 
time which is certainly the opening part of a short letter mistakenly 
connected with the preceding letter): quam vellem Bruto studium 
tuum navare potuisses ! Boissier, Cicéron et ses amis, Paris, 1902, p. 158, 
puts these negotiations at a later date, when Brutus was in Macedonia ; 
but it seems to me improbable that he should have had recourse to 
Atticus at a time when he could have extorted money from the province 
as pro-consul or have asked it from the Senate. 

SrGiow As ts XVe vin 1s 

|| Ruete, Corr. Cic. p. 23. 

4 Cic. A. XV.iv.2. Lanuviumeundem : 3 5 : non sine multo sermone. 

** Cicero, XV. xx. 2. The conversation at Lanuvium to which this 
letter alludes, is certainly the present occasion, and is also. referred 
to in the beginning of Cicero’s letter A, XV. viii. 1, post tuwm discessum. 

Tt Corn. Nepos, Afi, 8, 

May 20-30, 
44 B.C. 

June 1-2, 

44 B.C, 

The session of 
the Senate, 


the capitalists were anxious for the maintenance of public 
order, they did not care to spend money for that purpose. 
When Atticus and Cicero met at Lanuvium, probably about 
May 30, for a conference with Brutus and Cassius, they were 
reduced, after long deliberation, to recognise the fact that 
Antony was now master of the situation, and could inflict any 
damage upon them that he pleased.* 

Antony, however, was by no means inclined to pursue such 
formidable projects as were attributed to him; he did not 
perceive his mastery of the situation as announced by Brutus 
and Cassius some days previously, until June 1, when, to his 
astonishment, he saw that neither Cicero nor the consuls 
elect nor the leading men of the party were present in the 
Senate.t It was a day of surprises. Antony found no one 
at the session but obscure senators, whose subservience to 
himself was complete. There was therefore, general expecta- 
tion that he would lay his claims to the provinces before the 
meeting, and there was no less astonishment when it was found 
that in this session the consul confined himself to ordinary 
business, and made no allusion to these supposed plans. The 
conservatives began to wonder whether Antony had been 
slandered, and their anxiety seemed to grow calmer towards 
the evening. After the session however, emboldened by 
the absence of the leaders, Antony resolved, as is often the case 
after a long period of hesitation, to act without delay and to 
convoke a popular meeting for the following morning in haste 
and without giving time for the legal interval of trinum nun- 
dinum between the announcement and the approval of it.f 
By this means he would prevent his adversaries from sending 
opposition tribunes to interpose their veto, while he would be 
able to propose, through certain friendly tribunes, the law 
prolonging for six years, including the consular year, the pro- 
consulships of Syria and Macedonia for himself and Dolabella, 
Notwithstanding this precipitate haste, he continued to show 
a measure of prudence, and to spare the feelings of the con- 

* Cic. A. XV. xx. 2. Lanuvii i+: vidi nostros tantum spet 
habere ad vivendum, quantum accepissent ab Antonio. 
tT Cie, Phil, I, ii. 6. t Cic. Phil. V. iti. 7 fi 


servatives by offering them some compensation for this illegal 
method of procedure. He renounced for the moment his claim 
to the province of Gaul, and fixed for June 5 the session 
at which the decree would be proposed conferring their pro- 
vinces on Brutus and Cassius. He also proposed, on the 
motion of the same tribunes and in the same comitia, to give 
legal force to the senatus consultum which provided a commission 
for the examination of Czsar’s papers. Instructions were 
therefore given to the veterans and their friends in the evening ; 
in the morning the consul, the magistrates who supported him 
and a certain number of citizens gathered in the forum to 
represent the tribes ; in the course of the day a large number 
of people who were not even aware that an assembly was being 
held, learned that the lex de provinciis and the lex de actis 
Cesaris cum consilio cognoscendis had been hastily passed.* 
During the same day, Balbus learned to his astonishment that 
Antony was thinking of sending Brutus to Asia and Cassius to 
Sicily to buy corn.t This was an extremely clever manceuvre ; 
if the two conspirators refused to act, they could be charged 
with responsibility for the chronic scarcity of corn at Rome ; 
if they accepted, they would be obliged to leave one another 
and abandon all their measures for the defence of the con- 
servative party in order to haggle with corn merchants. 

June 1-2, 
44 B.C, 

The anxieties of the last days of May had been succeeded by Dissension 

comparative calm among the conservatives and conspirators 

Antony and 

when they saw that the amnesty at least was respected. Cicero Octavianus. 

himself had no sooner arrived from Tusculum than he had asked 
Dolabella to appoint him his pro-consular legate, with per- 
mission to re-enter Rome when he would.{ After his futile 
conversation with the leaders of the conspiracy, he seems to 
have thought that it was best to travel at the expense of the 
republic. When, however, Antony’s intentions respecting 
the provinces of Cassius and Brutus were known, general 
indignation prevailed that so humble a mission should have 
been given to the two liberators of the country ; § it was not 

* Cic. Phil. V. iii. 7 

t Cic. A. XV. ix. 1; he received Balbus letter with the news, on 
the evening of the 3rd, probably at Tusculum. 

f Cic. As XV. viii. § Cic. As XV, ix: 

Ul E 


June 1-10, a mission, but exile in disguise; Antony wished to remove 

4A B.C. 

The meeting 34 

at Antium, 

them from Italy, and to deprive Decimus of his province.* 
Brutus once more sent messages to his mother, to Cicero, to 
Atticus, and to his friends on every side, inviting them to meet 
at Antium for a second conference. However, further dissen- 
sion had broken out at Rome, on this occasion between Antony 
and Octavianus. Irritated by the affront which he had received, 
Octavianus had begun a popular agitation; he denounced the 
consul as the enemy of the people, recalling bitter memories 
of the year 47,t and accusing him of betraying Czsar’s memory 
and his party, and preventing the payment of Czsar’s legacies. 
This discourse was followed by a magnificent announcement 
to the effect that he would sell ail Czsar’s property and his own 
family possessions with the object of paying the three hundred 
sesterces without delay.[ Antony, by way of reprisal, pro- 
ceeded to raise obstacles against the passing of the lex curiata 
which ratified the adoption,§ in which attempt he was sup- 
ported by the relatives of the conspirators, who were not 
anxious to have a son of Czsar at Rome. Octavianus replied 
by a more energetic pursuit of his agitation than before; he 
collected a band of partisans and repeating the practice of 
Herophilus, went about the streets of Rome, making speeches 
against Antony, attempting to arouse the veterans, calling 
once more for vengeance for Cesar, and accusing Antony of 
lukewarmness in this cause and of treachery to his party.|| He 
also wrote to his friends among the legions in Macedonia, 
informing them of the infamous treatment which Antony 
had inflicted upon Czsar’s son. 

Cicero, however, had received on June 74 a letter from 
Dolabella (possibly somewhat delayed), stating that the latter 
had appointed him as his legate on June 2, that is, immediately 
after the approval of the lex de provinciis, but for five years 

* Cic. A: XV. x, St vero aliquid de Decimo gravius . = : « Dionis 

ft See Dion, xlv. 6. ft Appian, B. C, iii, 21. 

§ Dion, xlv. 5. Appian’s account, B. C. ili. 2 ff. seems to me to be 
greatly exaggerated. 

|| Appian, B. C. iii. 28. 

4] Cic. XV. xi. 4; td mihi hert vespert nuntiatum est (the letter is 
dated the 8th), 


and not for two, as Cicero had thought.* Dolabella had thus 
hastened to satisfy the wishes of his former father-in-law that 
he might oblige him to recognise this law, the legality of 
which was doubtful. In fact, this nomination brought a 
certain philosophic calm to Cicero’s anxious mind and the 
following day, the 8th, he yielded to the requests of Brutus 
and Cassius, and went to Antium. On that lovely shore he 
found Brutus and his wife Portia, Servilia, Tertulla, the wife 
of Cassius and sister of Brutus, Favonius, and many other 
friends. Atticus was not there, as he did not wish to leave 
Rome. Cicero was obliged to give his opinion before this 
gathering of men and matrons, and he advised that the mission 
should be accepted. Dolabella’s legation had temporarily 
calmed the fury of the conservative leader and his desire 
to exterminate the popular party. Cassius, however, in great 
excitement, loudly declared that never at any cost would he go 
to Sicily and that he would rather go into exile in Achaia. 
Brutus, on the other hand, in spite of his discouragement, 
said that he wished to return to Rome where it was his duty as 
. pretor to hold the Ludi Apollinares for the people. Cicero 
attempted to dissuade him ; Servilia, who was anxious to save 
not so much the republic as her son and son-in-law, advised 
him to accept the legation, saying that she would arrange for 
the transference elsewhere of the unpleasant duty of purchasing 
corn. Discussion then wandered from the point; useless 
regrets were uttered regarding a number of things which should 
have been done, and of which no one had thought ; the advice 
of Decimus Brutus should have been followed to kill Antony 
with Czsar on the Ides of March. Argument seems to have 
grown so keen that Cicero and Servilia had a quarrel on this 
point. At last Brutus yielded and resolved not to go to Rome, 
but to arrange for the celebration of the games by his colleague, 
Caius Antonius, who was supplying his place. The question 
of the mission, however, still remained undecided; though 
Cassius no longer protested with the same energy, he would 
not declare himself ready to start. Brutus, on the other 

* Cic. A. XV. ix. 4. 


- June 1-10, 

44 B.C. 

June. 1-10, 
44 B.C. 


hand, seemed to Cicero more inclined to accept the mission.* 
Cicero’s journey had thus once more been futile; he consoled 
himself with the thought that he had at least performed his 
duty and decided to start for Greece.t 

* See the whole of Cicero’s fine letter, A. XV. xi. with all the 
explanations and details added in the twelfth letter at the request of 
Atticus. The words of § 2, amissas occasiones Decumumque Brutum 
graviter accusabant, express, in my opinion, regrets that Antony had 
not been killed on the Ides of March on the advice of Decimus and 
not of Marcus, as is generally believed, following Plutarch and Appian. 
This is probable enough, because Decimus and Antony had been 
fellow soldiers, while Marcus Brutus and Antony hardly knew one 
another and it is clearly confirmed by this passage which is otherwise 
inexplicable. The words amissas occastones can only refer to the in- 
activity of Decimus in Gaul with his legions; Antony showed little 
more activity at Rome and Decimus had still time to act. 

7 Cicero, A. XV. xi. 3. 


Antony reorganises the Cesarean party—Antony’s friends— 
Financial difficulties of the conservative party—The conser- 
vatives incite Octavianus against Antony—The agrarian law is 
approved—tThe projects of Cassius. 
Encouracep by the initial success of the lex de provinctis, Legislative 
Antony resolved to reorganise the Cxsarean party, which had Pr°P°s#! 
been shattered by the Ides of March, and in continuation of 
Czsar’s policy, to propose a series of popular laws to pave the 
way for his measure concerning the Gallic provinces. ‘These 
two attempts were the necessary consequence of that new 
policy upon which Antony had entered after April 15. To 
reassure and to flatter the colonists and the veterans and to 
show that in matters of importance senatorial decrees were 
inadequate, he proposed that the senatus consultum of March 
17, concerning the acts of Czsar and the maintenance of his 
colonies, should be passed into two laws by the comitia; at the 
same time with the object of refuting those conservatives 
who accused him of a desire to make himself dictator, he 
proposed to pass into law the senatus consultum of April which 
abolished the dictatorship. On the other hand, Lucius 
Antonius proposed to follow the example of every leader of 
the popular party since Tiberius Gracchus, and to pass a 
comprehensive land law. Unfortunately our knowledge of 
its provisions is derived only from the scanty details given by 
Cicero and from his invectives ; thus it is impossible to restore 
the text of the law and we must confine ourselves to stating 
that in order to accelerate the distribution of land to the 

veterans, the law provided for the draining of the Pontine 

44 B.C. 



Marshes, a project which Cesar had already entertained,* 
while it proposed a commission of seven,t which was to 
divide the public lands and to purchase private property in 

These bills were promulgated by Antony and his brother 
during the first half of the month of June. Antony, however, 
was not equal to the great efforts which their execution 
demanded, or to the task of governing the republic with 
a strong hand. His only supporters were his two brothers 
and the veterans, whereas he needed more powerful helpers 
and a larger body of officials ; to supplement this deficiency 
he saw that his only resource was to reorganise, not the whole 
of Czsar’s party, but its left wing, which contained the popular 
and revolutionary elements. Antony could no longer count 
upon the famous Cesareans, such as Hirtius, Pansa, Balbus, 
Piso, Sallust, and Calenus, who were now satisfied with their 
gains and unwilling to compromise themselves or to run any 
risks. Nor, again, could he hope to find supporters in the 
upper classes, which had produced so many leaders and cham- 
pions of the popular party towards the year 70, after the death 
of Sulla. Times had changed; the upper classes were worn 
out by the great struggles of former agitations; they were 
decimated by the great civil wars and were themselves sterile ; 
wealth, pleasure, and power had enervated them ; disorganised, 
proud, and malevolent, they no longer possessed any power 
of self-defence ; they provided no recruits for the conservative 
party, and left Cesar’s last contemporaries to wage this supreme 
contest alone. Even the sons of the great conservative 
leaders during the preceding generation, of Hortensius, of 
Lucullus, and of Cato, now stood aside and devoted themselves 
to their pleasures, their games, or their studies, while the 
destruction which menaced their order steadily approached. 
These classes were even less able to provide recruits for the 
popular party, which had become entirely revolutionary. 
Hence, Antony was forced to turn to the less wealthy and more 

* Dion, xlv. 9. 
t Cic., Phil, VI. v.14; VIIIs ix. 26. 
} This is proved by Cic. Phil, VIIL. ix. 26. 


discontented elements in Casar’s party, to the men of no June, 
account, the artisans, the small landowners, and merchants, the 44 3-¢- 
soldiers and centurions, the Italians and foreigners, from whom 

Cesar had latterly preferred to draw his officers, magistrates, 

and senators. ‘These men were naturally opposed to the 
conspirators, who were almost entirely of noble birth, and 
regarded them as intruders and usurpers of positions which 
rightfully belonged to themselves; they feared to see them- 

selves deprived of the possessions or the property which they 

had acquired, or at any rate to see the overthrow of their 

hopes and ambitions. ‘Thus, it was easier to secure an under- 
standing with this section, and if any difficulties yet remained, 

Antony was in possession of two powerful levers, Czsar’s 

papers and the State treasury, on which he continued to draw 


Thus by flattery, by promotion, by means of forged docu- The new 
ments attributed to Ceasar, and by distributions of money, aera 
magistracies, and senatorial seats, he strove to gather round him 
the more intelligent of those Czsareans who were still too 
discontented to join the conservative party. Such were 
Ventidius Bassus, a former muleteer and transport contractor, 
Decidius Saxa, a Spaniard to whom Casar had given the 
citizenship, a metator castrorum (the chief of the Sappers in 
those days), and a tribune of the people in that year ; * Tullus 
Hostilius, and a certain Insteius, both of whom were tribunes 
elect for the following year; the latter was said to have been 

san attendant in some baths at Pesaro;Tt a retired actor named 
Nucula; Cesennius Lento, an officer of Cesar who had dis- 
tinguished himself in the last Spanish War, but was of humble 
origin; Cicero asserts that he had been a mime; f Cassius 
Barba, Marcus Barbatius Philippus,§ Lucius Marcius Censorinus,|| 
Titus Munatius Plancus Bursa. The last named had been 
exiled after the funeral of Clodius, had returned during the 
civil wars, and was much afraid that he might be driven out 

Cic. Pil. XT. veit2s SALT. xi 274 

7 Cic. Pail. XIII. xiii. 26. 

t Cic. Phil. XI. vi. 13; Dion, xliii. 40; Orosius, VI. xvi. 9. 
SiG, Ih Danie ep 

Cie. Prat. XT. v. 11s 


44 B.C. 



once more.* ‘To these men Antony added a considerable 
number of his friends and boon companions ; he was a Sybarite 
by nature, and at this very moment, in the intervals of business, 
if we are to believe Cicero’s story, which may be somewhat 
exaggerated, he was spending Czsar’s money and the public 
funds in leading a life of pleasure and gambling, festivals 
and banquets, and keeping a court of parasites t in which 
some of his coadjutors were to be found; among others, 
Seius Mustela and Numisius Tiro, who divided with Cassius 
Barba the command of his little guard of veterans.t There 
too was a certain Petissius of Urbinum who had squandered 
all his property,§ Publius Voluminius Eutrapelus, the patron 
of Citheris, who had been Antony’s mistress before his 
marriage with Fulvia and who was then one of the most 
fashionable courtesans; and an Athenian, Lysias, the son of 
However, the promulgation of these laws had started a fresh 

popular agitation, which absorbed in its course the remnants 
of the movement begun by Herophilus. The veterans and the 
mob who had formerly threatened to besiege the houses of the 
conspirators, now crowded the meetings in which the land 
law was discussed. ‘These meetings were entirely devoted 
to the praise of Cesar and to the abuse of his murderers, and 
soon became extremely violent in character; once more the 
richer classes, the conservatives, and the conspirators took 
alarm, and their panic increased as they began to understand 
the import of the land law, of the other legal measures and of 
the new popular agitation. ‘The new movement was not merely 
an attempt to annul the amnesty, but also to lay violent hands 
upon the State revenues and to secure their possession to the 
Cesarean party. ‘The situation was serious. For three months 
the conservatives had secretly nourished hopes of using the 
sums accumulated by Cesar in the public treasury to indemnify 
those families who had lost property in the civil war and 

* Cics Phil; XIII. xii. 273 

~ Cics Phil, XIII. ii. 3. 

t Cic. Phil. V. vi. 18. 

§ Cic. Phil. XII. viii. 19. 
|| Cice Phtl V. v: 13: 


whose estates could no longer be returned to them.* On the 
other hand the Cesarean party, which claimed to champion 
the cause of the poor, not only retained possession of this 
property and plundered the public treasury through the 
consul, but when the land law had been passed, would be in 
legal possession of the treasure at a moment when the financial 
embarrassment of the conservatives was increasing every day. 
By a strange reversal of fortune, the wealthy party would thus 
be in want of money at the decisive moment of the struggle, 
if the State chest should fall into the power of their adversaries. 
The resources of private individuals were almost exhausted, 
and numerous conservatives fled from Rome to the country 
not only under stress of fear, but because the friendship of the 
conspirators threatened ruin to all who had not the wealth 
of Atticus; not only Brutus and Cassius, but many of the 
conspirators demanded contributions from their friends and 
admirers for the defence of the good cause. Public resources 
were also running low. The friends of Decimus Brutus 
informed him of Antony’s intrigues, and urged him to increase 
his army and to collect money in Cisalpine Gaul ; t yet he was 
henceforward obliged to draw upon his own fortune for his 
soldiers’ pay, and to ask help from all his friends.t It would 
have been dangerous to levy contributions from Cisalpine 
Gaul, as that country was no longer a province. 

Thus the upper classes were utterly dispirited and dis- 
couraged. Society rumours at Rome asserted that the cause 
of the republic was lost.§ Pansa and Hirtius again began to equi- 
vocate when they saw the Cesarean party once more forming 
about Antony ; Cicero, wearied and disgusted by the situation,|| 
definitely resolved to start for Greece, and requested Dolabella 
to give him a commission, pro forma ; @ Atticus abandoned all 
hope of recovering his lands at Buthrotum. At a time when 
the popular party was promising to found so many colonies, 
how was it possible to deprive it of territory which it had 
already seized ?** It was already known that Lucius Antonius 

* See Cic. Phils I. vii. 17: 
{ Appian, B. C. iii. 27. t See Cic, By XIs x; 53 

Si CicwAw Xx Vin xx. 2. || Cic. A. XV. xxii, 

4] Cic. Az XVz xiv. 2. ** See Cic. A. XV. xix: I. 

44 B.C. 

Cicero's state 
of mind. 


44 B.C. 



was opposed to his demands.* ‘‘ We are upon the verge of 
a massacre,” wrote Cicero.t ‘The rumour then spread that 
Carteia, an important Spanish town near the straits of Gibraltar, 
had yielded to Sextus Pompeius. Pompey’s son had thus a 
harbour at his command; he would certainly embark his 
army without delay and sail to Italy to begin the war. This 
news, however, instead of reviving the courage of the party, 
inspired a general fear that Antony would precipitate events. 
Cicero, therefore, prepared to accelerate his departure ; t 
rumour asserted that Brutus himself was about to start for Asia 
to fulfil his mission for the purchase of corn.§ Other con- 
spirators also, such as Domitius Ahenobarbus, the son of the 
consul who had been killed at Pharsalia, held ships in readiness 
off Puteoli, that they might be ready to leave Italy as they 
had left Rome, if the amnesty were repealed.|| Cicero asked 
Atticus if he should embark at Puteoli or at Brundisium ; 
Atticus, who seems to have been deeply irritated with Antony 
on account of his lands at Buthrotum, urged him not to go to 
Brundisium ; the consul had stationed the Fifth Legion, known 
as “ the Lark,” on the Appian Way; these troops were on the 
way to Macedonia,™ and the roads did not seem safe with so 
many bands of fierce veterans wandering about.** However, 
the days went by; the trinum nundinum was drawing to a 
close ; the conservatives wrung their hands, but would not act. 

The general gloom was relieved by one feeble ray of hope. 
Some members of the party began to wonder whether they 
could not bring discord among the Czsareans by inciting 
Octavianus against Antony. Octavianus had continued his 
campaign against Antony, making speeches everywhere, and 
attempting to show the people that Antony was not to be 
trusted by reason of his inconsistent behaviour during the 

* Cic., (AV ie XV Vax lve ie 

CIC. Ay 2k Via VILE, tose Vie SG NS OKA 


§ Cic. XV. xx. 3. Brutus quidem subito (‘‘ will depart ”’ understood). 

|| Cic. A. XVI. iv. 4. 

§| This is a conjecture by Domaszewski, Neue Heidelberger Jahrb. 
iv. p. 176, which seems to me justified, as otherwise the presence of 

this legion during the war of 43 is inexplicable. 
MGIC AY AV. exh 13) AL XV xo. gs 3 NV Darcccitin ot 


recent months; he reproached him with secretly favouring 
the conservatives and the murderers of Cesar at the very time 
when he dared to claim the leadership of the Cesarean party. 
However, Octavianus was related to the noblest families in Rome 
and, after spending the day time as a demagogue, he would 
return to his aristocratic society in the evening, and meet the 
friends of his family, who were all friends of the conspirators. 
These friends made remarkable proposals ; Antony was indeed 
a dangerous adventurer, and his overthrow would be to the 
general advantage ; if Octavius would show some confidence 
in the conservatives and conspirators, he would find them 
trusty and loyal helpers against the common enemy. Of 
these advisers the most zealous seems to have been Caius 
Claudius Marcellus, the irreconcilable aristocrat, who had 
provoked the civil war in the year 50 when he was consul, 
and who was, or would be, the brother-in-law of Octavianus by 
marriage with his sister Octavia.* Marcellus believed that the 
young man was ready to lend a willing ear to his advice.t 
Antony was annoyed by these intrigues, but none the less the 
legal interval for the promulgation of the laws had elapsed, 
and the land bill and the other measures were approved during 
the second half of June, probably in the course of several 
days; there was no opposition, and therefore no violence. 
The commission of seven was also appointed ; Marcus Antonius, 
Lucius Antonius, Caius Antonius and Dolabella formed the 
majority, their colleagues being Nucula, Cesennius Lento, 
and a seventh whose name is unknown ; { thus this powerful 
weapon of gain and government was entirely in the hands of 

Antony and his family. 

* J infer this from the fact that their son Marcellus was born in 43 ; 
on December 20, when Cicero delivered the third Philippic, the mar- 
riage had already taken place. See Phil. III. vi. 17. 

7 See Cic. A. XV. xii. 2. I follow the reading Sz pracipit 
nostvo et nostvis ; that is, si precipit deditum esse nostro Bruto, nostris 
hevoibus. This reading, however, is not certain. These allusions to 
the advice given by Marcellus and others to Octavianus are important, 
because they show the origin of the intrigue which induced Octavianus 
to join the conservative party at the end of June. See Nic, Dam. 

} Lange, Rémische Alterthimey, Berlin 1871, iii. 493; Drumann, 
G, R. 12, 82 ff. 

44 B.C, 


44 B.C. 


By the passing of these laws Antony had secured a great 
advantage over Octavianus and the party of the conspirators, 
which now fell into complete confusion. It was generally 
believed that Antony was master of the situation after the 
passing of the laws, that Octavianus could only be regarded as 
a harmless agitator, and that every one must make the best of 
the situation. Cicero had received his mission from Dolabella 
and could now start, but hesitation and scruples held him back.* 
He would have liked to go, but he was detained by anxiety 
for his reputation, by the fear of missing some such magnifi- 
cent opportunity as Catiline’s conspiracy had offered, and by 
some remorse and shame. His departure might be regarded 
as flight. He began to ask advice of different people, to 
examine the situation carefully, and to consider if he might 
not go away with the intention of returning on January I, 
when Antony would be no longer consul and the Senate could 
deliberate in freedom.t He was also detained by his private 
affairs,t which were greatly involved. A short time previously 
he had sent his faithful Tiro to try and disentangle the accounts 
of Eros; § he asked Atticus to help him out of his difficulties, 
although he did not dare to request any further pecuniary 
loan. Atticus was a wealthy man, but there were a large 
number of calls upon him. He was obliged to provide most 
of the expenditure for the Ludi Apollinares of Brutus.|| It is 
true that this boundless expenditure and generosity was about 
to receive a brilliant reward at that moment; the senatorial 
commission entrusted with the task of examining Czsar’s papers, 
declared towards the end of June, when Atticus had given 
up all hope, that his claims were well founded and Cnaeus 
Plancus was ordered to respect the territory of Buthrotum.4] 
Atticus owed this agreeable surprise to the intervention of 
Mark Antony, whom he had abused so violently in his letters 

*Cic. AL XV, xxv, } Ibid. 

GIG. eA.) ok Veacx es 

SICIGnA, XV, Revi Ot oe Vie Villa meN Wome 

|| Cic. A. XV. xviii. 2. 

q Cic. A. XVI. xvi. c. rr; A. XV. 14. This letter, as shown by 
Gruber, Q.C., p. 31, is out of place and was written on June 26 or 27. 
It enables us to determine the date of the resolution: 


since the beginning of the month. Lucius, a rasher and more | June, 
truculent character, had proposed to divide among the poor 44 B-¢- 
the large estates which the rich knight held in Epirus ; Marcus, 
however, was more prudent; he successfully continued his 
task of reuniting the former Ceasareans and of gathering 
friends by concessions and promises ; he also strove to reassure 
the conservatives, lest the more energetic members of the party 
should attempt some sudden blow with the help of Decimus. 

The upper classes displayed great satisfaction at the consul’s The prospects 
consideration for Atticus; moreover, after the passing of the eH 
laws the tension had been relaxed. The massacre and the 
other outrages which the conspirators had predicted had not 
occurred. Rome had become more peaceful; July was ap- 
proaching, the month of festivity when the Ludi Apollinares 
were to be celebrated and followed by the games in honour 
of Cezsar’s victory. ‘The spirit of peace seemed to descend 
upon the forum. Though in the middle of the month it 
was believed that Sextus Pompeius would attack Italy, it was 
stated towards the end of the month that he wished to lay 
down his arms, somewhat to the disgust of Cicero, who would 
have wished Sextus to keep his army for the use of the con- 
servative party.* Many. people also began to hope that the 
land law was merely a bait to attract the people and that 
Antony would not push it to extremes. In short, the pacifica- 
tion spread apace, and Cassius was the only member who 
remained uneasy. More energetic and intelligent than 
Brutus, who was exhausted and enervated by inaction and 
mental strain, he not only procured ships to buy grain from 
Sicily, but patiently wove the most extensive combinations 
and tormented his friend with them in secret. He asserted 
that they should immediately take in hand the work of preparing 
refuges and armies in the provinces to meet the attack which 
Antony would make upon them at the head of the popular 
party, an attack which might be immediate, and was certainly 
inevitable. In Italy the state of affairs was hopeless, and there 
was no chance of recovering power with the help of the con- 
suls appointed for the following year. On the other hand, 

J Cicw A. XV) xxixs La 


44 B.C. 


Decimus Brutus was in Cisalpine Gaul; though he was short 
of money, he was at any rate a faithful friend ; he had recruited 
the Third Legion and was preparing an expedition to certain 
valleys in the Alps to practise his troops and collect booty. 
It was also possible to count upon Plancus.* In the East, 
their friends were yet more numerous and an understanding 
with them would be easy. Trebonius was governor of Asia, 
where he was gathering money; Tullius Cimber was in com- 
mand of the legions of Bithynia and was collecting a fleet. 
Four legions were stationed in Egypt and contained numbers 
of Pompey’s old soldiers who had taken practically no part in 
the civil wars. In Syria his own reputation was by no means 
small, and Cacilius Bassus was still in possession of a legion 
at Apamea, where he was secure from attack. If secret negotia- 
tions were begun and their friends in the east realised the 
danger which menaced their party, they would soon find an 
army to resist the popular revolution. Brutus, however, 
hesitated, deterred by the difficulty of sending trusty mes- 
sengers ; he also told himself that if Antony happened to learn 
or even to suspect the progress of these intrigues, he might 
precipitate events; in short, he had no hope that the con- 
servative party could gather an army to defend the cause of 
Czsar’s murderers. ‘The soldiers were too deeply inspired by 
Czsar’s spirit. ‘This was a pessimistic impression, which was, 
however, general throughout the aristocratic party.t 

* See (Cic. #2 XI, iv, 1s As XV. xxix.a'> de “Planco ef aDecumor 
sane velim possibly alludes to secret negotiations with Decimus Brutus 
and Plancus. 

+ With the exception of the few allusions already quoted from 
Cicero’s letters, there is no evidence of the negotiations or discussions 
which preceded the departure of Cassius for Syria. At the same time, 
as will be seen in the course of the narrative, it is obvious that Cassius 
started for Syria with a well-defined plan for seizing the province, 
Hence it is likely that during this period Cassius and the more energetic 
members of the conspirators’ party attempted to open negotiations 
with such governors as they might suppose favourable to their cause ; 
only on this supposition can the departure of Cassius be regarded as 
anything but a sudden and extravagant whim. 


Cicero prepares to start for Greece—The Ludi Apollinares— 

War of intrigue between Antony and Octavianus—Cesar’s 

comet—The promulgation of the “lex de permutatione ’’— 

Cicero interrupts his journey—The reconciliation of Octavianus 

and Antony—The “‘lex de permutatione”’ is approved— 

Cicero returns to Rome. 
Cicero had finished his book on “ Glory” and had nearly 
completed his treatise on “‘ Old Age,” but had been informed 
by Atticus that to balance his accounts he would be obliged 
to borrow two hundred thousand sesterces for five months, 
that is, until November 1. On that date his brother Quintus 
was to pay him an equivalent amount.* Atticus was ready 
to undertake the task of finding some one to lend the money, 
and Cicero was therefore free to start when he pleased. He 
returned to Puteoli towards the end of July, making the 
journey in short stages, and stopping at Anagnia,t at Arpinum,f 
and at Formiz.§ He proposed to make Puteoli his starting- 
point for the east, but he was still in great indecision. Unable 
to decide upon his course of action, he asked advice from every- 
body, and was not even sure whether he should embark at 
Puteoli, or go to Brundisium by land. For a moment he had 
thought of making the voyage with Brutus, who like Cassius, 
proposed to start in a short time upon his mission for the 
purchase of corn; Brutus had established himself in the little 

mcicn Ay XV. Xx. 4. 

+ Cic. A. XV. xxvi. 1. Tabellavius ..+ in Anagninum ad me venit 
im ea nocte que proxima ante Kal. fuit. On the difficulties of this 
passage see Ruete, Correspondenz Ciceros, p. 27. 

t Cic. A. XV. xxvi. 5 ; ex Arpinate. 

§ Cic. A. XV. xxix. 3. 

for departure. 

44 B.C, 



island of Nisida in the Bay of Naples, and lived in the villa 
of Lucullus, where he hired as many ships as the merchants 
of Puteoli and of Naples could provide. 

Various rumours, however, came into circulation, and dis- 
turbed the peace which had followed the passing of Antony’s 
laws. The report that Sextus Pompeius was inclined to 
make peace was confirmed, whereupon Cicero considered that 
the last hope of freedom was gone.* On the other hand, 
disquieting rumours concerning Antony’s intentions arose 
from time to time; it was even asserted that he was anxious 
to bring the Macedonian legions to Italy, and to disembark 
them at Brundisium ; ¢ there the Senate had placed them under 
his imperium in the month of March. Cicero regarded this 
possibility as very remote.[ But his confidence was by no 
means complete, and he feared that a journey to Brundisium 
might bring him face to face with these legions. It was there- 
fore, advisable to go by sea. ‘There was, however, a further 
danger to be faced, as the coasts were said to be infested by 
pirates.§ Cicero told himself that if he sailed with Brutus 
and his little fleet he would be more secure; on July 8, there- 
fore, he went over to Nisida, and was delighted to see in the 
roadstead of the beautiful little island the numerous vessels 
of Brutus, Cassius, Domitius Ahenobarbus and of other 
conservatives and conspirators who were in readiness to depart 
if the amnesty should be annulled. He tried to make Brutus 
understand his desire to accompany him. Brutus either did 
not or would not understand, and was indeed in greater uncer- 
tainty than Cicero himself. He was anxious to yield to the 
exhortations of Cassius, but he was also anxious for peace ; 
he wished to make a start, but before he could resolve to weigh 
anchor he wanted to know the state of feeling in Rome on the 
occasion of the games, hoping that these festivities would 
produce a change in public opinion and that he might then be 
able to stay. At that moment the first accounts arrived of the 
performance of a Greek comedy, at which the spectators 
* Ci. ALG G Vie, es ale eats 
7 Ciey AD XVI ive 4s 
t Cic. A. XVI. iv. 4 videtur .... dicuntur, 

§ Cic, A. XVL Wids KV 


were by no means numerous ; Cicero, however, explained the 
fact on the ground that such performances did not attract 
the Roman people, and that only at Latin comedies or at wild 
beast shows were there likely to be any public manifestations. 
Scribonius Libo then arrived with the first authentic letters 
from Sextus Pompeius, which a freedman had just brought 
from Spain; Sextus declared that he was ready to lay down 
arms if his father’s property were restored to him, and if the 
other leaders of the party would also resign their commands. 
It became obvious that he was more disposed to peace than 

As Cicero was unable to make any arrangements with Brutus, 
he returned to Puteoli, where he remained during the 9th and 
roth; he still cherished the idea of accompanying Brutus, 
even if the latter did not start immediately ; t on the roth 
he received a letter from Atticus saying that his voyage met with 
general approval at Rome, provided that he would return on 
January 1 ; t the same day he revisited Nisida. ‘There he found 
every one in delight at the news from Rome. The Tereus of 

'Accius had attracted a very numerous audience, and the per- 

formance had been most successful. Cicero was also delighted, 
though he was of the opinion that the people could defend 
the republic better by taking up arms than by applauding 
actors ;§ on his return to Puteoli he was again seized with a 
fit of impatience and wished to start immediately by way 
of Brundisium without waiting for Brutus. At that moment 

* Cicero, A. XVI. v. and XVI. iv. (these letters must be read in 
their entirety). In the early letters of the sixteenth book of letters 
to Atticus the arrangement is somewhat faulty. No. 5 was written 
before No. 4; in fact, in both of them Cicero’s visit to Brutus on 
July 8 is discussed, but in the opening of No. 4 (2ta ut hert ttbi narravt) 
there is an allusion to No.5. No. 4 was written on July 10; hodie; 
Quintus enim (who left Nisida on July 8, Cic. A. XVI. v. 2) altero 
die se atebat. Hence No. 5 belongs to July 9. Nos. 5 and 4 were 
therefore written after No. 1, but before Nos. 2 and 3, as No. 2 refers 
to the second visit to Brutus on July 10: see § 1. VI. Idus duas 
episiolas accepi.... §3: Fui enim apud illum (1.e., Brutus) multas 
horas in Neside, quum paulo ante tuas litteras accepissem. A. XVI. 
ili, 6 was written conscendens e Pompeiano, that is,a few days later. 
Hence the order is 1, 5, 4, 2, 3. 

7 Cic. A. XVI. iv. 4. 

mCic A XVI. 4 > XVI. vi. 2. § Cic, A. XVI. ii. 3. 

Ill F 

44 B.C. 


44 B.C. 

Position of 
Antony and 



the legions seemed to him less formidable than the pirates.* 
On July 11 he wrote to Atticus entrusting him with the general 
supervision of his property, begging him to make good his 
promises to all his creditors, and authorising him to contract 
loans, and even to sell property when necessary, for the pay- 
ment of all claims.t Atticus was, indeed, an excellent friend, 
and even at that moment he was thinking of publishing a 
collection of the great orator’s letters and had asked of him 
all the letters which he possessed.} 

Cicero started for Pompeii. Meanwhile the Ludi Apollinares 
had been concluded at Rome. ‘The conservative party 
asserted that they had been highly successful, whereas the 
friends of Antony and the opponents of the conspirators 
declared that the public had shown no enthusiasm.§ Thus 
it seems that the destinies of the republic were thought to 
turn upon the success of an actor! On this occasion, however, 
the friends of Brutus were certainly right, because the Roman 
audiences would recognise no party at the theatre or the 
circus, and applauded any performance which pleased them. 
Octavianus threw the more energy into the preparations for the 
games in honour of Cesar’s victory, and attempted to arrange 
a great demonstration in favour of Czsar’s son which would 
rouse Antony to fury. The latter, however, was by no means 
inactive ; he worked indefatigably to reorganise Czsar’s former 
party before presenting the law concerning the Gallic pro- 
vinces. He granted favours, scattered money with a lavish 
hand, and continually produced supposed decisions from 
Cesar’s papers. He added to the Senate individuals popularly 
known as Charon’s senators ; these were obscure individuals, 
creatures of his own, and centurions of Czsar’s army whose 
nominations he declared had been found among the dictator’s 
papers.|| By this means he had gathered round him all the 
capable members of the Cesarean party who were of low birth ; 
he had, moreover, attached to himself certain Cesareans of 
higher rank and even a few conservatives, such as Lucius 

Cie Ay SVL dA. | SPICE AMIRV RE a2, © Ah Cie Ay x Vile 

§ The first version is given by Plutarch, Brut. 21, and Cicero, Phil. I. 
xv. 36; the second by Appian, B.C. iii. 24. 

|| Plutarch, Ant. 15. 


Tremellius, who, as tribune of the people, had vigorously 
opposed Dolabella’s revolution in 47. ‘Times were hard and 
Tremellius, like many others, was embarrassed by pecuniary 
anxieties; he had, however, decided to join Antony as had 
also the former edile, Lucius Varius Cotila.* Antony was also 
attempting to corrupt Cicero’s nephew,t and, apparently, 
Czsar’s father-in-law, Piso himself; { it was possibly at that 
time that he opened negotiations with Lepidus for the engage- 
ment of one of his daughters to one of Lepidus’ sons, neither 
of the parties being yet of age;§ in short, he made every 
possible effort to remain on good terms with the conservatives. 
His decision concerning the question of Buthrotum had so 
entirely secured the favour of Atticus that the rich financier 
had made a special journey to Tibur to thank him.|| Mean- 
while, Lucius Antonius was busy putting the land law into 
operation ; he had the public lands surveyed, and attempted 
to buy private estates at prices which varied with the ownership 
of the land by friends or by enemies. He soon had so many 
flatterers about his person that some one eventually proposed 
to arrange for the thirty-five tribes to erect an equestrian 
monument to him in the forum.{ Supported as he was 
by so many different: interests, Antony’s power seemed im- 
pregnable, and the efforts of Octavianus seemed doomed 
to failure. He, however, enjoyed great popularity with the 
veterans and the mob, even with the friends of the consul, 
and with the whole of the popular party as reconstructed 
by Antony. Cesarean fanaticism had grown so violent that 
the very name of Czsar would have been enough to secure 
his popularity, apart from the dexterity of his efforts to gain 
sympathy on every side. Thus the Cesarean party were 
inclined to regret the differences which had arisen between 

* Cic. Pil. VI; iv. 11. 

} Cp. Cic. A. XV. xxi. 1 (though the passage is not clear). 

+ Cp. Cic. A. XV. xxvi. 1. 

§ Dion, xliv. 53. He, however, confuses the dates by bringing 
together the offer of the pontificate and this marriage. Cicero F. XII. 
ii. 2 (the letter is written in the last ten days of September) says, 
with obvious allusion to Lepidus, that affinitate nova delectatur ; as 
Lepidus was in Gallia Narbonensis, negotiations concerning this marriage 
must have been begun about this time. 

HeGicw A oc Vile ii./T. 4 Cp. Cic. Pil, VI. v. 12: 

44 B.C. 

44. BC. 



the consul and Octavianus. It was even said that Antony had 
shown excessive severity. Was it possible that the Cesarean 
party could refuse office to Czsar’s son, seeing that his presence 
would be a considerable source of strength to themselves? * 
However, the political tranquillity remained unbroken and 
when Cicero left his villa at Pompeii on July 17+ to begin 
his journey at last, he was able to calm his conscience and 
to persuade himself that he was not taking flight. At that 
moment all was peaceful, and he proposed to return on January 
I, at which time disturbances would probably begin.[ His 
plans, however, had undergone a further change in the course 
of his journey ; he resolved to go not by land but by sea with 
three little ten-oared vessels which he had hired at Pompeii ; § 
on his arrival at Rhegium he would attempt to secure a 
passage upon some large merchantman and sail directly to 
Patrae or follow the coast with his little ships as far as Leuco- 
petra of the Tarentines ; || then he would make straight for 
Corcyra ; at the same time he was not entirely content and 
could not make up his mind upon the advisability of his action, 
while he was still harassed by many financial anxieties. His 
accounts had been balanced, thanks to the help which Atticus 
had given before his departure, but the money owed him by 
Dolabella on account of Tullia’s dowry was still outstanding, 
and the prospects of payment were by no means certain, 
as Dolabella had given him a note of hand in lieu of ready 
money. He was so afraid that upon his departure the 
delicate balance of parties might be disturbed that he had 
been anxious to entrust the entire administration of his 
affairs to Atticus; he had also commissioned the rich 
financier, Balbus, to watch over the honour of his name.** 
In any case, for good or for evil he began his journey, and 

* Nic. Dam. 293 

ft Cic. A. XVI. vi. 1 says that he was at Vibona on July 24, the 
eighth day after his departure ; he therefore started on the 17th. 

PaCic ANON Vile tidings mess Vile nvaloes 

§ Cic. A. XVI. iii. 6. 

|| Cic. A. XVI, vi. t thus gives the name, but he certainly meant 
Cape Leuca, and not Leucopetra, near Rhegium, of which he speaks in 
the following letter. 

4 Cic. A, XVI, vi. 1. RHE CLOW AG OX Vile to ue VL ation 


shortly afterwards, during the last ten days of July, the games _July, 
in honour of Cesar’s victory were celebrated at Rome. This 44 8.¢- 
event had been preceded by a sharp dispute between Antony 
and Octavianus. ‘The latter had been anxious to bring Czsar’s 
golden chair to the theatre, and certain tribunes in Antony’s 
pay had opposed this design. Antony had applied to the 
consul who not only supported the tribunes but threatened 
to imprison Octavianus if he attempted any disturbance.* 
None the less the people and the veterans, who regretted these 
scandals, made great demonstrations in favour of the young 
man during the three or four days that the games continued.t 
On the evening of the last day a great comet was seen in the 
sky, and Octavianus, to stimulate the religious adoration in 
which the name of Cesar was held at Rome, asserted that the 
comet was the soul of Czsar, which had risen to the sky and 
taken its place among the gods. In the temple of Venus he 
placed a statue of Czsar, the head of which was decorated 
with a golden comet.f 

But on the conclusion of the games, the tranquillity which The Jer a 
apparently prevailed at Rome was rudely broken before the Pabst. 
end of the month. Antony and Dolabella suddenly promul- 
gated a lex de permutatione provinciarum § depriving Decimus 
Brutus, Cesar’s murderer, of Cisalpine Gaul, which province 
was iminediately transferred to Antony with the legions in 
Macedonia; he was also to hold Gallia Comata|| from 
the outset of the following year. In return, Decimus received 
Macedonia for the rest of the year. As Cicero had gone and 
Decimus was marching with his army towards the Alps, Antony 
had chosen this moment to secure the Gallic provinces until 
the year 39, and to reply at the same time to the accusations 
of Octavianus by satisfying the veterans who were indignant 
with the amnesty of March 17. Antony, however, was not 

* Dion, xlv.6; Appian B.C; iii) 28; Nic. Dam. 28; Plut. Ant. 
“Sp Nic. Dam. 28. Cp. Schmidt, Neue Jahrbucher fiir Philologie und 
Pddagogik, 1883, i. p. 864. 

¢ Dion, xlv. 7; Suet. Cas. 88. 

§ Livy, Per. cxvii. 

\| Not merely Cisalpine Gaul, as Krause thinks: see Schmidt, N.J.P.P. 
uppl. vol. xiii. p. 714. 


44 B.C. 


anxious to provoke a further civil war, and while he yielded to 
the force of the Casarean and revolutionary movement, he 
strove to spare his adversaries as far as possible. He did not 
now propose to annul the amnesty, but simply to deprive 
Decimus of his command for the few remaining months of 
his term of office. While intending to represent this action 
to the veterans as a great humiliation for the conspirators, he 
also hoped that the conservatives would accept the change, 
as Decimus was to have Macedonia by way of compensation ; 
he seems also to have entertained some hope that he might 
secure a secret understanding with his comrade of the Gallic 
War and induce Decimus to agree to the change.* As a matter 
of fact, though this change of province was by no means 
favourable to the conservative party, it was much less serious 
than the repeal of the amnesty. Antony, however, was 
speedily undeceived ; as soon as the law was known, a wild 
political and financial panic broke out at Rome. Once more 
alarm for the maintenance of the amnesty was general, and 
Antony was credited with the most sinister intentions. Civil 
war was thought inevitable and money could not be borrowed 
at any price ; tT a few of the leading members of the conserva- 
tive party who were still at Rome awoke from their long inac- 
tion and attempted to combine both among themselves and 
with Brutus and Cassius. Certain leading Cesareans then 
joined the conservative side, including Piso, Cesar’s father- 
in-law, who declared himself ready to support in the Senate a 
proposal which seemed likely to settle the question of Cisalpine 
Gaul for ever; as the right of citizenship had been granted 
to the inhabitants of that district, it was time to secure its 
complete amalgamation with Italy, when neither pro-consul 
nor pro-pretor would be there required. It was agreed that 
on August 1 a large number of senators should be present at 
the session to refuse auctoritas to the proposal if Antony 
demanded it, and if he did not, to beg the two or three tribunes 
opposed to Antony to use their veto.t During these prepara- 

* Such is apparently the meaning of Dion, xlv. 14: kal adrov 
(Decimus) 6 ’Avravios édrida odd) elyev . . . 

f Cic. A. XVI, vii. 6, mirifica enim dvoxpnoria est propter metum 
aymorum ... t Appian, B.C, iii. 30, 


tions the public, who realised that the consul’s audacity had 
been largely increased by Cicero’s departure, displayed great 
dissatisfaction with the orator, and asked how he could have 
gone to see the Olympic games at so criticala moment. That 
this was the object of his journey was generally believed 
throughout Rome, and every one began to wonder whether the 
former consul had lost his reason. Atticus wrote to him in a 
panic, urging him to return, and sent the letter with the 
utmost speed to Leucopetra, hoping that it would reach him 
in time.* Bar | 

Cicero, however, who knew nothing of all this, was coasting 
along the shores of Southern Italy, and spending his time 
on board in writing books in the intervals of constant self- 
examination. He wondered whether he had been wise in 
departing, he was torn with regrets and doubts, ashamed to 
turn back, and yet afraid that evil might result if he went on. 
Thus he reached Syracuse on August 1 and Leucopetra on 
August 6, but hardly had he left this latter town when a violent 
gale obliged him to disembark almost at once at the villa of 
Publius Valerius, one of his friends, and to wait there for a 
change of wind. It was soon known throughout the neighbour- 
hood and even in Rhegium that Cicero was in this villa, and 
numerous citizens of the upper middle classes, whose sympathy 
with the conspirators was real, if not practical, came to call 
upon him. They had left Rome on July 29, or 30, and related 
events since his departure, the promulgation of the law, the 
panic, public opinion as affecting himself and an improvement 
in the situation which had since become manifest. Antony 
seems to have been alarmed for the moment by the agitation 
of the conservative party, the extent of which he could not 
foresee, and also by the intervention of Piso. He had, indeed, 
delivered a most conciliatory speech, had hinted that he would 
give Brutus and Cassius more important provinces in place of 
their mission for the purchase of corn, and that he would try 
to arrange a compromise upon the question of the Gallic 
provinces. Brutus and Cassius had then published a manifesto 
declaring that they were ready to resign their offices and go 

1 (CO. TaN, MISTS Ah 2. 

44 B.C. 


44 B.C. 

The situation 
at Rome. 


into exile, if such action would conduce to the public peace ; 
this was intended as a refutation of those Czsareans who sup- 
ported the law while accusing the conspirators of fomenting 
a fresh civil war.* Thereupon the general hopes began to 
rise, and these were communicated to Cicero by the inhabitants 
of Rhegium, who had returned from Rome. Antony was ill- 
advised, but he was careful; hence it was probable that peace 
would be secured, and that Brutus and Cassius would return to 
Rome.t Cicero, however, had received the letters from 
Atticus,t and he immediately resolved to return. 

While he was travelling with this object in view, affairs at 
Rome began to run a very different course from that which 
he had expected. Antony’s hesitation was but short-lived, 
for he had been impelled to action, not only by the continual 
incitement of Fulvia and Lucius,§ but by the enthusiasm of his 
veterans. ‘The latter had interpreted the lex de permutatione in 
the light of their own desires and interests, without considera- 
tion for Antony’s intentions. They told themselves that the 
pro-consulship of Gaul, as essential to the domination of Italy, 
was the best guarantee for the maintenance of the Cesarean 
party; that if this province were taken from the conspirators 
and given to a Cesarean, they could feel sure that their in- 
terests would be protected, while the task of avenging Cesar 
would be an easy matter; Antony, the faithful friend of the 
dictator, would accomplish this vengeance and would re- 
establish the power of the conquerors of Pharsalia and Munda. 
This outburst of enthusiasm swept away the consul, the Senate, 
and every one else. On August 1, Piso delivered a vigorous 
speech against Antony in the Senate, and brought forward 

* The manifesto of Brutus and Cassius to which Cicero refers, 
Phal. I. iii. 8 and A. XVI. vii. 1, is probably that of which Velleius II. 
Ixii. 3, gives a part, and the gist of which may be inferred by com- 
paring this passage with Cicero, F. XI.iii. Groebe, App. to Drumann, 
G.R., 12, p. 430, supposes that in the manifesto they demanded the 
provinces which they should have had as praetors for the following 
year. This, however, seems unlikely, as the object of the manifesto 
was to force Antony to resign his claims to Gaul. 

le CicwPAl. Ly iil, 8p AV le valence 

t Cic. A. XVI. vii. 2, lectis vero tuts litteris. 

§ Cic. Phil. I. iii. 8, malis swasoribus, an obvious allusion to Fulvia 
and Lucius. 


his proposal for dealing with Cisalpine Gaul; the Senate, 
however, overawed by the veterans, received the speech coldly,* 
and contented themselves with giving new provinces to Brutus 
and Cassius, which were no better than those they had had 
before. One of these was Crete and the other seems to have 
been Cyrene.t On his side, Antony found further equivoca- 
tion impossible ; in order to content the veterans he was obliged 
to declare open war upon the conspirators, and he replied to 
the generous proposals of Brutus and Cassius by a letter and a 
manifesto both of equal violence, in which he reproached them 
with wishing to desert their posts and to begin a civil war. On 
August 4, Brutus and Cassius replied with similar vehemence ; 
they were not fomenting a civil war nor were they afraid 
of Antony; their action was inspired by patriotism.[ But 
during the progress of this quarrel, the enthusiasm of Czsar’s 
veterans for the dictator increased with such rapidity as to 
involve Antony in further embarrassments. It became neces- 
sary to elect a tribune of the people in place of that Cinna 
who had been killed on the day of Czsar’s funeral ; Octavianus, 
encouraged by the success of his games, had conceived the idea 
of offering himself as a candidate, although he was a patrician. 
Antony opposed this design, and eventually postponed the 
election to a later date.§ The veterans, however, continued 
to deplore the dissension between Antony and Octavianus ; 
some of them in the delight which the lex de permutatione 
had inspired, asserted that it was time to stop these fatal quarrels 
and that the veterans should intervene in the interests of peace. 
Consequently one day during the first fortnight of August, 
Octavianus was informed that a band of soldiers were marching 
to his house. His servants and friends were terrified, and the 
doors were hastily closed; Octavianus mounted to the roof 
to observe the situation without being seen. The crowd, 
however, began to cheer ; Octavianus was emboldened to show 
himself, and was received with loud applause. The soldiers 

Cie Pril. Viv. 10: 1. vi. 14; A. XVI. vi. 7: 

+ That these provinces were assigned at this session is a conjecture. 

Gio bx1,\ 3) 

§ Suet. Aug. 10; Dion, xlv. 6; Appian, B.C, iii. 31. The date, 
however, is a conjecture. 

44 B.C, 

44 B.C. 

and Antony. 


were anxious for a final reconciliation between him and Antony, 
and had come to look for him, while others had gone to fetch 

Neither Octavianus nor Antony could venture to reject a 
reconciliation arranged in such a manner and by such well- 
wishers, the less so as the time for voting upon the lex de 
permutatione was close at hand. Peace was therefore made ; 
Antony and Octavianus exchanged visits and compliments, 
Octavianus even declared himself ready to support the law, 
which was approved shortly afterwards in the second half of 
August. Such tribunes as were opposed to it were probably 
bought over,t while those who remained incorruptible were 
kept away by barricading the entrance to the forum and 
allowing none but friends to pass.t Cicero learnt of these 
events at Velia where he met Brutus, who was slowly moving 
along the coast of Italy with his fleet, having definitely 
decided to depart. Their conversation was melancholy in 
the extreme, for Brutus was utterly discouraged. When once 
the lex de permutatione was approved, Cesar’s friends would 
be masters of the republic and could deal with the amnesty 

* Dion, xlv. 8; Nic. Dam. 29; Plutarch, Ané. 16, speak of only 
one reconciliation between Antony and Octavianus ; according to Appian 
iii. 30 and 39, there were, on the contrary, two reconciliations. Even 
if Appian is correct, the second reconciliation is of little importance, 
as can be seen from his own narrative. The important reconciliation 
was the first, and the date of this can be determined, for the narratives 
harmonise if it be admitted that the lex de permutatione was approved 
in the month of August. Dion puts it after the Ludi V.C.; Appian, 
iii. 30, shortly after the vote on the lex de permutatione ; so also does 
Nicholas of Damascus, contrary to the idea of Schiller, Geschichte 
dey Romischen Kaitserzeit, Gotha, 1883, i. 29, n. 5. Nicholas does 
not put this reconciliation before Antony’s journey to Brundisium, 
but before the exchange of provinces (chap. xxx.) ; he refers to it only 
in a few words because in his biography of Augustus he gives nothing 
more than the outline of any such event as does not immediately 
concern his hero, Plutarch, Ant. 16, is evident y wrong in putting 
this reconciliation at the time when an agreement was concluded 
between Octavianus and Cicero. Thus the question of this date becomes 
a difficulty. The texts, however, harmonise with wonderful consis- 
tency if the lex de permutatione be placed in the month of August, 
which is a fresh argument in favour of this hypothesis. 

7 Appian, B.C. iii. 30. 

{ Livy, Per. 117: quum...legem... per vim tulisset. Cp. Cic. 
Phil: V: iv. 9. 


as they pleased, while the only resource left to the conspirators 
and the conservatives was the supreme expedient of civil war ; 
but it was doubtful if the conservatives could find an army. 
Brutus did not share the optimism of Cassius; the latter 
with confident audacity and in agreement as it seems, with 
Servilia, had shortly before the end of July sent secret 
messengers to T'rebonius, to the officers of the Egyptian legions, 
and to Cecilius Bassus, proposing that a great army should be 
prepared in the east for the defence of the conservative cause, 
and also informing them that he, at any rate, was ready to go 
to Syria. With the consent of Brutus, some complicity in 
this plot was given to Marcus Scaptius, an intriguer whom 
he had used to make his loans in Cyprus and who had many 
friends and relatives in the east. Brutus himself abandoned 
the struggle and having procured about 100,000 sesterces from 
Atticus for the expenses of his journey,* was going into volun- 
tary exile in Greece, thus sacrificing himself to the cause of 
peace. When, however, he found that Cicero was inclined 
to enter the fray once more, he made no attempt to dissuade 
him ; indeed, he congratulated him upon his intentions and ex- 
plained the bad impression which his departure had caused ; he 
advised him to go to Rome without delay, and to lead the 
opposition against Antony.t However, Cicero’s enthusiasm 
was beginning to cool, and he was once more beset by doubts. 
With what purpose could he go to Rome? Could he make 
head against Antony | in view of the present condition of the 
Senate ? After the law upon Gaul the question of the amnesty 
would come forward, and to oppose Antony and his veterans 
on this subject would be no easy matter. At this moment 
Hirtius, whose health had long been feeble, became so seriously 
ill as to cause fresh anxiety to the conservative party.§ 
If Hirtius were to die, Antony would certainly secure the 
appointment of a declared Cesarean as consul for the year 43. 

However, the laudations which Piso had received, the desire 
to efface the impression caused by his recent journey, and the 
exhortations of all who stated that he alone could save the 

* Cornelius Nepos, AZt. viii. 6. 1p MOiKSe, Hey, MIS Sag Si 
POCA Devil, 7. § Cic. Phil. I. xv. 37. 

44. B.C. 

Cicero reaches 

44 B.c. 


republic, largely determined Cicero’s action; he was’ also 
anxious to be at Rome in view of the anxiety caused by his 
private affairs. "The panic produced by the lex de permutatione 
had hopelessly confused the balance-sheet which Atticus had 
prepared with such care; Atticus had written to him a short 
time before stating that he could only pay his debts by calling 
in outstanding loans, as it was impossible to borrow money 
at any price ; * amid the uncertainties of the situation Cicero 
could hardly insist upon the repayment of the whole of his 
loans unless he met his debtors in person. ‘Thus he conquered 
his remaining hesitations and reached Rome on August 31 
where he was rapturously received by his friends and admirers. 
Fortunately he found that Hirtius was out of danger upon his 

* Cic. A. XVI: vii. 6, 

7 Cic. Phil. V. vii. 19 says that on September 1 was held the session 
at which he was not present to hear Antony’s threats against him. 

Plut, Cic. 43, says the session was held the day after his arrival, 
Hence he reached Rome on August 31: 


The “‘ lex judiciaria’’ and the “lex de vi et majestate ’’—The 
economic and moral crisis in Italy—Scandal during the 
senatorial session of September 1, 44—Fictitious attempts at 
assassination attributed to Octavianus—Antony starts for 
Brundisium—Octavianus starts for Campania—Antony and 
the Macedonian legions—Octavianus requests an interview 
with Cicero. 

Wuen Cicero reached Rome, Antony had already promulgated The situation 
two further laws, a lex de tertia decuria, and a lex de vi et* pace? 
majestate. He had ordered four of the Macedonian legions, the 
Second, the Fourth, the Thirty-fifth and the Martian legion, to 

cross the Adriatic. When these troops were added to the legion 

of the “ Lark,’”? he would have a considerable force at his dis- 

posal in Italy, if Decimus did not agree to recognise the laws on 

his return from the Alps. He had, however, made no proposal 

on the subject of the amnesty ; in other words, he continued 

to flatter the people and the Cesarean party without as yet 
attacking this question, which he regarded as extremely dan- 
gerous. Much as the conspirators feared that he might pro- 

ceed to abolish the amnesty, he was himself no less afraid of any 

such action. By the first of these laws he conciliated the soldiers, 

as he thereby destroyed the aristocratic reform of the courts, 

which Cesar had carried out in 46; the list of citizens from whom 
judges, or jurymen, as we say to-day, were drawn for the 
guestiones, would no longer be limited to the senators and 
knights, in other words, to the upper classes, but would also 
include the centurions and lower military officers, whose names 

would be enrolled without any pecuniary qualification. The 


Sept. second of these laws provided that every citizen condemned 
44B.C. for majestas or vis, and all offences against the public peace 
fell under these two heads, should have the right of provocatio 
or appeal to the comitia, a right which Sulla and Cesar had 
abolished.* By this law Antony condemned the punishment 
of Herophilus and the massacre of 47, by making the rapid 
suppression of riots almost impossible. Finally, to provide 
a further harmless satisfaction for the people, though from 
a certain point of view it was a most audacious proposal, Antony 
intended to propose to the Senate on the following day, Sep- 
tember 1, that in addition to the funeral honours which Cesar’s 
family would annually perform, public supplications should be 
added, such as were offered to the gods; this was tantamount 
to a proposal for Czsar’s deification.t ‘This Oriental supersti- 
tion, so hateful to the Romans, had made great progress within 
the last two months. The ignorant mob had begun by making 
simple offerings upon the altar erected by Herophilus ; a month 
later, Octavianus had followed with his declamations upon the 
comet and the dictator’s soul, while now at the end of another 
month, a proposal was made for the official inauguration of 
Cesar’s worship. 
maionys The popular party seemed once more to be victorious, and 
its triumph to be even more complete than that of §9. Antony, 
however, did not possess that energy with which his master 
Cesar had pushed his triumph to the furthest point without 
leaving the enemy a moment’s rest. Hitherto he had acted 
with great circumspection, hesitating, equivocating, and contra- 
dicting himself, but taking infinite precautions to secure his 
personal safety; the least opposition caused him nervous 
anxiety ; fatigue, excitement, and debauchery had made him 
more irritable than ever.§ Not only were the two leaders 
themselves different, but the situation also had changed since 
Cesar’s first consulship, and the change was not to Antony’s 
advantage. At the time of Cesar’s first consulship the recollec- 
tions of the civil war of Sulla and Marius had almost died 
away ; Catiline’s conspiracy, a danger in any case exaggerated, 

* Cic. Phtl. I. viii. 19 ; I. ix. 21, Tt Cic. Phsl. I, vi. 13: 
t Cic. A, XV. xx. 4; tste qui umbras timet (Antony). 
§ Cic. Phil. I. xi. 27; ewm (Antony) tracundum audio esse factum: 


had been crushed; the triumphs of Lucullus and of Pompey _ Sept. 
in the east were of recent occurrence; the wealth ofthe nation  448.¢. 
was rapidly increasing, while its intellectual vitality was no 

less vigorous. Complaints were customary and habitual, but 

there was confidence in the future, and no apprehension of any 

great catastrophe ; such immediate difficulties as debt, admin- 
istrative disorganisation, political corruption and instability 

were accepted with no undue misgivings. ‘Thus the revolution 
accomplished by Cesar had met with no opposition or was 

even greeted with admiration on the part of the middle classes, 

who were rapidly transforming the social life of Italy. 

Great was the difference at the present moment; every The 
class and every party had been bitterly deceived and grievously oy ae 
harassed; rich and poor, conservative and democrat were 
alike weary, mistrustful, and exhausted ; the social and political 
life of Italy was utterly disorganised. The whole country was 
more than ever inspired with the conservative spirit, with the 
fear of a revolution, hatred of mob rule, and the love of social 
order; at the same time, there was, correctly speaking, no 
conservative party. The upper classes were sunk in brutal 
selfishness, the spirit of which appears in a letter written at 

| this time by Atticus to Cicero; “If the republic is lost, at 
| any rate save our property.” * Selfishness of this kind implied 
_ the risk of losing not only the republic, but also the property. 
Of the younger generation no individual was willing to take the 
» risk of a struggle against the revolution; the old champions, 
their numbers thinned and scattered, unequal to the task of 
defending the interests of the wealthy classes, could discover 
| no recruits, and but few of the bolder and more energetic 
citizens thought of defending themselves. At the same time, 
| paradoxical as it may seem, the projects advised by these in- 
| dividuals amid the general disorganisation of their party were 
' rash even to the bounds of madness. Cassius was ready to 
start alone with a few ships for the conquest of the East, and at 
| the same time, another, whose name is unknown, was supporting 
/ a yet more audacious and difficult plot, with the help of the 
_ less enlightened conservatives ; this plan was nothing less than 

* Gic, A. XVI. 11. 13 

44 B.C. 

The popular 


to rouse a revolt of the legions in Macedonia against their 
general by any and every means; by accusing Antony of 
disloyalty to Czsar and of lukewarmness in his cause, and by 
applying not only to the many officers of those legions who 
were friendly to the conservatives, but to Octavianus himself, 
who was to be used for the conversion of his friends, a yet more 
numerous body. The first attempts to embroil Octavianus with 
Antony had failed because the veterans had intervened, but 
neither Marcellus nor the other noble friends of the family had 
ceased their efforts to undermine the confidence of Octavianus 
and to persuade him that he could not trust Antony, the recon- 
ciliation notwithstanding, and that he should help them to 
sow sedition among the troops of the overbearing consul. 
Though the action of the conservative party was confined 
to such disconnected intrigues, the popular party could boast 
no greater solidarity. It undoubtedly enjoyed the sympathies 
of the mob, who were constant in their admiration for 
Cesar and their hatred of his murderers; it was also sup- 
ported by a strong coalition of interests and by the veterans 
and colonists of Casar who were anxious either to keep what 
the dictator had given them or to receive what he had promised. 
The veterans eagerly demanded a further appeal to arms, and 
offered their leaders anything they desired in exchange, even 
to the empire of the world. But no one could be found to 
grasp the sword without hesitation. No one could forget the 
cowardice of the Ides of March, or Cesar, the conqueror of 
Gaul, the founder of many colonies, dictator for life, stabbed 
by his friends and debtors openly in the Senate, before the eyes 
of other partisans, not one of whom dared to come to his help. 
No one could forget the appalling disorganisation which over- 
took the popular party on the death of its leader, or the speedy 
dissolution which, in a few months, had reduced a party of 
supreme power to a gang of desperadoes, bandits, and adven- 
turers. No one could throw off the general depression which 
beset every thinking man. Nor did any one believe in the 
possibility of success as before; it seemed unlikely that the 
prevailing state of debt could be relieved without difficulty, 
or that the political and economic crisis by which Italy was 


torn asunder could ever come to an end. In desperation, the 
country had recently sought a remedy for these evils ; the only 
consequence of the civil war had been to accentuate them. 
Values had been diminished, and many vast estates such as 
those of Pompey and Labienus had been confiscated and 
divided. Many of Cesar’s tribunes, centurions and soldiers 
had secured comfort or even wealth; * but if the multitude 
was not poorer than before, it was certainly less contented, 

while the middle classes found their burdens in no way lightened.’ 

For a time the powerful revolutionary dictatorship had crushed 
the former conflict of party; a few dagger-thrusts had over- 
thrown it one morning and the last state of the Roman world 
was worse than the former. The governmental power was not 
even in the hands of one of the old factions, but was wielded 
at one time by Herophilus, at another by Fulvia. Amid such 
uncertainties, it was impossible for Antony to cherish illusions. 
True, monuments were erected to his brother Lucius not 
only by the tribes but by the joint efforts of the knights 
and usurers; his wife Fulvia was able in these critical 
periods to buy vast estates which obliging vendors were ready 
to sell on credit ; ¢ and the Senate was blindly obedient to his 
orders. But Antony had seen Cesar slain by his dearest friends ; 
he had seen many politicians continually changing front and 
contradicting on one day their avowals of the day before ; 
though events had forced him to take command of the 
gang of adventurers who now constituted Cesar’s party, he 
distrusted them far too deeply to begin a decisive action with 
their support, except after the utmost consideration. He was 
forced to climb a steep and slippery slope, upon an uncertain 
surface which gave way at every step, and his mistrust of men 
and things was necessarily universal. 

44 B.C. 

Even Cicero’s return and the joyful welcome which he Antony and 
received caused the consul keen irritation. It seemed that Cicer 

the opposition were about to discover a leader, and a man, too, 
of high authority. Brutus and Cassius had gone, but Antony 
benefited little in consequence, as Cicero had come back, 
and had, moreover, returned in time for the session which was 

*Cp, Cich Ay XIV. x. 10, 2: + Corn, Nepos, Ait. ix. 5, 

44 B.C. 

The first 


to be held the following day in the Temple of Concord. Cicero 
however, did not appear in the Senate on September 1, and 
sent a friend to inform Antony that the fatigue of his journey 
would not allow him to leave his house.* It is much more pro- 
bable that Cicero did not venture to oppose the deification of 
Cesar because he was afraid of the veterans; and that as he 
could not go to the Senate and sit in silence, he had invented 
this excuse. In any case Antony should have been delighted. 
Yet the state of his mind is difficult to explain. Violent by 
nature, and at this time even more irritable than usual, he may 
have yielded to a sudden access of fury, or again, may have 
pretended a show of wrath, to intimidate Cicero, and induce 
him to leave the country. Either supposition is possible. 
The facts are that when this message was delivered to him, 
Antony flew into a violent rage and thundered before the Senate 
that Cicero was hinting at some attempt upon his life, was 
slandering and insulting him, that he would use all his consular 
rights and bring him to the Senate by force, and that if he 
resisted, he would send soldiers and smiths to break down the 
doors of his house.t ‘These words caused a great sensation ; 
the senators immediately rose and begged him to be calm. 
Antony either perceived that he had gone too far, or his fury 
was merely a pretence; he eventually annulled the order for 
bringing Cicero to the Senate by force.{ The law was then 
approved concerning the honours to be rendered to Cesar.§ 
Antony had doubtless intimidated Cicero by these threats, 
but he had also insulted the most illustrious member of the 
Senate, and that so openly that the orator, notwithstanding 
his weakness and his advanced age, could not fail to resent the 
affront. In fact, the aged orator showed his resentment, not- 

* Cicero, Phil. I. v. 12; Plutarch, Cic. 43. Plutarch asserts that 
he did not come because an ambush was laid for him, but this cannot 
be true. Neither Antony nor any one else would have conceived 
such an outrage. This was the explanation given by Antony’s enemies, 
and the consul for that reason yaderés pév elyev eri TH SiaBorH: “ He 
was indignant at such a calumny’”’; hence I have assumed that 
Antony protested against the calumny in his excitement. 

t Cicero, Phil. I. v. 12; Plutarch, Cic. 43. The smiths were in- 
tended to break down the doors, and not to destroy the house, as 
some historians explain, ToPluit. Circa es 

§ Cic, Phil. I. vi. 13. Quod vos tnviti secutt estis. 


withstanding his fear of Antony and the veterans, in a Sept.2, 
weighty and dignified speech which he wrote the same day;  448.¢. 
this was the first of the speeches against Antony, to which he 
afterwards gave the title of Philippics, by which they are still 
known, a name given half in jest and half seriously in memory 
of Demosthenes.* In this speech he first explained the reasons 
for his journey and for his absence the preceding day ; he re- 
gretted Antony’s invectives, but briefly and with a certain 
gravity, as if it ill-became him to discuss a matter so little 
consonant with his dignity. He then proceeded to consider 
the condition of the republic; he criticised Antony’s policy, 
but with moderation and from a strange point of view, accusing 
him of insufficient respect for Czsar’s laws and decisions, as 
though he would indicate to the veterans that he was ready 
to respect the dictator’s wishes even more sincerely than 
Antony himself. Finally, he objected to Antony’s laws, not 
for their provisions, but for the irregularity of his procedure, 
and concluded with advice to Antony and Dolabella to recon- 
sider their intentions, avoid any disloyal ambitions, and to 
» put into practice the classical theory of the constitution pro- 

pounded by Aristotle and popularised by himself: Jibertate 
esse parem ceteris, principem dignitate, to be the first citizen in 
a republic of citizens with equal rights.t In short, by this 
speech he seemed to indicate that he was ready to receive an 
apology if it were forthcoming. On September 2, however, 
Antony did not appear in the Senate;{ possibly he feared 
Cicero’s eloquence as much as Cicero feared the veterans, and 
thought he might be unable to make a fitting reply. In any 
case his absence was a fresh insult to Cicero. He left the Senate 
as Antony’s declared enemy; he declined to greet him when 
they met in the street ; § he referred to him, not in public, but 
in private and in his letters as a madman, a gladiator, and a 
desperado ; || he accused him of preparing a general massacre 
of senators and nobles which was to begin with himself,] and 

* Cp. Cicero, ad Brut. II. v. 4. | Cicer Prds lexiv34: 

£ Cic. Phil. I. vii. 16; I. xiii. 31. 

§ Plut. Cre. 43. 

: | Cic. F. XII. ii. 1; homo amens et perditus. F. XII. iii 1. 
4 q Cic. F. XII, ii. 1. 

44 B.C. 

Antony’s reply 

to Cicero. 

Supposed plot 
of Octavianus 


suspected the motives of all who did not openly declare their 
hostility to Antony.* 

This tendency to impute evil motives, this frenzy for 
mutual persecution, which in times of great social crises may 
pervade every party and every class, is the most dangerous of 
maladies, for the reason that the politician who exaggerates 
the numbers and the fury of his enemies often makes real 
adversaries of imaginary opponents. Such was the case in the 
present instance. None of the conspirators was able to realise 
Antony’s perplexity and hesitation ; all imagined that as soon 
as the Macedonian legions reached Italy, he would annul 
the amnesty, and in view of the imminent danger which seemed 
to threaten every member of their party, they began yet more 
vigorous intrigues with the Macedonian legions and with 
Octavianus. Whether the latter was won over is a doubtful 
question ; probably he declined to listen, but it appears that 
about this time Antony perceived the web of intrigue which 
centred about the Macedonian legions. No other theory 
will explain why Antony at this moment suddenly abandoned 
all prudence without apparent motive and began a violent 
attack upon the conspirators, the conservatives, and Octavianus. 
After a silence of seventeen days, when every one began to think 
that he would make no answer to Cicero, he suddenly convened 
a meeting of the Senate for the 19th and delivered a most 
violent speech against the great orator, accusing him of having 
organised a conspiracy against Cesar.t Cicero, divided between 
his anger and his fear of Antony, of his machinations and of his 
veterans, remained at home on that day.t Thereupon during 
the second half of September news arrived that Decimus Brutus 
was returning from his expedition in the Alps, and that he had 
been greeted as imperator by his soldiers.§ 

On this news the conservatives recovered courage, and 
Antony strove to arouse Cesarean enthusiasm among his own 
* Cio, By ll, G2 =3- Ti Gicy Eko tl. X11,530) - sib ex Minions 

t Cic. Phil. V. vii. 20. 

§ Sternkopf, in Philologus 1x. pp. 303-304, supposes with good 
reason that Cicero’s letter F. xi. 4 was written in September, and 

that the letter F. XI. vi. 1 is the reply, placed by mistake at the begin- 
ning of another letter consisting of §§ 2 and 3. 



party; upon the pedestal of a statue of Czsar on the rostra, October, 
he inscribed the words “ parenti optime merito;* on October 44 3.¢. 
2 at a popular meeting he delivered so violent a speech against 
the conspirators that the conservatives believed he had already 
annulled the amnesty of March 17; finally he laid a snare 
for Octavianus a few days later, onthe 4thor 5th.t A rumour 
suddenly arose about that time that Antony had discovered 
assassins in his house, who had admitted that Octavianus had 
sent them to murder him. Excitement in Rome was keen and 
opinions widely divergent. Few gave full credence to the report ; 
Cicero and the most violent enemies of Antony went so far 
as to congratulate the supposed author of the attempt and 
regretted its failure. The mother of Octavianus, however, 
was afraid; she hastened to her son and begged him to leave 
Rome fora time until the storm had passed. Octavianus then 
displayed great resolution ; not only did he decline to leave 
Rome, but he gave orders that his house should be open to 
every one as usual at visiting-times and continued to receive 
clients, petitioners, and veterans. Antony, however, had 
gathered a group of friends to narrate to them the confessions 
of the assassins, and to request their advice. A curious scene 
was then played in the presence of the consul. Upon the con- 
clusion of his speech every one understood that he was asking 
them, under colour of obtaining their advice, to share the 
responsibility of a false accusation and of a prosecution aimed 
at Cexsar’s son. The responsibility was serious, and a painful 
silence ensued ; no one ventured to offer an opinion. Eventu- 
ally some one broke the silence by suggesting that the assassins 
should be brought and questioned before the auditors. Antony 
replied that that was not necessary, and turned the conversa- 
tion; his friends in great embarrassment offered no reply to 
his remarks and he soon dismissed them.§ Nothing more was 
heard of the assassins. 

* Cicl Fo XI, iii, 14 fe Cice a Slee 2h xxili.933 

t According to Nic. Dam: 30, the attempt took place on the 4th or 
5th, before Antony’s departure, which took place on October 9. Cics 
FE. XII. xxiii. 2. 

* This is one of the most obscure points in the history of Octavianus. 
. The account given by Nic: Dam., though somewhat coloured by the 

44 B.C. 

Antony goes 
to Bruadisium. 


Though the plot had been cleverly conceived, it had none 
the less failed. ‘The Macedonian legions remained the subject 
of great anxiety among the consul’s friends. Uneasiness became 
so great that Antony and Fulvia * resolved to go to Brundisium 
to meet the legions ; in fact, they started on October 9 tT in a 
frame of mind which can easily be imagined, expecting to 
find intriguers and murderers on every hand. On this occasion 
Octavianus followed them a few days later. ‘The snare which 
Antony had laid for him not only proved to Octavianus and his 
friends that the conservatives were right, and that Antony wished 
to monopolise Czsar’s inheritance, but also gained for Octavianus 
the favour of the conservative opposition to Antony ; { their 
hatred induced them to believe that Octavianus was ready 
to become a second Brutus in the case of Antony. Octavianus 
had in fact been overwhelmed by the praises and congratulations 
of the aristocrats as a worthy rival of the conspirators, and 
this for participation in a plan of which he had never even 
dreamed ; he had heard universal wishes uttered that on this 
occasion Antony might not escape his death, that his soldiers 
would revolt, and that some one would have the courage to 
snatch the power from him bya bold coup @état. Octavianus 
was a prudent and almost a timid character ; moreover, at the 
very outset of his political career, it is most unlikely that he 

spirit of the courtier, has been here followed, because of its full proba- 
bility. It is impossible, as Appian observes, B. C. iii. 39, that Octa- 
vianus should have planned the murder of Antony; this would have 
been a difficult and dangerous enterprise, and its audacity would be 
in complete contrast with the habitual hesitation and prudence of 
Octavianus. If Antony, who was much stronger and bolder, would not 
run the risk of assassinating Octavianus, it is impossible that the feeble 
Octavianus should have made a similar attempt upon Antony. The 
whole story was invented by Antony. Besides, Cicero, F, XII. xxiii. 
2, says that no one at Rome seriously believed the accusation. The 
statement of Suetonius, Aug. 10, and of Seneca, De Clem. I. ix. 1, 
cannot hold ground against the other authorities and the probabilities 
of the case. 

* The story of the punishment of the centurions at Brundisium 
proves that Fulvia accompanied Antony. See Cicero, Phil. III. ii. 4; 
and Vs viii. 22. 

{¢ Cic. F. XII. xxiii. 2, 

ft Cic. F. XII. xxiii. 2; prudentes et bont viri et credunt factum et 
probant . . . magna spes est im eo (Octavianus). Nzthil est quod non 
existimetur laudis et glorie causa facturus. 


would have attempted so audacious an enterprise as that which October, 
we shall shortly narrate if he had not felt sure of the help, or 44 B.c. 
at least the approbation, of powerful personages. We may 
thus assume that not only did he receive these praises as his 
due and accepted the position of a man who had plotted 
Antony’s destruction, but we may also consider that the violent 
speeches of the conservatives, especially those of his brother- 
in-law, Caius Marcellus, gave him the idea of recruiting a 
body-guard from Czsar’s veterans in Campania, as Antony had 
done in the month of April, an idea which met with the full 
approbation of his conservative friends when he laid it before 
them. All were of the opinion that in so desperate a situation 
it would be advisable to have two bodies of veterans at Rome, 
to act as counter-balancing forces in case of a conflict. This 
advice was dictated by hatred for Antony and given with the 
carelessness of men who feel that their responsibility is not 
involved. The danger was already so great that Octavianus 
and his friends eventually resolved upon this step, notwith- 
standing its unparalleled audacity. They gathered their 
servants and clients, loaded all the money they could procure 
upon mules, and went off to Capua in a large body, under the 
pretext that they were intending to sell the estates belonging 
to the mother of Octavianus.* At this moment Cicero also left 
Rome.t He had begun to write his second Philippic in reply 
to Antony’s speech ; this invective is a marvellous caricature 
which many historians have wrongly regarded as a portrait, 
and into it the orator poured all the fury with which the 
recent affront had inspired him. He did not propose, however, 
to publish this Philippic; so often had he asserted that his 
enemy proposed a general massacre that he was really afraid 
of the approaching arrival of the Macedonian legions. He 
therefore went away to Puteoli to resume his studies and begin 
his “ De Officiis.” 

Thus during the second half of October, while Cicero was Octavianus in 
working at a description of the perfect manners to be found ©?™P#"* 

* Nic. Dam. xxxi: 
} The letter F. XII. xxiii. 2 shows us that he was still in Rome on 
October9; A. XV. xiii. 1 that he had reached Puteoli on October 25. 


October, in an ideal republic, the agents of Octavianus and of Antony in 

44 B.C. 

southern Italy were struggling to secure Czsar’s veterans and 
new recruits. Antony had gone to Brundisium, where the 
four legions, with a large body of Gallic and Thracian cavalry, 
had disembarked in two detachments between the Nones and 
Ides of October.* The temper of these troops was by no means 
reassuring. The letters which Octavianus had written to his 
friends in Macedonia during the preceding months denouncing 
Antony as a traitor to Czsar’s party had had their effect, 
especially among the old soldiers of the dictator who were 
numerous in the Fourth and in the Martian legions ; irritation 
had been revived by the intrigues of those officers who were 
friendly to Octavianus and the conservatives, while the soldiers 
possibly found a fresh cause for discontent in the fact that they 
were not allowed to take part in the Parthian campaign which 
was generally regarded as imminent and as likely to be very 
profitable, but were to be sent to Gaul where they would remain 
in poverty and inaction. They therefore expected to receive 
a considerable donativum by way of compensation. For these 
various reasons Antony met with a cold reception and gained 
no applause when he mounted the tribunal to harangue the 
troops. Irritated by this lack of enthusiasm, he committed 
the mistake of blaming it at the opening of his speech ; he made 
a second and more serious mistake in explaining and perhaps 
exaggerating his suspicions and regretting that the soldiers 
should have tolerated instead of denouncing the agents of 
Octavianus, who had come to raise a revolt. After the bitter- 
ness of reproach he gave them the honey of fair promises, and 
undertook to-distribute four hundred sesterces. The soldiers 
expected a great deal more, and the conclusion of the speech 
was greeted with loud laughter, cries and abuse. Antony’s 
irritable character then allowed his imperious instincts to rise ; 
he made an inquiry; certain centurions who had been noted 
as seditious by private black marks (the practice is as ancient 
as the phrase is modern) t were seized and carried to the house 

* See Schmidt, Neue Jahrbucher fiir Philologie und Padagogik. 

Suppl. 13, pp. 720-721. 
+ Appian, B, C. iii. 43. 


where Antony was staying; if the facts are not exaggerated 
by his enemies they were put to death in the presence of Fulvia. 
According to Cicero this terrible woman insisted upon witness- 
ing the bloody spectacle, and her clothes were said to have 
been stained with the blood which spurted from a centurion’s 


44 B.C, 

The legions in Italy held their peace, but Antony, by his Antony's 

very suspicions had suggested the idea of a revolt, and as though 


he wished to urge the project yet more firmly, he changed Octavianus. 

all the officers and ordered a strict investigation to discover 
the agitators sent out by Octavianus. These could not be found 
for the simple reason that they did not exist.t Unfortunately, 
it was not only to the soldiers that Antony had suggested the 
idea of a revolt, but to Octavianus himself; he learnt of these 
events in Campania while he was gathering some three thousand 
veterans [ in the neighbourhood of Casilinum and Calatia; 
while recruiting, it was his practice to make speeches on behalf 
of Czsar, whom he declared himself ready to avenge, and also 
to use the money which he had brought on his mules, making 
offers of two thousand sesterces to each individual. Since 
Antony regarded him as so formidable, it seemed possible to 
induce the Macedonian legions to revolt, and the soldiers now 
had some real cause for discontent, exasperated as they were by 
the punishment of the centurions. It was indeed a most 
audacious and dangerous enterprise, but Octavianus had been 

* Appian, B. C. iii. 43 and 44. See Cic. A. XVI. vill. 2, The 
account of this event, as given in Appian, is fairly probable; he is, 
however, wrong in assuming that the agents of Octavianus were already 
at work, It is difficult to say exactly what punishment was inflicted 
at Brundisium ; Appian’s details are too brief, while Cicero’s are too 
fragmentary and suspicious. Is it possible that Antony could have 
put three hundred persons to death ? Cicero, Phil. III. iv. 10. Did 
these centurions belong to all the legions, or merely to the legion of 
Mars, as would appear from Cicero, Phil. XII. vi. 12, XIII. viii. 18 ? 
Moreover, according to Cicero, Antony performed two executions— 
one at Brundisium, the other at Suessa Aurunca, and the date and 
reasons of this latter are unknown. 

+ Appian, B. C. iii. 44. 

i Suet. Aug. 10; Dion, xlv. 12; Appian, B: C. iil. 4o; Cic. 
A. XVI. viii. 1. Cicero’s statement that Octavianus collected 3000 
veterans is more certain than Appian’s assertion that 10,000 were 

44 B.C. 


driven to it by Antony’s reproaches, by the ease with which 
he could procure recruits and by the encouragement which 
came to him from Rome. He therefore resolved upon the 
attempt, and as Antony had sent three legions along the 
Adriatic coast to Cisalpine Gaul,* intending himself to return 
to Rome with the other legion and with the “ Lark,” Octavianus 
sent agents to these very legions promising them also two 
thousand sesterces a man if they would declare for him. Ata 
distance from Antony, they would be more inclined to mutiny.T 
The enterprise, however, though favoured by events, was so 
much beyond the powers of a few inexperienced young men 
without influence, that Octavianus and his friends were beset 
by doubts and irresolution during those days. ‘They did not 
know what to do with their three thousand men, whether to 
leave them at Capua or to take them to Rome; they asked 
whether Octavianus should visit the other colonies of Czsar or 
follow the Macedonian legions who were marching upon Ari- 
minum.[ ‘They desired the help and counsel of influential 
men who would share the responsibility and take some of the 
weight from their shoulders. Having heard that Cicero was at 
Puteoli, Octavianus resolved to try and win him over, and wrote 
to him asking for a private interview at Capua or elsewhere.§ 
M CiceA. ox Levill2. 

t Cic. A. XVI. viii. 1-2; quas sperat suas esse. 
t Ibid. § Ibid. 



The ‘‘ De Officiis’’—The ideal of a perfect aristocracy 
—Correspondence between Octavianus and Cicero—The 
return of Antony and of Octavianus—Speech of Octavianus to 
the people ; its failure—A critical day for Octavianus—The 
revolt of the two Macedonian legions. 

Tuts letter reached Cicero at Puteoli on November 13” cicero at 
he seems to have received secret information a few days Puteoli- 
previously from Servilia upon other important matters. 
Marcus Scaptius and a servant of Cecilius Bassus had arrived 
from the east bringing the news that the Egyptian legions were 
well inclined, and that Cassius was expected in Syria; en- 
couraged by this information, Cassius resolved to start at once 
with a little fleet, with the object of wresting Syria from Dola- 
bella.§ But if this news had caused the old orator some plea- 
sure, it had none the less been inadequate to overcome the 
profound despondency under which he had laboured for some 
time.|| Antony seemed to him henceforward invincible, and 
he saw no prospect of checking his progress. Weary and dis- 
illusioned, Cicero thus resigned himself to his fate; he declined 
to interfere with public business, and would not even publish 

* Cic. A. XVI. viii. 1. 

j Cicero, A. XV. xiii. 4. It is generally admitted that this letter 
has been erroneously placed among the letters of June, and that the 
opening date should read viii. Kal. Nov. 

t Cicero’s letters, F. XII. ii. and iii, show that Cassius was still in 
Italy during the first half of October ; he must then have started in 
October, as is assumed by Schmidt, Rhein. Mus. 1898, 235. The vague 
expression paucis post diebus, employed by Cicero in Phil, X. iv. 8, 
is no ground for objection. It is likely that Cassius started without 
receiving the letters to which Cicero refers, A. XV. xiii. 4. 

§ Cic. Phil. XI. xii. 28. || Cic. A. XV. xiii. 4 and 7. 


November, the second Philippic which he had finished and sent to Atticus.* 

44 B.C. 

The ‘‘ De 

Elsewhere social order seemed likely to be engulfed in an abyss 
of avarice, luxury and debt, while Cicero in his solitary villa 
on the shore of the bay, amid the November winds and snow, 
worked anxiously at the task of constructing an ideal republic 
on paper. He had now finished the first two books and was 
proceeding with the third of his treatise upon duty, which, after 
some hesitation, he had entitled, ‘‘ De Officiis.” + 

As concerns the theory propounded of good and evil, there 
is nothing striking in the book ; it is merely a hasty compilation 
from the works of Panztius and of Posidonius, interspersed 
with reminiscences of Aristotle and Plato, with reflections 
and personal recollections of earlier and contemporary Roman 
history. ‘The book, however, deserves to be read with close 
attention by historians, who will find amid its philosophical 
discussions an important theory of the possibility of social 
and moral regeneration for Rome. It must be constantly 
remembered that this book was written during the autumn of 
44, under the stress of the reaction caused by the bitterness 
of the Civil War, by the moving tragedy of the Ides of March, 
and by the apprehension of coming disaster ; the reader who 
does not know the history of that terrible year, and of the daily 
life of Cicero during those months, will erroneously regard as 
one of many other mediocre philosophical treatises this most 
important document for the political and social life of Rome. 
Like all deep thinkers in Rome after the second Punic War, 
Cicero had been profoundly struck by the pitiable contradiction 
which he saw before him; while gaining in knowledge Italy 
also increased in corruption, wealth made her still more insati- 
able, her birth-rate declined as men were needed, she provoked 
war and lost her military capacity, extended her power over 
other peoples and bartered away her own freedom. He there- 
fore proposed to make one more search, as his predecessors had 
done, for the hidden means of conciliating imperialism with 

* Cic. A. XV. xiii. r and 2, 

f Cic. A. XV. xiii. 6; XVI. xi. 4. The true interpretation of 
A, XVI. xi. 4 seems to me to be that of Remigio Sabbadini, in the 

introduction to his commentary on the De Officiis, Turin, 1889, pp. 


liberty, progress with prosperity, luxury and wealth with social 
and political discipline, and intellectual culture with morality ; 
he resumed the consideration of a problem already examined 
in the De Republica, but on this occasion from the moral and 
social rather than from the political point of view. In short, 
he wished to discover what virtues were necessary to the ruling 
classes in this ideal republic, the institutions of which he had 
already described. He had reached the conviction that a general 
pacification could only be secured by an inversion of the moral 
principles of life ; wealth and power, which so easily corrupted 
men, were to be regarded not as the highest benefits of life, 
to be sought and desired for themselves, but as heavy burdens 
to be borne for the welfare of all, and especially for the welfare 
of the people.* What beneficial revolution, then, could intro- 
duce this new principle into social and political life? The 
nobles would eventually understand their private and public 
duties which Cicero enumerates and analyses in the course 
of his work; they were to live with dignity but without 
extravagance,t occupied with agriculture or wholesale trade ; f 
they were to take their share of public duty, not in order to 
enrich themselves and to corrupt the people, but in the zealous 
service of the interests of the poor and middle classes ; § they 
were to undertake such public works as were useful, the con- 
struction of walls, harbours, aqueducts and roads, and not of 
theatres, porticoes, temples or other monuments of luxury.|| 
They were to support the people in time of famine without 
impoverishing the public treasury,’ and to help innocent 
debtors without abolishing debt by revolution ; ** they were 
to give land to the poor but not to take it from its legitimate Thus the object of government would be the general 
welfare,f{ and this object would be reached by scrupulous 
respect for law, by the intelligent generosity of the great, and 
by the practice of such austere virtues as faith, honesty, and 
economy. “ Woe to the republic in which the governing class 
is overwhelmed with debt and financial embarrassments,” wrote 

* De Off. I. viiis; I. xix. 65. + Dicey f L. xii. 
§ Il. xxii; Il. xv. and xvi.; IJ. xviil 63. {| II. xvii. 60. 
Qj I, xxi. 72. ** TI. xxii. 78 ; IL. xxiv: 

tft Il. xxii. 78. {ft L xxv. 

44 B.C. 

44 B.c. 

The ideal 


the friend of Atticus, forgetting his own difficulties and strug- 
gles with this very question of debt.* 

Thus the ideal republic which he imagined could not be 
absolved of responsibility towards the nations under its sway. 
Its rule should be just, and should rather aim at the welfare 
of the governed than at its own aggrandisement ; ¢ such aggres- 
sive wars as those which Cesar, Crassus, and the popular 
leaders had undertaken in recent years should not be waged ; f 
there should be no acts of useless ferocity, such as the destruction 
of Corinth ; treachery and disloyalty even to enemies, were to 
be objects of detestation ; § in short, the Empire was to be 
as we should say to-day, “a pacific force,” so far as the condi- 
tions of the ancient world would permit. The Empire would 
use war merely as a means to secure peace, which is the greatest 
blessing and object of life ; || great orators and lawyers, wise and 
generous citizens, learned men and philosophers would be pre- 
ferred to great warriors, but upon the condition that a life of 
study should not turn the citizen from his duties of citizenship, 
which were to be the supreme and constant object of his every 
effort. The division of labour which now prevented many 
citizens from undertaking the manifold functions of orator, 
lawyer, general, and administrator, the growing variety of 
individual objects and inclinations which caused the downfall 
of the old republican institutions, were regarded by Cicero 
as signs of decadence. ‘The old encyclopedic unity was his 
ideal ; ** he thus proposed an attempt to combine the austere 
and vigorous past with the refinement and magnificence of the 
present, to remove from the present its elements of corruption 
and from the past its lack of refinement; such was Cicero’s 
idea of an aristocratic republic in which there would be neither 
ambitious demagogues nor violent conservatives, no Sullas 
or Cesars or Gracchi, all of whom he judged with the same 
impartial severity.TT 

*- De Ort. Llexv. 16. Dp MULE beh Gye ee 
Wy ct. B66 xa Se ilvinsor. Sid STR e 
a tgs > Ten So; || I. xxii. 

SS lovi, Ov 1. 1%./298-20) iL pes, aul eR 
Tt 1. xiv. 43; I. xxii. 76; IL vii. 23; II: viii: 27; Il. xii. 43; 
Tivexin72y lh xxvii ilex 2s 


In the enthusiasm of these great ideals and in his disgust with 
public affairs, Cicero replied to Octavianus refusing his request 
for a private interview.* No sooner had he despatched this 
letter than a messenger from Octavianus arrived, probably on 
November 2. This was one of his clients, a certain Cecina 
of Volterre; he brought news that Antony was marching 
upon Rome and that Octavianus was hesitating whether to go 
to Rome with his three thousand veterans, or to attempt to bar 
Antony’s passage at Capua, or to join the Macedonian legions. 
The aged and inconsistent orator, prone like his friends to 
exaggerate the power of Cesar’s name with the people, felt 
some revival of his courage and of his illusions at this news. 
While Cassius was advancing to the conquest of the east, it 
might be possible for Octavianus to carry with him the people 
and the upper classes, if he made a loyal resistance to Antony.t 
It might be possible even to overthrow Antony and to save the 
amnesty. Cicero therefore advised Octavianus to go to Rome. 
But on the 3rd, he received two more letters from Octavianus, 
urging him to come to Rome, declaring that his soldiers should 
be placed at the disposal of the Senate and promising to submit 
to Cicero’s guidance upon every occasion. Cicero then 
recovered hope and began to take more interest in the course of 
public affairs. On the 4th and sth other letters arrived with 
the same proposals and exhortations couched in more earnest 
form. Octavianus went so far as to say that the Senate must 
convoked immediately. 

In short, the adherence of Czsar’s son to the conspirators 
party had been suddenly confirmed, and the plan of Marcellus, 
fantastic as it had seemed, appeared to be upon the point of 
success. It was a sign that events were now proceeding 
rapidly. Antony, in fact, was keeping a watch upon his adver- 
saries and was aware that Cassius had started for the east with 
the intention of conquering Syria.§ He knew that the con- 

me CicAn ON Vil. Vill. 1, 
+ Cic. A. XVI. viii. 1. As the letter was written on the 12th at 

latest he must have received the visit of Czecina on that day. 

+t Cic. A. XVI. ix. 1: bine uno die mihi littere ab Octaviano (the 
letter was perhaps written on the 3rd); A. XVI. xi. 6: ab Octaviano 
quotidie littere (letter of November 5, as is proved by § 1). 

§ We know that Antony suspected the intentions of Cassius by a 


44 B.C. 

dence between 
and Cicero. 

return to 


reaches Rome, 


spirators were sending letters and messages to Decimus urging 
him not to recognise the lex de permutatione and that certain 
Czsareans such as Pansa, were inclined to follow this policy ; * 
he also knew that Octavianus was now working in earnest to cor- 
rupt the legions, and that he was plotting with the conserva- 
tives and, in particular, with Cicero. At the outset of November 
he had, however, ordered Dolabella to start immediately for 
Syria, and to secure his possession of the wealthy province of 
Asia; he was then hastening to Rome with two legions, one 
of the Macedonian legions and the “ Lark,” resolved to rend 
the web of intrigue woven by his enemies and to settle his 
account with Octavianus. The moment seemed to be well 
chosen, as the imprudent young man had committed a grave de- 
linquency in arming soldiers against the consul. Antony would 
demand his proclamation as hostis republice by the Senate; the 
Senate would be forced to pass condemnation, and Octavianus 
would destroy himself if he attempted to evade the conse- 
quences. However, this instant march to Rome had inspired 
Octavianus and his friends with the keenest alarm; they had 
easily guessed Antony’s intentions and had resolved to go to 
Rome themselves with their three thousand veterans; they 
had redoubled their efforts to secure the support of the con- 
servatives who would surely defend them openly after their 
encouragements of the previous month. 

On November 10,t Octavianus reached Rome before Antony 
with his three thousand veterans, and encamped them near the 
Temple of Mars, where the baths of Caracalla were to rise at a 
later date ; {| however, he speedily perceived that the congratula- 
tions and encouragements offered him did not imply practical 
support. Public opinion at Rome was not in his favour. The 
fiercer conservatives approved Octavianus in private conservation 
and attacked Antony, whom they accused of desiring to raise 
a massacre throughout Rome; but many other conservatives, 

letter which he wrote in March 43, under the walls of Modena, to 
Hirtius and to Octavianus before the letters of Cassius had arrived. 
See Cicero, Phil. XIII. xv. 30; in Syriam Cassium misistis. 

FiCpCicy bo leveens 

t See Ruete, Correspondenz Ciceros, 36. 

{t Gardthausen, Augustus und seine Zeit, Leipzig, 1891, I. 70. 


more prudent and far-sighted, such as Varro, Atticus,* and the 
relatives and friends of the conspirators mistrusted Octavianus, 
and thought that the defence of the amnesty could not possibly 
be left in the hands of the son of the victim. Moreover, the 
majority of the Senate, the magistrates, and the aristocracy 
were afraid of Antony. They told themselves that with so 
many legions at his disposal he could not be intimidated by a 
young man who held no office and commanded only three 
thousand veterans, and they further considered that the military 
measures of Octavianus were both foolish and criminal.t In 
short, the majority of the Czsareans and not merely those who 
had hitherto followed Antony, were furious with Octavianus, 
accusing him, and with some reason, of betraying their party 
to the advantage of their enemies. Every one, indeed, was 
stupefied by his audacity, and even those who had secretly 
urged him to enlist soldiers would not venture to support him 
in public. Octavianus wished to make a speech to explain his 
action and to remove popular apprehension, and after number- 
less conversations and promises he induced the tribune Canutius 
to convoke a meeting in the forum. ‘The enterprise, however, 
was extremely difficult, as the prejudices of either party were 
both numerous and hard to overcome. Octavianus found him- 
self in a hopeless dilemma; he had denounced Antony as a 
traitor to the Cesarean cause and had invited the veterans to 
come and defend his father’s memory ; he was now proposing 
to use these soldiers on behalf of the conservative party to 
defend Czsar’s murderers and to annul Cezsar’s measures. To 
avoid discontenting either the popular party or the conserva- 
tives, the young man spoke very ambiguously; he delivered 
an emphatic eulogy of Czsar but did not venture to assert 
that he had recruited these troops to take that vengeance 
for his father which Antony had declined to pursue; nor 
again could he venture to admit that he had opened negotia- 
tions with Cicero. He contented himself with saying that he 
placed his troops at the disposal of the country, with the 

pee paGicn Ay XV EL ix,- AY XVI. xiv. 150A, XVI. xv.03: 

f Cic. A. XVI. xi. 6: Quis veniet ? (in senatum). Si venerit, quis, 
incertts vebus, offendet Antonium ? 

Il H 

44 B.C. 

44 B.C. 

Difficulties of 


consequence that the speech left the soldiers spiritless and 
undecided, and caused much dissatisfaction to the conservatives 
whose aid he desired and to Cicero in particular.* 

The distant thunder of the storm could even then be heard ; 
Antony was approaching and was promulgating edicts of 
extreme violence against Octavianus as he went, reproaching 
him for his low birth, insinuating that Cesar had adopted him 
in consequence of their immoral relations and referring to him 
as a second Spartacus ; f he also issued an edict convoking the 
Senate for November 24 to deal with matters de summa republica 
and warning the senators that all who did not appear would be 
considered as the accomplices of Octavianus.{ The family and 
friends of Octavianus found themselves abandoned by every one, 
though his brother-in-law, Marcellus and his father-in-law, 
Philippus, did their best to help him. ‘These two men § and 
Oppius, whom Octavianus had contrived to win over,|| begged 
Cicero to intervene. Cicero, however, had hoped too much 
of Octavianus, and was now terrified by the threats of Antony ; 
once again he began to distrust every one and Octavianus more 
than any one; while approaching Rome he sent excuses for 
his inaction, urging that nothing could be done until the follow- 
ing year when Antony would be no longer consul ; he demanded 
pledges of sincerity from Octavianus and offered his support, 
when he could prove that he was really the friend of Cesar’s 
murderers. This proof might be given on December 10 when 
the new tribunes entered upon office ; among them was Casca, 
the conspirator who had given the first dagger-thrust to Cesar. 
Oppius vainly attempted to assure Cicero that Octavianus was 
really the friend of Casca, and of all Cesar’s murderers,** but 
Cicero would attend to nothing at the moment but his pecuniary 
affairs and the De Officits. However, the attempts of Octavianus 
and his friends to raise the people against Antony met with 

* Appian, B. C. iii. 41-42; Dion, xlv. 12; cp. Cic. A. XVI. xv. 3. 

+ Cic. Phil. III. vi. 15; ILI. viii. 21. The coarse accusations of 
Antony to which Suetonius alludes (Aug. 68) are possibly those uttered 
on this occasion. 

t Cic. Phir. Til. viii. 19- 

§ Plut: Cre; 44; Cor Gics A. eX Vileav.e: 

WGic eA x ViILe ava: WAGGA es WL eI Vines 


little success ; the veterans enrolled in Campania were them- 
selves wavering ; they were intimidated by the knowledge that 
they might be declared public enemies and also realised that 
many members of Czsar’s party had become hostile to 
Octavianus.* Their numbers were only three thousand, and 
with no one but a young man to lead them, they were not 
likely to revolt against the consul with success. Desertions 
began, and the force melted like snow in summer. 

44 B.C, 

Antony at length arrived at Rome after sending his two Antony 
legions to Tibur; he did not find Dolabella, who had already ‘e#ches Rome: 

started for the east. ‘The 21st and 22nd were days of alternate 
hope and fear. On the 23rd it was suddenly learned that the 
session had been postponed till the 28th,t becauseAntony 
had gone to see his legions at Tibur, for reasons which we do 
not know.{ Antony seems for some time to have been uneasy 
as to the effect produced by the silent machinations of the 
agents of Octavianus among his legions, supported as they were 
by the conservative party ; he may have heard that his soldiers 
were already discontented, and, ill-informed as to the real 
intentions of Octavianus, were blaming the fresh persecution 
instituted against him. Was it possible that one of Cesar’s 
favourite generals should threaten the dictator’s son simply 
because he had recruited a handful of veterans to take a speedier 
vengeance for his father’s murder ? Was it with the object 
of crushing Octavianus that Antony had returned with such 
haste to Rome? No doubt at the last moment Antony had 
been alarmed by some worse news and had hastened to secure 
their allegiance by fresh promises before delivering his mortal 
thrust at Cesar’s son. In any case the postponement was 
fortunate for Octavianus, as many events were possible within 
those four days. In fact, before Antony’s return, Octavianus 

* Appian, B. C. iii. 42: + Cic. Phil. III. viii. 19-20. 

it Vino atque epulis vetentus ; so says Cicero, Phil. IIT. viii. 20, but 
this is evidently an invention. We see from Cicero, Phil. XIII. ix. 19, 
vediit ad milites ; ibt pestifera illa Tiburt contro, that the object of the 
delay was a journey to Tibur, which, though the fact is not certain, 
may have been undertaken to calm the hesitation and anxiety of the 
soldiers. Appian, B. C. iii. 45, only speaks of the session of the 

28th and of the journey to Tibur after that session, and makes no 
reference to the journey between the 24th and 28th. 

44 B.C. 


was informed that the news of the fresh persecution to which 
he was exposed, the anger caused by Antony’s executions, 
and the attraction of the two thousand sesterces which he had 
promised, had conquered the Martian legion, which had declared 
in his favour and was about to leave the other two legions and 
establish itself at Alba.* He could at least find a refuge from 
his danger amongst these soldiers, now that the three thousand 
veterans had almost entirely abandoned him. Moreover, Cicero, 
who could not remain inactive, had eventually yielded to the 
exhortations of Oppius, Marcellus and Philippus, and had 
resolved to come to Rome, where he arrived on November 
27. Antony also returned on that day; while at Tibur, he 
had heard of the revolt and had immediately hastened to Alba, 
had attempted to gain entry to the town in order to restore 
the allegiance of his troops, but had been refused admittance.{ 
He therefore returned in greater anger with Octavianus, and 
resolved to take vengeance the following day. Fortune saved 
Octavianus for the second time, for at daybreak of the 28th, it 
seems that news reached Antony that the example of the 
Martian legion had been followed by the Fourth legion ; these 
troops had been chiefly influenced by the questor, Lucius Egna- 
tuleius, who had zealously espoused the cause of Octavianus,§ 

* The passage in Cicero, Phil. XIII. xix, nam Martiam legionem 
Albe consedisse sciebat, shows that Appian, B. C. ill. 45, is wrong 
in placing his announcement of the revolt of the two legions in suc- 
cession at an interval of a few moments, in somewhat melodramatic 
style. Antony heard of the revolt of the Legion of Mars between the 
24th and 28th, when he was on his way to Tibur. 

t+ The date given by Cicero, F. XI. v. 1, a.d.v. Idus decem., should be 
corrected as proposed by Ruete, Covvespondenz Ciceros, xxxvii. fi., 
to a.d.v. Kal. decem, It is true that Sternkopf, Phzl. vol. lx. p. 299, 
has overthrown several ingenious arguments by Ruete, by showing that 
the first paragraph of Cicero’s letter, F. XI. vi. is aseparate epistle, 
written probably in September ; but in my opinion the decisive argu- 
ment is the fact that letter v. written after Cicero’s arrival at Rome, 
was composed before he knew of the revolt of the legions ; otherwise 
Cicero would have mentioned this revolt to Decimus as an argument in 
favour of resistance ; as is shown by letter vii. Cicero therefore wrote 
the letter before the revolt of the legions. The fact that he often 
declares that he will not come to Rome while Antony is there is of 
little importance, for he continually contradicts himself at this time. 

{ The journey to Alba which Appian, iii. 45, puts after the 28th, 
must have taken place before that date for reasons already advanced, 

§ Cic. Phil, IIT, iii, 7; XIII. ix. 19; Appian, B, C, iii, 45. 


for reasons unknown to us. The prevailing confusion was thus November, 
extraordinary ; Octavianus had assured the conservatives of his 44 B.c. 
good feeling towards his father’s murderers; Czsar’s two 

former legions were leaving Antony for Octavianus, and accusing 

Antony of lukewarmness in the cause of vengeance, though 

even then he was preparing to dismiss Decimus. 

This second revolt threw Antony into such alarm that he Consequences 
abandoned his design of crushing Octavianus without delay. her be ee 2 
He feared revolts among the other legions if he continued his 
persecution, and in this event he would be at the mercy of the 
conservative party. Thus the situation had been entirely 
transformed in a few hours. With a sudden change of plan 
Antony appeared in the Senate, but made no reference to 
Octavianus or his military enterprises; he announced on the 
contrary that Lepidus had finally concluded peace with 
Sextus Pompeius, on condition that Sextus should receive 
an indemnity for his father’s property which had been confis- 
cated ; he even proposed a supplication in honour of Lepidus ; * 
this motion was passed and the indemnity for Pompeius was 
approved; Antony then dismissed the senators and called a 
meeting of his friends to discuss the situation. It is not unlikely 
that he was even disposed to make overtures for a reconciliation, 
but his wife and brother were awaiting him at his house, 
disillusioned, exasperated and resolved to drive him to 
desperate measures. He must immediately secure possession 
of the rich and populous province of Cisalpine Gaul before the 
conservative party had time to realise the position, and to use 
its momentary advantage. Once again Antony yielded. 

The Senate, however, had not yet drawn lots for the provinces 
in which Cesar had assigned no commands for the year 43. It 
would have been foolishness on Antony’s part to permit his 
adversaries to distribute them to their friends. The senators 
were therefore hastily convoked to an evening meeting, contrary 
to custom; hurriedly and without formality the provinces 
were divided in such a manner that Antony’s friends were 
highly benefited by a judicious management of the drawing. 
Thus, for instance, Caius Antonius gained Macedonia, and 

* Cic. Phil. IIT. ix. 23. 


November, Calvisius Sabinus Ancient Africa.* During the night Antony 
44.B.c. gathered the larger part of such veterans as he had been able to 
recruit, and went away to Tibur to take command of the 


* Cic. Phil. III. x. 24 ff. On the names of the governors then chosen, 
as given by Cicero, see Groebe, App. to Drumann, G.R. 1”, 439. 
t Cie. Phil. V. ix. 24; Appian, B. C. ili, 45. 


The situation at Rome after Antony’s departure—The con- 
servative party is reorganised—Cicero’s last doubts—The 
third and fourth Philippics—The first news of the siege of 
Modena—The sixth Philippic and the embassy from the 
Senate to Antony—The seventh Philippic—Antony’s pro- 
posal—The eighth and ninth Philippics—The despatch of 
Marcus Brutus from Macedonia—His counter-revolution in 
Macedonia—The tenth and eleventh Philippics—The corre- 
spondence between Octavianus, Hirtius, and Antony during 
the siege of Modena—The twelfth Philippic—The thirteenth 
Philippic—The beginning of dissension between Marcus 
Brutus and Cicero—The battle of Forum Galloruam—The 
fourteenth Philippic and the battle of Modena. 

Wen the news of Antony’s departure was learned the following The situation 
day, the first impression among the senators, the knights and peed gk 
the rich plebeians of Rome was one of panic. Since the year 
49, a space of five years, five civil wars had taken place, and it 
seemed that the sixth was about to begin. It was already 
announced, in fact, that Decimus Brutus had recruited four 
new legions, and that he was thus at the head of seven legions.* 
As he saw that events were moving rapidly, he probably did 
his best to accelerate the recruiting which he had begun. 
Accordingly, many influential citizens went to Tibur to attempt 
a reconciliation.t At first it seemed that Antony, who had as 
great a horror of civil war as the conservatives, would resolve 
to return to Rome. Unfortunately, Lucius once again inter- 
vened and succeeded, according to report,{ in dissuading him 
by using threats. In the early days of December, Antony 
set out for Cisalpine Gaul followed by two legions, the pre- 

* Cp. Cic. Phil. V. xiii. 36. F. XI. vii. 3: + Appian, B. C. iii. 46. 
t Cic. Phil. VI. iv. 10: nuper quidem dicitur ad Tibur, ut opinor, cum 
et (L. Ant.) labave M. Antonius videretur, mortem fratri esse minitatus. 
T1g = 

44. B.C. 

The Cesarean 

Decimus and 


torian Cohort, the cavalry and the veterans, who left Rome 
almost to a man. He also carried with him all the money 
that was left in the public treasury. 

Together with the veterans a large number of Czsareans 
joined Antony, who was now the only leader of the party 
after the treachery of Octavianus had become apparent. ‘These 
included Decidius Saxa, T. Munatius Plancus, Censorinus, 
Tremellius, and Volumnius, whom Antony wished to make his 
chief engineer officer. Several of them were travelling with 
the help of money borrowed from Atticus,* who was lending 
to both parties at the same time, and while supporting the 
conservatives, did not neglect to pay this insurance money 
against the dangers of a revolution. Thus the Cesarean 
party which had driven the conservatives from Rome in the 
month of April, was now obliged by an unexpected reversal of 
fortune to make a hasty evacuation of the metropolis; this 
retreat was equivalent to abandoning the reins of power, and 
the conservatives could re-enter as they pleased and seize the 
government. The relatives of Pompeius and of the conspira- 
tors, the remnant of the irreconcilable conservatives, imme- 
diately understood that a unique opportunity was thus given 
them to secure the destruction of the Cesarean party and the 
deliverance of the republic from its most dangerous enemies. 
Unfortunately Brutus, Cassius, and the most influential con- 
spirators had started for Sicily, while the helpless majority in 
the Senate, now left to itself, was inclined to take an indulgent 
view and to pardon Antony’s numerous illegal acts. ‘The com- 
mand of Decimus would lapse in a few days, and they thought 
that Antony might very well govern Gaul for five years in spite 
of the small informalities involved. It seemed better, there- 
fore, to give way.t On the other hand, even among Antony’s 
enemies, no one ventured to begin hostilities in the Senate. 

Thus at the outset of December the republic was abandoned 
by all, and left in indescribable confusion. ‘There were no 
consuls and several pretors too few, while all the offices would 
speedily lapse; this was an excellent pretext for postponing 
action and waiting for December 10, on which day the new 

* Cp. Corn. Nep, Aut. ix. 3. + Cp. Cic. Phil. V. ii. 5. 


tribunes would take up office; delay became the watch- 
word of all those timid spirits who formed the majority. In 
the meanwhile they would have the advantage of seeing what 
Decimus proposed to do, and whether he would yield or resist. 
This was a matter of much importance, as a great deal depended 
on his action. Private correspondents urged him vigorously 
to resist, and some members of the party even went to seek a 
personal interview. No one, however, ventured to propose 
a meeting of the Senate in which Decimus Brutus should be 
legally authorised to declare war upon Antony; on the con- 
trary many people still hoped that he would yield. One man 
alone was still working actively on behalf of the conservatives and 
of Czsar’s murderers; this was Cesar’s son, Octavianus, who 
was well pleased with his miraculous escape from danger, and 
had hastily taken shelter at Alba with the two revolted legions. 
Though Octavianus had been abandoned by almost the whole 
of Czsar’s party, the little group of irreconcilable conservatives 
none the less continued to encourage and flatter him, and to 
regard him as a hero; this sympathy on the part of the aris- 
tocracy had induced the ambitious young man to consider the 
possibility of securing some official authority in the midst of 
this confusion by bringing war to pass at any price. He sent 
messages to Decimus offering his help and alliance if he would 
resist the consul ; * he flattered the soldiers and induced the 
legions to offer him the insignia of a propretor, which he 
refused with pretended modesty ; ¢ he made overtures through 
his friends and relatives to the nobles who were most bitterly 
opposed to Antony and to the relatives of the conspirators, 
offering to prepare an army for the help of Decimus, to form 
a legion of new recruits, to march to Arretium with the two 
legions at Alba, or to meet his father’s veterans and to reorganise 
Czsar’s seventh and eighth legions if he was given the necessary 
legal authority. 

44 B.C. 

Those conservatives, however, who were not blinded by the 

their hatred of Antony returned but cold answers to these mani- © 
festations of zeal. The revolt of the two legions had rather 
increased than diminished their mistrust and dislike of Czsar’s 

* Dion, xiv. 15. + Appian, B. C. iii. 48. 



44 B.C. 



son. ‘There was, moreover, a greater obstacle in the way; 
to begin a life and death struggle with Antony as Octavianus 
desired, a leader of tried worth, capable of assuming supreme 
command, was indispensable. Overtures were made to Cicero, 
but he hesitated and continued to cherish his project of defer- 
ring his appearance in the Senate until January 1.* However, 
the departure of the veterans brought general relief; many 
of the conservatives recovered their courage and began to 
discuss the possibility of combined action. Cicero had not 
forgotten the insult which Antony had inflicted on him on 
September 1, and felt a certain desire for action after his long 
philosophical contemplations. At this point a certain Lupus 
arrived in Rome; he had been sent by Decimus to question 
the most capable men and to ask their advice. A gathering 
which included Servius Sulpicius and Scribonius Libo, the 
father-in-law of Pompeius, was held at the house of Cicero 
himself, who by this time had certainly learned Octavianus’ 
proposals. They decided to urge Decimus to act for himself 
and not to wait for orders from the Senate; f a certain M. Seius 
immediately started to carry this answer. None the less, 
during the early days of December, the situation remained 
uncertain ; Cicero did not believe that Decimus would venture 
to assume the responsibility which everybody at Rome was 
attempting to decline, and hastily wrote to him saying that 
he should not regard Octavianus’ recruiting and the revolt of 
the two legions as ridiculous, seeing that it was approved by 
all good citizens. 

At length on December to, the new tribunes of the people 
took up office, and about the same time, Caius Antonius started 
with a noisy company of his friends for Macedonia, resolving to 
hasten his journey as much as possible. ‘The new tribunes,how- 
ever, in their turn, allowed several days to pass without action, 

* Cics Bex vie 

+ Cicero, F. XI. vii. 1, On the question of the date of this letter 
and interview, which has given rise to much discussion, see Sternkopf 
in Phil, vol. Ix. p. 297; he places the interview on December 12. If 
it be admitted that Cicero returned to Rome on November 27, the 
date may be anywhere within the first ten days of the month. 

i Cie: PX; vit; 2 


and finally resolved to convoke the Senate for December 20, 
not for discussion upon the position of Antony or of Octavianus, 
but to consider what measures were necessary to enable the 
new consul to enter office without danger,* as if the veterans 
still thronged the streets of Rome. People found it difficult 
to realise that the veterans had already gone. The same day, 
however, probably the 14th or 15th, it was learned at Rome 
that Decimus had published an edict declaring that he would 
not recognise Antony as governor of Gaul, and would continue 
to hold the province for the Senate.t This news made a great 
sensation at Rome, and Cicero, in particular, was extraordinarily 
disturbed. Should he pursue his intention of not reappearing in 
the Senate until January 1, or should he go to the session of the 
2oth? The friends and relatives of Octavianus strenuously 
urged him to appear; the discussion could not be confined to 
the colourless orders of the day as defined by the tribunes, and 
would deal with the edict of Decimus. In that case Cicero 
might lose the opportunity of some great exploit, even more 
glorious than his overthrow of Catiline, the opportunity of 
destroying Czsar’s party and finally restoring the republic. 
Every noble element in his ambitious character, his sense of 
duty to his country, his ideal love of the republic, and parti- 
cularly his hatred of Antony and his affection for the many 
friends who had perished in the civil war or were in danger, 
urged him to act. The difficulties before him, however, 
were countless and the danger most serious. 

Once more Cicero was overcome by his natural timidity, 
as though he had a presentiment that his decision at this 
moment was a matter of life or death. His indecision was 
probably increased by the arguments of the agents, the friends 
and the relatives of Octavianus. The offers of alliance which the 
young man had made to Decimus might have conciliated the 
more mistrustful of his opponents; { it seemed imprudent, 
when war was so probable, to reject the support which five 

* Cic, F, XI. vi. 2. 

+ Cicero, Phil, III. iv. 8; Appian, B. C. iii. 49, who says that 
Decimus thus acted in consequence of an order from the Senate, is 

directly contradicted by Cicero’s third Philippic. 
t Dion, xlv. 15. 

44. B.C. 

Cicero decides, 


44. B.C. 


legions could provide ; on the other hand, it was a most serious 
matter to give official authority to a young man of twenty 
bearing Cesar’s name. Harassed by the difficulties of decision, 
Cicero was unable to make up his mind before the 19th; on 
that day, however, he was bound to decide one way or the other. 
None the less, on the evening of the roth, he still hesitated, 
and when he rose on the morning of the 2oth, was not certain 
whether he would go to the session or not.* This was the 
decisive hour of his life, the moment of supreme audacity, 
of final self-sacrifice, of permanent glory. ‘That morning he 
took the decisive step ; at the age of sixty-two, more capable 
of wielding the pen than the sword, the leader of that political 
world in which equivocation had reigned supreme for eight 
months, he plunged into the vast and unknown dangers which 
barred the progress of his generation, with an audacity which 
can only be regarded as heroic when his natural timidity and 
the terrible uncertainty of the situation are remembered. 
He went to the Senate,ft where Hirtius and Pansa, however, 
did not appear,} and delivered the third Philippic ; this was a 
moderate speech intended to try the nature of the ground, 
and proposed that the Senate should decree a eulogy to Decimus 
Brutus for his edict, to Octavianus for his enlistments, and to the 
two revolted legions for their rebellion. He also proposed 
that Pansa and Hirtius should be ordered to assign on January 
1 the rewards to be given to those who had deserved well of 
the republic, from the leaders to the soldiers, and that this 
should be done before anything else ; finally he proposed that 
the distribution of the provinces as made by Antony on No- 
vember 20 should be annulled, and that the governors now in 
office should be allowed to remain until the Senate could send 
successors.§ It was a clever speech, for it did not contemplate 

* This is shown by the passage in Cicero, F, XI. vi. 3. Cicero tells 
us it was only on the morning of the 20th, when he was seen going to 
the session, that any of the principal senators followed his example. 
Hence we may infer that on the preceding evening his mind had not 
been made up. 

t Cicero, Phil, III. i. 1; V. xi. 30, says that he daily urged a convo- 
cation of the Senate; but he contradicts himself in the more faithful 
and more sincere admission which he makes in F. XI. vi. 2. 

t Cie. Pati. V. xi. 30; BeOicntentha Luly exyaes vats 


either peace or war as necessary alternatives; Varius Cotila 
was the only senator who replied in a feeble speech, and as the 
majority were anxious not to compromise themselves unduly, 
all these proposals were approved.* The same day Cicero 
delivered his fourth Philippic to the people in which he 
repeated his proposals. 

44 B.C. 

However, the first news of war began to arrive, if we may Outset of the 

characterise as war a struggle in which the two adversaries 
were doing their best to avoid a collision. Antony and Brutus 
had begun to exchange letters, politely urging one another to 
yield for their respective benefit. Brutus had been requested 
by Antony to leave Cisalpine Gaul in virtue of the lex de 
permutatione provinctarum ; Antony had been urged by Brutus 
to respect the province in the name of the Senate. Antony 
had then established his headquarters and the greater part of 
his army at Bologna and had allowed Decimus Brutus to lead 
his forces to Modena, and to make all arrangements for a long 
siege.t Neither was anxious to begin hostilities. Decimus 
did not feel strong enough to confront Antony’s practised 
legions with his hastily recruited army; he wished to 
protract the struggle as much as possible, to give his friends at 
Rome time to send him reinforcements. Antony, on the other 
hand, though he might perhaps have surprised and crushed 
Decimus,{ wished first to repair the losses which the revolt 
of the legions had caused, by organising a numerous army which 
would be useful whether civil war broke out, or whether some 
arrangement was secured. During the last ten days of Decem- 
ber he sent a few troops to surround Modena and make a show 
of besieging the place ; § while waiting at Bologna for the spring, 

* Against the view of Nake and Bardt, who consider that they were 
not approved. See Cic. Phil. IV. ii. 6; IV. iv. 8; V. xi. 28; X. xi. 
23; F. XII. xxii. 3. See also Sternkopf in Phil. vol. Ix. p. 285 ff. 
Dion, xlvi. 29, mistakes the date when the law upon the provinces 
was annulled. 

+ Appian, B. C. iii. 49. t Ibid. 

§ Cp. Dion, xlvi. 36. He says that Brutus mavred@s drereyic6n, 
that is to say, was entirely blockaded only when Antony had given up 
hope of withdrawing the allegiance of his troops ; on the other hand, 
Cicero, F. XII. v. 2, says that until the second half of February Antony’s 

forces were all at Bologna and at Parma; he cannot, therefore, have 
spared many for the blockade of Modena. 

Modena war. 


December, he sent Lucius Piso to Macedonia to bring over the legion there 

44 B.C. 


stationed, and Ventidius Bassus with a large supply of money 
to southern Italy, where he was to recruit the veterans of 
Cesar’s Seventh and Eighth Legions, who had abandoned 
Octavianus, and also those of the Ninth Legion. 

Thereupon, instead of attempting the immediate capture of 
Modena, he applied his energies to the task of gaining some 
hold upon Rome. He had not lost all hope of securing this 
object by political intrigue instead of war. As things had 
gone, Antony henceforward represented the traditions and 
interests of the Czsarean party, to which a triumphant aris- 
tocratic restoration would be fatal. Thus the party which 
he had reorganised in June and July had every interest in 
preventing his fall. Even Fufius Calenus, who inclined to 
Antony’s enemies upon several occasions during the preceding 
months, now joined Antony’s side, possibly under the influence 
of very tangible arguments. He had given hospitality to 
Fulvia, * and was preparing to lead the old Cesareans in the 
Senate, together with all whom Antony had appointed as 
senators or had otherwise favoured. His purpose was to secure 
Italy, to prevent the despatch of reinforcements, to give 
Antony time for intrigue with Lepidus, Plancus and Pollio, 
and to await events. Antony had everything to gain by this 
policy. On the other hand, the interest of his enemies lay 
in crushing him without delay. For that reason the first news 
of the war was exaggerated at Rome by the irreconcilable con- 
servatives, by the relatives of the conspirators and by the friends 
of Octavianus who were already encouraged by the session of 
December 20. It was said that Decimus had been enclosed in an 
iron circle ; public opinion was frightened by these exaggera- 
tions and a general reaction in favour of Octavianus took place. 
It was asserted that Rome would have been pillaged by Antony if 
Octavianus had not seduced the legions ; Octavianus was praised 
as the saviour of Rome; though a few days previously Cicero 
had modestly requested that his actions should not be considered 
ridiculous, all were now asserting that his audacity had been 
sublime ; t the alliance between Octavianus and the conserva- 

* Cic, Phil. XII. i. 7. + Cp. Cic. ad Brut. I. xv. 7 + Ty iii. 1. 


tives against Antony was finally confirmed under the impression 
produced by this first and very exaggerated news from the seai 
of war. Octavianus was to take command of the army, while the 
conservatives would induce the Senate to provide the necessary 
money, to give him the dignity of a senator and propretor, 
and the privilege of applying for the consulship eighteen years 
before the legal time. Marcellus and Philippus, Antony’s 
fiercest enemies, induced two men of age and influence, Servius 
Sulpicius and Publius Servilius, to propose the grant of these 
gifts to Octavianus ;* Cicero was also induced to make a 
great speech in support of the proposal. 

Jan. 1-4, 
43 B.C. 

On January 1 of the year 43, at the first session of the Senate The fifth 

after the speeches of the new consuls Hirtius and Pansa, 
Fufius Calenus rose to speak; with great moderation he 
attempted to deprecate any serious view of the situation; he 
asserted that Antony did not wish for war, and finally proposed 
to send ambassadors to begin peace negotiations.t Servius 
Sulpicius and Publius Servilius then spoke ; they proposed that 
Octavianus should be given the rank of propretor, and the com- 
mand of the army a which he had prevented Antony’s 
proposed massacre; that he should be considered_as_a_ com- 
mander with the Pak of pretor and should be eligible for 
offices as if he had already held a questorship. ‘Then Cicero 
rose. It sometimes happens that men of letters, however 
timid, vacillating, or even indolent, may be inflamed by passion 
to the brilliancy, impetuosity, and indefatigable energy of heroes. 
A change of this nature had been at work in Cicero during the 
eleven days which had elapsed since the last session of the Senate. 
Overcoming his presentiments of evil, throwing aside all fear 
and hesitation, the author of De Republica, the philoso- 
phical doctrinaire, had realised that the conservative cause 
could only be defended by revolutionary methods. He pro- 
ceeded to deliver the fifth Philippic, a furious attack upon_ 
Antony, in which he recklessly ly exaggerated all his siren nes, 
declaring that it was not a matter of fighting Czsar’s ar’s party, 
but of ut of opposing a band of brigands 5” he repeated the proposals 
of Servius and Servilius, and added suggestions of his own. 

* Cic, ad Brut, I. xv. 7. 1 Gic. LMtin Naik, 252 


Jan. 1-4, 
43 BC, 

The close of 
the debate. 


He urged that levies should be raised, that a twmultus and state 
of siege should be proclaimed, that a golden statue should be 
raised to Lepidus in recognition of his republican opinions, 
that Egnatuleius should be allowed to solicit office three years 
before the legal date,* that the soldiers should be given the 
sums promised by Octavianus, while other rewards of land, 
money, and privileges should be held out to them. After this 
speech, the struggle between the two parties began. The 
declared friends of Antony were certainly not numerous in the 
Senate, but there were many eminent men, such as Piso and 
the two consuls,t who were opposed to war; the proposal 
of Calenus was thus calculated to win the favour of many. 
For this reason Antony’s friends were able to prolong the dis- 
cussion upon this first day, and to postpone a decision until the 

The next day the debate was resumed ; during the night, 
however, the more vigorous of the conservatives had arranged 
to secure a majority in this session, and the friends of Antony, 
fearing that they might be out-voted, succeeded in obtaining a 
postponement of the vote by the intervention of a tribune.§ 
This policy of obstruction infuriated the majority, which imme- 
diately retaliated by approving, though with some modifica- 
tions, the honours requested for Octavianus. He was to be ad- 
mitted to the Senate among the senators of consular and not of 
pretorian rank ; he might apply for the consulship, not eighteen 
years, which seems exaggerated, but ten years before the legal 
time.|| Antony’s partisans did not venture to veto these 
proposals, but spent the night in working for their friend, 
and went so far as to send the aged mother of Antony and 
Fulvia from house to house to use her influence with those 
senators who were hesitating. On January 3 the discussion 

* Cic. Phil. V. xvii.-xix. 46-53 ; Phil. VI. 1. 2. 

jp LWdfoyaly edhidla eine 

t Dion, xlvi. 29; Appian, B. C. ili. 50. 

§ Appian, B. C. iii. 50. 

|| Mon. Ane, i. 3-5 (Lat.) ; i. 6-7 (Gr.) ; Appian, B.C, iit. 51 ; Livy, 
Per. cxviii. The statement of Dion, xlvi. 29-41 is thus erroneous. 
Hence, according to Appian, these honours were approved on January 2 ; 

according to Dion, on January 3. See Groebe, App. to Drumann, G. R. 
I? p. 443. q Appian, B. C. iii, 51, 


was resumed with increasing warmth. Cicero made another 
speech and was enthusiastically applauded by his friends who 
thus strove to bring over the waverers to their side ;* others 
also spoke, but once again no decision was secured for reasons 
unknown tous.t It was therefore necessary to meet again on 
the 4th and then, after a speech from Piso, a compromise was 
arranged ; an embassy was to be sent out composed of 
Servius Sulpicius and Lucius Marcius Philippus, not to treat 
for peace, but to command Antony to leave Cisalpine Gaul, 
and to return to Italy; if he did not obey, the twmultus would 
be proclaimed. Meanwhile military preparations were to 
continue, and one of the consuls would take the supreme com- 
mand of the army which Octavianus was already preparing at 
Arretium, and would lead it towards Gaul.{t On the proposal 
of Lucius Cesar, the agrarian law of Lucius Antonius was 
also revoked.§ 

On the same day before an immense crowd in the forum, 
Cicero delivered his sixth Philippic and gave an account of 
these events; he warned the people that war was inevitable 
and, in imitation of Aristotle’sletter to the Greeks of Alexandria, 
he said that though other people might be able to live in slavery, 
Romans could not exist without their liberty.|| Thus, after 
five days’ struggle, was concluded the first engagement in the 
Senate; this conflict was, as it were, the prologue to that civil 
war which was soon to break out in the valley of the Po. After 
this engagement, as is often the case, there was a short truce 
during which Hirtius, as appointed by lot, left Rome, though he 
was barely convalescent, to join Octavius; Pansa remained at 
Rome to recruit four new legions and to raise money if he could, 
while Cicero became, in fact if not in law, head of the republic. 
After the great speeches of December 20 and January 1 the 
audacious figure of the old orator stood out amidst the universal 
vacillation like a huge erratic boulder in the midst of a plain. 
He was requested upon every side to unmask dangers and to 
advise upon precautions, and was himself obliged to intervene 

* Appian, B. C. iii. 54. TA CiC neta Nite 3% 
taCicn Viliit OM Vl avelItA, Vl tix, 20, 
§ Cic. Phil. VI, v. 14. || Cic. Phil. VI. vii. 19. 

Ill I 

43 B.C. 

The sixth 

43 B.C. 

The seventh 


in public business to secure the execution of his decrees, which 
otherwise would have been dead letters. Thus, though upon 
his proposal the Senate had annulled the division of the pro- 
vinces as arranged on November 27, Caius Antonius had already 
started for Macedonia, while Calvisius Sabinus had left Rome 
and was sending legates to his province. Cicero was on the 
alert and uttered several protests in the Senate against the 
usurpation of Calvisius, but was unable to secure the passing 
of any vigorous measure.* He also maintained a voluminous 
correspondence with Octavianus. He realised that the responsi- 
bility for the extraordinary honours granted to the young man 
would rest upon himself, rather than upon Servilius and 
Sulpicius, in view of the great speech of January 1, when he 
had loudly eulogised Octavianus and guaranteed his action. He 
therefore attempted to exert some control over him, sending 
him an infinite number of letters full of wise advice, and thus 
indirectly assuming responsibility for the conduct of the war. 
Such, indeed, was the general confusion that Cicero was 
forced to undertake the duties of many missing officers of state. 
These labours roused his energy, and his strength was redoubled 
by his enthusiasm. Never had he been forced to receive so 
many visitors, to read so many letters, or to make so many 
speeches,t but he felt his youthful powers revive and his 
indefatigable vigour grow daily stronger, while his enthusiasm 
became almost an obsession. Thus in the second half of 
January, when Pansa convoked the Senate to deal with certain 
administrative questions concerning the Appian Way, the 
coinage of money and the festival of the Lupercalia, the old 
orator seized the opportunity in a violent speech, his seventh 
Philippic, to turn the energy of the Senate from the coinage 
to the inevitable war. ‘‘On no condition,” said he, “ will 
I make peace with Antony.” [ “If we cannot live in freedom, 
let us die.” § Unfortunately, this enthusiasm was by no 
means universal. The two consuls were writing friendly 
letters declaring themselves inclined for peace ;|| senators 

CA Ctopay OA IWEA Re ip ah DE GUNG S 6 Sie.52) Co OO Sea IMIS og Xe}, 
t Cic. F. X. xxviii. 3; evam maximis occupationibus impeditus. 
HaGicwPiii. Vales: § Cic. Phil, VII. v. 14. 

|| Dion, xlvi. 35. 


who loudly praised Cicero’s courage were secretly following January, 
the example of the consuls ; the ambassadors, who had accepted 43 B.C. 
their mission as a means of concluding the long and wearying 
senatorial debates, were inclined to make their ultimatum an 
occasion for beginning negotiations for peace. The eldest 
of the three, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, was already ill and died 
upon the journey.* Only Piso and Philippus appeared in 
Antony’s camp, where they were able to see the extraordinary 
method of siege operations pursued by the man whom 
Cicero had described as a beast thirsting for Roman blood. 
He had extended his army from Claterna to Parma, and 
appeared purposely to be blockading the town with very few 
soldiers and with such feeble energy that provisions were 
constantly brought in.t 

Antony was waiting for spring and for reinforcements to The embassy 
begin the war in earnest if war should be necessary ; meanwhile ‘° “"*°? 
he was attempting to increase his forces by proclaiming himself 
the avenger of Cesar and the champion of his soldiers’ rights. 
He had sent emissaries to the legions of Asinius,{ and possibly also 
to the legion of Plancusin an attempt to secure their desertion 
by a promise of two thousand sesterces. He was also attempt- 
ing by letters and messages, to induce Lepidus and Plancus 
to join him ; he was recruiting a new legion in Cisalpine Gaul, 
and had even sent agents into Modena to tell the soldiers of 
Decimus that he did not wish to fight with them, but only to 
punish Decimus Brutus, who had shared in the dictator’s 
assassination. If they were willing to abandon Brutus and to 
make common cause with Cesar’s veterans, they would be 
rewarded.§ But all these manceuvres were secret and the 
ambassadors could only see the slackness with which Antony 
conducted the war. Philippus and Piso naturally did not wish 
to exasperate so agreeable an opponent. They introduced 

we Cic wea LX i 1. {+ Dion, xlvi. 36. 

ACD ACiCe be OM SX, 4. 

§ This is shown by a comparison of Dion, lvi. 36 with Antony’s 
letter to Hirtius and Octavianus. Cic. PAd/. XIII. xvii. 35 ; Nehtl moror 
eos (the soldiers in Modena) salvos esse et ve quo lubet, si tantum modo 
patiuntuy perive eum qui meyvuit (Decimus Brutus). Cp. also Dion, 
xlvi. 35. 


Feburary, themselves with all the respect due to so great a personage, 

43 B.C. 

proposals to 
the Senate. 

and instead of presenting the Senate’s ultimatum, began a 
friendly discussion of the situation. Antony, on his side, was 
no less friendly, and if he did not authorise them to transmit 
the decisions of the Senate to Decimus Brutus, he none the 
less made reasonable proposals for peace.* He was ready to 
give up Cisalpine Gaul, but wished to retain Transalpine 
Gaul for five years with the three legions which he had and with 
the three which Ventidius was recruiting ; his actions and those 
of Dolabella, were not to be annulled; the lex judiciarta was 
not to be repealed, and there should be no inquiry into the 
sums taken from the treasury by the members of the commission 
entrusted with the execution of the agrarian law of Lucius ; 
his six legions, his cavalry, and his Pretorian Cohort were to 
receive lands.t So true it is that Antony desired nothing more 
than to secure a rich province. Piso and Philippus went away 
delighted with his proposals and accompanied by Lucius 
Varius Cotila, who was to represent Antony during the negotia- 
tions. However, Hirtius and Octavianus left Arretium, crossed 
the Apennines, and reached Ariminum; they followed the 
Via AXmilia as far as Forum Corneli in the neighbourhood of 
Imola, where they encamped to wait for spring.[ Hirtius 
even drove Antony’s outposts from Claterna a few days later.§ 

The ambassadors reached Rome in the early days of February || 
and Pansa immediately convoked the Senate. Cicero had up- 

* Cicero himself recognises this fact; Phil. XII. v. 11; videbantur 

. aliquo modo posse concedt, 

{ Cic. Phil. VIII. viii.-ix. t Dion, xlvi. 35. 

§ Cicero, Phil. VIII. ii. 6. The ancient Claterna is the modern 
Quaderna, nineteen kilometres from Bologna, where Professor Brizio 
made interesting excavations in 1890. See E. Rosetti, La Romagna, 
Milan, 1894, p. 625. 

|| It seems to me that the date of the tenth Philippic is reasonably 
placed in the Ides of February by Schmidt; De epistolis et a Cassio 
et ad Cassium datis, p. 27, provided that the date be accepted only as 
approximate. The arguments of Ganter, Neue Jahybucher fiir 
Philologie und Péddagogik, 1894, p. 613 ff., are very ingenious and 
in a large degree acceptable ; they seem, however, to me to leave 
too little intervening time between events, and his theory will not 
hold water unless we admit that such great events as the revolution 
of Brutus in Macedonia cccurred with mathematical exactitude. It 

is better, in my opinion, to leave a little more room for the unforeseen 
and to place the dates a little further apart ; the more so as the tenth 


braided the two ambassadors in his private letters,* and trusted 
that this session would be decisive. Considering, in fact, that a 
speech was hardly necessary, he briefly stated his opinion and 
declared that as Antony had not obeyed the Senate, he should 
be declared ostis.t In his enthusiasm, however, he was mistaken 
as to the intentions of the rest. A large number of the con- 
sulars no longer despaired of an understanding with Antony 
after this embassy ; t Fufius Calenus proposed to send fresh 
ambassadors ; Lucius Czsar, Antony’s aged uncle, was perhaps 
persuaded by his friends to urge a modification of Cicero’s 
proposal ; he wished for a declaration, not of war, but of the 
tumultus, which would be an admission that public order was 
disturbed, but not that civil war had actually broken out. 
Pansa, who was constantly paying court to the Czsareans, 
and who was even anxious to submit a law to the comiita 
centuriata, to confirm Cesar’s decisions,§ supported the pro- 
posal of Lucius Cesar, and led the debate with such dexterity 
that the measure was approved.|| Cicero in exasperation, 
prepared for a more vigorous attack in the next day’s session, 
at which Pansa was to communicate the despatch of Hirtius 
upon the skirmish of Claterna, and to propose a measure for 
restoring to the people of Marseilles the territory which Cesar 
had taken from them in 49,4 and which they had continually 
reclaimed during the last few months. Without confining 
himself to this question, Cicero pronounced the eighth Philippic ; 
he criticised the deliberations of the previous day ; pointed out 
that a war and not the tumultus was the question at issue, made 
a violent attack upon Calenus, two consulars and the ambas- 
sadors, and predicted confiscations and massacres if Antony 

Philippic might very well have been delivered about the middle of 
February, and not upon the fourth. 

2 AGTEA AS DA aha 

t+ We have no speech delivered by Cicero in this session, in which, 
however, dixit sententiam: Phil. VIII. i. 1; vtcta est... propter 
verbt asperitatem . . . nostra sententia. 

t Cic. F. X. xxviii. 3; habemus fortem senatum, consulares partum 
timidos, partim male sentientes. F. XII. v. 3: partim tnertes, partim 
tmprobos : Cic. Phil. VIII. vii. 20. 

§ Cic. Phil. X. viii. 17; cp. XIII. xv. 31. 

|| Cic, Phat. VIII. i. 1. 4 Cic. Phit. VIIT. vi. 18. 

43 B.C. 

43 B.C. 

The situation 
at Modena. 


gained the upper hand. He also regretted that such culpable 
inaction should allow the zeal of Italy and the Gallic towns to 
cool, favourably inclined as they were to the Senate. In 
conclusion he proposed that Antony’s soldiers should be given 
the opportunity of leaving him until March 18, after which 
date they should be considered as rebels. This vehement 
speech proved effective and the proposal was passed. Pansa, 
however, who possibly wished to compensate the conservatives 
whom he had betrayed the preceding day, advanced another 
proposal; he urged that a small funeral monument should be 
raised to Servius Sulpicius at the expense of the State and an 
equestrian statue in the forum, as was usual in the case of 
ambassadors who had been killed in the service of their embassy. 
Servilius, however, who was a scrupulous adherent to small 
points of law, objected that Servius had not been killed but had 
died of illness. ‘Thereupon the enthusiastic orator delivered 
the ninth Philippic in support of Pansa’s proposal, arguing with 
considerable sophistry that the causes of his death and not the 
nature of it were the question at issue. Nothing was decided 
upon the question of Marseilles.* 

As a matter of fact, Cicero was the only man with a whole- 
hearted desire for war. The rest spoke with hypocritical 
reserve, or acted under the secret determination that matters 
should not be driven to extremities. So much is true, not only 
of Hirtius but of Octavianus himself, though he would gladly 
have seen Antony crushed and though his arrival at the seat of 
war made the position most unfavourable to Antony. Withthree 
legions and one cohort, Antony was now besieging two legions 
of veterans and five legions of new recruits; at the same time 
he had to oppose an army of four legions of veterans and one 
legion of new recruits; if Hirtius and Octavianus attacked he 
would be caught between their forces and those of Decimus, 
and would be crushed, or forced to flee northward.t None 

* This is proved by Antony’s letter to Hirtius and Octavianus, written 
in March. Cic. Phil. XIII. xv. 32: Masstliensibus jure belli adempta 
veddituros vos pollicemini, It is reasonable to assume with Ganter, 
Neue Jahrbucher fur Philologie und Padagogik, 1894, p. 616, that the 
8th and 9th Philippics were delivered on the same day. 

} Cicero, F, XII. v. 2, however, rightly points out that in February 


the less, after the skirmish of Claternum, Hirtius and Octavianus 
had led back their soldiers to the camp and had remained 
inactive ; Antony had paralysed both them and Decimus with 
the sight of what was then the Head of Medusa for every 
politician of the day, the vengeance to be taken for Cesar’s 
murder. The feeling of the veterans throughout Italy had 
again become so favourable to Antony that Ventidius had been 
able without difficulty to re-enlist almost all the disbanded 
soldiers of the seventh, eighth and ninth legions, so that there 
were then two legions known as the seventh and two known 
as the eighth legion of Cesar ; these were the legions of Venti- 
dius and of Octavianus. At this moment the favour of the 
veterans was worth as much to Antony as the command of a 
large army. Decimus, disturbed by the secret intrigues of 
Antony, was too much occupied with the task of preventing 
a revolt among his soldiers * to venture any attack; Hirtius, 
weakened by disease, would not venture to cross swords with 
his old friend, who was besieging Decimus to avenge their 
common benefactor ; Octavianus was also intimidated by the 
vague danger of a military revolt, and was embarrassed by the 
inactivity of Hirtius ; in complete indecision, he spent the time 
in his favourite literary exercises, writing and declaiming the 
whole day.t 

A few days later, however, public attention at Rome was 
diverted from Modena by a bolt from the blue. One day 
towards the middle of February, the senators were unexpectedly 
informed that Pansa had convoked the Senate for the following 
day ; letters of such importance had been received from Brutus 
that the matter could not possibly be postponed.t The 
Senate was thronged the following day, and amid general 
amazement letters were read containing the following incredible 
narrative. Brutus had reached Athens in the autumn, had 
taken up his quarters with a friend and proceeded, like any 
private individual, to attend the lectures of two philosophers, 

Antony was at the mercy of Decimus Brutus, of Hirtius, and of Octa- 

* Dion, xlvi. 36. ft Suet. Aug. 84. 


43 B.C. 

Marcus Brutus 
in Macedonia. 

43 B.c, 

Brutus takes 
the offensive. 


Theomnestes and Cratippus, with many other young Roman 
students ;* these included Cnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, 
Cicero’s son, and a young man of twenty, a native of Venusia, 
by name Quintus Horatius Flaccus. The father of this latter 
was an honourable and intelligent freedman ; his profession 
as a customs official had enabled him to save some money ; he 
had bought a little estate and as he took great pride in his 
son, had sent him to study at Athens. These young men, 
who were almost all members of noble families, had extended 
the warmest of welcomes to the tyrannicide; he had been 
welcomed with equal readiness by Athens, the decadent 
republic which showered its honours readily upon every distin- 
guished guest. ‘The feeling of this party soon grew warm 
and a revolutionary conspiracy was hatched amid their regrets, 
their enjoyments, and their conversations. Who first mooted 
the idea will never be known; it is not probable that Brutus 
was the author,t though he was eventually obliged to lead the 
movement. His personal authority, the part that he had played 
in the conspiracy, and finally an incident which occurred shortly 
after his arrival, obliged him to take the lead whether he would 
orno. The younger men among the friends of Brutus had heard 
that Trebonius was sending sixteen thousand talents from Asia 
to Rome,f and that the official in charge of this tribute would 
touch at Greece. They pointed out to Brutus the necessity 
of intercepting this sum, which would certainly fall into the 
hands of their enemies when it reached Italy; they further 
explained that he alone had the necessary authority to induce 
the messenger of Trebonius to hand over the treasure. Brutus 
was persuaded ; he met the envoy in Eubcea, and induced him 
to hand over the money ;§ but once in possession of this 
large sum, he felt bound to use it in the interests of the 
conservative party. 

At this moment, in November of the year 44, Dolabella 
was hurrying through Macedonia with furious speed ; part of 
his cavalry were ordered to precede him; he had one legion 

* Plut. Brut. 24. 
t Cp. Boissier, Cicévon et ses amis, Paris, 1902, p. 370. 
t About £320,000. § Plut. Brut. 24. 


with him, and the cavalry which remained had been ordered 
to follow him to Asia in two detachments.* As soon as Dola- 
bella had gone, the young friends of Brutus began to bribe the 
soldiers with the money of Trebonius ; Domitius won over a 
body of cavalry, while a certain Cinna seems to have induced 
another body to join Brutus; Cicero’s son also induced the 
last Macedonian legion to declare for Brutus, the legion which 
the legate of Marcus Antonius had come to take over.t| Thus 
in December Brutus found himself at the head of a small 
army and surrounded by a band of young admirers, among 
whom was Horace; with these he had gone to Thessalonica, 
where Hortensius, the governor of Macedonia,who had no troops 
at his command, had recognised Brutus as his successor. Brutus 
had even sent troops without delay to seize the arsenal which 
Cesar had established at Demetrias and, with the help of 
Hortensius, attempted to recruit a fresh legion from the 
numerous veterans of Pompey who had remained in Macedonia 
and Thessaly after the battle of Pharsalia.f In the midst of these 
preparations in the early days of January, he heard that Caius 
Antonius, the new governor of Macedonia, had disembarked at 
Dyrrachium.§ Fearing that Caius Antonius would make war 
upon him in concert with Vatinius, the governor of Illyria, who 
was a Cesarean, Brutus forthwith braved the rigours of winter 
with his little army and by forced marches traversed the two 
hundred and seventy miles which separate Thessalonica from 
Dyrrachium, reaching the shore of the Adriatic about January 
20.|| Fortunately for him, Vatinius was ill; he was also an 
incompetent commander and detested by his soldiers, while 
after Czsar’s death he had been unable to prevent a general 
revolt of the population of Illyria, who declined to pay further 
tribute; he had lost five cohorts in an ambush and his army, 
which had received no pay, was in a state of complete exaspera- 
tion. The arrival of Brutus and his supplies of money pro- 
duced a revolt ; two of the three legions of Vatinius went over 

* Dion, xlvii. 26 and 29; Cic., Phil. X. vi. 13; Plut. Brut. 25. 

if Les TEE DS Sealy See + Dion, xlvii. 21 ; Plut. Brut. 25. 

§ Plut. Brut. 25 ; Dion, xlvii. 21. 

|| Ganter, Neue Jahrb. fiir Phil. u. Pad., 1895, p. 620 ff. 
4 Appian, iii. 13. 

43 B.C. 


February, to the side of Czsar’s murderer ; the other had followed Caius 

43 B.C. 

The tenth 

Antonius, who was attempting to retreat towards Epirus. He, 
however, had lost three cohorts on the road, and eventually 
had thrown himself into Apollonia with the remaining seven, 
where Brutus was besieging him. Brutus concluded his 
despatch with the request that his actions should receive the 
approval of the Senate.* 

The sensation produced in Rome by this news can well 
be imagined. Itsimportance was in fact enormous, for it did 
more than any victory to raise the courage of the conservative 
party. The military command and the government of the pro- 
vince had been overthrown by a fugitive from Italy with a few 
ships, a few friends, and a hundred thousand sesterces borrowed 
from Atticus; the fact demonstrated to the conservative 
party their error in believing that every arm of the service 
was so thoroughly imbued with the Cesarean spirit as never 
to be likely to serve themselves. Now they had an army at their 
disposal composed of troops both tried and faithful. For 
similar reasons this news shattered the confidence of Antony’s 
friends. During the night they hastily resolved upon a 
desperate effort to prevent any approval of the acts of Brutus 
by the Senate. The following morning after the despatches 
from Macedonia had been read, Calenus requested to speak ; 
he began by warmly praising the style of the despatch ;+ he 
proceeded to explain that it was impossible to approve Brutus’ 
action because it was illegal; he also tried once more to use 
the veterans as a threat, asserting that they had no confidence in 
Marcus Brutus ; if the Senate yielded to his demands, it would 
run the risk of alienating the sympathies of the veterans entirely. 
Cicero, however, delivered the tenth Philippic, an emphatic 
eulogy of the revolution which Brutus had accomplished ; he 
had no difficulty in securing the approval of a proposal to 
invest Brutus with pro-consular command over Macedonia, 
Illyria, and Greece, coupled with a recommendation that he 
should remain in the neighbourhood of Italy.§ More serious 

*Cic. Philo XX. svi U3) Lives Bey. 118); ‘Dion, alvils sraeBlute 
Brut. 26; Appian, B.C. iii. 79 ; iv. 75. 

Tf Cicn PAU Sis. EN GIC MEN Vile TT 5s 

§ Cic. Phil. X. xi. 25-26, 


was the fact that probably in that same session the Senate was 
encouraged by the success of Brutus to annul all Antony’s 

While this news revived the courage of, the conservatives, 
it also spurred Antony and his friends to redoubled activity. 
The probability of a compromise was, indeed, vastly diminished 
and preparations must be made for a struggle. Antony was 
beginning to lose hope in the possibility of inducing the legions 
of Decimus to revolt; towards the end of February he left 
Bologna and concentrated his forces about Modena, intending 
to begin a strict blockade; he ordered Ventidius Bassus who 
was moving upon Ancona, to bring up his three legions quickly ; 
in short, he resolved to begin the war in earnest, and to capture 
Modena.t At the same time, his friends redoubled their 
efforts at Rome to hinder the departure of Pansa, who was 
preparing with great deliberation to lead reinforcements to 
Modena. At that moment, at the outset of March, probably 
on the Ist or 2nd, news arrived that Dolabella had entered 
Asia with his legion and his body of cavalry, had treacherously 
seized the person of Trebonius at Smyrna, and had put him to 
death after torturing him for two days to discover the where- 
abouts of the money.{ This, at any rate, was the account of 
the despatches, though they may intentionally have exaggerated 
Dolabella’s wickedness. The loss of the province of Asia, the 
richest source of wealth to Rome, was a misfortune for the 
conservative party ; but it was counterbalanced by the atrocity 
of this murder which raised a storm of public indignation 
and consequently injured Antony’s cause, for every one knew 
that he was in concert with Dolabella, and many even accused 
him of instigating this murder. Calenus, with his usual 
dexterity, attempted to make capital even from this incident ; 
at the next meeting of the Senate, he delivered a violent 
speech against Dolabella, asserting that he was ready to declare 
him a public enemy ; § at the same time he proposed that the 

* Cp. Cic. Phil. XII.v. 2. On the question of the date, see Lange, 
Rémische Altevtumery, Berlin, 1871, iii. 515. TeDionexivieesO. 

t Dion, xlvii. 29; Livy, Ep. 119; Appian, B. C, iii. 26; Orosus, 
MI. xvili.6; Cic. Phil. XT. ii. 4; iii. 9. 

§ Cic, Phil, XI, vi. 15, 

43 B.C. 


az B.C, 


conduct of operations against him should be entrusted to the 
two consuls when they had relieved Modena.* By means of 
this speech, Antony’s party disavowed the compromising 
connection with Dolabella, and attempted to hamper the 
action of the consuls by thus authorising them to make prepara- 
tions for a new war. ‘The proposal roused keen opposition ; 
other senators demanded that a general with an extraordinary 
command should be sent against Dolabella.t Cicero advanced 
a yet more audacious proposal, which was the subject of his 
eleventh Philippic; he urged that the war against Dolabella 
should be entrusted to Cassius, together with the pro-consulship 
of Syria, including powers over Asia, Bithynia and Pontus. 
As yet, he knew nothing definite concerning the movements 
of Cassius, but in his excitement at the favourable news from 
Brutus, he felt no doubt that Cassius had also succeeded in the 
project which he had formed upon leaving Italy, and in support 
of his proposal he boldly asserted that Cassius was already 
master of Syria, that he had already recovered Asia, and that 
official news of this success would soon be at hand.{ However, 
upon this occasion Pansa, who supported the conservatives 
but did not wish to see them too powerful, offered a vigorous 
opposition, and prevented a vote upon the question. Cicero 
then sought to overpower the hesitation of the Senate by 
raising a popular outcry; he induced a tribune to convene a 
popular meeting, and again explained his plan amid loud 
applause. Pansa, however, intervened, and renewed his 
opposition, stating that the proposal was displeasing to the 
mother of Cassius, to his sisters and to Servilia.§ After several 
days of lengthy discussion, the proposal of Calenus was even- 
tually adopted.|| Cicero, in exasperation with Pansa, again 
accused him of betraying the conservative cause; this charge 
was not entirely unjustified; the cunning consul, who did 
not desire to see the conservatives masters of the situation, 
had refused for some time to send Brutus a detachment of the 

* Cic. Phil. XI. ix: 21 fi. 

+ Cic. Phil. XI. vii. 16 ff. t Cic. Phil. XI. xi. 26 ff. 

§ Cic. F, XID. vii. 1. 

|| Cic. F. XII. xiv. 4: Consulibus decreta est Asia: Dion, xlviix 



new recruits levied in Italy, and also attempted to prevent 
many people, especially the young men of the leisured classes, 
from going to serve under the orders of the leader of the 
conspiracy ; * however, many went, including Marcus Valerius 
Messala Corvinus, the sons of Lucullus, of Cato, of Hortensius, 
and of Bibulus. 

This failure somewhat discouraged the old orator and 
correspondingly roused the energy of Antony’s friends, who 
straightway attempted a fresh manceuvre. On March 7 or 8, 
Antony’s best friends were suddenly seen with sad and gloomy 
countenances talking together in groups, receiving and despatch- 
ing messages in haste, and asking individual senators what they 
would do if Antony were to raise the siege of Modena. Every- 
body believed that Antony was resuming his pacific attitude ; 
Pansa was anxious to begin immediate negotiations for peace, 
and exhaustion robbed Cicero himself for the moment of his 
usual penetration. There was a moment of general hesitation ; 
and the Senate resolved to send a fresh embassy to Antony 
composed of five members of all parties, including Cicero him- 
self.t However, Octavius, fearing that Modena would fall, 
induced Hirtius, who still hesitated, to leave his winter quarters, 
to seize Bologna, and advance to Panaro in sight of Modena, 
in order to encourage Decimus by their presence,f though no 
attack upon Antony was proposed. Neither party would 
begin vigorous action. ‘Their embarrassments were increasing, 
for the events of Macedonia, the repeal of Antony’s laws, 
and the decisions of the Senate on the subject of Marcus 
Brutus, decisively confirmed Antony’s accusations, that Hirtius 
and Octavianus were defending the cause of Cesar’s murderers 
against the cause of the veterans. Octavianus decided to pacity 
the scruples of the Czsareans among his soldiers by a 
promise of twenty thousand sesterces apiece instead of two 
thousand ;§ but notwithstanding this magnificent present, 

* Cicero, ad Brut. II. vi. 1. I may here point out, once for all, 
that the two letters ad Brut. II. iii. and v., are two parts of one letter 
written by Brutus to Cicero on April 1, and that the two letters ad 
Brut. Il. iv. and vi., are two parts of the same answer written on 
April 12. 

fe CicePhil <0. \i, 0 fe ¢ Dion, xlvi. 36. 

§ Dion, xlvi. 35. 

43 B.C. 

Hirtius and 


Antony’s reply 
to Hirtius and 


he did not venture to lead them out to battle; instead 
of attacking Antony, he began almost to flatter him, in 
conjunction with Hirtius. Thus Hirtius, who might have 
cut Antony’s communications with his friends at Rome from 
his position at Bologna, was so unusually kind as to send to 
Rome all the letters of Antony which he intercepted.* 
When he and Octavianus learned on the 12th that a new 
embassy to Antony had been despatched from Rome, they 
hastily wrote him a most obsequious letter. ‘They referred to 
the death of Trebonius, and to the horror which it had caused; 
they informed him that the senators had resolved to send a new 
embassy ; they almost apologised for their opposition, stating 
that their object was not to injure him or to help Decimus, 
but merely to save such of Cesar’s soldiers as were besieged in 
Modena; they begged him not to force them to begin the 
attack, for they were not his enemies and would leave him 
in peace if he would raise the siege of Modena, or simply allow 
corn to be brought into the town.f It was impossible to be 
more conciliatory ; they might have crushed him; yet they 
begged him to be reasonable, and to be kind enough to allow 
provisions to enter Modena while awaiting the arrival of the 

Antony, however, who understood the reasons for this 
moderation, seized the opportunity to proclaim himself once 
again to the soldiers of Hirtius and Octavianus as the one and only 
avenger of Czsar’s murder ; he replied in a violently insulting 
letter, which has come down to us and shows that Antony 
possessed remarkable literary talent, if indeed he was actually its 
author. In this letter he eulogised the assassination of Trebonius 
as a magnificent exploit, and declared that he would remain 
faithful to Dolabella to the last in his desire to punish Cesar’s 
murderers; he reproached Hirtius and Octavianus with treachery 

* Appian, B. C. ili. 48. He is wrong, however, regarding the date 
of the increased offer when he puts it before the senatorial vote of 
January 2. This is an obvious mistake, as otherwise the subsequent 
friction between Octavianus and the Senate would never have occurred 
respecting the sum due to the soldiers, of which we shall speak in the 
next chapter. 

+ The contents of this letter canbe deduced from Antony’s reply, 
fragments of which are given in the 13th Philippic. 


to the Cesarean cause and with their support of the murderers 
and of the party who wished to rob the veterans of their reward ; 
he declared himself ready to permit the soldiers to leave 
Modena if they would surrender Decimus, stating that Lepidus 
and Plancus were in full agreement with him ;_ he expressed his 
willingness to receive the ambassadors if they came, as his desires 
for peace were unchanged, but added that he did not think 
their arrival probable. Hirtius and Octavianus accepted this 
insulting letter and contented themselves with sending it to 
Rome; by the time of its arrival on the 18th or 19th, some of 
Antony’s prophecies had already come to pass. The embassy 
had been annulled, probably between the roth and 14th; 
Antony’s friends were too busy to make any demonstration of 
delight. Cicero and the rest realised that they had been 
duped ; * treachery was already whispered at Rome, and at the 
next meeting of the Senate Cicero had already delivered 
the twelfth Philippic, in which he admitted that he had been 
deceived. The Senate had revoked its earlier decision. How- 
ever, with the return of the fine weather, letters from the 
provinces began to come in more frequently, and as Pansa had 
no fresh pretext for delay, he was obliged to fix his departure 
for March 19. On that day, however, before starting, he 
presided at a session of the Senate, where letters were read 
from Cornificius, in which he complained of the difficulties 
thrown in his way by the legates of Calvisius. The Senate 
ordered that the governor of Numidia, T. Sestius, should pro- 
vide Cornificius with one legion to re-establish order, and that 
he should send two other legions to Italy to support the opera- 
tions about Modena; when, however, the Senate proposed 
to punish the pretended legates of Calvisius, Pansa objected.t 
He then started at the head of four new legions, taking the 
Via Cassia in order to avoid Ventidius; this route passed by 
Fiesole and the Apennines, and joined the Via Amilia below 
Bologna. Added to the three legions of Octavianus and the four 
of Decimus, there were now fourteen legions on foot which 
had been newly recruited or re-enlisted within a few months ; 
the thirty-six legions which Czsar had left had become fifty 

* Cic. Phil. XII. vii. 18. Ciera eT scxcy. t. 

43 B.C. 

43 B.C. 

The thirteenth 


within Italy itself, which had furnished no soldiers for so long 
a time. It seemed as if the military energies of the Italian 
people were about to revive. The example of Czsar’s soldiers, 
who had grown wealthy in war, and the dangerous illusion of 
chimerical hopes added to constant poverty, attracted to the 
army many artisans who could find no work at Rome or near 
the towns, many young colonists who were weary of their 
fathers’ poverty, and many more of the working classes reduced 
to desperation by debt. The political rivalries of the Roman 
oligarchy provided their only means of livelihood at this 
crisis. No one, however, asked how the rapidly increasing 
expense of these preparations was to be met, and there was 
some difficulty in finding weapons for so many soldiers. In 
Antony’s camp, for instance, the new recruits from Cisalpine Gaul 
were without weapons; Antony had thought for a moment 
of sending for munitions from Demetrias,* while Pansa was 
obliged to recruit all the armourers he could discover in Rome.t 

The situation, however, remained extremely uncertain. 
In the absence of the consuls, the pretor Aulus Cornutus on 
March 20 read letters from Lepidus and Plancus to the Senate 
expressing their great desire for the restoration of peace. 
Plancus in particular had written most prudently, urging 
C. Furnius, the bearer of his despatch, to add the most explicit 
declaration of his loyalty to the constitution.[ Everybody 
knew that Lepidus was on Antony’s side; but the two men 
were attempting to blind the eyes of every party and to avoid 
compromise with either. Lepidus indeed, had done more; 
he had re-enlisted the tenth and sixteenth legions, which Cesar 
had established at Narbonne and at Arles, and was also forming 
a third legion, of what soldiers we do not know.§ He had 
even sent reinforcements to Modena, under Marcus Junius 
Silanus, the son of Servilia and consequently his brother-in- 
law ; this officer had received most equivocal orders, capable of 

interpretation in a sense opposed to Antony.|| Exasperated 
by these letters, every line of which betrayed an anxiety to 
* Plut. Brut. 25. tT Cic. Phil, VIT. iv. 13. 

PeCic he Nomv ag 
§ Kromayer in Hermes, vol. xxxi, p. 1 ff. 
|| Dion, xlvi, 38. 


avoid decision, and feeling that they would encourage the vacil- April, 
lation of the Senate, Cicero strove to rouse the Senate to war 43 B.C: 
and to secure the decree of the honours for Sextus Pompeius 
by means of the thirteenth Philippic, a masterpiece of furious 
and tremendous eloquence. Then he wrote two very curt and 
cutting epistles to Plancus and Lepidus.* He wondered 
whether any one would attempt to raise further obstacles in 
the way. However, the last days of March and the first of 
April were days of uneasiness and anxiety for every one. Noone 
knew what was happening about Modena, or what Dolabella 
and Cassius were doing in the east. Rome was from time to 
time in despair ; Modena was thought to be at the last gasp 
and it was said that the consuls were betraying the Senate.t 
Cicero was forced to assume an outward calm in public, 
to reassure everybody, and to display an assurance which 
he probably did not himself possess. On April 7,{ further 
letters from Plancus were read to the Senate; § on learning 
that Pansa’s reinforcements were actually starting, he had has- 
tened to say that his republican sentiments had hitherto been 
concealed in order to secure the fidelity of his legions, which 
Antony was attempting to seduce. When Cicero proposed 
to confer certain honours upon him, the question was vehe- 
mently debated for two days in the Senate, because Servilius, 
with obstinate hatred, declined to give honours to one of 
Cesar’s former partisans.|| 
Fortunately, on April 9, good news from Cassius came in Despatches 
from different quarters. He had disembarked in the province Somyasss 
of Asia in advance of Dolabella, had received money from Tre- 
bonius, and a detachment of cavalry sent in advance by Dola- 
bella had also been surrendered to him by Lentulus, whom 
he had intercepted. He had then recruited fresh troops in 
Asia, collected money and invaded Syria, where the five legions 
of the governors of Syria and Bithynia, who were then besieging 
Czcilius Bassus at Apamea, had gone over to him, an example 
speedily followed by the legion of Cacilius Bassus. ‘Thus 

eCiCn Lee Vil E koe AL. 

f Cic. ad Brut. Il. 1-1. PCicr By xy xs 2=3! 

S Gicw. Bo XS. 8; || Cic. F. X. xii. 3-4. 
Ill K 

43 B.C. 

Brutus and 


the conservative party had now a fresh army in the east, and 
Dolabella was ruined. On the other hand, two days after this 
good news, Cicero received a strange letter from Brutus, dated 
April 1. The famous conspirator displayed alarm, and asked 
for advice ; as he had lost Asia and its subsidies, he was without 
money, for the sixteen thousand talents were exhausted ; he 
added that he thought the information from Cassius should 
only be published after mature reflection ; he finally admitted 
that he did not know how to deal with Caius Antonius, the 
brother of Marcus, who had surrendered to him a short time 
before at Apollonia. The prayers of Caius had “ touched 
him too deeply.” * The fact is, that Brutus was a scholar 
who had drifted into a life of action ; his power of penetration 
was of the lowest order, and whilst he amused himself by 
striking coins ornamented with the Phrygian cap, with daggers 
and with the inscription Ezd-Mar (Ides of March), the clever 
Caius Antonius had befooled him with a thousand flatteries 
and was attempting to embroil him with Cicero, telling him 
that Cicero was reducing the Czsareans to despair, and destroy- 
ing every possibility of an understanding ; that it was absurd to 
trust to Octavianus instead of attempting to secure an arrange- 
ment with Mark Antony. In short, he had aroused the old 
mistrust of the conspirator for Czsar’s son. Thus the feeble 
Brutus had become his friend, and had even begun to think 
of an alliance with Antony against Octavianus ; one of his actions 
he did not dare to repeat to Cicero; he had given Caius a 
command as governor of Illyria in place of Vatinius. Cicero 
sent a dry answer the next day, stating that there was no 
money to send, and that no more soldiers could be enlisted ; 
that he must keep Caius Antonius as a hostage until Decimus 
was relieved ; t+ that as for the news from Cassius, it should be 
published far and wide and that secrecy was out of place. 

The following morning, however, April 13, Cicero received 
a yet greater surprise in the Senate; two messages, one from 
Caius Antonius, and the other from Brutus, had arrived that 

* Cic. ad Brut. II. v. 2. 
+ Cicero’s letters ad Brut. II. iv. and Il. vi. are one reply which 
has been divided into two letters, 


morning, and had been brought directly to the Senate, before April, 
they could be delivered as usual for Cicero or some other 43 B.C. 
leading man to read. In these letters Caius demanded peace 
for himself and his brother ; and Brutus not only recommended 
the Senate to welcome this request but had allowed Caius to 
style himself pro-consul at the head of his letter. Cicero, 
though utterly astounded, was able to control himself; but 
on the conclusion of the session he held a hurried conference 
with other senators, and an extreme measure was resolved. 
The next day the senator Labeo declared that he had carefully 
examined the seals of Brutus’ despatch, and was certain that 
they were forgeries. The same day Cicero wrote a long 
letter to Brutus couched in polite but determined language ; 
he told him everything and hinted that Labeo’s statement 
must not be denied; he finally informed him that in a war 
where victory and death were the only alternatives, relentless 
energy and not feeble moderation was the quality desired.* 
This was a warning which Brutus was soon able to appreciate ; 
for Caius Antonius returned his kindness by attempting to 
raise his soldiers in revolt against him, though the plot was 
fortunately discovered and crushed in time.t 

On the same April 14 or the following day, for the date is The battle of 
not precisely known,{ the two armies at length met at Castel- Pheri 
franco, then known as Forum Gallorum. Antony had no great 
forces at his disposal, but sure of the support of Lepidus 
after Silvanus had brought his soldiers, and confident in his 
prestige as Czsar’s avenger, he ventured to take the offensive. 
Some time before, he had left part of his troops to continue 
the siege of Modena, and had pitched his camp near that of 
Hirtius and Octavianus, whom he harassed by skirmishes ; but 
upon the approach of Ventidius, when he knew that Pansa 
was about to leave Bologna to rejoin Hirtius and Octavianus, 
he conceived the idea of attacking him on the road, arranging 
for his brother Lucius to distract the attention of Hirtius and 

* This is Cicero’s letter ad Brut. I]. 7. I think, with Gurlitt, that 
it was written on the 14th, not on the 19th as the MSS. give it, nor 
on the 16th, as Schmidt and Meyer suppose. Cp. Supp. Phil. iv. 564. 

t App. B.C. iv. 79 ; Dion, xlvii. 23. 
} See Cic. F. X. xxx. 1; Ovid, Fast. iv. 625, 

43 B.C. 


Octavianus by a feint upon their camp. Hirtius, however, had 
sent a certain Galba to meet Pansa and urge him to haste; 
he suspected Antony’s intentions and during the night of 
the 13th and 14th sent Carfulenus to meet him with the 
Martian legion and two Pretorian cohorts. Carfulenus 
passed Forum Gallorum during the night and continued his 
march to meet Pansa; some hours later, Antony, who was 
unaware of this movement, reached the spot, and concealed 
two legions and two Pretorian cohorts in Forum Gallorum ; 
he then sent his light cavalry and infantry along the Via 
Emilia to meet Pansa. ‘This plan was successful, but he drew 
on the attack, not of one or two legions of recruits as he thought, 
but of the twelve veteran cohorts under Carfulenus, who was 
marching at the head of the army some distance from the new 
legions. As the Via Aimilia runs between woods and marshes, 
it was impossible to come to close quarters for a time; but in 
the neighbourhood of Forum Gallorum the ground becomes 
more open, and the twelve cohorts then deployed in battle 
array ; thereupon Antony’s cohorts left the village and attacked 
the Martian legion. A fierce engagement took place. Pansa 
ordered two of the four new legions to throw up a hasty en- 
campment and sent on the two remaining legions as reinforce- 
ments; he also sent out messengers to Hirtius asking for 
support and himself entered the thickest of the fight. The 
new legions, however, proved useless; Czsar’s Pretorian 
cohort was destroyed, and Pansa was wounded ; the Martian 
legion was also obliged to retire upon the camp pursued by 
the enemy, and lost a great number of veterans and recruits. 
Antony’s soldiers were rejoicing in their complete victory ; 
but when they had obliged the enemy’s army to take refuge 
in the camp, Hirtius suddenly appeared with two legions of 
veterans in the afternoon as they were retiring upon Modena 
in exhaustion ; it was impossible to begin a new battle against 
fresh troops, and the two legions scattered in disorder through- 
out the forests and marshes of the neighbourhood. Fortunately 
nightfall and the want of cavalry had prevented Hirtius from 
pursuing the fugitives, and during the night, Antony collected 
them with his cavalry, and brought them back to their encamp- 


ment at Modena. Octavianus, meanwhile, had successfully April, 
defended the camp against the feints of Lucius. This was his 43 5.¢. 
first deed of arms, and though a matter of no great difficulty, 
secured for him an ovation from the army, which the two 
consuls also received.* Thus neither party was able to claim 
a complete victory. 

Great was the anxiety at Rome. About the 17th or 18th The battle of 
a rumour was current that the senatorial army had been Moder 
annihilated.t Eventually despatches from Hirtius came in. 
Antony’s partisans shut themselves up in their houses in 
despair; a great popular demonstration took place before 
Cicero’s house ; he was escorted to the Capitol and obliged to 
make a speech amid loud applause; { many of the usually 
prudent or apathetic citizens were now carried away by the 
popular enthusiasm and demonstrated their hatred of Antony. 
In the session of April 21, Cicero delivered the fourteenth 
and last Philippic, in which he demanded that a supplication of 
forty days should be decreed, a monument erected to the 
soldiers who had fallen in the battle, and that their parents 
should be given the sums and privileges promised to the 
senatorial army. Every one believed that the conservative 
party had won a great victory. The engagement, however, 
had not been decisive; Antony had become more prudent 
after this check and kept his army within the camp to continue 
the siege ; Ventidius was approaching on the Via Aimilia in the 
rear of Hirtius and Octavianus. ‘They had been emboldened by 
the knowledge that their veterans would fight, and resolved upon 
April 21 to try and break the investing lines in order to send a 
convoy of provisions into the town. Antony first sent out his 
cavalry to drive them back, and supported this force with 
two legions. Hirtius took advantage of the opportunity to 
attack with the Fourth Legion the camp which was defended 
by the Fifth Legion, while Decimus Brutus at length ventured 
to send a few cohorts out of Modena under the command of 
Pontius Aquila. Two terrible conflicts then took place in 
the camp and the trenches. Hirtius and Pontius Aquila were 

* Cic. F. X. xxx.; Dion, xlvi. 37; Appian, B. C. iii. 67-70. 
f Cic. ad Brut, I, iii, 2. t Ibid. 

43 B.C. 


killed, and the Fourth Legion was in retreat when Octavianus 
came up to its support; the battle was renewed with such 
fury that Octavianus found himself in the forefront of the fray, 
and was forced to fight like a common soldier. He recovered 
the body of Hirtius, but was unable to retain his hold on the 
camp, and gave orders for retreat. ‘The soldiers of Decimus 
therefore returned to Modena, and it appeared in the evening 
that the investing lines remained intact. However, Antony’s 
army had suffered severely; in the course of the night he 
summoned a council of war where the general opinion was in 
favour of continuing the siege. If Antony had known of 
Hirtius’ death, he would certainly have attacked the army 
the next day ; Octavianus was now the only commander and 
possibly Antony might have been able to crush Cesar’s son 
once and for all with the help of Ventidius, who had reached 
Faenza. During revolutions, however, the fates of men often 
depend upon slender threads. Antony was unaware of the 
facts and feared to be overthrown by a fresh attack on the next 
day before Ventidius could arrive; he remembered what 
Cesar had done beneath the walls of Gergovia and resolved 
to fall back upon Lepidus in Gallia Narbonensis. During the 
night he sent messengers to Ventidius Bassus ordering him to 
cross the Apennines and to rejoin him in Gallia Narbonensis ; 
he gave orders for raising the siege and retreated during the 

* The best reconstruction and chronology of the second battle of 
Modena appears to me that given by Schmidt, Neue Jahrb. fiir Phil. u. 
Pdd., 1892, p. 323 ff. 


Antony is proscribed—Interview between Decimus Brutus 
and Octavianus—Antony’s retreat—Further discord among 
the conservatives at Rome—Initial dissensions between Octa- 
vianus and the conservatives--The mistakes of the conser- 
vative party—Antony reaches Vado and joins Ventidius— 
Octavianus again falls back upon the popular party—Tactics 
of Decimus Brutus—Lepidus—Antony and the army of 
Lepidus—Agreement between Lepidus and Antony—Octa- 
vianus demands the consulship—Attempt to reorganise the 
Cesarean party—The coup d’état of Octavianus—Octavianus 
as consul; the amnesty is annulled—The reconciliation of 
Antony and Octavianus—Triumviri reipublice constituende. 

News of the events at Modena reached Rome apparently » News of the 
ttle a 
on April 25 in very exaggerated form; the Senate met on the Rowe 

26th. Under the impression of this news the exile of Antony 
and his partisans was decreed without opposition ; * and the 

* Comparison of the passages in the letters ad Brut. I. v. and I. iii. 
seems to me to show that Antony’s proscription was decreed on the 
26th, as is stated by Lange, R. A. iii. 524. The letter I. iii. is com- 
posed of two letters, as pointed out by Schmidt, J. P. P. 1892, p. 331; 
one letter is composed of §§ 1 to 3, and was written after the battle of 
Forum Gallorum, the date possibly being placed at the foot of the com- 
plete letter ; the other letter is composed of § 4, was written after the news 
of Pansa’s death had arrived, and mentions Antony’s proscription. In 
letter I. v., under date May 5, Cicero speaks to Brutus of a session of 
April 27, when the methods of pursuing Antony were discussed, which is 
apparently not the session at which Antony was proscribed. Hence I 
assumethat there was a session on the z6th and another on the 27th, the 
latter being rendered necessary by the news of Pansa’s death, which 
arrived between the 26th and 27th. Appian iii. 74, says, as a matter of 
fact, that at the first session there was a disinclination to give the 
supreme command to Decimus. Cicero’s letter ad Brut. I. iii., para- 
graph 4, was therefore written after the session of the 26th and before 
the session of the 27th, when the news of Pansa’s death, which was not 

known in the morning, had just arrived—that is to say, in the course 

43 B.C. 


most divergent proposals were made by different senators. 
In honour of Decimus Brutus the most extravagant decrees 
were proposed, as his obstinate resistance seemed to have been 
the chief factor in the victory; these proposals included a 
supplication of fifty days, a triumph, and the inclusion of his 
name in the calendar to commemorate the day when the news 
had reached Rome, which happened to be the birthday of Brutus.* 
Public opinion was thus greatly misled.t It was also resolved to 
honour those who had fallen on the field of battle, and some 
one urged that the soldiers of Modena should be made elig- 
ible for the rewards promised to the troops of Octavianus ; ft 
Cicero, who thought that no time was to be lost, proposed to 
confer the supreme command upon Decimus as Hirtius was 
dead and Pansa had been left wounded at Bologna ; § naturally, 
these proposals did not meet with complete approval; the 
idea of including Brutus’ name in the calendar was opposed,|| 
and Cicero’s motion respecting Pansa was certainly rejected. 
In the course of the day, however, news arrived that Pansa 

of the 26th. This evidently shows that the news of Pansa’s death 
reached Rome on the evening of the 26th. 

* Dion, xlvi. 39-40; Appian, B.C. ili. 74; Cic. ad Brut. I. xv. 8. 

+ Modern historians, in dealing with these events, have been deceived 
by partisan accounts which were given by the friends of Augustus, 
and of which numerous traces may be found in Livy, Per. cxix. ; 
Velleius, ii. 62; Dion, xlvi. 39-40; and Appian, B. C. iii. 74. These 
stories are attempts to justify the disgraceful behaviour of Octavianus 
to the conservative party, and regard his attitude as a consequence of 
senatorial disloyalty and opposition. We shall see that this is only 
partly true; we also observe a tendency to represent the honours 
voted to Decimus Brutus after his liberation as a slight upon Octavianus. 
This, however, is ridiculous, and it is absurd for ancient historians to 
assert that Decimus Brutus had done nothing, seeing that he had held 
out courageously instead of capitulating. In every war, when an 
army is sent to the relief of a besieged force, it is to the besieged that 
honour is chiefly paid; there is a sense that their endurance should 
be rewarded and their sufferings consoled. Thus these honours to 
Decimus Brutus were by no means intended as an affront to Octavianus. 

t Dion, xlvi. 40. 

§ This is the statement of Appian, B. C. ili. 74, and it seems to me 
very probable. In fact, Decimus Brutus (F. XI. x. 1), in a letter 
dated from Tortona, May 5, complains that certain citizens are opposed 
to any mark of distinction to himself, and even attempted, as he says, 
to secure quo minus vespublica a me commode administrarit possit, which 
is probably an allusion to the proposal of Cicero, which was not approved. 

|| Cp. Cic. ad Brut. I, xv. 8. 4] See note + above. 


had died in the night of the 22nd and 23rd.* It was necessary 
to convene a Senate on the 27th to discuss the movements of 
the legions and the war against Dolabella whch had been 
entrusted to the consuls. 

In this session Servilius successfully attempted to secure ap- 
proval of a former proposal of Cicero, to the effect that Cassius 
should be entrusted with the war against Dolabella, with the 
proconsulship of Syria and full control over all the governors 
of the Asiatic provinces ; ¢ it was resolved that Marcus Brutus 
should be relieved of his obligation to remain near Italy, and 
should be permitted to go to the support of Cassius if he 
judged such action advisable. Ventidius was also proscribed ; 
his case had been forgotten in the delight and excitement 
of the previous day.{ Italy was now secure; at least such was 
the general belief, as Antony was flying with troops exhausted 
and defeated.§ It also appears that with reference to the war 
against Antony a compromise was arranged, and that Pansa’s 
four legions were placed under the command of Decimus, a 
propretor of longer standing than Octavianus, though the latter 
was left in command of his five legions.|| Every one at Rome 
thought that Decimus Brutus and Octavianus had already 
started in pursuit of Antony,4 and were persuaded that in 
a few days he would meet the fate of Catiline. Once more 
the conservative party seemed to be masters of the republic, 
as during the days immediately after Czsar’s murder; the 
friends, relatives, and the wife of the defeated consul were 

* Cic. F. XI. xiii. 2. 

t Cic. ad Brut. 1. v. 1; Dion, xlvi. 4o. 

{ Cic. ad Brut. I. v. 1. SUC pe Cic mE wis Siirater ee lexi vents 

|| Livy, Per. 120. Dion, xlvi. 40, says that the command of his 
legions was not withdrawn from Octavianus, and the statement is con- 
firmed by Cicero’s letters F. XI. xiv. 2 and XI. xix. 1, which show 
that the proposals of Drusus and of Paulus were not approved. On 
the contrary, it appears from Cicero’s letter F. XI. xx. 4, that three of 
Pansa’s four legions were sent by Octavianus to Decimus Brutus, who 
complained that the fourth had not also been sent ; this implies that 
his right to the command of the four legions had been recognised even 
by Octavianus, and that the Senate had placed them under the commaud 
of Decimus Brutus. Such, at least, is the statement of Dion, xlvi. 
40, and of Appian, B. C. iii. 76. Here again the decision was in no 

way a slight upon Octavianus. 
4] Cic. ad Brut, iii. 4. 

43 BC. 

of Antony. 

43 B.C. 

Action of 
Brutus and 


overwhelmed with insults, with threats and with persecution ; 
Fulvia, who was obliged at that moment to find money for 
the purchase of an estate she had bought, would not have 
been able to borrow a sesterce without the help of the obliging 
Atticus, who continued his custom of lending money to 

No one at Rome suspected that these optimistic views by 
no means reflected the facts of the case; contrary to the 
general opinion, Decimus Brutus and Octavianus had not started 
in pursuit of Antony on the day when the siege was raised. 
On April 22, Decimus Brutus had entered the camp of the 
relieving army to pay his respects to Hirtius; when he heard 
of the death of the consul and was informed by Octavianus of 
the military position,t he immediately realised that Ventidius 
Bassus would attempt to rejoin Antony while avoiding contact 
with their armies, and would therefore cross the Apennines 
at once and descend into Liguria; he had therefore attempted 
to induce Octavianus to cross the mountains with his legions 
and bar the road to Liguria, while he himself pursued Antony 
and attempted to drive him into the desolate regions of the 
Apennines.t Octavius, however, had received but a hesitating 
obedience from his legions, even when he enjoyed the partial 
support of so illustrious a Cesarean as Hirtius ; it would have 
been impossible for him to lead them now in conjunction with 
one of Czsar’s murderers to deal a final blow at Antony and his 
veterans.§ Thus Decimus had been unable to convince him 
on that day ; || he had possibly resolved to start alone on the 
next day when he received a letter from Pansa during the 
night calling him to Bologna. On the morning of the 23rd he 
therefore started for Bologna. On the road, however, he heard 
that Pansa was dead; he then turned back and carried out 

* Corn. Nepos, Aft. 9. 

t Cicero, F. XI. xiii. 1. Appian’s account of this conversation in 
B. C. iii. 73 is pure invention, or at least exaggeration from a partisan 
of Augustus. The fact becomes plain by a comparison of Cicero’s 
letter F, XI. xiii., which clearly shows the falsity of the account. 

te (Caos Lev GRE ral, 

§ Decimus Brutus plainly states the fact: Cic. F. XI. x. 4; sed 
neque Cesari imperari potest, nec C@sar exercitut suo. 

HECiCn bec, iil, 7, 


his former plan, starting with his legions in pursuit of Antony 
on the 24th. Thus Antony had a start of two days,* and only 
one general was in pursuit of him; on this point, therefore, 
Roman opinion was deceived. Yet more serious was another 
disappointment which Antony himself prepared for his enemies 
at Rome, proving to them by facts that he was neither crushed 
nor resigned to his fate like Catiline, although he was aban- 
doned and supported only by a weak body of troops. Fury at his 
defeat and the imminence of his danger had suddenly aroused 
Antony’s strength of will and imaginative power, vacillating 
though he had been during the last few months. He conceived 
and immediately put into execution a truly Cesarean plan ; 
to reach Gallia Narbonensis, he resolved to take the Ligurian 
road, to cross the wild and precipitous Apennines between 
Tortona and Vado, where Decimus Brutus wished to drive 
him to bay like a wounded stag. It was a bold enterprise to 
expose his army among these desolate mountains to the possi- 
bility of famine, an army, too, which had certainly suffered in 
the recent engagements, if it had not been so entirely defeated 
as was believed at Rome. ‘The man, however, who had fought 
with Cesar against Vercingetorix did not hesitate to choose 
this road which, though more difficult, was shorter than 
that of the little St. Bernard, and facilitated a junction 
with Ventidius, whom he had ordered to cross the Apen- 
nines. By taking the Ligurian road he would be going to meet 
Ventidius, might join hands with him at Vado, and would 
shorten the journey which his general would otherwise be 
obliged to make alone ; in other words, he would spare Ventidius 
the most dangerous part of the march when soldiers and leader 
might most easily be discouraged by a sense of their distance 
from himself. 

43 B.C. 

With the four legions and the cavalry, which were still in a Antony's 
state of efficiency, and with other troops which he had recruited yeti 

but had not yet organised into legions or armed, he therefore 
marched the thirty miles between Modena and Parma on the 
22nd and 23rd. On the evening of the 23rd, he descended on 
Parma like a whirlwind and abandoned the town to the soldiers 

{ Gicy Peckls xXii2, 

43 B.C. 

among the 
at Rome. 


who were guilty of some pillaging ; * on the 24th and 25th he 
marched the forty miles between Parma and Placentia; on 
the 26th he had advanced along the Via Milvia towards Dertona 
(Tortona) some hundred kilométres away; here he probably 
arrived on the 28th, gave his soldiers a day’s rest, and began 
on the 30th the ascent of the mountains which separated him 
from Vada Sabazia (Vado). Decimus, on the other hand, 
had presumed too far upon the strength of his army, which 
was partially composed of recruits, was exhausted by the priva- 
tions of the siege, and was deprived even of mules and 
horses,t as these had all been devoured during the siege; f 
thus during the first days his advance was slow. During this 
time Octavianus was marching to Bologna with his army to 
prepare for the solemn escort of the remains of Hirtius and 

These facts were known at Rome in the first days of May 
at the moment when the false belief in Antony’s overthrow 
had created fresh confusion. The victory of Modena had 
actually diminished the authority of the man to whom it was 
chiefly due, a curious contradiction which shows what ravages 
political dissolution had made among the upper classes in 
Rome. Cicero realised that the great confusion of the Cesa- 
rean party should be turned to account without a moment’s 
delay, and that the annihilation of Antony was the first step 
towards crushing the party. He was, however, torn by impa- 
tience and harassed the Senate and the senators lest they should 
be lulled to apathy by the delusion that the victory was anything 
more than temporary. As, however, the consuls were dead, 
the government was in the hands of an obscure propretor, 
Aulus Cornutus ; in other words, there was no one at the head 
of affairs. During’the siege of Modena, the imminence of the 
danger had inspired the wearied assembly with some energy ; 
now, however, the greater part of the senators who had reluc- 
tantly consented to the war and were anxious merely to convince 

* Cicero, F. XI. xiii. a. See Cicero, F. X. xxxiii. 4, Parmam direp- 
tam. Antony’s enemies must have exaggerated events to represent 
him as a brigand and a suborner of slaves ; he had no time to waste 

in the pillaging of towns or the robbing of the ergastula. 
hy Cicih Oxhy sxuil, 2, t Appian, B. C. iii. 49. 


themselves that there was no further reason for uneasiness, 
for effort, or for struggle, no longer paid the same attention to 
the author of the Philippics, and regarded his speeches as the 
wild ravings of an excited old man. Moreover, personal rivalry, 
petty individual quarrels, and individual sensitiveness became 
once more predominant. Thus it was impossible to take any 
serious steps, as the Senate was always able to prolong discussion 
or to postpone it, and would approve no measures but those of 
delay. Cicero no longer felt that he had the Senate in hand as 
during the previous months; he realised that the death of 
Pansa was a misfortune for himself, that the illustrious consul, 
notwithstanding his equivocations, was, at any rate, a man of 
energy and common sense.* 

43 B.C. 

As soon as news reached Rome that Decimus was marching Increased 
alone in pursuit of Antony, fresh difficulties arose. The old “culties: 

discord between the partisans of Octavianus and his enemies, 
which had died away during the war, broke out afresh. Many 
members of the Senate were indignant with Octavianus, who 
remained inactive at Bologna ; t the relatives of the conspirators 
who were uneasy as usual, and the jealous opponents of the 
young man who were numerous, took advantage of this ill- 
feeling to injure his cause. Two senators, Lucius Amilius 
Paulus, the brother of Lepidus, and Livius Drusius, proposed to 
give Decimus command of all the veteran legions which Octa- 
vianus had recruited.{ This was a vigorous policy which might, 
if pushed with energy and consistency, havedeprived Octavianus 
of any power for harm. Others, on the contrary, including 
Cicero, realising that the victory was by no means decisive, 
recommended prudence and advised that Octavianus should be 

PaeOicnl Kl xiv; 1» ad Brut. lox. V. 

+ Ancient historians, too prone to accept accounts favourable to 
Augustus, have failed to realise that the refusal of Octavianus to join 

in the pursuit of Antony was the first cause of discord between the 
Senate and Octavianus. 

+ See Cicero’s letter F. XI. xix. 1, which was written on May ar. 
These proposals were therefore advanced in the first ten days of May 
and not immediately after the news of the victory of Modena. This 
fact proves that the proposal was not a gratuitous provocation as 
represented by Dion, xlvi. 40, but that it was made in the first days 
of May, when the Senate knew that Octavianus was not starting in 
pursuit of Antony. 

43 B.C. 

Position of 


flattered and used for the defence of Italy.* Cassius himself, 
the most capable of the conspirators, seems to have been 
inclined at that moment to begin negotiations for an agreement 
with him.t This policy again, though opposed to the former, 
might have resulted favourably if it had been courageously 
pursued, but in the universal apathy the Senate was unable 
to decide for either course and adopted a compromise which 
secured the danger without the advantages of either pro- 
posal. The proposal of Amilius and of Livius was con- 
sidered too venturesome, and the Senate refused its approval, 
fearing that the soldiers would not be willing to obey; { on 
the other hand, no negotiations were opened to secure the 
support of Octavianus, who was left to himself without orders 
at the head of his legions. 

The Senate, however, was greatly deluded when it considered 
that it had thus relieved itself of all possible trouble arising 
from Octavianus and his army. At the end of some days, letters 
were received at Rome from Octavianus requesting the Senate 
to give his soldiers their promised rewards ; § these presents 
included not only the two thousand sesterces which the 
Senate had resolved to give to the revolted legions on 
January 24, but the twenty thousand promised to each soldier 

* Cicero, XI. xiv.1, mivabiliter, mi Brute, letor mea constlia measque 
sententias probart de decemviris, de orvnando adulescente. This letter 
was written at the end of May in reply to a letter of Cicero’s despatched 
about the beginning of May. It proves that the proposal of the 
decemvirt was made by Cicero, consequently that at the beginning of 
May Cicero considered that it was necessary ornare adulescentem, and 
that he met with opposition, as he congratulated himself on the fact 
that Decimus Brutus agreed with him. 

y+ This seems to follow from Dion, xlvii. 28, according to which 
Cassius r@ re Kaioapt rept rOy cvvadd\ayav eréoreire. 

+t So Dion, xlvi. 40, confirmed by Cic. F. XI. xix. 1, and XI. 
xiv. 2: , 

|| Appian, B.C. iii. 86 and 88, speaks of two embassies of Octavianus’ 
soldiers to Rome, the first of which arrived at this moment. I can 
hardly believe, however, that he had recourse upon two occasions to 
so revolutionary a proceeding, or that he adopted this method on the 
first occasion, when the situation was by no means desperate. As, 
however, it is unlikely that the Senate, in its inactivity after the relief 
of Modena, would take the initiative of sending such a message to the 
soldiers, I assume that the message was determined in consequence of 
steps taken by Octavianus. 


by Octavianus in case of victory, and this not merely to the 
two revolted legions, but to every soldier of the five.* Octa- 
vianus was now inactive at’ the head of a useless army confined 
to a little town in Gaul, unwilling to revolt against the Senate, 
which was equally unwilling to give him orders; he was thus 
in a most embarrassing position at Bologna, and did not in the 
least know what to do with his army. He prepared Pansa’s 
four legions for their transference to Decimus ; + at the same 
time he left Ventidius a free passage across the Apennines. 
He merely wished to show the soldiers by his application to the 
Senate that he felt a keen interest in their welfare. Precisely 
for this reason it was very difficult for the Senate to give a 
direct answer. Negotiations both long and fruitless began. 
Eventually those who wished to give nothing to the soldiers 
and those who wished to act generously, agreed upon arrange- 
ments which were both incomplete and contradictory; they 
resolved that only the revolted legions, according to the 
letter of the senatus consultum, should be rewarded, and should 
receive not twenty thousand but ten thousand sesterces ; 
they also resolved that this decision should be communicated 
directly to the legions by an embassy from the Senate as 
an indication that they depended upon the Senate and not 
upon Octavianus ; { as a compensatory measure, on the proposal 
of Cicero, who was anxious not to irritate the soldiers, they 
resolved to appoint a commission of ten members, including 
Cicero, to pay out the donativum and to find land for dis- 
tribution among the four legions. Two of these legions 
were certainly those which had revolted; the two others 
may have been those of Decimus Brutus, but the point 

* Dion, xlvi. 40, and Appian, B. C. iii. 86, practically give the 
same account, each supplementing the narrative of the other. Dion 
says that it was decided to give ten thousand to some of the soldiers 
and nothing to the others; Appian says that half of the promised 
donativum was sent to the two revolted legions. It must, then, be 
admitted that disputes arose concerning the interpretation of the 
senatus consultum of January 3, that the Senate applied the act literally 
as regarding the number of those who had the right to the donativum, 
but that with reference to the amount some arrangement was made, 
in virtue of which they resolved to give only half. 

faCicn Buel, <x. 4. 
t Dion, xlvi. 40; Appian, B. C. iii, 86, 

43 B.C. 


May, is uncertain.* Possibly to show its interest in the veterans, 
43 8c. the Senate in this session commissioned Lepidus and Plancus 
to found the colony at the confluence of the Rhone 
and the Sadne which afterwards became Lyons; in short, 
the Senate replied to the soldiers by equivocal decisions 
which were bound to inspire suspicion, and by fair promises 
which it was unable to carry out, for there was very little land 
to distribute in Italy, unless it was to be bought at an extremely 
high price; moreover, the public treasury was empty, as the 
tribute from the rich eastern provinces had been intercepted 
by Brutus, Cassius, and Dolabella. Cicero was horrified to find 
that these promises could only be met by imposing upon Italy 
the tributum, or forced war loan, and this at a moment when 
gold and silver were scarce in Italy, and credit was very difficult ; 
many people at that time, even among the wealthy classes, 
could only procure ready money by selling at reduced prices 
their houses, farms, villas, works of art, and promissory notes. 
Progress of While the Senate was thus occupied at Rome, the indefati- 
— gable Antony had crossed the Ligurian mountains on April 
30; in the course of six days he had advanced along the road 
from Aquz Statielle to Vado, amid the wild and desolate 
mountains of that region, harassed by the idea that Ventidius 
would not stop, that he might be defeated, or that he would 
betray him on the road. His fate partly depended on Ventidius 
and the success of his journey. At length on May § Antony 
reached Vada Sabazia (Vado), but he did not find Ventidius 
there ; he had a longer journey by fifty miles to perform and 
therefore could not yet have arrived; however, Antony 
probably found a message from him which decided him to 
despatch Lucius Antonius with a body of cavalry t and some 

* Decimus Brutus, in the letter F. XI. xx., written from Ivrea on 
May 25, speaks not only of the decemvirt, but also of the distribution 
of land and payments of money, and refers to the complaints of the 
soldiers upon this question. That seems to show that all these deci- 
sions were made at the same time in the first ten days of May, and 
for that reason I bring them into connection with the action of Octa- 
vius. Appian, B. C. iit, 86, also says that the decemviyt were to 
undertake the task of paying out the money. 

+ Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 1; F. X. xv. 3. L. Antonium, premissum cum 


cohorts ; they were to wait at Vado and to prevent Decimus 
from throwing his army between Antony and Ventidius if he 
should reach Vado before the latter. ‘This was now the great 
question ; would Ventidius arrive before Decimus ? Decimus 
had reorganised his army as well as he could while upon the 
march and had accelerated his progress. On May 5, shortly 
before Antony reached Vado, he was at Tortona, where he 
heard a false rumour, intentionally or accidentally spread, 
that Ventidius had joined Antony at Vado.* Decimus 
believed the story at the moment and wrote a despairing 
letter to Cicero, adding a request for the immediate despatch 
of money, of which he had run short.t During the night, 
however, he was doubtless informed that the news was false, 
for the next day he advanced his troops in the direction of 
Aqui, and on May 6, 7 and 8, he marched without a halt, 
arriving within thirty miles of Vado on the gth.[ There he 
gained more exact information concerning Antony. Ventidius 
had arrived, probably on the 7th, and Antony for the moment 
had been able to think himself secure. In a few hours, how- 
ever, he was bitterly undeceived; the three legions were 
greatly exhausted and when Antony addressed them on the 
8th, declaring his intention of joining Lepidus, the prospect 
of more than one hundred miles additional march through 
these wild regions discouraged them; they refused obedi- 
ence and loudly asserted that they preferred to return to Italy, 
even at the risk of death. Antony was obliged to promise that 
they should retire upon Pollenzo the next day, while he went 
on with his own troops into Gallia Narbonensis.§ Decimus 
Brutus had been informed of this transaction, and changed his 
route for a hasty march upon Pollenzo; he reached the town 
an hour before the advance guard of Ventidius, and thereby 
rendered a great service to Antony.|| When the three legions 
found themselves driven from Pollenzo, they resigned them- 
selves to the journey into Gaul and followed Antony at an 
interval of two days’ march.4 

Be CIC Ear el 0 (OOH Mare dG 

t Cic. F. XI. xiii. 3. § Ibid. \| Cic. F. XI. xiii. 4. 

4] Cic. F. XI. xiii. 4. Cp. F. X. xvii. 1. Ventidius bidui spatio 

abest ab eo. 
III i 

43 B.C. 

43 B.C. 

Octavianus and 
the Senate. 


When these facts were learned at Rome during the last ten 
days of May, Cicero was confirmed in his opinion that Octavianus 
must be won over; however, the enemies of Antony and 
the rivals of Decimus accused that general of carelessness in 
allowing the fugitive to escape.* "Their exasperation was 
the keener at the end of several days when further despatches 
from him arrived, in which, like Cicero, he advised that every 
courtesy should be shown to Octavianus, and that Marcus Brutus 
should be recalled to Italy.t This proposal had been advanced 
at Rome during those days to calm the anxiety caused by the 
news of Antony’s movements ; it was also desired to transport 
the legion in Sardinia to Italy, and to hasten the progress of 
the African legions.| At this moment it was learnt that Lucius 
Antonius had reached Forum Julii on May 8.§ The rising 
irritation was further increased at the end of May when the 
ambassadors returned who had gone to address the soldiers 
in the camp of Octavianus. Cesar’s son had prepared a most 
unusual reception for the ambassadors. They had been brought 
into the camp and the soldiers had been assembled, but the 
latter had declined to listen to the ambassadors unless Octavianus 
were present ; to this demand they had been obliged to yield. 
Octavianus therefore cameforward and the ambassadors explained 
the decisions of the Senate; but the sense of comradeship 
was at that moment so powerful among the soldiers that there 
was an outburst of general protestation, and those to whom 
rewards were offered were even more exasperated than those 
who had been deprived of them.|| The soldiers were also 
dissatisfied with the Land law and complained that Octavianus 
had not been appointed to the commission. This was a pre- 
monitory hint that Octavianus might be a dangerous force. 
Notwithstanding the illusions cherished by many politicians 
at Rome, it was impossible for him to remain longer inactive. 
Apart from the pressure of circumstances he would be drawn 

* Gic, By RTs xive 3 

t Cic. F. XI. xiv. 2. The letter must have been written at the 
end of May. 

{ Cic. F. XI. 26 proves that Decimus Brutus knew on June 3 that 
this proposal had been mooted. § Cig BL Xen 

|| Dion, xlvi. 41 ; Appian, B. C, iii. 86, 

LOT eee 3] Ri Fate gh 


into action by those about him, who were, without exception, 
old soldiers and officers of Casar’s army. ‘Though they had 
taken up arms against Antony, their hatred for the conservatives 
was violent and deeply rooted and they feared that a conserva- 
tive restoration might take place upon the ruins of the Cesarean 
party. Many of them attempted to embroil Octavianus with 
Cicero; they went so far as to tell him that Cicero had said 
he should be killed,* and they advised him to display some 
boldness.t He was told that the conservatives who had made 
him a propretor were attempting to be rid of him, and were 
already seeking to discredit him on account of his youth. 
As Antony had been almost crushed by ill-fortune, Octavianus 
should forthwith lead the Cesarean party, which was now 
deprived of guidance. He himself, following the example of 
Herophilus, had stirred up the movement to avenge Cesar 
which Antony had continued with such success. As Cesar’s 
adopted son and heir, he was precisely the man to continue 
this movement with vigour. ‘The two consulships were vacant : 
legal difficulties and the intrigues of an excessive number of 
candidates had delayed the election. Octavianus, therefore, 
should appear as a candidate for the consulship, should come 
forward as Cesar’s son and tell the people that for their good 
and for the welfare of the army, he was ready to continue all 
the plans which the conspiracy had prevented his father from 
accomplishing. A consul nineteen years of age had not yet 
been seen at Rome, but it was a time of change. He would 
certainly be elected and would thus become the head of the 
Cesarean party. 

Octavianus was not insensible to this flattering advice; he had 
retained one of Pansa’s legions under his command, and was 
busy recruiting two more; none the less he hesitated. He 
realised the disturbing fact that certain conservatives were 
attempting to deprive him of his army.[ Was it, however, 
possible for him to lead Cesar’s party in Italy, unless he was 
helped by at least one of the more powerful governors of the 

PaGicn Bex, xx,a, Cp. Velleins, IT: Ixi. 6: 

¢ Cicero ad Brut. I. x. 3, says that it was the friends of Octavianus 
who urged him to claim the consulship, and the statement seems very 
probable. f Plut. Cec. 45. 

43 BC. 

Antony evades 

43 B.C. 



provinces around Italy ? He began to consider the possibility 
of a reconciliation with Antony; he showed kind treatment 
to those of Antony’s soldiers whom he had captured; and 
released some of his officers after allowing them to see that he 
would be ready to consider proposals for an agreement.* At 
Rome, however, very few people suspected anything of the 
kind; on the contrary, they regretted the young man’s forced 
inactivity at Bologna, and towards the end of May all hope 
was lost that Decimus would inflict the fate of Catiline upon 
Antony. His project of preventing a junction between Antony 
and Ventidius had failed, and he had not ventured to advance 
into the wilds of Liguria with his freshly recruited legions, 
telling himself that if the fugitives were welcomed by Lepidus, 
then Lepidus also must be declared an enemy ; he had decided 
to rejoin Plancus in the Gallic provinces, returning through 
Cisalpine Gaul, and crossing the district now known as Pied- 
mont. Plancus was to be consul with him the following year ; 
they might therefore regard one another as colleagues, and 
act in common. He had written to Plancus without delay, 
and had remained a short time at Pollenzo as his army was 
suffering from dysentery ; fT then towards the end of May he 
turned his back on Liguria and marched towards the Valley 
of the Po. ‘Thus it was certain that Antony might reach 
Lepidus without hindrance. 

General anxiety, however, prevailed at Rome as to the 
attitude of Lepidus. Would he treat Antony as an enemy 
as he had affirmed in his letters,t or was he already in agreement 
with him as malicious gossip affirmed ?§ It was extremely 
difficult to divine the intentions of the pro-consul from his 
acts. As Lucius Antonius advanced, his officer Culleo, 
who was guarding the frontier, had joined Lucius instead of 
opposing his passage ; |] yet, at the same time, Lepidus had 
written to Plancus stating that he was resolved to oppose 
Antony, and asking for reinforcements of cavalry. What then, 
did he propose to do? Plancus, on the other hand, was 

* Appian, B. C. iii. 80. + Appian, B. C. iii. 81. 
1 Ci Hore. RR KIVe DL . SUCIC UN KL Vans 
|| Appian, B. C. iii. 83, confirmed by Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 2. 


regarded by the conservatives as a sure ally ; he had gone down 
the Valley of the Isére as far as Cularo (Grenoble) ; he had con- 
structed a bridge and crossed the river with his army on May 12, 
hastily sending on four thousand cavalry in advance as soon as he 
had been informed of the arrival of Lucius at Forum Julii.* But 
while attention at Rome was centred upon Lepidus, Octavianus 
had realised that every moment was now precious ; as he could 
not formulate a plan, he attempted once more to play a double 
game. He wrote to Lepidus and also to Asinius to learn 
whether they would be inclined to recognise him as the head 
of the Cesarean party.t He also wrote to Cicero urging him 
to secure the consulship and accept him as a colleague ; adding 
that in view of his youth he would be guided by Cicero in every 
respect, and would help him to save the republic! { This 
proposal was not displeasing to Cicero, but he felt himself 
discouraged and paralysed by the increasing scorn and hatred 
of the conservatives for the young man and he could not venture 
upon a definite reply. 

Amid such universal confusion no one was sure of his inten- 
tions. Antony alone resolutely pursued a definite object. 
While Decimus Brutus, who had been joined by three of 
Pansa’s four legions, was slowly marching towards the Little 
St. Bernard by way of Vercelli and Ivrea,§ Antony had reached 
Forum Julii (Fréjus) on May 15,|| and boldly proceeded 
towards the army of Lepidus which was composed of seven of 
Cesar’s old legions, and was stationed at Forum Voconii, 
twenty-four miles away. The critical moment was approach- 
ing. Were these legions likely to take up arms against their 
old general who was coming to join them with many of their 
old comrades, coming as the proscribed avenger of Cesar, to 

ask help for himself and for the party which claimed the 

* Cic. F. X. xv. 2-3: + Appian, B. C. iii. 81. 

t Appian, B. C. iii. 82; Plutarch, Czc. 45. Appian puts these 
overtures before the meeting of Antony and Lepidus, while Dion, 
xlvi. 42, places them later. Dion is confirmed by Cicero’s letter ad 
Brut. I. x. 3, which was written after the treachery of Lepidus. How- 
ever, the two accounts can be harmonised, if we assume that the 
negotiations were begun, then broken off and afterwards resumed. 

SiGponCic) Be Xl xix.) XL) xx, DOL) xxiit. 

|| Cic. F. X. xvii. re 4] Cic. F. X. xvit. 1; X. xxxiv. 1. 

43 B.C. 

Antony and 

43 B.C. 


performance of former promises and was ready to make further 
offers; this, too, at a time when the sense of comradeship 
had become so powerful among the dictator’s old armies? In 
reality, the pro-consul of Gallia Narbonensis thought the possi- 
bility of opposing Antony with his legions was quite hopeless ; 
he was, however, a weak and ordinary character, and wished his 
soldiers to force his hand that he might delude himself and others 
with the belief that he was acting under compulsion. Antony 
was ready to support the secret desire of his colleague, and 
proceeded to play a strange comedy when the two armies 
met between May 15 and 20 upon the banks of a little stream 
called the Argenteus.* Antony did not even order his soldiers 
to entrench, baring his breast, so to speak, to the dagger, if 
his enemy had the courage to strike; Lepidus, on the other 
hand, entrenched himself in a camp as if he were facing a 
second Hannibal.t When Silanus and Culleo appeared in 
the camp, Lepidus reprimanded them severely for the help 
they had given to Antony; their punishment, however, was 
confined to this mark of displeasure, out of pity, as Lepidus 
wrote to the Senate.{t He made overtures to Plancus who had 
stopped at Grenoble to wait for Decimus after receiving his 
letter ; at the same time he allowed a bridge of boats to be 
built between the two camps ; § he welcomed a large number 
of supposed deserters who, under pretence of abandoning 
Antony, came to intrigue for him in the camp of Lepidus. 
He pretended to regard them as real deserters; he even 
wrote to the Senate that Antony’s army was visibly melting 
away ; || and hopefully asserted that the the legions would not 
fail in their duty. At the same time he permitted certain 
officers, in particular Canidius and Rufrenus,** to incite them to 
revolt, and allowed messages from Antony to circulate among 

CCG IG SS, SS lolohigy, ily 

t Plut. Ant. 18; Appian, B. C. iii. 83. 

} Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 2; Dion, xlvi. 51, with some inaccuracies which 
are corrected by the letter from Lepidus which is quoted. 

§ Appian, B. C. iii. 83. 

|| Cic. F. X. xxxiv. 18 

SL ACiGs EG exo 

** Cic. F. X. xxi. 4; corrupti etiam per eos qui presunt, per Canidios 
Rufrenos et cateros » « » 


the soldiers. ‘These were mysteriously brought, were whispered —_June, 
in the darkness, and excited fresh enthusiasm.* 43 B.C. 
One day when Antony doubtless thought that the moment Lepidus joins 
had come, he appeared with dishevelled hair, untrimmed 4"*°°¥ 
beard and in mourning dress on the banks of the Argenteus 
at the narrowest part of the stream, and began to harangue 
the soldiers of Lepidus who were on the other bank. They 
ran together and a great uproar took place in the camp; Lepi- 
dus, however, was afraid of such manifest treason, and hastily 
ordered the trumpets to be sounded, so that it was impossible 
for the soldiers to hear a word of Antony’s speech.t Intrigues 
between the two camps began more vigorously than before 
and the soldiers of the Tenth Legion did their utmost to win 
over their comrades ; [ the only officer who sincerely supported 
the conservative cause, Juventius Laterensis,§ continually 
warned Lepidus of the danger of a mutiny, and urged him to 
take now one step, and now another.|| Lepidus pretended 
fear, thanked him and promised to follow his advice but did 
nothing. On the contrary he wrote to Plancus, who had started 
on the 21st without destroying the bridge which was to serve 
for Decimus, requesting him not to come to his help; 4 he 
allowed his soldiers to make demonstrations in favour of Antony, 
even in his own presence, without punishment.** At length 
on the morning of May 29,tt Antony forded the stream with a 
little band of soldiers; the soldiers in Lepidus’ camp broke 
down the palisading, came to meet Antony and carried him in 
triumph to the tent of Lepidus; he was still in bed, but with- 
out waiting to dress himself, came out to embrace 
In the midst of the tumult Laterensis committed suicide 
before his soldiers.§§ ‘The next day Lepidus wrote a brief 
letter to the Senate, which might be regarded as a sarcasm ; 
he stated that his soldiers and himself had been overcome by 
Ze Dionsxlvis 51. + Plut. Ant. 18, 
t Appian, B. C. iii. 83. 
§ Dion, xlvi. 51; Appian, B. C. iii. 84. 
i| Appian, B. C. iii. 84. 
‘| See Ue OG Slocayee, AGO, US Borah, 7p 
Tt Cie. F. X. xxiii. 2; Appian, B. C. iii. 84. 

{tt} Appian, B. C. iii. 84; Plut. Ant. 18. The two accounts supple- 
ment one another. $§ Dion, xlvi. 51. 

43 B.c. 

Public feeling 
at Rome, 


pity, and that he trusted their compassion would not be regarded 
as criminal either in his legions or in himself.* 

This news reached Rome about June 8 and aroused extra- 
ordinary indignation and uproar. The Senate, in affright, 
hastily passed a large number of measures which had been 
urged upon them long before. Marcus Brutus and Cassius 
were summoned to Italy with their troops; messengers were 
sent to the African legions to hasten their progress; Sextus 
Pompeius was placed at the head of the fleet with the title of 
prefectus classis et ore maritime, and with all the powers 
which his father had held during the war against the pirates ; + 
a tributum or forced war loan was decided, and finally Octavianus 
was given the command of the war against Antony.[ A 
further difficulty arose on the question of the proscription of 
Lepidus. This measure had been straightway demanded by 
Cicero, who was ever ready for energetic action, but Lepidus 
had too many relatives and friends at Rome and his mother- 
in-law, the powerful Servilia, strove her utmost to save him.§ 
At length the debate upon the matter was postponed, and thus 
the advantage of immediate action, the most powerful factor 
in revolutions, was lost. However, news soon arrived ; Plancus 
had retreated on learning the events of May 29 on the banks 
of the Argenteus ; || Decimus had gone up the valley of Aosta 
by way of Vercelli and Ivrea, where the cunning Salassians had 

Pu CIC aE wen KV 

} Dion, xlvi. 51. See Appian, B. C. iv. 84. It is true that Dion, 
xlvi. 40, says that a similar decree in favour of Pompeius had been 
voted after the battle of Modena, together with the decree which gave 
the command of the war against Dolabella to Cassius and Macedonia 
to Brutus. Dion however has already confused, in reference to 
Brutus, the decision of February with the powers then given 
to him to take part in the war against Dolabella, and he is equally 
wrong on the subject of Sextus. In fact, Cicero’s letter, ad Brut. I., 
v. 1 and 2, says that in the session of April 27, when the decisions 
respecting Brutus and Cassius were passed, Pompeius was not discussed 
at all. Cicero would certainly have referred to the fact in writing to 
Brutus, as it was important for him to know that they could rely upon 
a fleet. The official title of the office given to Pompeius has been 
preserved to us by coins ; see Cohen, M.R. i. pps 19 and 20. On the 
subject of the African legions, see Appian, ili. 85. 

{ Appian, B. C. iii. 85 ; Dion, xlvi. 42 and 51, confirmed by Cic, 

Pe exxiv. 4. 
_ § Cic. ad Brut, I. xii, 1, || Cic. Fs XX. xxiii, 3. 


made him pay a drachma for every soldier under threats of 
barring his passage ;* he had passed the Little St. Bernard 
and had effected a junction with Plancus at Grenoble during 
the first half of June. 

At that moment an unexpected scandal arose, and Octavianus 
committed what was a very serious error at this crisis; he 
reconsidered the prospect of an agreement with the conserva- 
tives, and thinking that he might induce the Senate at such a 
moment of panic to authorise his candidature for the consul- 
ship, he urged Cicero to propose the idea once more.t Cicero 
was attracted by the possibility of a further consulship for 
himself and agreed. On this occasion, however, the new 
ambition of Octavianus was so ill-received, not only by the 
conservatives, but by all the impartial public, that no magis- 
trate would venture to support him. Cicero was forced to 
abandon the plan, and attempted to dissuade Octavianus from 
his designs upon the consulship.{ Popular dislike to the young 
man turned into irritation ; rumour even affirmed that he had 
assassinated Hirtius in the battle, and had poisoned Pansa 
when wounded that he might have a better opportunity of 
securing the consulship.§ But when this scandal had been 
forgotten, the former apathy speedily supervened and 
continued until the end of June. Plancus and Decimus 
were waiting for Octavianus; when he realised that he could 
not expect the consulship at that moment, he wrote that he 
would come immediately, but did not stir.|| Antony was 
reorganising his legions with the help of Lepidus, and was 
waiting in Gallia Narbonensis. The arrival of Brutus and Cassius 
at Rome was expected daily, but Cassius was far distant and 
occupied in opposing Dolabella. Brutus was in a state of 
complete physical and mental prostration; he was suffering 
from a stomachic disorder, and allowed himself to be guided 
by the cunning Caius Antonius instead of enforcing the decree 
of proscription passed against his brother’s partisans on April 

* Strabo, IV. vi. 7 (205). 

tT Dion, xlvi. 42. { Cic. ad Brut. I. x. 3. 

§ This was probably the origin of the rumours in circulation, to 

which reference is made by Suetonius, Aug. IT. 
|| Cic. FOX. xxiv. 4. J Cic. ad Brut. I. xiii. 2. 

43 B.C. 

demands the 

43 B.C, 

Prospects of 
either party. 


26; the misrepresentations of Caius induced him to discoun- 
tenance Cicero’s kindness to Octavianus.* He continued to urge 
that the best policy was to secure an agreement with Antony. 
He was also greatly disturbed by the imminent proscription 
of Lepidus, and wrote to his friends at Rome, requesting them 
to look after his sister and nephews, who would be ruined 
by it;+ finally, instead of making preparations for the 
voyage to Italy, he projected an expedition against the Bessi. 
Cicero’s chief enemies were thus amongst his closest friends, 
including Brutus himself. On June 30 Lepidus was at length 
proclaimed a public enemy; but a further interval elapsed 
between the threat and the punishment; it was thought 
desirable to give the soldiers an opportunity of securing their 
pardon, and they were given until September 1 to abandon 
the pro-consul.f{ 

Matters, however, had reached a point at which some issue 
became inevitable, notwithstanding all fears and vacillation 
and all efforts to avert the crisis. Antony and Lepidus had 
good reason for prolonging their stay in Gallia Narbonensis. 
The conspirators and conservatives, notwithstanding their 
panic, had reconquered almost the whole of that empire 
which Antony seemed to have taken from them in the 
previous July and August. In Europe they had the ten 
legions of Decimus whom they could trust entirely, the 
five legions of Plancus and the three of Asinius which seemed 
bound to remain faithful to them; they had also conquered 
the east, where Brutus had recruited fresh soldiers, bringing 
the number of his legions up to seven, and where Cassius with 
his ten legions would soon overthrow Dolabella. Moreover, 
Sextus Pompeius at Marseilles was concentrating ships from 
every harbour in the Mediterranean; he was buying and 
enlisting sailors in Africa, and preparing a fleet. Against these 
powerful forces Antony and Lepidus could only set fourteen 
legions. It was necessary to reorganise the great Caesarean 
army in the west, and to persuade most of the generals in Europe 

* Cp. his letter to Atticus, in Cic. ad Brut. 1.17. Cp. also Cic. ad 
Brut. J. iv. 4 ff 
+ Cic. ad Brut. 1. xiii. ILS Tes 1G OAM ores vie 


to join them or to seduce their legions if they refused. Hence July, 
it was impossible to show further hostility to Octavianus. For- 43 8-¢: 
tunately, Lepidus * was able to play the part of go-between 

in this great political bargain, and to reconcile the two rivals. 

He was the eldest of the three, had been a close friend of 

Cesar, and had not been involved in the quarrel. Overtures 

were therefore made to Plancus and Asinius, who had also 

been Czsar’s friends; agents were sent to their armies to 
disseminate doubt, suspicion, and promises, and to bring over 

the soldiers by means of the generals and the generals by means 

of the soldiers. At the same time, in the early days of July, 
Lepidus took steps for a reconciliation with Octavianus. 

The moment was entirely opportune. Octavianus had been Attempts to 
disappointed in his hopes of the consulship, and had realised Biase Wee 
that he could no longer rely upon the conservatives or the party. 
Senate; he remembered once more that he was Cesar’s son, 
and prepared to show himself the rival of Antony in his zeal for 
the Czsarean cause. His soldiers, moreover, had been gradu- 
ally overcome by a kind of Cesarean fanaticism which then 
pervaded the armies and made constant demonstrations, in 
which they asserted that they would never fight against Czsar’s 
soldiers.t If Octavianus felt any remaining hesitation, it would 
speedily have been dispelled by his soldiers. He therefore 
welcomed the proposals of Lepidus; he made inflammatory 
speeches to the soldiers in praise of his father, and promised 
them that when he was once elected consul, he would secure 
them the promised rewards. In this way he induced the troops 
to send a deputation of soldiers and centurions to Rome 
demanding the election of Octavianus as consul, and the repeal 
of the proscription against Antony.[ ‘The embassy reached 
Rome about July 15,§ at a time when the conservatives were 
uneasy, as they had heard nothing concerning the return of 

* Livy, Per. 119 and Eutr. vii. 2 tell us that Lepidus was the 
means of reconciliation. 

¢ Dion, xlvi. 42. 

{t Dion, xlvi. 42-43; Appian, B. C. iii. 87-88 ; Suetonius, Aug. 26. 

§ Plancus, in Gaul, was informed of this attempt on July 28. Cicero 
F. X. xxiv. 6. There is, perhaps, a further allusion to it in Cic. ad 
Brut. I. xiv. 2, which was written on July 11. Cp. Cic. ad Brut. I. 
Xviil. 4. 

43 B.C. 

coup a élat. 


Brutus to Italy; at a moment, too, when Cicero had been 
entirely discredited by the suspicious intrigues of Octavianus, 
and when the ¢ributum * was known to have caused the utmost 
discontent among the wealthy classes throughout Italy. Thus 
the deputation reached Rome without hindrance, and the 
centurions were able to make their way into the curza, where 
the Senate had met to receive them in a spirit of fear and 
distrust. The insults of the embassy, however, revived the 
energy and even the courage of this pusillanimous Senate, 
which abruptly dismissed the centurions in irritation.t Octa- 
vianus was informed of this refusal towards the end of July, 
and emboldened by the possibility of an agreement with 
Antony and Lepidus, he ventured a supreme act of audacity. 
When the soldiers came to him to offer him the consular in- 
signia, he accepted, though he pretended that he acted under 
compulsion, and marched away with his eight legions. 

As the action of Lepidus and Antony had driven Octavianus 
to re-adopt the principles of a Caesarean and democrat, this 
bold and determined proceeding on his part similarly 
spurred Antony and Lepidus to make every effort to win 
over the armies of Plancus and of Asinius, and to induce 
the troops of Decimus to mutiny. They would not be out- 
stripped by their former rival, who had suddenly become their 
friend. In every army the silent energy of the democratic 
emissaries was redoubled ; Cesarean fanaticism grew fierce ; 
the fidelity of the legions was undermined and wavered. One 
shock was enough to cause the final overthrow, and this shock 
was given by the expedition of Octavianus to Rome. If he were 
to succeed in securing the town and his election as consul, 
Cesarean fanaticism would burst forth throughout the armies 
with overwhelming violence. Hence Rome was seized with 
panic on the approach of the army. Women and children 
were sent away to the neighbouring villas, houses were closed, 
and the Senate attempted to stop the legions by sending 
delegates with the promised money. On July 25, Casca, 
Labeo, Scaptius and Cicero, who was in despair when he 

* Cic. ad Brut. I. xviii. 5. f Dion, xlvi. 43. 
{ Appian, B. C. iii. 89. 


realised that he had been the true founder of Octavianus’ power,* 
met in the house of Servilia to discuss the situation; she was 
the Niobe of the last revolution at Rome, and symbolised with 
her family the tragical disruption of the Roman aristocracy. 
At that moment her son-in-law and son were respectively 
leading and serving in the Cesarean army, which desired to 
revenge the death of her great friend; another son and son- 
in-law were leading the conspirators’ party. At this meeting 
it was decided to make a further appeal to Brutus, and induce 
him to return to Italy.t Octavianus, however, was able to per- 
suade the senatorial delegates to return by telling them that 
numerous assassins were in waiting upon the road.[ The 
majority of the Senate was thus seized with such panic that 
it turned against the Pompeian party, and basely yielded 
every demand. It was resolved that the twenty thousand 
sesterces should be given, not merely to the Fourth and the 
Martian Legions, but to all without discrimination ; Octavianus 
was to be nominated to the commission for the distribution of 
lands, and he might also become a candidate for the consulship 
without visiting Rome. Messengers were hastily despatched to 
inform the young general of these measures.§ 

However, the messengers had no sooner started when the 
news arrived that the African Legions had reached Ostia ; 
the Sardinian Legion had doubtless been at Rome some time 
before. Suddenly the Pompeians, the relatives of the con- 
spirators and Cicero recovered their ascendency over the 
cowardly majority, and so far intimidated them as to secure 
the repeal of the measures already passed. A levy of soldiers 
was ordered, and the town was fortified ; search was even made 
for the mother and sister of Octavianus that they might be kept 
as hostages.|| Hardly had the first messengers from the 
Senate reached the army when they were rejoined by others 

* Cic. ad Brut. I. xviii. 1-3. + Cic. ad Brut. I. xviii. 1-2. 

t Appian, B. C. iii. 88. 

§ Appian, iii. 90; Dion, xlvi.44. Dion is certainly wrong in saying 
that the Senate appointed Octavius consul. 

|| Dion, xlvi. 44, and Appian, iii. 90, both state this reversal of the 
Senate’s policy, but give no reason. Drumann, G. R. I*, 244, correctly 
sees the reason in the arrival of the African legions, of which Appian 
speaks B. C. iii. gt. 

43 B.C. 

Octavianus at 

43 B.C. 

annuls the 


who countermanded all that the first had said, with the sole 
result that they increased the exasperation of the soldiers ; * 
Octavianus then sent emissaries to Rome who mingled with the 
people in the taverns, in the forum, and in the back streets 
of the lower quarters to reassure the masses upon his 
intentions, to make great promises to the African legions, 
which were composed of Czsar’s old soldiers, and to urge them 
to revolt. Upon the arrival of Octavianus beneath the walls 
of Rome, the African and Sardinian legions declared for him,t 
and the population followed. The town surrendered, the 
leaders of the conservative party took flight, and the next day 
Cesar’s son was able to enter Rome with an escort. In the 
forum he embraced his mother and sister, who had been con- 
cealed by the Vestal Virgins; heoffered sacrificeto Jupiter Capito- 
linus, gave an audience to numerous senators and to Cicero 
himself, whom he seems to have received somewhat coldly, 
and then returned to his army outside the town, while the 
Senate made preparations for his election as consul. On 
August 19 the formalities were hurried through, and Octavianus 
and Quintus Pedius were elected consuls.f 

The fears which the conservatives had entertained during 
the last twelve months had thus been realised. Octavianus 
secured the ratification of his adoption by the comitia curtata ; 
paid with the public money some part of their reward to the 
soldiers and some part of Czsar’s legacy to the people, and 
pursued to the uttermost that course of action which Antony 
had only half supported; through Quintus Pedius, he passed 
without difficulty through the comitia a law subjecting all 
Cesar’s assassins and their accomplices to the jurisdiction of 
a special court, which was to condemn them to the tuterdictio 
aqua et igni, and to confiscation of their property.§ The 
caprice of fortune had once again raised the one party to the 

* Appian, B. C. iii. 92. 

t Ibid. This revolt must have happened as soon as Octavianus 
arrived ; otherwise we cannot understand why his entrance to Rome 
was unopposed. 

¢{ Dion, xlvi. 45-46; Appian, B. C. iii. 92-94. The date, Aug. 19, 
is given by Dion, lvi. 30, and Tacitus, Ann. i. 9. This will also be the 
date of Augustus’ death. Velleius, II. lxv. 2 is wrong. Cp. C. I. L. x.3682. 

§ Dion, xlvi. 47-48; Appian, B. C. iii.95 ; Livy, Ep. 120; Velleius, 


humiliation of the other; the amnesty of March 17, 44, 
Cicero’s political masterpiece, was annulled; Herophilus, 
the obscure veterinary surgeon of Magna Grecia, who had 
been the first to rouse the people to vengeance for the assas- 
sinated dictator, was now completely triumphant. Within 
a few days, the friends of Octavianus, attracted by the fact that 
the accusers were to receive a proportion of the property of 
the condemned, divided the conspirators among themselves 
as their prey, and each undertook to accuse this or that member. 
All were speedily condemned for contumacy. No exceptions 
were made even in the case of Casca, who was a tribune, nor of 
Brutus, who was then fighting against the Bessi, nor of Cassius, 
who was accused by Agrippa, nor of Decimus, who had joined 
Plancus and was waiting reinforcements from Octavianus to 
oppose Antony, nor of Sextus Pompeius, who had not been 
concerned in the assassination, but was even more to blame 
for accepting the extraordinary powers which his father had 
held in the war against the pirates.* The Cesarean party 
was master of Rome and Italy, with Octavianus at the head of 
an army of eleven legions, and commanded Gallia Narbonensis 
with the fourteen legions of Lepidus and Antony. 

The results of this success were speedily apparent. The 
soldiers of Asinius Pollio were already wavering ; his gratitude 
to Cesar inclined him to support Octavianus, while he was power- 
less in isolation with three legions in the depths of Spain. 
He therefore resolved to come over, and during September 
divided his legions between Antony and Lepidus, giving two 
to the former and one to the latter.t ‘The two armies of 
Brutus and Plancus now remained. Plancus had remained 
faithful to the Senate hitherto, for fear that he might lose 
the consulship in the following year ; if, however, he did not wish 
to quarrel simultaneously with Antony, Lepidus, Octavianus, 
and Asinius, he felt bound to abandon Decimus Brutus after 
his condemnation.{ He himself and Decimus had only fifteen 
legions between them, while their adversaries’ force amounted 

* Plut. Brut. 27; Velleius, II. Ixix. 5 ; Dion, xlvi. 48-49. 
jt Appian, B.C. iii. 97. ny 
t Plut. Ant. 18 ; Dion, xlvi. 53; Velleius, II. lxiii. 3. 

43 B.C. 

Fate of 


September, to twenty-eight ; it seemed impossible to continue the struggle 

43 B.C. 

of Antony and 

in view of this disparity. Plancus therefore followed the 
example of Asinius. ‘Three of his five legions were taken over 
by Antony and two by Lepidus.* Decimus, now abandoned 
by Plancus and proscribed, attempted to rejoin Brutus in 
Macedonia by an overland march with his army ; the promises, 
however, which had shaken the faith of so many armies, the 
force of example, and a kind of Czsarean mania which came 
over the troops, attracted his legions in the opposite direction ; 
they were, moreover, dismayed by the long and painful journey 
which lay before them. During the march the soldiers began 
to desert Decimus in small bodies and in cohorts, to join Antony 
and Octavianus. At length the army broke up and the four 
original legions which were the most capable, started to rejoin 
Antony and Lepidus, while the other six set out for Octavianus. 
Decimus, thus abandoned, wandered on with an escort of a 
few men, and was captured in the Alps by a barbarian chief, 
who put him to death at Antony’s orders, though Decimus had 
saved Antony’s life during the conspiracy.t ‘Thus the conserva- 
tive party had lost the last army and the last remaining general 
in the west; Italy and the European provinces were gone for 
ever unless discord should embroil the leaders of the new 
Cesarean revolution. 

This hope, however, if it was ever entertained, soon dis- 
appeared. Something stronger than personal will or caprice 
obliged these leaders to act in concert, and this influence was 
the armies of Brutus and Cassius. Cassius had overcome 
Dolabella, who had committed suicide at Laodicea in the month 
of June; he had taken two legions from him and brought the 
number of his forces up to twelve legions. Hence Brutus 
and Cassius had nineteen legions, and were masters of the east, 
which was the richest part of the Empire. Throughout the 
month of September, a large number of messages must have 
passed between Lepidus, Antony, and Octavianus, and by degrees 
a concerted course of action was sketched out. Though unable 
to meet, they readily agreed to re-establish Cesar’s dictator- 

* Appian, B. C. iii. 97. 
t Dion, xlvi. 53; Appian, B.C. ii. 97-98 ; Velleius, ii. 64. 


ship, which was to be divided between them, they being 
triumviri reipublice constituende, with the full powers which 
Cesar had enjoyed during the last years of his life. After thus 
agreeing upon their general plan of action, it was necessary 
for them to secure confidence by the interchange of pledges ; 
there were, moreover, a large number of secondary questions 
which urgently required settlement, and for these reasons 
a meeting was necessary. This was not easily arranged, as 
Antony and Octavianus distrusted one another. The place and 
manner of meeting thus formed a difficult problem. Over- 
tures, however, were begun. Octavianus left Rome with his 
eleven legions, asserting that he was going to oppose Antony 
and Lepidus by the orders of the Senate; * Lepidus and 
Antonius left Varius Cotila with five legions in Transalpine Gaul 
and marched southward into Italy with seventeen legions and 
ten thousand cavalry.t While they were advancing Octavianus, 
through Quintus Pedius, proposed and induced the Senate 
to approve a law annulling the proscription issued against 
Antony and Lepidus.{[ This was in itself a considerable 
guarantee of good faith. At the same time, the difficulties 
of arranging a meeting where neither suspicion nor fear should 
be possible, were considerable. At length the place was found, 
and a meeting was arranged near the Via Aimilia and Bologna 
in the little island formed by the confluence of the Reno and 
Lavino, which was then doubtless a tributary of the Reno, 
not of the Samoggia. This little island was joined to the 
banks by two bridges.§ The three leaders were thus able to 
enter the island, leaving their soldiers beyond the bridges, and 
to hold their discussion under the eyes of their legions without 
any fear of violence or surprise. "Towards the end of October, 
the two armies were facing one another on either side of the 

* Dion, xlvi. 52; Appian, B. C. iii. 96. 

+ Plut. Ant. 18; Dion, xlvi. 54. 

{ Dion, xlvi. 52; Appian, B. C. ili. 96. 

§ The ancient texts which describe the meeting are: Suet. Aug. 96; 
Plut. Ant. 19, and Cic. 46 ; Dion, xlvi. 55 ; Appian, B.C. iv. 2; Florus, 
iv. 6. Much has been written concerning this meeting-place: see 
Giornale Arcadico for 1825; Borghesi, Giwuves, Paris, 1865, vol. ive 
p. 91; Frati, in the Atti della Deputazione di Storia patria delle Romagne, 
1868, p. 1 ff. 

Ill M 

43 B.C. 

43 B.C. 


river; their camps were pitched at a prescribed distance ; 
a tent was pitched on the island or peninsula and one morning 
Octavianus on one side and Lepidus and Antony on the other 
advanced with an escort towards the two bridges which gave 
access to this insignificant spot of earth. Lepidus was the fisrt 
to cross, and looked about him alone to see whether all was 
secure; then he made signs to Octavianus and Antony to proceed. 
They advanced, greeted one another, carefully felt one another’s 
persons to assure themselves that no concealed weapons were 
carried, and then entered the tent with Lepidus.* 

* Appian, B. ©. iv. 2; Dion, xivil s5- 



The triumvirate—The convention of Bologna—The fortune 
of Lepidus—The “lex Titia’’—The proscriptions—The 
confiscation of the property of the wealthy—The death of 
Cicero—The true historical importance of Cicero—Further 
confiscations and new imposts—Divus Julius—The panic of 
Octavianus and his cruelty—Brutus and Cassius in the East 
—East against West—The beginning of the war—The plain 
of Philippi—Disorderly condition of both armies—The first 
battle of Philippi—The death of Cassius—The second battle 
of Philippi—The suicide of Brutus. 

Tue discussion lasted two or three days,* and what exactly The | 
passed between the leaders was not known to contemporaries, ““™"*** 
and is, therefore, unknown to us. Exact information could 

only have been provided by the leaders themselves, and in the 
course of after events, each of them had every reason for 
throwing the responsibility of the resolutions passed upon the 
shoulders of the others. We are, therefore, confined to relating 

the results of the conference, which are but too well known. 

The situation must have seemed terrible to the three generals, 

and so indeed it was. ‘They had set themselves, as the ancients 

said, to solve “the problem of Archimedes,” or in modern 
phrase, to square the circle. After the lex Pedia, and the 
revolt of so many legions, war was inevitable with Brutus 

and Cassius, that is to say, with the last army of the conserva- 

tive party. It was therefore impossible to disband any single 
legion of the forty-three which they led. They were obliged 

* Two days, according to Appian, B. C. iv. 2; three days according 
to Plut. Czc. 44. 


43 B.C. 

The compact 
of the 


to keep the extravagant promises which had been made to 
these two hundred thousand men in the excitement of the 
struggle ; they had also to provide for the maintenance of the 
thirty or forty thousand auxiliary troops and cavalry who 
followed their army; this by their calculation implied an 
expenditure of more than eight hundred millions of sesterces, 
a sum of eight million pounds in our money.* The triumvirs 
were penniless. ‘The public treasury, which Octavianus had 
plundered in August to pay the soldiers and the people, was 
empty. The richest provinces of the east, and Asia in par- 
ticular, were in the hands of the enemy; the poor provinces of 
Europe could not meet such heavy war expenses, nor was it 
possible to rely upon Italy, where for more than a century the 
custom of paying taxes had disappeared, and where the tributum 
re-established by the Senate had proved extremely unpopular. 
In short, this great revolution and the military command of 
the European provinces had only been possible by means of 
promises lavishly scattered by the three leaders, promises which 
they could not possibly keep if they were limited to ordinary 
resources. ‘They feared that their soldiers would desert if 
they ran short of money; they were spurred by that instinct 
which most easily produces rashness, the instinct of fear; they 
were also driven by the fatal necessity which suddenly obliges 
revolutionary leaders to rush on because they cannot retreat, 
and they therefore decided on a terrible course of action, which 
would doubtless have horrified the three of them a few months 
before. They resolved to seize and to divide the sovereign 
power, and when their mastery of the State was absolute, they 
would confiscate the property of the wealthy classes, and thus 
pay their soldiers by fair means or foul; then they would 
hasten to carry the war into the east against Brutus and Cassius, 
supposing, as was likely, that the latter did not commit the 
mistake of coming to attack them in Italy to escape from the 
dangers of the situation. 

These decisions were strictly kept; confiscation was im- 
possible unless they held the dictatorial power, and war was 
impossible without confiscation. It was arranged, therefore, 

* Appian, B, C. iv. 31, 


that Octavianus should resign the consulship, and that all three of 
them should assume, not the title of dictators,* but that of 
triumviri reipublice constituende, for a space of five years from 
the end of the year in progress until January 1, 37.t They 
would assume the power to make laws,t and would claim 
criminal jurisdiction without right of appeal or form of trial,§ 
the sovereign power of consuls over the whole state,|| the right 
of imposing taxes, ordering levies, appointing senators and 
officials in Rome and in the towns, and the governors of pro- 
vinces,]/ the right of expropriating owners and distributing 
lands, of founding colonies,** and of striking coins with their 
images and They arranged to divide the 
provinces, but Rome and Italy would be governed by the three 
of them in conjunction. Octavianus, whose army was the smallest, 
and whose authority was the weakest by reason of his age, 
was to take the least attractive share,[{ namely, Africa, 
Numidia, and the islands ; Antony would have Gallia Comata 
and Cisalpine Gaul; Lepidus, Gallia Narbonensis and the two 
Spains.§§ Lepidus, who was the brother-in-law of Brutus 
and Cassius, was unable to join in the war against the 
two conspirators ; Antony and Octavianus would therefore com- 

* Appian, B. C. iv. 2. ¢ Fasti Colotiani in C. I. L. p. 466. 

+ Mommsen, Rim. Staatsvecht, iv. 451. Others deny it, as Ganter, 
Die Provinzialverwaltung der Triumvini, Strasburg, 1892, p. 49. 

§ Mommsen, Rim. St. iv. 461. 

|| Appian, B. C. iv. 2; iv. 7. Cp. Mommsen, Rém. St. iv. 449. 

q Appian, B. C. iv. 2; Dion, xlvi. 55; Mommsen, Rm. Si. iv. 
456-464. ** Mommsen, Rém. St. iv. 465. 

+7 Mommsen, Rém. St. iv. 454; Herzog, Geschichte und System der 
vimischen Staatsverfassung, Leipzig, 1891, il. 96. 

tt Pliny, H.N. VII. xlv. 147; Gardthausen, Augustus und seine 
Zeit, i. 130. On the other hand, Drumann, G. R. I’, 264, and Schiller, 
Geschichte der vimischen Katserzett, i. 60, attribute this choice to the 
foresight of Octavianus, who was anxious for a fleet, which was, in fact, 
very useful to him at a later date in his struggle with Antony. This 
is exaggerated praise of him. The haste with which Octavianus formed 
his fleet, a work only begun several years later, is positive proof that 
he had no idea, at that time, of making himself a sea power, and that 
he was content, on the contrary, to take the provinces which Antony 
left tohim. ‘In the light of after events, we are too often inclined,”’ 
says M. Viollet, in the Revue Hippique, vol. xl. p. 14, with great truth, 
‘to construct prodigies, I might say monsters of foresight and pene- 
tration which have never had any real existence.” 

§§ Dion, xlvi. 55; App. B.C. iv. 2. 

43 B.C. 

43 B.C. 


mand forty of the forty-three legions at their disposal, which 
they would divide equally, while Lepidus would be left with 
three legions to watch over Italy. A list was then drawn up 
of one hundred senators and about two thousand knights 
chosen from the richest men; a certain number of political 
opponents were added in order to deprive the conservative party 
of the few men of energy and capacity yet remaining in Italy. All 
were to bc condemned to death and to the confiscation of their 
property.* This point seems to have been warmly debated, 
as each leader wished to save his friends and relatives, but 
Antony was too full of hatred, while Lepidus and Octavianus 
were too panic-stricken. Eventually, they drew up a list out 
of which they chose, some say twelve, and others seventeen,t 
victims, who were to be put to death first, without hope of 
pardon. The list included Cicero, whom Octavianus abandoned 
to Antony. They even gave orders to Quintus Pedius to exe- 
cute these proscribed men without delay, before the law con- 
cerning the triumvirate had given them the right to condemn 
citizens to death. ‘They also decided to issue a solemn promise 
that when the war was concluded, they would give the lands 

* The proscriptions of the years 43 and 42 are wrongly regarded as 
political vengeance on the part of the triumvirs. Their chief object 
was to plunder the richest landowners of Italy. It is remarkable 
that the list of the senators, though this varies with historians (300, 
Appian, B. C. iv. 5, and Plutarch, Ant. 20; 140, Florus, iv. 6; 132, 
Orosius, VI. xviii. 10 ; 130, Livy, Per. 120; and 200, Plutarch, Circ. 46, 
Brut. 27) is much less than that of the knights. The number, according 
to Appian, B. C. iv. 5, is two thousand, and according to Livy, Per. 
120, pluvimi. In Orosius, VI. xviii. 12, there is certainly a mistake. 
Dion says that the enemies of the triumvirs, as well as the rich, were 
also the victims of the proscription (xlvii. 5, of é€y@poi atréy 
}} Kat of mdAovow.), and he says (xvii. 6) that the triumvirs 
became the enemies of the rich from want of money. Kloevekorn, 
De Proscriptionibus, a. 43, Kénigsberg, 1891, gives the names of ninety- 
eight proscribed persons, almost all senators, of whom fifty-four were 
afterwards spared ; this is a further proof of the fact that the triumvirs 
did not fear their action and had no great animosity against them, 
seeing that they spared their lives when they had abandoned part 
of their property. Finally, a certain number of senators could only 
have been proscribed because they were rich men—Verres, for instance, 
who had retired into private life at the age of twenty-seven, and Varro, 
who was very old and almost helpless. 

+ Appian, B. C. IV. vi. These twelve or seventeen names were 
probably political enemies and nothing else. 


promised by Cesar to the veterans who had hitherto received Oct.—Nov. 
nothing ; it is, however, unlikely that they then decided the 43 B.C. 
details of that distribution which afterwards took place. 
Finally they chose magistrates for the following year from their 
respective friends; Ventidius Bassus was to take the consul- 
ship for the few remaining months of the year after the resig- 
nation of Octavianus ; * Plancus and Lepidus were to be consuls 
the following year. It was also agreed, apparently at the 
request of the soldiers, that Octavianus should marry the 
daughter of Clodius and Fulvia.t 

Thus the military despotism which had been wielded two The respective 
years previously by a man of lofty intellect, was now re-estab- ee 
lished in the hands of three men, of whom, notwithstanding 
his defects, Antony was the one remarkable personality. 
Octavianus was only a young man of twenty, while Lepidus was 
an ordinary unknown character, who owed his position to a 
stroke of fortune. A mediator had been required to reconcile 
Antony and Octavianus, and to re-establish the union of the 
Cesarean party ; Lepidus was alone in a position to perform 
that service, and was rewarded by a position in the triumvirate. 
It is remarkable, however, that the three accomplices did not 
venture to take the title of dictators, though they proclaimed 
themselves the re-organisers of the State, and that their power 
was assumed for a space of five years, as if they wished to 
indicate that their despotism would be nothing more than an 
incident in the long constitutional history of Rome. ‘Thus 
they would not venture to outrage the republican superstition 
and the attachment to the constitution which had grown even 
keener among the upper classes with the death of the dictator ; 
for that reason, even when they overthrew the republic, they 
rendered formal homage to republican traditions by respecting 
the recent law of Antony which had abolished the dictator- 
ship. The public, however, had little time to consider these 
subtleties. The nomination of Ventidius Bassus as consul 
became at first a subject for jest; he had begun life as a mule- 
teer, and never had a man of such low birth reached a consul- 
ship. Shortly afterwards, when Ventidius raised a statue to 

* Appian, B. C. iv. 2. { Dion, xlvi. 56. 

43 B.C. 

The lex Titia. 


the Dioscuri in the temple, a wit wrote a biting parody against 
him upon the famous poem of Catullus : 
Phaselus ille quem videtis, hospites. # « .* 

Laughter, however, was forgotten about November 15, a 
few days after the news of the triumvirate had been received ; 
Quintus Pedius, though himself dismayed by the cruelty of 
the order, was then obliged to send assassins to kill the twelve 
doomed politicians; four were found and were put to death 
immediately. ‘This first premonition of the coming storm 
filled Rome with wild panic. Pedius was obliged to leave his 
house, and to spend the night in the streets to calm the 
populace; in the morning, at his wits’ end to restore 
confidence, he published on his own initiative, an edict 
proclaiming that only twelve citizens had been condemned. 
The next day, however, Quintus Pedius suddenly died.t 
Then the storm burst in all its fury. On November 24, 25 
and 26, Octavianus, Antony, and Lepidus entered Rome in 
succession, each with a legion and the pretorian cohort; on 
the following day, the 27th, they secured the passing of the lex 
Titia on the proposal of Lucius Titius, without previously 
promulgating it; this measure established the triumvirate 
until December 31 of the year 38.[ They appointed one of 
Cesar’s former officers, Caius Carrinas, consul in place of 
Pedius; they then proceeded to publish the list of the proscribed, 
promising large rewards to all freedmen or slaves who should 
denounce them or put them to death; those who might help 
them to hide or escape, were threatened with death and con- 
fiscation of property, however close their relationship; in a 
word, every tie of fidelity, respect and affection binding master 
to servant, patron to client, friend to friend, husband to wife, 
or father to children, was shattered at one blow. ‘The veneer 
of educated self-restraint, of unconscious hypocrisy, or of 
studied dissimulation vanished, and every man followed his 
own instincts. As upon a dark night the sudden glare of a 
great lightning flash displays the stems and branches of a 
forest, so did this fulmination suddenly bring to light the new 

* No. viii. of the Catalecta attributed to Virgil. 
+ Appian, B. C, iv. 6. y Col epi. 466. 


vices and new virtues which had sprouted from the vigorous 
stock of the old Roman life, transformed as it was by wealth, 
by power, and intellectual culture.* Selfishness, want of nerve, 
and the clinging to life produced by a complex civilisation 
with its multiplication of intellectual pleasure and sensual 
amusement, were suddenly manifested in deeds of unparalleled 
cruelty and cowardice. Proud senators who had worn the 
consular cloak, who had governed vast provinces with the power 
of kings, disguised themselves as vine-dressers and _ slaves, 
clasped the knees of their servants begging them to be faithful, 
hid themselves under floors, in sewers and in abandoned 
graves. Some burst into sighs and lamentations of bewilder- 
ment and awaited capture. Others ran upon their execu- 
tioners, to be the sooner freed from the horrors of anticipation, 
which exceeded the pains of death itself. Servants killed 
their masters with their own hands, wives inserted in the fatal 
list the names of husbands whom they hated, or delivered 
their husbands to the executioners with their own hands under 
pretext of securing their safety. Sons~ even betrayed the 
hiding-places of their fathers, and the younger generation in 
particular displayed abominable cowardice amid these appal- 
ling scenes.t ‘The generation subsequent to the year 60, the 
generation of Octavianus, was far weaker than the men of Cesar’s 
day in its fear of death and poverty, and displayed a corres- 
ponding timidity and cowardice. 

On the other hand, there were men in whom the danger 
roused some remnant of the old Roman ferocity ; these barred 
themselves in their houses, armed their slaves and slew their 
opponents before meeting death themselves. An old Samnite, 
who had taken part long ago in the Social War and was now 

* It would be impossible to examine in detail the numerous stories 
of the escapes or captures of different proscribed persons. During the 
following ten years a large number of books were written on these 
adventures (Appian, B. C. IV. xvi.), and in these stories truth was 
interspersed with fiction. It is possible, however, from the totality 
of these accounts to gain a tolerably clear idea of what must have 
happened; an authentic document for these proscriptions is the 
“Eulogy of Turia” (C. I. L. vi. 1527), though this is incorrectly so 
called, as Vaglieri has pointed out. See Notizie degli Scavi, October 

1898, p. 412 fff. 
{ Velleius, ii. 67: fidem .. . filiorum nuliam. 

43 B.C. 

The massacres 

43 B.C. 


proscribed at the age of eighty by reason of his wealth, ordered 
his slaves to throw into the street all the gold, silver and valuables 
which he possessed, and thus to rob his executioners of their 
spoil; then he set fire to his house, and threw himself into the 
flames. In other cases, kindness, generosity and self-sacrifice 
were prominent, with those generous virtues which civilisation 
intensifies by deepening the sense of duty in certain chosen 
minds. Servants of low degree, inexperienced children and 
timid wives were seen to meet force with cunning; at the 
risk of their lives they hid their masters, their fathers, or their 
husbands, prepared their escape, secured their pardon from 
the triumvirs and sometimes sacrificed themselves for their 
loved ones. One faithful servant even assumed his master’s 
dress and met death in his stead at the hands of the hurrying 
executioners. The majority of the proscribed attempted to 
fly and to reach the coast, where they might find some ship to 
take them eastward; or they attempted to reach Sextus 
Pompeius, who had come to Sicily with his fleet with the object 
of persuading the government to recognise his powers on the 
seaboard as given him by the Senate ; * he did his best to help 
the proscribed and for this purpose he published in every Italian 
town edicts promising those who should save a proscribed 
person double the reward promised for his death. He even 
sent along the Italian coasts numerous ships to collect the 
fugitives, or to guide boats under the control of inexperienced 
pilots.t Notwithstanding his help, a large number of the 
proscribed were captured on the road. Bands of soldiers arrived 
daily from every part of Italy, bringing in sacks the heads of 
noble senators or rich financiers, on their way to the forum 
to expose the frightful trophies of this appalling civil war. 
Those who secured their escape and found a temporary refuge 
after many vicissitudes, in Sicily or in the east, knew that their 
lands were confiscated, their houses plundered by the usurpers 
and their families dispersed, while their only prospect of return 
to Italy lay in a fresh civil war. 

The great landowners and the plutocracy were almost 

* Appian, B. C. iv. 84; Dion, xlviii. 17. 
t Appian, B. C. iv. 36. 


entirely exterminated; the property of the wealthy classes, Nov.—Dec. 
which comprised a considerable part of the plunder gathered 43 8.¢. 
by Rome throughout the world, fell into the hands of the Results of the 
% . e 5 é “ proscription. 

victorious revolutionaries. ‘The widows, of the proscribed 

were left in possession of their dowries, while their sons were 

allowed to retain a tenth part of their fortune and their daugh- 

ters a twentieth part.* Throughout Rome and in Italy the 
triumvirs collected plunder of enormous value, including all the 

gold and silver found in the houses of the rich knights; other 

objects of value, such as pottery ware, statues, vases, furniture, 

valuable carpets, and slaves, a large number of mansions and 

houses at Rome, the finest villas in Latium and Campania, an 

infinite number of estates scattered throughout Italy and 
cultivated by colonists, the great estates of Southern Italy and 

Sicily belonging for the most part to the rich knights of Rome ; 

the extensive lands owned by senators and knights in Cisalpine 

Gaul and elsewhere beyond Italy, especially in Africa; beasts 

of burden and tools, oxen, carts, horses, slaves who had been 

trained in certain arts and trades; finally, the credit notes, 

which many of these knights held at three per cent., were also 
confiscated. All this property was to be sold by degrees. ‘The 
triumvirs, however, were the first to use the situation, and all 

three proposed to secure a large fortune for themselves within a 

few days by the process of driving competitors from the auction 

sales and buying in for almost nothing whatever properties 

they pleased.t When they were satisfied, the serious business 

of sale was to begin. ‘The example of the triumvirs was imitated 

by the most influential officers, such as Rufrenus and Canidius, 

who had risked their lives to induce the legions to revolt. 
Imitating the example of their leaders, they sent soldiers to 

the sales to drive away unknown purchasers; if any tactless 

person persisted in his efforts to purchase, they ran up the price 

to force him to buy at a ruinous rate.t ‘The triumvirs were 

obliged to wink at this abuse, as they could not afford to 
exasperate the soldiers; { bands of joyful and insolent soldiers, 

drawn from every part of Italy, from the little flourishing 

* Dion, xlvii. 14. t Ibid. 
+ Ibid. and cp. Appian, B. C. iv. 35. 

43 5.c, 

Death of 


towns of Cisalpine Gaul, from the mountains of Apulia or 
Lucania, from the dying townships of Southern Italy, soon 
surrounded the public criers who announced in every quarter 
of Rome and in many Italian towns the auction of the spoils of 
those aristocrats and financiers who had plundered the domains 
of the republic by force and by usury. Those who had spoiled 
the world were now despoiled; a retired muleteer held the 
consulship, an outward and visible sign of the political triumph 
of the poor over the rich; while the vast fortunes amassed 
within the circuit walls of Rome and drawn from the ruin of 
many a shattered civilisation were abandoned to a _ horde 
drunk with the lust of plunder. 

But some few nobles escaped. ‘The families of the Roman aris- 
tocracy were so widely united by ties of friendship and relation- 
ship that in many cases it was possible to find secret protectors 
even amid these freebooters, who pretended a furious animosity 
for the benefit of the simple public. Thus it was that Calenus 
saved Varro,* and Octavia, the sister of Octavianus and wife of 
Marcellus, a beautiful, gentle and accomplished woman, inter- 
ceded with her brother to save the lives of numerous proscribed 
persons. Atticus, the faithful friend of every one, was undis- 
turbed ; Antony was grateful to him for help given to his wife 
and friends in moments of difficulty, and had personally op- 
posed his proscription.t But neither Verres nor Cicero was 
equally fortunate ; accuser and accused thus met once more 
after twenty-seven years, upon the edge of thesame abyss. Verres 
was proscribed by reason of his wealth, though he was an old 
man and for many years had lived in retirement, peacefully 
enjoying the fruits of his earlier rapacity.[ | Cicero’s name and 
fame could not protect either himself, his brother, or his nephew 
from Antony’s hatred. If his son had not been in Greece at 
that moment, the family would have been annihilated at one 
blow. As it was, he met his death; he had finished his work 
and had secured the claim to be regarded with Cesar as the 
greatest figure in this great epoch of Roman history. Modern 
historians have an easy task when they proceed to point out the 

* Appian, B. C. iv. 47. t+ Corn. Nepos, Aft. 10. 
Pliny WIN kas, oes Varden Ox 


weaknesses, the vacillation and the inconsistencies of Cicero ; 
they forget, however, that the same observations would equally 
apply to any one of his contemporaries, even to Cesar himself, 
and that they are the more obviously true in Cicero’s case only 
because he has himself exposed them to our view. Cicero’s 
personality and the part in history which he played are of 
greater significance than this. In a society where for centuries 
noble birth, wealth, or military talents had been the only 
openings to political power, Cicero had been the first, though 
he possessed none of these advantages, to enter the governing 
class, to hold the highest offices, and to govern with nobles, 
millionaires, and generals, simply by reason of his admirable 
literary and oratorical style, and of the lucidity with which he 
was able to expound to the public the deep complexities of 
Greek philosophy. In Roman history and in the history of that 
European civilisation which began with Rome, he was the first 
statesman belonging to the intellectual class ; he was, however, 
the first of a dynasty as corrupt, as vicious, and as degrading 
as can be conceived, but which any historian must admit, 
whatever his disdain, has lasted longer than the dynasty of the 
Cesars ; for from Cicero’s time to our own, for twenty centuries 
it has never ceased to dominate Europe. Cicero was the first 
of those men of letters who have been throughout the history 
of our civilisation either the pillars of state or the workers of 
revolution ; the great company of rhetoricians, lawyers, and 
publicists under the Pagan Empire are succeeded by the 
apologists and fathers of the Church; monks, lawyers, theo- 
logians, doctors, and readers appear in the Middle Ages, 
humanists at the time of the Renaissance; Encyclopedists 
appear in the eighteenth century in France; barristers, jour- 
nalists, political writers, and professors in our own day. Cicero 
may have made many a grave political error, but none the 
less, his historical importance can compare with that of Cesar, 
and is but little inferior to that of St. Paul or St. Augustine. 
He had, moreover, all the fine qualities of the dynasty which he 
founded, and of their defects only the most venial. He was one of 
those unusual characters rarely to be found even in the world of 
thought and of letters, who have no ambition for power, no 

43 B.C, 

43 B.C. 

and imposts. 


thirst for wealth, but merely the far nobler desire, whatever 
the vanity which it implies, to become the objects of ad~- 
miration. Of all the men who governed the Roman world in 
that day, Cicero, alone amid the frightful political debasement 
of his time, had not wholly lost that sense of good and evil 
which may not raise a man above petty weaknesses, but at any 
rate withholds him from criminal excesses and extravagance. 
He alone attempted to govern the world, not with the foolish 
obstinacy of Cato, or with the cynical opportunism of others, 
but upon a rational system based upon loyalty to republican 
tradition amid the prevailing disorder, based upon the effort 
to harmonise the austere virtues of the Latin race with the art 
and wisdom of the Greeks and to disseminate throughout the 
Roman aristocracy that sense of equity and moderation 
which can often mollify the constitutional brutality or blind- 
ness of the principle that might is right. Historians have 
jested lightly upon Cicero and his Utopias ; his contemporaries 
must have thought more of them, seeing that fifteen years 
later they attempted to put many of them into practice. 
When, however, the great orator was slain by the assassins 
of the triumvirs at Formiz, but few citizens had time to lament 
his fate in secret. Amid this appalling tempest the prevailing 
thought was self-preservation, and little consideration could be 
spared for the struggles of a drowning neighbour. ‘The actual 
danger was exaggerated by panic-stricken imagination, and the 
most alarming rumours were in circulation. It was said that 
the three tyrants were meditating a system of universal pillage, 
and Octavianus, who had attained his power with a rapidity 
unparalleled in Roman history, became in popular imagination 
a monster of cruelty. It might be possible to tolerate the 
dictatorship of a man like Antony, who had long before given 
proof of greatness, or of a great lord such as Lepidus, but what 
right to dominate Rome could a young man of one-and-twenty 
possess, the son of a usurer (for the universal hatred confused 
his father with his grandfather) ? ‘The streets of Rome were 
soon covered with insulting remarks upon his ancestors and 
himself ; * the most frightful stories were repeated concerning 
* Suet. Aug. 70. 


him ; it was stated that he dictated death sentences at table in 
a state of intoxication ; * that he had opposed the conclusion of 
the massacre against the wish of the two remaining triumvirs ; t 
that he had added to the list of the proscribed the names of cer- 
tain rich men, merely because he wished to steal their magni- 
ficent Greek vases.[ ‘These are doubtless exaggerations, but 
most people believed them, and for that reason a large number 
of citizens who had not been proscribed, but possessed wealth 
or title, fled from Italy, such as Livius, Drusus, Favonius, and 
many others. Though they had been spared hitherto, the 
perils which they had witnessed made the inference probable 
that more and worse was to follow. Their fears were but too 
well founded ; the triumvirs, unable to restrain their soldiers, 
were forced to follow their lead, and were thus swept away 
by the force of circumstances, which, especially in revolutions, 
produces results far beyond human intention, though human 
agency afterwards has to bear the shame or the glory, as if 
it had been the real cause. When the triumvirs proceeded to 
sell the houses, the lands, and the furniture of the proscribed 
persons, they speedily discovered that the confiscations would 
not produce as much money as they required for the war, 
and that the commercial value of their immense plunder was 
little or nothing. Possibly many of the proscribed were not so 
rich as was supposed ; possibly also, they had succeeded, in the 
midst of the general panic, in hiding their money or entrusting 
it to sure hands or in depositing it with the Vestal Virgins.§ 
Much money was also doubtless seized by the slaves, the freed- 
men, the relatives and the assassins, and the general scarcity 
of ready cash enabled very few people to buy the property 
put up for sale. There was also a general hesitation to bid 
for the goods of the proscribed ; would-be buyers feared perse- 
cution, popular hatred, or the opposition of the officers who 
had arranged to monopolise the best for themselves and to 
drive away dangerous rivals. 

42 B.C 

Thus, though the confiscations continued, and though an Farther 
increasing number of properties were put up at auction, the “*to™ 

* Seneca, De Clem. I. ix. 3. t Cp. Suet. Aug. 27. 
§ Plut. Ant. 21. { Suet. Aug. 70. 

Ae BC. 


number of serious purchasers grew less and less,* while the 
sales produced such scanty profits that the triumvirs speedily 
suspended them and left these vast properties to wait for better 
times. Money, however, must be found. As no better means 
was to hand, the triumvirs resolved upon further spoliation 
at the outset of the year 42. They confiscated the sums which 
private individuals had deposited in the Temple of Vesta ; T 
they increased the tributwm already imposed by the Senate, 
they ordered that all citizens, foreigners, and freedmen possessed 
of more than four hundred thousand sesterces should make 
a declaration of their property and lend to the State a sum 
equal to two per cent. of their value and a year’s income, 
which seems to have been calculated in doubtful cases as 
equivalent to the tenth of the capital sum. In these 
calculations they even included the houses inhabited by the 
property holders, though here they were so benevolent 
as to assess only the probable income for six months; { those 
who possessed less than four hundred thousand  sesterces 
were obliged to make a contribution equivalent to half of their 
income for one year ;§ they even went so far as to request 
thirteen of the richest ladies in Italy to declare the value of 
their dowries.|| Pitiless extortion was necessary to extract 
all the gold and silver from Italy which might still be left in 
the country. The triumvirs, therefore, decided to confiscate 
the property of those who, though not proscribed, had taken 
flight, in the hope of arresting the exodus of emigrés at this 
time. Amid all these thefts and murders, Rufrenus, the officer 

* Dion, xlvii. 17 ; Appian, B. C. iv. 31. 

TP lute e te 

t Appian, iv. 34, states that a forced loan was made of a fifteenth 
and a forced contribution was ordered of a year’s income; the view 
given in the text is a possible way of reconciling this statement with 
that of, Dion xlvii. 16, who says that every one, even freedmen, was 
obliged to surrender the tenth part of his property. This tenth 
part was perhaps the supposed revenue for a year, and it also seems 
likely to me that the house tax of which Dion speaks (xlvii. 14) was 
included in this same arrangement. 

§ The vague phrase in Dion, xlvii. 14, seems to indicate that in certain 
places property holders were obliged to give the “half’’ of their 
income. || Appian, B. C. iv. 32. 

4, An inference from the clause in the treaty of Misenum, which 
restored their property to éa0u kara PoBov epevyov, 


who had seduced the legions of Lepidus, proposed to the Jan. 
comitia a law declaring Julius Cesar to be Divus, and decided, 42 8-¢: 
not merely to restore the altar of Herophilus,* but to close 
the Curia Pompeii, and to raise a temple in the forum to Cesar 
on the spot where his body had been burnt. Thus the vic- 
torious party satisfied the vague aspirations of the mob who had 
worshipped the spot where Czsar’s funeral pile had been raised. 
The measure, however, introduced a novelty of an extremely 
serious nature; a citizen whom all had known in his lifetime 
was now worshipped as kings were adored in the east.t 

The extent of the social upheaval produced by the proscrip- Effect of the 
tions was appalling. The triumvirs themselves, apart from memes 
Antony, were horrified. Antony, however, intoxicated by triumvirs. 
success and greedy for wealth and vengeance, squandered the 
profits of the confiscations in festivities and orgies with 
actresses, singing girls, and courtesans, while Fulvia avenged 
herself for the humiliations she had suffered by giving free vent 
to her instincts of pillage and tyranny. A contemporary 
document also displays Lepidus as a choleric and brutal cha- 
racter, overwhelmed by his own disgust and fear.[ Octavianus 
seems to have been seized with a transport of madness marked 
by alternating fits of mildness and ferocity. Nor is the fact 
difficult to explain in the case of a young man unused to violent 
scenes. From an early age he had been one of those 
nervous and delicate children brought forth by a corrupt, 
refined and exhausted civilisation; his health was sickly and 
feeble, his intelligence precocious, and his mother and grand- 
mother had watched over him with most careful attention. 
At the age of thirteen, he had been regarded as a prodigy of 
learning and had even made a speech in public ; so he quickly 
developed into a thoughtful and studious young man, careful of 
his health, drinking little wine,§ and unwilling to leave his books 
and his favourite teachers, Athenodorus of Tarsus and Didymus 
Areus. This delicate and sickly youth, brought up under 

* The ruins of it have been disclosed in the forum by the excavations 
of the archeologist Boni. 

¢ Dion, xlvii. 18-19; C.1.L. vi. 872; ix. 5136. 

¢ C.1. L. vi. 1527, p. 335, v. 10-15. 

§ Suet. Aug. 77. 

Til N 


42 B.C. 

for war. 


female guidance, was suddenly thrown by chance into the 
midst of the revolution; whereupon he became what we 
should call at the present day a ferocious “ hustler,” one of 
the young men produced without number by a rich and 
refined civilisation, who can be induced to commit the utmost 
cruelty and the basest atrocities by their ambition, their 
anxiety to succeed, their instability and their cowardice. 
Weak and impressionable as Octavianus was, it is not surprising 
that his behaviour should have been the subject of most contra- 
dictory accounts by different historians; yet these accounts 
are in every case probable, because they are contradictory. 
We can understand that in his calmer moments, his favourite 
sister may have induced him to spare the lives of certain pro- 
scribed persons, while on the contrary, in moments of passion 
or fear, he may have displayed cruelty and even have caused 
the death of people whom he suspected of designs upon his 

In any case the situation soon became so serious that even 
Antony was obliged to turn his attention to it. After this 
terrific scene of pillage it was obvious that the triumvirs could 
only overcome their profound unpopularity throughout Italy 
by crushing the army of Brutus and Cassius without delay. 
This was the only success likely to appease the violent discontent 
of the Italian towns, which could have weakened and paralysed 
the triumvirate government, even if unable to secure its over- 
throw. At the outset of the year 42, Antony had already 
sent eight legions to Brundisium under the command of Lucius 
Decidius Saxa and Caius Norbanus Flaccus; these officers 
were ordered to invade Macedonia in the spring. At the end 
of the year,t Brutus had evacuated this province after putting 
Caius Antonius to death by way of reprisal; he had then 
marched into Asia with his army, probably with the object 

* Suet. Aug. 27. 

t Plutarch, Brut. 28. According to Gardthausen, Brutus went to 
Asia at an earlier date, and his second meeting with Cassius took place 
at Sardis at the beginning of the year 42. (A. Z. i. 669.) Apart from 
the fact that this statement contradicts Plutarch’s narrative, it is 
improbable for the reason that the battle of Philippi did not take place 
until the end of October, and so long a period of inactivity before it is 
difficult to explain. 


of collecting money and of taking up winter quarters in a 
richer country and at a greater distance from Italy. It was 
clear that the main body of troops must be sent to support 
this advanced guard and that a much greater effort must be 
made; this necessitated the abandonment of Italy to the forces 
of] anarchy and discontent. Under stress of this danger the 
triumvirs resolved upon an‘ act of tyranny which Cesar would 
never have dared ; they entirely abolished the electoral rights of 
the comitia and nominated in advance the magistrates who were 
to hold. office during the five years of the triumvirate.* This 
was one method of attaching the interest of many people to the 
stability of the triumvirate. 

While Decidius and Norbanus were disembarking in Mace- 
donia, Brutus and Cassius with their armies had met at Smyrna. 
Brutus, who by reason of his proximity to Italy had been better 
informed of the course of events, had arranged this meeting 
in a letter to Cassius, urging that they should combine their 
armies for a joint struggle with the triumvirs, as they were 
authorised to do by the decrees of the Senate.t Cassius had 

_ thought of marching upon Egypt to punish Cleopatra, who 

remained faithful to the Cesarean party; he had, however, 
agreed to the plan of Brutus, had left a little garrison in Syria 
under the orders of his nephew, and sent a large detachment of 
cavalry into Cappadocia, to put to death the treacherous 
governor of the province and to collect gold and silver; 1 
then, with the main body of his army, he had gone to meet 

Brutus at Smyrna.§ A council of war was held. Brutus pro- 

posed that Cassius should return with him to Macedonia, 
to destroy the eight legions of the advanced guard and to 
prevent the arrival of others ; || Cassius, on the other hand, 
proposed a more comprehensive, more deliberate and easier 
plan, which Brutus eventually accepted. ‘They were not yet 
certain of their hold upon the east ; Rhodes, the republics of 
Lycia and other towns were still doubtful; in Syria a Parthian 

* Dion, xlvii. 19 ; Appian, B. C. iv. 2. 

+ Appian, B.C. iv. 63; Plut. Brut. 28. 

t Appian, B. C. iv. 63 ; Drumann, G.R. ii. 133. 

§ Plut. Brut. 28. 
|| Appian, B. C. iv. 65. 

42 BC, 

Brutus and 

Cassius in the 



42 B.C, 



invasion and in Egypt fresh intrigues were™always dangerous 
possibilities. If great disturbances took place in the east 
while they were fighting in Macedonia, or if the enemy with 
his larger numbers should attempt an attack upon their 
rear from Egypt, their prospects would be shattered. It was 
better to abandon Macedonia to the enemy, to negotiate for 
Parthian neutrality, to secure their hold upon the sea and 
the east, to collect a large fleet and subjugate Rhodes and 
Lycia, while gathering the largest possible supply of money 
from the east; then they could make themselves masters of 
the sea, cut communications between Italy and Macedonia, 
and invade the latter province. It would be impossible for 
the triumvirs to throw forty legions into Macedonia if their 
communications by sea were cut or threatened, as they could 
only maintain the small force for which the province of Thessaly 
could provide subsistence, and these districts were barren, 
depopulated and impoverished by the recent wars. Moreover, 
if hostilities were prolonged, the lack of money would be felt ; 
Italy was already suffering from this cause, and the discontent 
of the soldiers would increase if their wants were not satisfied.* 
Brutus accepted this plan and Cassius handed over part of his 
treasure ; Labienus, the son of Czsar’s former general, was sent 
to the court of the Parthian king.t It was decided that Brutus 
should begin the conquest of Lycia, while Cassius would 
subjugate the Island of Rhodes. 

These expeditions obliged Antony to delay the war against 
Brutus and Cassius.[ This was a dangerous course for Antony 
to pursue; the inactivity to which he was condemned ener- 
vated his soldiers, fostered public discontent, and increased 

* See Appian, B. C. iv. 65, and the speech of Cassius, Appian, B. C. 
iv.90 to 100. This speech is so exactly suited to the conditions of the 
moment that it must contain the actual thoughts of Cassius. 

t+ Dion, xlviii. 24. It is asserted that Cassius asked the Par- 
thians for help, but this was probably an invention of his enemies. 
It was so impossible an idea that I cannot believe Cassius ever 
conceived it. 

{ Dion, xlvii. 36, says that the triumvirs sent Norbanus and Deci- 
dius into Macedonia to profit by the expeditions of Cassius and Brutus 
in Asia, It seems to me more correct to put the expedition of Octavianus 

to Sicily about this time, though it is more probable, as Appian says, 
that the eight legions were already in Macedonia. 


the political and financial difficulties with which the trium- 
virate was struggling. At all costs it was necessary for the 
triumvirs to perform some exploit which might impress Italy 
with their power. Antony, then conceived the idea of sending 
Octavianus with a part of the fleet to recapture Sicily. Pompeius 
had put the governor to death at the beginning of the year 42, 
had seized the whole island, and was now becoming trouble- 
some; he collected ships, recruited sailors, and organised 
legions ; devastated the Italian coast and intercepted the grain 
cargoes intended for Rome; he might easily support the 
fleets of Brutus and Cassius and prevent the transport of troops 
and provisions to Macedonia across the Adriatic. Thus 
during the spring of 42 war began in Sicily and in the east. 
Between the spring and the beginning of summer Cassius 
conquered Rhodes; * in the public and private treasuries he 
found 8500 talents, which he confiscated; + he made the 
Asiatic towns pay a ten years’ tribute ; [ he collected the ships 
which had come in from every side and organised a great 
number of garrisons by sea and land throughout the east ; 
he sent Murcus with sixty ships to Cape Tznarum to intercept 
the reinforcements which Cleopatra was sending to the trium- 
virs.§ Meanwhile, Brutus had carried out a successful campaign 
and had conquered the republics of Lycia, levying forced 
contributions upon the principal towns. Thus, at the begin- 
ning of the summer the two leaders of the republican army 
were able to meet at Sardis, and to make arrangements for 
invading Macedonia. 

42 B.C, 

On the other hand, the expedition of Octavianus had been The East 

a miserable failure, and Sicily remained unconquered at the 
moment when Brutus and Cassius were marching upon Abydos 
to throw their army across the Bosphorus and to take the 
Via Egnatia at Sestos which led to the heart of Macedonia. 
The failure of Octavianus must have been very embarrassing 
to Antony, as the movements of Brutus and Cassius obliged 
him to send help to Norbanus and Decidius. At length, hoping 
that Octavianus would eventually succeed, Antony resolved to 

* Appian, B. C. iv. 66-67. + Plut. Brut. 22. 
Appian, B. C. iv. 74. § Ibid. 
~ App 74 

against the 




leave him in Sicilian waters, and to cross to Macedonia by himself 
with twelve legions ; * there he would begin the last act of this 
supreme struggle, which was not only the struggle of the 
Cesarean and popular party against the aristocratic and 
conservative party, but of the east against the west. Brutus 
and Cassius, who had made the Asiatic provinces their base 
of operations, could dispose of less troops than Antony and 
Octavianus, for the reason that fewer soldiers were to be found 
in the civilised east, the country of merchants and capitalists, 
peaceable and deprived of political independence. Brutus 
and Cassius, however, could wield the great power which 
the civilised and manufacturing east represented in the ancient 
world—the power of money; they carried with them upon 
their march against the enemy the precious metals gathered 
upon their expeditions and now enclosed in great amphore 
and placed upon carts; during the forty years of comparative 
peace and order that had followed the great Mithridatic war, the 
eastern world had succeeded in accumulating much treasure, 
notwithstanding the extortions of the governors, and had even 
recovered a considerable part of the wealth which the Italians 
had stolen, in exchange for agricultural products or manu- 
factured wares exported to Italy.t Italy, on the other hand, 
for two centuries had been gathering the most useful commodi- 
ties and the mast precious metals from every part of the world ; 
none the less, the general poverty was extreme, and gold and 
silver were especially scarce, so vast was the amount of wealth 
swallowed up by public and private pleasures, by the revival 
of agriculture, by the increase of luxury in every class, by rash 
speculations, revolutions, and civil war, by a domestic policy 
based upon intrigue and patronage, and a foreign policy of 
plunder and conquest. Italy had almost more soldiers than 
she needed ; she could send formidable armies to the east, but 

* It is clear that Antony sent twelve legions into the east, 
because at Philippi the triumvirs had nineteen and had left one at 
Amphipolis (Appian, B. C, iv. 107 and 108). As there were already 
eight under the command of Norbanus and Decidius, twelve further 
legions must have disembarked in Macedonia at the time of this 

+ Cp. Appian, B. C. iv. 73. 


she was forced to send them beyond the sea almost in rags, 42 B.c. 
without money, without the necessary munitions of war, and 

without a fleet adequate to defend their communications or 

to bring them supplies. The result of the war was to show 

which metal was the more valuable in this civil strife, gold or 


The early stages of the campaign were easily performed The beginning 
and the spirits of Brutus and Cassius rose correspondingly. ahaa 
They brought their armies across the Bosphorus without 
difficulty, and led them along the coast to Cape Serrheion, and 
to the narrow passage between the mountains and the sea which 
Norbanus was holding; they forced him to retreat without 
difficulty by sending Tullius Cimber with a fleet to menace 
his rear. Norbanus was obliged to fall back upon the pass 
of Burun Calessi, then regarded as the only entrance by which 
a great army could pass from Asia to Europe and also considered 
of impregnable strength.* Antony, on the other hand, had 
been stopped at the outset of his expedition by an unforeseen 
obstacle, the fleet of Murcus. Cleopatra’s reinforcements 
had been scattered along the African coast by a storm, and 
Murcus had immediately proceeded to block Brundisium and 
to prevent Antony from crossing the Adriatic; Antony 
made several attempts to force a passage, but after a succession 
of failures, he called Octavianus to his help, thus interrupting 
his Sicilian campaign which was by no means concluded.t 
It was inadvisable to leave Sextus Pompeius in possession of 
the island in his rear, but there was nothing else for him to do. 
When Octavianus appeared in the Adriatic, Murcus who had 
only sixty ships, was obliged to retreat,{ and the two triumvirs 
were thus able to disembark their twelve legions at Dyrrachium. 
The trials and dangers of the enterprise then began. Urgent 
despatches from Norbanus and Decidius announced that they 
had been forced to abandon the impregnable position which 
they had occupied. A Thracian chief had shown Brutus and 

* Heuzey and Daumet, Mission archéologique de Macédoine, Paris, 
1876, p. 99, have identified the col of Burun-Calessi with the Sapzicus 
pass of ancient times. 

7 Appian, B. C. iv. 82; Polyznus, Strat. VIII. xxiv. 7. 

t Appian, B. C. iv. 86. 


marches to 


Cassius another passage narrower and steeper, by which the 
army could cross the mountain in three days if they carried 
their water-supply with them. Norbanus, who was expecting 
a frontal attack, had suddenly learned that the enemy was 
about to deploy in the plain of Philippi on his rear, and had been 
forced to make a precipitate retreat to Amphipolis to avoid 
being cut off. In a word, the entrances to Macedonia and the 
communications with Thrace were in the hands of the enemy, 
while Amphipolis, which was only defended by eight legions, 
might be attacked at any moment by an army almost twice 
that size. 

The situation seemed highly critical and the danger was 
increased by a sudden illness which forced Octavianus to remain 
at Dyrrachium. Resolved to defend Amphipolis, Antony 
left his colleague at Dyrrachium and marched upon the town 
with his legions at all speed ; no sooner had he arrived than he 
perceived that the fears of his subordinates had been wholly 
imaginary, as is often the case in war. Brutus and Cassius 
had not attempted to pursue Norbanus and Decidius ; they had 
halted below Philippi in a strong position and were entrenched 
in two camps upon the Via Egnatia. Brutus was at the north 
below the Panaghirdagh range of hills ; Cassius was upon the 
south coast, and was separated from the sea by a vast and 
impassable marsh and entrenched at the foot of the hill of 
Madiartopé.* The two camps were united by a palisade behind 
which flowed a pure and abundant stream, the Gangas; the 
Via Egnatia was their line of communication with Neapolis, 
to which port provisions, munitions of war and money were 
brought by ships from Asia and from the island of Thasos, 
which the conspirators had chosen as the spot for their stores. 
Established in this strong position Brutus and Cassius proposed 
to await the attack of the enemy and to prolong the war until 
their adversaries were reduced by famine, shut up as they were 
in a narrow and barren district ; they also attempted to hamper 
their communications by sea, sending a fleet under Domitius 
Ahenobarbus to support Murcus. As soon as Antony realised 

* See the map of Philippi (from Heuzey-Daumet) in Duruy, Histoire 
des Romains, Paris, 1881, iii, p. 483. 


that he would not be attacked at Amphipolis, he left one legion 42 8c. 
in that town and marched to the Plain of Philippi with the 
remainder of his forces; there he encamped in the face of the 

enemy, and waited for Octavianus who was now convalescent 

and arrived in a few days in a litter. Cassius then joined his 

camp to the marsh by means of a palisade lest Antony should 

attempt to cut his communications with the sea. 

Days and nights of weary anxiety now began for the two The opposing 
armies confronting one another on the Plain of Philippi, Seca 
throughout the winds and rain of the grey October weeks of 
the year 42.* ‘The supreme moment of the long struggle 
was at hand, and the combatants should have gathered their 
energies for one final effort, and have patiently submitted to 
the greatest sacrifices in order to gather the fruit of their many 
toils. They were, however, animated by no such spirit. 
At this supreme moment, the general disruption of law and 
tradition, of national and social ties, of property tenure and 
morality, which had shaken the empire, swept away with it the 
two armies and destroyed the authority of their leaders. The 
disunion, the hatred, and the weariness of the leaders increased 
the impatient and mutinous temper of the soldiers, and led to 
such confusion and disorder that no supreme will could be 
found in command on either side. The confidence which 
united Brutus and Cassius was absolute; but none the less, 
their views were often divergent. Brutus was a weak and peace- 
able student; thrown by a strange course of destiny into a 
life of action, he was exhausted by the long strain, by the weight 
of responsibility, and by the continual struggle between his 
philosophical and his political instincts ; every moment he was 
obliged to abandon action in apparent consonance with his 
duty and to follow an opposite course. He had become 
nervous and impressionable, was continually in tears and 
suffered from insomnia, while at night in his tent vague shadows 
appeared to him by lamplight until he thought he recognised 
the spirit of his victim. Cassius, an ardent disciple of Epicurus, 

* The two battles of Philippi are fairly well described by Plutarch, 
Brut. 40 ff.; not so well in Appian, B. C. iv. 108 ff. ; and very care- 

lessly in Dion, xlvii. 42 ff. Many obscure points and gaps in the 
narrative still remain. 

42 B.C. 


attempted to persuade him that these were nothing more than 
the hallucinations of a wearied brain. But such energy as 
he had was now exhausted ;* and his only desire was to conclude 
the business as speedily as possible, and to be rid of the weight 
of responsibility without any obvious display of cowardice 
or flight ; this deliverance he was prepared to buy at the cost 
of any sacrifice. He therefore proposed to give battle imme- 
diately ; if they were defeated, the last refuge and conclusion 
of death would still remain to him. Cassius, on the other hand 
was a strong man intent upon victory, and advised that the 
forces of the enemy should be exhausted by prudent delay.t 
If they had the patience to wait, they could rely upon two 
allies, sedition and famine. 

Unfortunately, the army agreed with Brutus, and was 
anxious to conclude the war before the winter, and to return as 
quickly as possible to Italy with the money gathered in the 
east during months of plundering. Only by dint of the most 
desperate efforts was Cassius able to induce his colleague and 
his army to submit to his wishes. Antony and Octavianus led 
the more practised troops, but Octavianus, exhausted by his 
illness and deterred by the desperate nature of their enter- 
prise, abandoned the army to its officers and spent his time in 
long excursions from the camp under pretext of regaining his 
strength. Antony was therefore obliged to act for himself 
and to take the whole responsibility of the war. With the 
fear of famine before his eyes, he continually offered battle and 
attempted to force an engagement which Cassius obstinately 
refused.{ The days followed in monotonous and enervating 
succession, undermining the resolution of every combatant ; 
they have been admirably described by the youthful Horace 
who then held a post in the army, in a poem composed at a 
later date, but probably conceived in the idleness of these days. 

A fearful tempest has overclouded the sky, and Jupiter rushes down 
in rain and snow ; the wind of Thrace roars over the sea and through 
the forests. Friends, let us seize the fleeting hour, and while our 
knees are strong and our strength remains, let us wipe the gloom of 

* Plut. Brut. 36-37. t Plut. Brut. 39. 
{ Appian, B. C. iv. 109. 


age from our brows. Bring forth the flask of wine laid down the year 
when I was born, and cease to talk of aught else ; some god perhaps 
will change the progress of events to greater fortune and restore all 
things in order.* 

42 B.C. 

Antony eventually conceived the idea of building a road with The first 

faggots, earth, and hurdles to cross the marsh separating the 
camp of Cassius from the sea; thus he would reach the Via 
Egnatia, threaten the enemy’s rear and force him to give battle. 
By deploying his forces every day in the plain as if to offer 
battle with a large proportion of his own soldiers and those of 
Octavianus, who took long rides to recover his health, he was 
able to distract the attention of the enemy, and his sappers 
were enabled to work for ten days among the high roads of the 
marsh without interference. tf Suddenly, however, on the 
eleventh day, the armies of Brutus and Cassius made a sortie, 
and the force of Brutus on the right wing attacked the legions 
of Octavianus. Probably Cassius, having perceived Antony’s 
preparations and their meaning, had given way to the advice 
of Brutus and resolved to attack.f 

The course of events from that moment is by no means 
clear. Itseems that Octavianus was taking a ride for the benefit 
of his health in the neighbourhood of the camp; and that the 
officers of his legions had no orders and were routed by the 
sudden attack of Brutus. The Fourth Legion alone is said to 
have offered a vigorous resistance. Antony, on the other 
hand, who was on his guard, made a furious charge upon the 
left wing commanded by Cassius, drove it back and pursued it 
to the camp, where a fierce combat began beneath the 
palisades. By that time Brutus had defeated and almost 
annihilated the Fourth Legion ; § if he had returned in time to 
help his colleague and had attacked Antony’s army in the rear, 

* Horace, Epod. xiii. 

jt Appian, B. C. iv. 109; his account is confirmed by Plutarch, 
Brut. 41. 

{ On this point it is impossible to reconcile the story of Appian, 
B. C. iv. 110, with that of Plutarch, 40 and 41. According to Appian, 
Antony was the first to attack, while Plutarch asserts that Brutus and 
Cassius began the action. The latter version seems to me the more 
probable, for it is difficult to understand from Appian’s account how 

Antony could have forced Cassius to give battle. 
§ Thus Appian, B. C. iv. 117; Plutarch says three legions. 


42 B.C, 


the battle would have been won. Brutus, however, was unable 
to restrain his legions, which set off in pursuit of the fugitives, 
swept their officers away with them and invaded the camp of 
the triumvirs, where they began to plunder ; they so terrified 
Octavianus, who was riding at a short distance from the spot, 
that he fled for refuge to a neighbouring marsh.* Antony was 
thus able to storm the camp of Cassius, but his soldiers, like those 
of Brutus, had no sooner entered the camp than they refused to 
obey orders, and scattered in search of plunder, like so many 
brigands. Every soldier hastened to carry his booty to his own 
camp; the battle soon became a number of petty skirmishes 
between little bands of soldiers returning to their camps loaded 
like porters; the result was wild confusion in which friend 
and foe were inextricably mixed, and in which Cassius met his 
death. ‘Tradition relates that he was unable to distinguish the 
course of the action from the height upon which he stood, by 
reason of the clouds of dust which rose, thought that Brutus had 
been defeated, and mistook for enemies the detachment of 
cavalry which Brutus had sent towards him to announce his 
victory. ‘Thereupon he is said to have ordered a freedman to 
kill him. Historians, however, unable to understand why so 
capable a general as Cassius should have lost his head so 
easily, have assumed that he was killed in the confusion by 
some freedman whom the triumvirs had suborned. ‘Thus by 
some unknown death perished the most intelligent of the 
conspirators. t He alone had declined to give way to the 
despondency which overwhelmed the whole conservative 
party in 44; he alone realised, and the event proved that he 
was right, the possibility of recruiting an army to confront the 
Cesarean party; to him is due the credit of the two years’ 
defence of his party which he maintained. It was a magnifi- 
cent effort, and if Cassius eventually failed, it should not be 
forgotten that though he might have been one of the best 
rewarded of Czsar’s servants, he none the less preferred to 
die in the defence of republican liberty ; this was a liberty 
which had become little more than an ideal and included a large 

* Pliny, N. H. VII. xlv. 148. 
t+ Appian, B. C. iv. 110-114; Plut. Brut. 41-45. 


number of class interests, but, none the less, remained a great 42 B.c. 

The issue of the battle was, however, by no means decided. Result of the 
Antony’s losses were double those of his enemies ; the whole of 4*t battle 
his camp had been plundered, while his soldiers had only pil- 
laged the camp of Cassius ; * his position would probably have 
become utterly untenable if the death of Cassius had not 
inflicted an irreparable loss upon the enemy’s power. This 
first battle decided the war merely because it caused the death 
of Cassius. ‘The anxious days of waiting in the Plain of Philippi 
began once more for the two armies. Persuaded by the result 
of the battle that Cassius was right, Brutus followed his 
plan, and now attempted to hold his troops in check by large 
distributions of money. If the troops had had the patience to 
wait, they would have won a victory without striking a blow. 
Famine was beginning to be felt in the enemy’s ranks ; an early 
winter with icy winds froze the soldiers in their encampment, 
while many of them had lost all that they possessed in the 
pillage; the generals were short of money and could offer 
nothing but promises. t An additional disaster speedily 
followed which the triumvirs strove to conceal from Brutus ; 
the convoy of provisions and reinforcements expected from 
Italy had been attacked by the fleets of Murcus and Domitius 
Ahenobarbus and had been sent to the bottom of the Adriatic ; 
two legions, one of which was the Martian, had perished in the 
sea-fight.{ Fortunately for the triumvirs, Brutus, unlike Cassius, 
was no disciplinarian ;§ he was too inclined to yield to the 
soldiers and to argue with them instead of enforcing obedience ; 
and though he was liked, he was not feared by the troops. 
This weakness in the commander became immediately obvious 
in a relaxation of discipline; former jealousies and discords 
between the old soldiers of Cassius and Brutus were revived. 
The troops had hardly recovered from the shock of the first 
conflict than they were anxious to make an end of the war ; 

* Plut. Brut. 45 ; Appian, B. C. iv. 112. 

t Dion, xlvii. 47; Plut. Brut. 46-47 ; Appian, B. C. iv. 122. 
t Appian, B. C. iv. 115; Plut. Brut. 47. 

§ Appian, B. C. iv. 123. 

42 B.C. 

The second 


the leaders of the eastern allies were anxious to return home, 
and continually urged the general to lead them out to battle.* 
Brutus was unable to check these outcries or to calm the pre- 
vailing impatience. Although he displayed his habitual and 
aristocratic serenity of bearing, he was utterly worn out. The 
crushing round of daily business was only confronted by an 
extraordinary effort of will; he was harassed by insomnia and 
hallucinations, and gave way to the fatalist resignation which is 
the last paralysis of will power in men over-sensitive and 
exhausted by excessive mental fatigue. He had written to 
Atticus that he felt happy because the end of his trials was 
approaching ; if he won the victory he would save the republic, 
while if he lost he would kill himself, and thus leave a life which 
had become intolerable to him. t 

Though thus prepared for death, he yet took the lead in the 
preparations for that final struggle which he had in reality 
already abandoned; he allowed himself to drift, and daily 
offered a feebler resistance to Antony’s desperate efforts to 
provoke a conflict. While the triumvir sent his soldiers out- 
side the vallum to abuse the enemy as cowards and poltroons, 
and to send in notes urging them to revolt, Brutus was making 
fine speeches to the troops and persuading them to hold out a 
little longer; he merely increased their exasperation, as in- 
evitably happens when attempts are made to calm the passions 
of a maddened crowd by appeals to reason. The officers, 
the eastern kings, and the common soldiers were soon unani- 
mously urging Brutus to give battle; Brutus realised that the 
order was a mistake, but he was exhausted and was thus even- 
tually persuaded to yield against his will. Antony’s troops 
were hardier than his own, while their leader’s energy was 
infinitely greater, and Brutus was defeated. [ Casar’s murderer 
withdrew with some friends to a little valley in the neighbour- 
ing hills, and committed suicide without a murmur and with 
his habitual calm ; the blow was given by a Greek rhetorician, 
Strato, who had been his tutor.§ Brutus was neither a fool 

* Appian, B. C. iv. 123-124. t Plut. Brut, 29. 

+ Appian, B. C. iv, 128 ff; Plut. Brut. 49. 

§ Plut. Brut. 50-53; Appian, B. C. iv. 131. 


nor a man of genius, nor a ruffian nor a hero, as historians have 
attempted to paint him in accordance with their party leanings. 
He was ascholar and an aristocrat, driven by the force of circum- 
stances to a position which demanded infinitely greater energies 
than his, and to an enterprise far beyond his strength. He 
could boast that he had borne the weight of responsibility 
till his death, but beneath that weight he was crushed. His 
sacrifice, however, was not in vain. At the supreme moment he 
could tell himself that the great ideal republic was now dead, 
and that the world which he was leaving had grown too corrupt 
for any adherent of this ideal. Brutus could never have divined 
the man who was destined to resume this ideal and to adapt 
it to the new conditions of political life. Yet that man was 
near at hand, and had fought at Philippi, though in the ranks 
of the enemy. 

42 B.C, 

The defeated 


The convention of Philippi—Grant of lands to Cesar’s 
veterans—Antony’s reasons for choosing the East—Fulvia 
and the revolutionary spirit—New currents in literature— 
Virgil’s Eclogues and Sallust’s Catiline—The return of Octa- 
vianus to Italy—Confiscations of land in eighteen Italian 
towns—First dissension between Fulvia, Lucius and Octavianus 
—Lucius undertakes the defence of the expropriated land- 
owners—Virgil’s first Eclogue—Antony in the East—First 
meeting of Antony and Cleopatra—New struggle between 
Fulvia, Lucius and Octavianus—Fulvia and Lucius prepare for 
a revolution—The new civil war—The parody of the social 
war—tThe siege of Perugia. 

A creat number of illustrious Roman families had perished on 
the battle-field of Philippi; Brutus had left no children, and 
with him died the only son of Cato, the only son of Lucullus, 
the only son of Hortensius, and Lucius, the nephew of Cassius. 
A certain number of proscribed and conspirators who had been 
captured, were massacred on the spot, including Favonius.* 
The greater part of the defeated army withdrew to the sea 
while its officers took ship and sailed to the island of Thasos. 
Here they might have settled for a time to recover from their 
discouragement, for their adversaries had no fleet. ‘The shock, 
however, had been too great, and it was impossible to overcome 
the universal feeling of depression. Many illustrious men 
committed suicide, such as Livius Drusus, Quintilius Varus, 
Labeo, and many others.t ‘Those who were not so utterly 
dispirited thought only of saving themselves and the army was 
disbanded. Cnzus Domitius seized a certain number of ships 
at Thasos ; he invited many of the soldiers of the defeated army 
* Dion, xlvii. 49. t Appian, B. C. iv. 135 ; Velleius, ii. 715 



to embark with him, and sailed away with a determination to 42 B.c. 
become a pirate * if he found no other means of safety. Cicero’s 
son escaped to the east, where a detachment of the fleet and the 
army still remained on the coast of Asia under the orders of 
Cassius Parmensis ; a second detachment was at Rhodes under 
the orders of a certain Clodius and of Turullius, while a third 
detachment was at Crete under the command of a certain 
Manius Lepidus.t Lucius Valerius Messala Corvinus and 
Lucius Bibulus, the son-in-law of Brutus, remained at Thasos ; 
they refused to take the command which was offered them by 
such soldiers as were left in the island and surrendered to Antony, 
who spared their lives when they had given up the treasure and 
provisions of the army. { Subordinate officers were pardoned 
more readily and were able to return to Italy with more or less 
difficulty, as did Quintus Horatius Flaccus. ‘The majority of 
the troops surrendered or dispersed. 

After this victory every one regarded opposition to the The position of 
popular and Cxsarean government as hopeless. It was incon- ‘"**™™¥** 
ceivable that the few desperate men who had put to sea or that 
Sextus Pompeius, who held only Sicily, could change the 
fortunes of the war. The battle of Philippi thus confirmed 
the result of Pharsalia. Liberty was dead; the armies would 
now recognise the triumvirs, and, in particular, Antony, 
who therefore seemed in secure possession of the power. 
After the battle, when the senators who had been captured 
were led before the triumvirs, many of them abused Octavianus, 
but all saluted Antony respectfully. In this they anticipated 
the general opinion, while at the point of death. The soldiers 
knew that the victory was due to Antony, and that Octavianus 
had done nothing. It was considered that Antony had reached 
his position by virtue of tenacity and endurance deserving of 
so great a result, while Octavianus was regarded as a hateful 
intruder, as cruel, perverse, self-seeking, and favoured by 
undeserved good fortune. Lepidus had utterly discredited 

* Velleius, ii, 72 ; Appian, B. C. v. 2. 

+ Appian, B. C. v. 2. This Lepidus is perhaps the same as the 

person to whom reference is made in the inscription reported in the 
Bull. Corr. Hell. 1879, 151. 

t Appian, B. C. iv. 136, § Suetonius, Aug. 13. 
Ill O 

42 B.C. 

The difficulties 
of the 


himself during the war by allowing the arrogant and intriguing 
Fulvia to usurp his power as triumvir, to govern Italy in his 
place, and to enforce her will upon the Senate and the magis- 
trates.* The conservative party being thus annihilated and 
the last battle won, Antony was now the supreme arbiter of a 
greater and stronger power than that of Cesar after Thapsus ; 
even though he was obliged to share this power with his dis- 
credited colleague, he could at least bend him to his will. f 
He therefore, was doubtless the moving spirit in the numerous 
important decisions which the two triumvirs passed after the 
battle of Philippi. 

Though the victory had been won, the triumvirs were con- 
fronted by many difficulties. They had to pay the soldiers 
the twenty thousand sesterces which they had promised, and the 
arrears of their pay. For this purpose they were short of money. 
It was necessary to disband part of the army, as the expense of 
maintaining forty-three legions was prohibitive. Finally, 
Czsar’s veterans, who had received nothing up to the Ides of 
March, required performance of the promises which the 
dictator had made to them and to which the triumvirs had 
pledged themselves, as the successors to Czsar’s policy. Hence 
it was urgently necessary to re-establish the authority of Rome 
in that part of the empire whence money could be drawn, 
that is, in the east, which had been thrown into utter confusion 
by the civil war. The petty princes of Syria and Pheenicia, 
whom Pompeius had dispossessed, had reappeared in increasing 
numbers during the last two years ; some had been encouraged 
by Cassius, others had acted for themselves and had profited 
by the general disorganisation. ‘The province was thus divided 
into a large number of petty states at war with one another ; 
one of the most important, the town of Tyre, was at war with 
Palestine, and had seized"part of its territory, in agreement 
with Ptolemeus, Prince of Chalcis, and with the help of 
Antigonus, son of the Aristobulus from whom Pompey had taken 
the government of Palestine to transfer it to Hyrcanus. 'Thus 
civil war had broken out again in Palestine, apparently 
between the adherents of the two claimants, but in reality 

* Dion, xlviii. 4. t+ Appian, B.C. v. 14. 


between the nationalists and the Roman party. Asia was less 
disturbed, though greatly unsettled by reason of war and pillage. 
In almost every monarchy and principality dependent upon 
Rome, class discord, family or faction rivalry, and even small 
revolutions had broken out. 

It was thus impossible to rest upon the laurels of Philippi. The compact of 

42 B.C. 

Antony and Octavianus first resolved to remove Lepidus ; he Pippi. 

had done nothing but blunder in Italy while they were winning 
the victory, and he could not think of resistance, as he had only 
three legions at his command. 'The army had lost three whole 
legions during the war, and was thus reduced to forty legions. 
The triumvirs resolved to disband eight legions of Czsar’s 
veterans who had been re-enlisted; that is to say, the three 
legions of Ventidius, the three of Lepidus, and two of Octavianus. 
Thus the army was reduced to thirty-two legions ; of these, 
the eleven who had fought at Philippi were to remain under 
arms in Macedonia and would be reinforced by the soldiers of 
Brutus and Cassius. Antony was to have six of these and 
Octavianus five ; the latter was also to have the three legions of 
Lepidus. Antony would thus be in command of seventeen 
legions, eleven in Italy, and six in Macedonia ; Octavianus would 
command fifteen legions, seven in Italy, five in Macedonia, 
and the three of Lepidus. With regard to the provinces held 
by Lepidus, Antony proposed to take Gallia Narbonensis ; Octa- 
vianus would take Spain, while he would exchange the province 
of Africa with Antony;* a petty civil war had broken out in 
Africa while the triumvirs were fighting at Philippi. Corni- 
ficius had refused to recognise the power of the triumvirs ; Sex- 
tius, the governor of New Africa, had declared for Antony ; 
and in the consequent war Cornificius had been beaten and 
killed. It was also understood that if there should seem to be 
any danger in thus completely stripping Lepidus, Octavianus 
was to give him Numidia, and Antony, Africa. T 

* Appian, B. C. v. 3; Dion, xlviii. 1. 

+ Dion, xlviii.1. Appian, B.C. v. 3, says, on the contrary, ina state- 
ment probably derived from the Memoirs of Augustus, that these 
provinces were to be given to Lepidus in case Octavianus should find 
that the suspicions of treachery with Sextus Pompeius under which 
Lepidus laboured, were unjust. Dion’s statement is correct, as this 
pretended treachery was obviously only a pretext for despoiling Lepidus. 

42 B.C. 
The rewards to 
be given to the 


Finally it was decided that Antony should go to the east 
under pretext of pacifying that part of the empire, but with the 
real purpose of procuring money, while Octavianus was to go to 
Italy to continue the war with Sextus, and to distribute the 
lands to his father’s veterans ; the latter task was by no means 
easy. The veterans of the Gallic wars who had not yet 
received their rewards had been probably reduced to seven 
or eight thousand by the recent struggles; each of them, 
however, was to have the very considerable allowance of 
some fifty acres. Hence it was necessary to find three or 
four hundred thousand acres of good land in Italy, an almost 
impossible enterprise under ordinary conditions. Past ex- 
perience had proved the fact. The agrarian laws of 
64, 60 and 59 had been wholly ineffectual; under these 
measures the popular party had been obliged to respect legal 
fictions and to confine their proposed distributions to the 
remnant of the ager publicus and to proposals for buying land 
at reasonable prices sine injuria privatorum.* ‘The only result 
had been the failure of attempts to buy private lands when the 
ager publicus proved inadequate; no one was willing to sell, 
except at excessive prices, the privileged soil of Italy which 
was free from taxation ; the petitions, the prayers and the 
intrigues of the landowners had bound by invisible bonds the 
hands of those who would found colonies, and even of Cesar 
himself. On the other hand, the triumvirs had no money 
and could not therefore have bought lands even if they had 
wished. As, however, they had annihilated the conservative 
party at Philippi, Antony and Octavianus might take more 
violent measures than Cesar had ventured to use after Thapsus 
against the conservatives, who were then defeated but not 
crushed ; only by such means was it possible to overcome the 
quiet but obstinate resistance of private interests. Antony 

* This formula had been used in the senatus consultum proposed by 
Cicero, January 1, 43. Cic. Phil. V. xix. 53: agri... qui sine 
injuria privatorum dividi possent. It seems probable to me that some 
similar formula appeared in all the agrarian laws, even in those of 
Cesar for the year 59 B.c. Its insertion was intended to reassure the 
middle classes; unfortunately, it enabled landowners to make the 
aw inoperative, 



and Octavianus therefore decided to provide these seven or eight 
thousand soldiers with lands from the territory of eighteen of 
the fairest and richest towns in Italy ;* from each town in- 
dividual landowners were to be deprived of a part of their 
holdings, and to receive promises of indemnities which the 
triumvirs would fix and pay when they could. These colonies, 
to be founded by Octavianus and to receive the name of Julia, 
would be entirely composed of Cesar’s veterans, and their 
foundation was merely the accomplishment of Czsar’s promises.t 
It was also resolved that Cesar’s law granting citizen rights 
to the Cisalpine Gauls should be carried out.{ These 
secret arrangements were not to be submitted for approval 
either to the Senate or to the people.§ After Philippi, 
the constitutional fictions which the triumvirate was obliged 
to use at the outset of its existence no longer seemed 
necessary ; the personal power of the triumvirs could outrage 
republican tradition more openly than before. Antony also 
took over from Octavianus two other legions which were in 
Macedonia, promising two of the legions then in Italy by way 
of exchange. || 

Many modern historians have asserted that Antony preferred 
the east in a foolish longing for the easy satisfaction of his 
sensuality ; it seems to me more probable that his object was 
to reorganise this portion of the Roman dominions which he and 
all his contemporaries, including Czsar, regarded as Rome’s 
most precious possession. The European provinces were 
indeed poor, thinly populated, and half civilised in comparison 
with the vast east, full of wealth and advanced civilisation, with 
great manufacturing towns, great commercial routes, important 
centres of learning, and well-cultivated lands. Italy herself 
was passing through an economic and political crisis of such 
serious length and complexity that few people had any hopes 
of the re-establishment of peace and order. Cesar had 
turned towards the Rhine to extend the Roman dominion, 

* Appian, B. C. iv. 3. + Appian, B. C. v. 14: 

¢ Appian, B. C. v. 3; Dion, xviii. 12. 

§ As may be seen in Appian, B. C. v. 12, and Dion, xlviii, 11-12. 

Cp. Ganter, Die Provinzial-Verwaltung dey Triumviri, Strasburg, 1892, 
Daz. | Dion, xlviii. 2; Appian, B. C. v. 3. 

42 B.C. 

Why Antony 
chose the east. 

42 B.C. 

The situation 
in Italy. 


almost by chance and because no other opportunity for con- 
quest lay before him at the end of his consulate ; but even he 
had always regarded the east as the true object of Italian 
aggression, and he was preparing a further expedition against 
Persia at the moment of his death. Moreover, the progress of 
the mercantile spirit inclined men to exaggerate the importance 
of wealth in human life, and therefore to consider the richest 
countries as the most perfect and desirable. The triumvirs 
had almost been defeated in the recent struggle for want of 
money. Czsar had said that with soldiers and money the 
world could be governed. Antony, his faithful pupil, resolved 
now that he had an army, to seize the richest countries before 
attempting further action. ‘Thus it appears that in this case, 
as in every other article of the so-called convention of Philippi, 
Octavianus was obliged to yield to the conditions which Antony 
was pleased to lay upon him. * 
+ Thus towards the end of the year 42, Antony set off for 
Greece with eight legions, while Octavianus returned to Italy 
with three legions, preceded and followed by troops of dis- 
banded veterans who were returning to their homes. They 
found Italy in the most disastrous state. Her economic 
ruin seemed complete ; there was no money in circulation and a 
kind of universal bankruptcy had been the consequence. By 
their extortion of high taxes at a moment when the precious 
metals were so scarce, the triumvirs had driven a large number 
of landowners into bankruptcy, even though they had allowed 
them to retain a third of the money produced by the sale of 
their property. Estates were sold at so low a price that almost 
all of them had been allowed to lie fallow. t Thus a large 
number of those small holdings which in the preceding 
half-century had been established side by side with the 
great public and private estates, were once more ruined. 
* Seeck, Kaiser Augustus, Leipzig, 1902, p. 63 ff, has given due 
weight to this fact. Certain events turned to the advantage of Octa- 
vianus some unfavourable clauses in the Treaty of Philippi, to which 
he was forced to agree ; and this obvious fact will appear in the course 
of our narrative. It is, however, futile to assume, as the majority of 
historians do, that Octavianus had been able to foresee these changes 

immediately after Philippi. 
JT Dion, xlvii. 17. 


The condition of public morality was yet more frightful. The 42 B.c. 
aristocracy had disappeared, the popular party was non- 
existent, the Senate was reduced to an obscure company of 
adventurers, the magistrates had lost all prestige and the laws 
all binding force. The distinctions of class and party, the 
constitutional machinery and the traditions by which the 
aristocracy had been guided, were broken up; confusion was 
universal, revolutionary anarchy complete, and the inevitable 
consequences were manifest ; individual tyrannies, formed by 
chance, asserted their power by the strangest means. The 
most monstrous and the strangest of these tyrannies, that of 
Fulvia, had dominated Italy. Amid this indescribable con- 
fusion, a woman had seized the supreme power, had appointed 
magistrates, guided the Senate, and made laws for a State in 
which the constitution had ever been most masculine in 
character. The government of Fulvia, by its mere existence, 
pointed to a vast disruption of the old Roman traditions. It 
was, however, not the only disintegrating force. When the 
classes and institutions based upon constitutional tradition had 
disappeared, the rising tide of revolution swept away the 
rights of the individual, the dignity of family life, the reality 
of education and the refinement of literature. The sense of 
social rank had so completely vanished that citizens of the 
equestrian order were now to be seen fighting wild beasts 
in the circus. * 

Amid this appalling confusion, the following year was to see The decay of 
the enactment of a law most important for its bearing upon the oe 
economic organisation of the Latin family, the lex Falcidia. ¢ 
This law was to become the basis of hereditary right for cen- 
turies and limited the unrestrained freedom which testators had 
enjoyed under the old system; they were now forced to leave 
a quarter of their estates to their heirs, though they might 
bequeath the remaining three quarters as they pleased. Such 
a woman as Fulvia was certainly abnormal, though many men 
could trace similar ambition and imperiousness in their own 
wives and daughters. ‘Throughout the high society of Rome 
women had received some literary culture and were arrogating 

Dion, xlviii,.33\ + Ibid. Gaius, Inst, ii, 227. 

42 B.C. 


to themselves a greater measure of freedom and licence. In- 
stead of remaining at home, busy in the education of their 
children, and the management of their servants, they preferred 
to mix in society, to be present at public shows and to attract 
admiration, while the men, who were enervated by vice, by 
study and by wild philosophical ideas, often became their 
slaves or their victims. ‘The basis of authority had been 
shaken within the family circle; the pater familias, the old- 
time despot, now resigned himself to share his power with his 
wife, as is often the case when civilisation reaches a height of 
intellectual and voluptuous refinement, under which the man 
surrenders the most powerful instrument of authority, the 
stick. As in the family and the State, so in literature, the 
struggle between the ancient and modern spirit was obvious. 
The passion for study, already wide-spread in the upper and 
middle classes of the earlier generation, became yet more pro- 
nounced in the newgeneration. Cicero had founded the dynasty 
of men of letters in Italy ; literary talent became a social force 
of increasing power as the aristocracy disappeared and as wealth 
and power fell into the hands of obscure families. Amid the 
universal decay of trade and handicrafts, education, in those 
days a matter of private enterprise, became a highly profitable 
business. Students became more numerous in the schools and 
in the lecture-rooms of private tutors. ‘The sons of wealthy 
landowners in the little towns elbowed the sons of freedmen 
or the slaves of knights who had made some little competence 
for themselves in agriculture or commerce under Cesar’s rule. 
Rome was full of poets reading their verses in public, even in 
the baths.* It was then that the son of the rich lord of 
Padua, Titus Livius, was to begin his studies at the age of 
seventeen, as also were the many poete@ minores of the Augustan 
age, under the numerous freedmen who will be found teaching 
rhetoric and grammar under the rule of Augustus. Thus these 
citizens, slaves, and freedmen formed a little class of “ in- 
tellectuals,”” as they would now be known, soon to contend 
with the eastern rhetoricians and philosophers in the intel- 
lectual professions, though they were but to swell the 
* Horace; sam l.ive 73 at. 


triumph of their rivals’ culture over that of their own country. 
The fall of the aristocracy and the triumph of the revolutionary 
party at Philippi was re-echoed even in the literary world. 
The old Roman classical literature was despised and neglected 
and the Greek spirit was everywhere triumphant. Asinius 
Pollio, the governor of Cisalpine Gaul, a young man of culti- 
vation and great wealth, composed carmina nova,* or poetry 
in a new style; he became the centre of a group of young 
poets imbued with the Greek spirit, and enthusiastic supporters 
of the most audacious Greek inventions. 

42 B.C. 

One of these young poets was Virgil, then twenty-eight years Vue aad 

of age; encouraged by Asinius, he was meditating a more original 
work than the minor compositions towhich he had hitherto con- 
fined his efforts. He proposed to write Eclogues in hexameter 
verse in imitation of Theocritus; but the Sicilian shepherds 
were to veil men of his own time, and the scenes of country life 
were to contain allusions to contemporary events ; the tradi- 
tional landscapes of Greek bucolic poetry were to be interspersed 
with descriptions of the beautiful Valley of the Po, the charm 
of which was profoundly felt by this peasant’s son, brought up 
on the banks of the Mincio. ‘Towards the end of the year 42, 
he was working at his Second Eclogue, the first which he com- 
posed, in which he sings the loves of the shepherd Corydon for 
the fair Alexis, thus displaying in bucolic verse, if the state- 
ments of ancient writers are to be believed, his admiration for 
a young slave with whom Asinius Pollio had presented him. 
This work was followed by the Third Eclogue, an imitation 
of the Fourth Idyll of Theocritus, where the poet represents 
two shepherds who quarrel and challenge one another to a 
poetic contest in which they launch invectives at the poets of 
the olden school and praise Pollio as a poet able to cultivate the 
new style. ‘Thus even the songs of the Arcadian shepherds were 
disturbed by the literary polemics of the time. At the same 
moment the furious and haughty spirit of Sallust attacked with 
murderous intent another hoary antiquity, the writing of 
** Annals.” Sallust had restored his fortune during Czsar’s civil 
war by plunder extorted in Numidia ; on his return he had been 

* Virgil, Buc. iii. 86. 

42-41 B.C. 


able to live in great luxury, to build villas and palaces, and to 
enjoy wealth and power which the friendship of Cesar seemed to 
make permanent. ‘The Ides of March, however, had shattered 
all his prospects. After this catastrophe, Sallust had hastily 
retired from political life, as too dangerous an occupation for 
so wealthy a man as himself. He was not, however, reconciled 
to the conservatives, and when the victory of Philippi destroyed 
all hopes of a conservative restoration, he poured forth his 
rancour through his pen, and proceeded to compose a series of 
histories intended to display the blunders and disgrace of the 
conservative party. The first of these works which he was 
then composing with the help of a Greek freedman, by name 
Atteius, a professional rhetorician and grammarian,* was a 
paradoxical history of Catiline’s conspiracy. Desirous of giving 
a bold answer to the conservatives, who constantly accused the 
popular party of complicity with this terrible criminal, Sallust 
attempted to prove that the conspiracy had been hatched by 
the nobility devoted to Sulla, which had squandered the booty 
of the civil war and was rendered desperate by poverty. ‘This 
conspiracy was a disgraceful incident in the history of the 
conservative party and in it had been involved the mother of 
one of the heroes of that party, the mother of Decimus Brutus, 
Cesar’s murderer. Sallust’s excessive partisanship naturally 
obliged him to confuse and distort his facts, but at the same 
time he rendered great service to lovers of literature by reviv- 
ing the artistic and psychological mode of writing history in 
opposition to the dry record of the Annals, which for centuries 
had been the official history of Rome ; as dry and absurd a mode 
of narration as the critical and scientific historical methods which 
certain pedants would revive to-day. Atticus and Cornelius 
Nepos, in relating the great events of Roman history had also 
followed the traditional method, and had given a dry summary 
of events year by year as if historical figures were merely 
shadows, and events the material for a monotonous catalogue. 
Sallust, on the contrary, in imitation of the Greeks, and 
especially of ‘Thucydides, wrote a psychological and artistic 
history ; he analyses the passions of his characters, shows up 

* Suet. iii. Gr. 10, 


the actors in strong relief, relates events in a rational order, and 
passes moral and philosophical judgments upon their course. 
These striking contradictions in the ideas and_ political 
ambitions of the time, together with the anxiety of the land- 
owners who feared deprivation of their property, inevitably 
caused great uneasiness throughout Italy, and revived hatred 
and animosity upon every side. ‘Towards the end of the year 
42 Octavianus was known to be dangerously ill, and while he was 
returning to Italy at the point of death, many would have 
greeted his death with delight.* It was known that he was 
returning for the sole purpose of committing further villainy 
at the expense of the rich and wealthy. The young triumvir 
however, did not die, and in the early spring of 41 he reached 
Rome almost recovered in health, with the object of beginning 
the distribution of lands to the veterans without delay. But 
an unforeseen obstacle awaited him. Fulvia, who had governed 
Italy during the war, had no intention of handing over the 
power to her young son-in-law. The Battle of Philippi had 
made Antony master of the situation and had increased the 
influence and ambition of his family; during that year his 
brother Lucius was consul with Publius Servilius; Lucius 
and Fulvia intended to govern Rome and Italy as the brother 
and wife of the victor of Philippi in place of a sickly and dis- 
credited young man. Octavianus, who had been weakened by 
his illness, and was unable to think of anything but the difficult 
task of land distribution, displayed much conciliation at first. 
He ordered Salvidienus to betake himself to Spain with his 
legions and those of Lepidus ; he was however, unable to in- 
duce Lepidus to hand over his three legions, and resolved to 
do without them for the moment ; he showed Antony’s letters 
and secured a promise from Calenus that the two legions should 
be transferred to him. t But he did not insist and the per- 
formance of this promise was delayed. ‘Then, without giving 
Lucius or Fulvia any reason for anxiety, he began the business 
of land distribution, appointing commissioners throughout 

* Plut. Ant. 23; Dion, xlviii. 3; Appian, B. C. v. 12. 

7 Appian, B.C. v.12. Appian, however, is wrong in asserting that 
the legions were given back, and Dion, xlviii. 5, is correct in his contrary 

41 B.C. 

The return 
of Octavianus 
to Italy. 

41 B.C. 

The confisca- 
tions of land. 


Italy and recruiting surveyors. He was, however, both too 
intelligent and too ambitious to be governed by Fulvia, or to 
waive his rights as triumvir. Thus relations speedily became 
strained, and Lucius began to accuse him of violating his rights 
as consul. * 

Though Octavianus had numerous causes of complaint,f he 
none the less bore this further vexation patiently, as he was 
anxious to finish the distribution of land without delay. The 
commissioners soon arrived in many Italian towns, which 
certainly included Ancona, Aquino, Benevento, Apollonia, 
Capua, Cremona, Fermo, Florence, Lucca, Pesaro, Rimini, and 
Venosa; they were ordered to choose lands for the veterans, 
to draw up a list of the owners, and to settle their contributions 
to the imposts, which were probably in proportion to their 
wealth, and consisted in grants, not merely of lands, but of 
animals, slaves, and agricultural implements; they were then 
to settle the indemnities for these expropriations, which indem- 
nities were not to be paid, and to divide the land with the help 
of the surveyors, and also the slaves and cattle.t In the 
spring this great spoliation began. Such wealthy families as 
those of Albius Tibullus and of Propertius in Umbria, lost the 
greater portion of their estates; smaller landowners, who 
possessed less property than the smallest grant made to a 
veteran, lost the whole; the wealthy middle class of Italy, 
which had shown such Platonic affection for the conspirators’ 
party, was obliged to yield part of its lands to the veterans, 
lands on which they had with anxious toil planted vines and 
olives during recent years with money borrowed at usurious 
rates of interest. ‘They were forced to divide with the soldiers 
who had returned from Philippi the flocks which they had 
reared, and the slaves which they had bought at high prices 
and had trained with much trouble. The veterans would not 
be satisfied, as the soldiers of a former of age, with virgin soil 

* The special clauses of the agreement of Teanum show that this 
accusation had been made against Octavianus. Cp. Appian, B.C. v. 20: 
Tovs pev Urdrous TA marpta Sorkeiy, fu) KOAVOPEVOUS Ud TOY TpLOy avdpev. 

¢ Dion, xlviii. 5. 

t Appian, B. C. v. 12, shows that indemnities were estimated. But 
they were not paid. 


for clearing; they required fields which others had already 
brought under cultivation, together with implements, cattle, 
and slaves ; in these holdings they proposed peacefully to spend 
the rest of their lives, as comfortable citizens and members of 
municipal Senates. * | 

No sooner, however, was the distribution begun, than the 
whole of Italy was shaken by a formidable agitation. During 
the early months of the year 41, the towns threatened with 
spoliation sent deputations to Rome from every quarter to 
intrigue, to supplicate, and to protest against the fact that only 
eighteen towns should have been marked for deprivation of 
their land. If Italy was bound to undergo this process of con- 
fiscation, surely it was just that every citizen should bear the 
burden. | Octavianus, who, apart from his youth, was broken 
both in reputation and in health, felt considerable anxiety at 
this deputation with its protests and intrigues. Another 
difficulty however, far more serious and utterly unexpected, 
presented itself. Fulvia and Lucius were exasperated at find- 
ing the young man less pliable than they could wish; they 
therefore agreed to stop his distributions of land under various 
pretexts. They began by asserting that Octavianus should 
await Antony’s return from Asia; then they claimed that if 
the distribution of land was to be made without delay, those of 
Cesar’s veterans who had fought at Philippi under Antony’s 
orders, should be installed in their colonies either by Antony 
himself or by his representatives, that their gratitude might be 
recognised as due to Antony and not to Octavianus.f Octavianus 
showed the text of the agreement concluded at Philippi, but 
Fulvia and Lucius declined to yield. Fulvia seems to have 
worked upon the veterans in Rome by her invectives and in- 
trigues so far that Octavianus was eventually obliged to yield.§ 
He ordered Asinius Pollio to supervise the commissions working 
in Cisalpine Gaul, || and appointed several of Antony’s friends 
to other commissions ; Plancus, for instance was appointed to 

* Dion, xlviii.6: perd re rips Sovdelas kal pera THs GAAns KaTac Kens 
rovs Seomdras 6 Katoap ofypeiro. Cp. Virgil, Ecl. I. 70. Impius hec 
tam culta novalia miles habebit. * Appian, B.C, v. 12. 

t Appian, B. C. v.14; Dion, xlvilii. 5 and 6. 
§ Appian, B.C. v. 14. || Servius, ad Virg. Ecl. ii, 1, 

41 B.C. 


41 B.C. 



the commission of Benevento. * Octavianus, however, was 
continually confronted by further difficulties apart from the 
malignity of his enemies. ‘The veterans in the proud con- 
sciousness of their power seized lands which were not intended 
for them. + Among the wealthy classes admiration for Brutus 
and Cassius, hatred for the despotic triumvirate and desire 
for free institutions were revived by the exasperation univer- 
sally aroused by the loss of property and by the failure to pay 
the indemnities. Many small landowners finding themselves 
stripped of everything, took up arms and proceeded to violence 
and murder;{ some enlisted in the army of Sextus Pom- 
peius ; § others turned to brigandage; others again put their 
children and their household goods into carts and went to 
Rome in the hope of finding some means or other of livelihood. 

Rome was already thronged by veterans waiting to be led to 
their colonies, and was now invaded by the starving bands of 
their victims who took refuge in the temples with loud lamen- 
tations. || Worse than all was the lack of money. Antony 
sent nothing ; 7 none the less, Octavianus was bound to pay the 
veterans the promised sums, to give the poorest soldiers a little 
ready money, and to provide them with slaves and implements 
when these were not to be had by confiscation; finally the 
expropriated landowners were continually clamouring for their 
indemnities. Octavianus again began the sale of the property 
of the proscribed, and of the rich who had fallen at Philippi 
such as Lucullusand Hortensius ; some money was thus realised,** 
for many veterans and officers both in the army of the trium- 
virate and in that of Brutus and Cassius had returned from 
Philippi with small fortunes of their own, and were willing to 
invest them in land at ridiculously low prices. Octavianus also 
placed a forced loan upon the towns exempted from the confisca- 
tion of land. But far larger amounts were required to meet his 

* C. I. L. x. 6087. That he was appointed in consequence of the 
remonstrances of Lucius and Fulvia is only a conjecture. 

+ Appian, B. C. v. 13. { Dion, xlviii. 8. 

§ Appian, B. C. v. 25. || Appian, B. C. v. 12. 

gq Appian, B. C. v. 13 and 15. 

** Appian, B.C. v.12. However, Dion, xlviii. 7, and Appian, B. C. 
v. 72, show that in this year, at the time of the peace of Misenum, 
much confiscated property had not as yet been sold. 


necessities. To crown his misfortunes, during the spring 
Sextus Pompeius began to reduce Rome by starvation, cutting 
off the corn ships by sea, while Domitius remained master of 
the Adriatic. Of the surviving remnants of the fleet and army 
of Brutus and Cassius, Staius Murcus, Cassius Parmensis, and 
Clodius had rejoined Sextus or Domitius, and Sextus in par- 
ticular had become more powerful and correspondingly auda- 
cious. * 

Confronted by such difficulties, Octavianus was bound to 
adopt a moderate and conciliatory attitude. Unfortunately, 
moderation is often more irritating to an enraged crowd than 
open defiance. Lucius and Fulvia, far from abandoning their 
harassing policy, pursued it with greater vigour ; they declined 
to transfer to Octavianus the two promised legions, while Calenus 
and Asinius Pollio, instigated by the terrible woman whom they 
could not resist, refused to allow the despatch of the six legions 
which the triumvir wished to send to Spain under the orders of 
Salvidienus. t Finally, Lucius began a most audacious in- 
trigue; he attempted to turn the hatred of the landowners 
against Octavianus to his own advantage without discontenting 
the veterans; he asserted in a series of speeches that further 
confiscation was unnecessary, as there were in hand large 
estates belonging to the proscribed with which the veterans 
might be satisfied.[ The universal unpopularity of Octavianus, 
the fear of confiscation and the general discontent, induced the 
public to lend a ready ear to these assertions; every one 
asserted that Lucius Antonius was right, and that Octavianus was 
continuing the confiscations merely for the purpose of winning 
the friendship of the soldiers by enriching them.§ Lucius 
delivered these speeches with no other idea than that of con- 
fusing and harassing his adversary, but the effect which he 
produced far outran his expectations. The wealthy middle 
classes imagined that Lucius and Mark Antony had agreed to 
discredit Octavianus; the remnants of the conservative party 

* Velleius, ii. 72 ; Dion, xlviii. 7 and 19; Appian, B.C. v. 2 and 25. 

t This is shown by the convention of Teanum: Appian, B. C. 
v. 20; cp. Dion, xlviii. 10. 

¢t Appian, B. C. v. 19; Dion, xlviii. 7. 
§ Dion, xlviii. 7. 

4I B.C. 


of Lucius 

and Fulvia 

to Octavianus, 

41 B.C. 

Virgil’s First 


soon conceived an unexpected and almost incredible admiration 
for Lucius, while the threatened landowners, believing them- 
selves sure of his support, took courage and proposed to defend 
their property by force of arms. Outbreaks of violence in- 
creased in number both in the country and the little towns, * 
and even in Rome, where a large number of brigands driven 
from every quarter, were committing robberies and assassina- 
tions. Poverty and famine increased to such an extent that 
many artisans, freedmen or foreigners, finding no work, 
afraid for their personal safety and horrified at the price of 
food, closed their shops and went away to seek their fortune in 
other towns. f Antony’s partisans, and even Fulvia herself, 
were at first dismayed by the agitation they had aroused, and 
were afraid of alienating the veterans. [ Lucius, however, was 
carried away by the movement which he had begun and was 
also deceived by its apparent tendencies; he therefore, went 
further and deliberately appeared as the champion of the 
despoiled landowners. Lucius thus became the most popular 
man in Italy, except amongst the veterans. He now asserted 
that land should only be given to those of Cesar’s veterans 
who had re-enlisted after the Ides of March and had fought 
at Philippi; those who had remained at home were to have 
nothing. § 

The ferment which Lucius had raised throughout Italy by 
this declaration was so great that Octavianus in dismay attempted 
to calm the prevailing exasperation by some concessions. He 
revived Czsar’s law reducing a year’s payment of rents 
by two thousand sesterces at Rome, and by five hundred 
sesterces in the other towns of Italy; he decided that in the 
distribution of lands, the estates of senators should be spared, 
and also land given as dowries and small holdings within 
areas already assigned to the veterans. Thus he attempted 

* Dion, xlviii. 8-9. + Appian, B. C. v. 18. 

t Appian, B.C. v.19. The fact is important because it shows that 
Lucius was not a mere instrument in the hands of Fulvia, as certain 
historians would represent him, but that he acted on his own account 
and for personal reasons, and afterwards joined Fulvia when she had 
been induced to oppose Octavianus for reasons of her own. 

§ This is also proved by the clauses of the convention of Teanum ; 
Appian, B. C. v. 20, 


to save the small holders from the utter ruin with which they 
were threatened.* This concession brought some small 
consolation to the middle classes, and amid the appalling 
confusion, a sweet and tuneful voice raised a song of gratitude 
which was to echo down succeeding centuries. Virgil, who was 
himself a small landowner, ventured for the first time to make 
bucolic poetry a medium for the treatment of what we should 
now call a question of the hour; in his First Eclogue he 
expressed his gratitude and that of the small Italian landowners 
to the young triumvir, whose acquaintance he had not yet 
made ; the poem was touched with that half-religious adoration 
which had been extended from the dead to the living after 
Cesar’s apotheosis, from the founder who had been killed to the 
new leaders of the victorious popular party. 

O Melibcee, deus nobis hec otia fecit ; 
Namque erit ille mihisemper deus ; illius aram 
Sepe tener nostris ab ovilibus imbuet agnus ; ¢ 

and he concluded with a beautiful description of a peaceful 
country evening: 

Et jam summa procul villarum culmina fumant, 
Majoresque cadunt altis de montibus umbre. 

The adoration of Virgil’s shepherds was, however, a very 
poor consolation for Octavianus in view of the discontent which 
these concessions aroused among the veterans in Rome. These 
warriors entertained no great respect for the triumvir at any 
time, and now cursed him to his face, displayed the utmost 
insolence, and went so far as to kill the officers who ventured to 
reproach them.{ In order to calm the soldiers, Octavianus, 
who had not ventured to punish the murderers among them, 

* Dion, xlviii. 8-9. 

{ Shaper thinks that lines 7-8 were added after the year 30 B.c., 
when emperor worship was introduced as a state religion. This theory 
is unnecessary ; on the contrary, if these lines were written at this 
time, they help us to understand the revolutionary notions which had 
made their way into literature and public feeling and had produced 
the idea of Cesar’s apotheosis. 

{ The facts related by Appian, v. 15-17, are explained by the briefer 
narrative of Dion, xlviii. 9. Cp. also Sent. Aug. xili.: neque vetera- 
novum neque possessorum gratiam tenutt. 


41 B.C. 

41 B.C. 

Antony in the 


seems to have promised to increase the number of towns upon 
whose territory the colonies were to be founded; he also 
proclaimed that the parents of veterans were not to be 
deprived of their fields; * in order to pay the soldiers more 
rapidly he borrowed, as he said, but in reality appropriated 
the sums laid up in the temples of Italy as sacred treasures. 

Thus at the outset of the year 41 Octavianus seemed to be in 
a hopeless situation. He could not avoid one danger without 
rushing into another. If he satisfied the greed of the merciless 
veterans, he deeply wounded the wealthy classes ; if he attempted 
to satisfy both parties he provoked the anger of the veterans 
without gaining sympathy elsewhere. Meanwhile, Antony 
had led an army to Greece, where he had remained until the 
spring; with the idea that he required no great military force 
for his immediate purpose, he had then appointed Lucius 
Marcius Censorinus as governor of Greece and Macedonia, ft 
and had started for the east. The object of his journey was, 
however, no unrestrained passion as many modern _histo- 
rians assert, in blind reliance upon the superficial narratives 
of classical historians. No sooner had he reached Bithynia 

“than he was besieged with deputations from the towns and 

from the majority of the eastern States, sent to justify their 
actions, to ask rewards for their fidelity, or to complain of some 
injustice which they had suffered. He was thus obliged to 
plunge into the hopeless labyrinth of dynastic intrigue, munici- 
pal rivalry, and political faction, which the east produced in 
such infinite variety ; he was forced to show favour here and 
severity there in order to form a political party, to re-establish 
some semblance of order, and to extract money from every 
one.§ For six centuries Rome had borne with this Oriental 
policy ; Antony, however, was unable to follow the simple and 
expeditious severity of the first pro-consuls and ambassadors 
sent to the Asiatic courts; he possessed neither the clear- 
sightedness and energy of Sulla, nor the audacious rapidity 
of Lucullus, nor the outward dignity of Pompey, nor the sure 

* Dion, xlviii. 9. + Appian, B.C. v. 13. 

{ Plutarch, Ant. 23-24. Censorinus was not merely governor of 
Greece, as Plutarch states, but also of Macedonia, Cp, C.1I. L.i. p. 461. 

§ Plut. Ant, 24, 


dexterity and speed of Ceasar. After the final victory of 
Philippi, Ceesar’s old lieutenant fell back into the ill-balanced, 
inconsistent, and voluptuous habits natural to an intelligent but 
undecided character ; these defects were even exaggerated ; his 
comprehension was rapid and his decision swift, but he was too 
prone to extreme measures, inclined to forget, and easily 
deceived. During his stay in the east, Antony plunged into 
myriad amusements and enterprises; hasty actions were as 
hastily countermanded; crowds of intriguers, male and 
female, worked upon his mind ; favouritism was combined with 
policy and political interests were often subordinated to 
caprice. Respect for discipline is incumbent upon those 
who command no less than upon those who obey, and its 
first law is that the commander should abstain from actions, 
however innocent, which may diminish the authority of his 
position. This was a principle fully realised by the earlier 
generation of Romans; but the later and pleasure-loving 
aristocracy, brought up amidst revolutions, speedily abandoned 
the principle when, like Antony, they became supreme 
masters of the east. Antony made no effort to enforce 
respect, to reward obedience or to repress insubordination. 
He wished to be surrounded, not by obedient and docile 
servants, but by boon companions, whose hilarity he en- 
couraged, allowing them full liberty as if they had been his 
equals. The Orientals had never seen so tolerant a pro-consul, 
and speedily turned his compliance to advantage; a horde of 
native intriguers and adventurers made their way to his ac- 
quaintance and insinuated themselves into his good graces.* 

4l B.C, 

Notwithstanding these undisciplined methods, Antony Antony’s 

Antipater, the prime minister of Hyrcanus and Ethnarch of 
Palestine, won him over with a great sum of money, and he 
ordered Tyre to restore the territory which it had conquered. + 
He also gave orders to collect a fleet of two hundred ships ; he 
visited Ephesus and laid a ten years’ contribution upon the 
Asiatic provinces, which was to be paid in two years; he 
pardoned certain illustrious fugitives who had fled to Asia 

* Plut. Ant. 24. iP Aish ke [a bais Te, 

: 3 : pr 
decided various matters of importance. Herod, the son of th 

rough Asia 

4I B.C, 


et 4 




after the Battle of Philippi, such as the brother of Cassius, 
though he put every conspirator to death who was captured. 
He also decided certain points of eastern policy.* Then 
accompanied by bands of clowns, dancers and musicians at 
high salaries, he began to tour Phrygia, Galatia and Cappa- 
docia, taking part in all festivities, scattering money everywhere, 
transforming the political map of the eastern world,t and 
taking wives and concubines from reigning sovereigns when 
their beauty pleased him.f 

He gathered, however, more homage than money; Brutus 
and Cassius had carried off most of the accumulated capital, 
which was now in the hands of the soldiers, in the chests of the 
questors, in the baggage of the troops, in the houses of the 
disbanded soldiers, or had been carried off by the Thracian, 
Macedonian and Gallic cavalry when they had been sent 
home. § In this most important respect, therefore, his enter- 
prise was a failure. When he at length reached Tarsus, he en- 
countered one of the most important, though one of the most 
obscure, adventures of his career; he there met Cleopatra. 
The ancient historians represent the history of Antony’s last 
twelve years as a love-story ; and relate this meeting in highly 
dramatic style. The triumvir, who was then aged forty, is 
said to have summoned the Queen of Egypt to Tarsus, to clear 
herself of the accusation that she had shown favour to Cassius ; 
the terrible woman is said to have appeared before the con- 
queror of Philippi and to have entirely turned his head. In 
the first place, it is by no means certain that Antony summoned 
Cleopatra to Tarsus to prove her innocence; it is quite as 
probable that Cleopatra may have come to meet Antony of 
her own accord, or by the advice of the triumvir’s friends.]| 
In any case it is certain that she went to meet him at Tarsus 
with a display of pomp which called forth most magnificent 

* Appian, B.C. v. 4-5. TeeND Diana. Ga Vie. 

t Plut. Anz. 24. 

§ That the contributions imposed upon the east produced little 
money is proved not only by the anecdotes related in Plutarch, Ant. 24, 
but also by the fact that Antony, as we shall see, had no money when 
the treaty of Brundisium was concluded. 

|| This is the version of Plutarch, Ant, 25. Appian, B. C. v. 8, is 
of another opinion, 


descriptions from the ancient historians; not only was she 41 B.c. 
pardoned, but she secured a promise from Antony that he 

would come to Egypt and re-establish her power, which had 

been somewhat shaken by recent events, while she also ex- 

tracted a further promise that he would spend the winter at 

Overwhelmed as he was with business, with complaints Antony’s 
and with pleasures, it is not surprising that Antony should pacar Zs 
have paid little attention to the news which came to him from 
Italy. ‘The situation seemed to him, doubtless, less serious 
than it really was. He therefore continued his journey to 
Syria, where he speedily and without difficulty dethroned the 
petty usurpers, and received the submission of the small garri- 
sons left in the provinces by Cassius. Antony’s indifference, 
however, rather strained than relaxed the tension existing 
between Fulvia, his brother and Octavianus. When Fulvia 
heard that her husband had forgotten Italy and was spending 
his time amid festivities with eastern queens, and that his 
absence promised to be far longer than she had expected, 
she feared that her own power at Rome might grow weak. 
Actuated rather by ambition than by jealousy, her sole idea 
now was to support Lucius and to raise such disturbances that 
Antony would be obliged to pay some attention to Italy.t 
Amid the prevailing confusion, the plan was by no means 
impossible for two such bold and truculent characters as 
Fulvia and Lucius, opposed as they were to so feeble and timid 
an adversary as Octavianus. Octavianus, in fact, at the outset 
of the summer, had sent deputations of veterans to Lucius to 
propose an agreement which was concluded at Teanum, and 
in which he promised to distribute land only to those soldiers 
who had fought at Philippi.f Lucius and Fulvia, however, 
were but the more exasperated§ by this proceeding; they 
discovered different pretexts for breaking their promises,]| 
and went away to Preneste{ with their friends as though 

* Appian, B.C. v. 9. t Appian, B. C. v. 19. 

¢ Appian, B. C. v. 20: there is possibly a vague allusion to this 
agreement in Dion, xlviii. 10. 

§ Dion, xlviii. 10, || Appian, B. C. v. 20-21. 
§| Dion, xlviii. 10; Appian, B. C. v. 21. 

AI B.C. 


they feared some new snare in Rome. They wrote to Antony 
and told him that his authority was threatened.* They then 
revived the project which Antony had failed to carry out in 44, 
the attempt to establish his family in sole power by crushing 
Octavianus in a civil war. To secure this object Fulvia and 
Lucius hoped to make use of the eleven legions of Antony 
stationed in the Valley of the Po and in Gaul, under the 
command of Calenus, Ventidius Bassus, and Asinius Pollio. 
Octavianus could only oppose them with ten legions, six of which 
were in Spain under the command of Salvidienus, while in 
the face of so threatening a situation he could not force Lepidus 
to surrender his three legions.t He had therefore become 
reconciled to him by promising him the province of Africa.t 
At the same time there is no doubt that Calenus, Ventidius 
and Asinius replied to the advances of Lucius and Fulvia by 
urging them to prudence.§ This agitation had hindered the 
foundation of colonies and the distribution of lands; the 
soldiers under arms, as well as the disappointed veterans, were 
anxious that peace between the triumvirs should be maintained ; 
it would therefore be imprudent to provoke a civil war of the 
landowners against the veterans, seeing that the army was the 
basis of their party strength. Certain friends of Antony, such 
as Barbatius, were utterly opposed to the plan.|| Thus 
Octavianus who was anxious for peace, was easily able to induce 
the veterans to intervene. ‘Two of Antony’s former legions, 
who had received lands in the neighbourhood of Ancona, 
sent an embassy to Octavianus and to Lucius, explaining the 

* Appian, B. C. v. 21. 7 Appian, B. C. v. 24. 

t Dion, xlviii. 20, places this reconciliation a little later, but it 
seems likely to me that the first negotiations were begun at this moment, 
and that Octavianus secured the good offices of Lepidus at Rome by 
holding out the possibility of this restitution. 

§ There is no trace of these negotiations or of this advice in the 
accounts of historians, but at the same time they must be assumed 
to explain the levies of Lucius and the revolt which he prepared in the 
Italian towns, by proclaiming himself, with increasing vehemence, 
as the defender of the conservative interests. If Lucius and Fulvia 
had been able to rely upon the help of Antony’s generals, they would 
not have had recourse to this dangerous expedient, which was merely 
intended to raise disturbance and disorder and to force the generals’ 

|| Appian, B. C. v. 31. 


common desire of the army that peace should not be disturbed. 
Octavianus declared himself ready to submit the points in dispute 
to the army, and added that he was Mark Antony’s friend ; 
the deputation formed a jury, in modern parlance, and invited 
Octavianus and Lucius to explain their views and to hear their 
own decision. The spot chosen was the little town of Gabii, 
halfway between Preneste and Rome. It is now buried beneath 
cornfields, but still displays the ruins of a temple. The 
veterans thronged Gabii on the appointed day ; seats for the 
jury were placed in the forum, with two other seats, one for 
Octavianus and one for Lucius. Octavianus, however, was 
the only man to appear.* 

Lucius did not come to the meeting and justified his absence 
by accusing Octavianus of laying an ambush for him on the road 
to Gabii.t The truth was that neither Fulvia nor himself 
felt any concern whatever for Antony’s generals or the veterans. 
Encouraged by the few conservatives who survived in the 
Senate and the equestrian order, and also by the very favour- 
able attitude of the Italian towns, Lucius and Fulvia imagined 
that they could easily overcome the opposition of the soldiers 
by means of promises ; they had resolved to deprive Octavianus 
of his province, to raise a general revolt in the Italian towns, 
and to recruit an army of six legions from the numerous bands 
of idle young men and from the artisans who had fled to Rome ; 
they might also count upon the help of the small landowners 
who had lost their all, and had now no means of livelihood. 
Sextius, the former governor of Africa, was urged to prepare 
a revolt against the new governor appointed by Octavianus, 
Fango, a former centurion in Cesar’s army.t Bocchus, the 
king of Mauretania, was apparently ready to seize the Spanish 
provinces of Octavianus ;§ emissaries were sent out in every 
direction throughout Italy to recruit the six legions, to en- 
courage the work of enlistment, to persuade the townships to 
give Lucius the money deposited in the temples, and to prepare 

* Appian, B. C. v. 23; Dion, xlviii. 12. 

t Appian, B. C. v. 23. 

t Appian, B. C. v. 26; Dion, xlviii. 21. 

§ Appian, B. C. v. 26. This, however, may be a calumny, or, at 
any rate, an exaggeration of the partisans of Octavianus. 

4I B.C. 

Lucius and 
Fulvia attempt 
civil war. 

Al B.C. 



the revolt of the landowners. We know that in Campania 
this task was entrusted to Tiberius Claudius Nero; he had 
served under Czsar on March 17 of the year 44, and had 
brought forward the proposal in the Senate to declare Cesar a 

tyrant; he made arrangements for the success of his mission 

with a certain Caius Velleius, a wealthy Campanian landowner, 
and a former friend and officer of Pompey.* Lucius and 
Fulvia hoped that upon the outbreak of the revolt and of the 
civil-war in Italy, Antony’s generals would come to their help 
and crush their common enemy, even though they received no 
orders from their absent chief. 

Recollections of the social war speedily awoke in every 
mind ; every one wondered whether Italy would rise, as upon a 
former occasion, not to secure citizen rights, but to defend its 
territory against the greed of the veterans and to restore the 
free republic of an earlier age. The outlook was most gloomy ; 
it was readily believed that this terrible episode of Roman 
history would be repeated ; Octavianus shared these appre- 
hensions, and did not venture to crush the obvious preparations 
for the revolt, or to stop the levies of the consul ; he confined 
himself to a feeble show of defence, divorcing Clodia, recalling 
Salvidienus, recruiting soldiers for himself, taking money from 
the temples in the Italian towns,t and discharging abusive 
lampoons at Fulvia from time to time. One of these has 
come down to us; it seems to be authentic and is full of wit, 
but so brutally obscene that translation is impossible.[ Thus, 
towards the end of the summer, the agents of Lucius and 
Octavianus were struggling in the towns to secure the young 
men, the veterans and the temple treasures.§ The disband- 
ment of the eleven legions after Philippi had thus proved useless, 

* Velleius, ii. 75, 76. The passage is important, because it gives 
us an insight into the secret intrigues of this business, and shows us 
that attempts were actually made to raise a revolt eorum qui perdrderant 
agros. Probably Campania was not the only district in which such 
intrigues went on, though this case comes to our notice really because 
the historian wished to mention his ancestor. 

tf Appian, B. C. v. 27 ; Dion, xlviii. 3. 

{ Martial, xi. 20. Weichert and Drumann regard it as apocryphal ; 
Gardthausen, on the other hand, considers it authentic. 

§ Appian, B. C. v. 27. 


as new levies were being raised; the majority of the veterans, 41 B.c. 
even those of Antony, hastened to take service under 
Octavianus;* the expropriated landowners enlisted under 
Lucius, who was obviously supported by the majority of the 
population.t No one asked how all these troops were to be paid. 
Quarrels and consequent bloodshed between the two parties 
were of constant occurrence,t and the situation soon became 
so threatening that the veterans in several colonies sent am- 
bassadors to Antony in the east urging him to come and restore 
peace without delay.§ Octavianus still vacillated, and made 
a last attempt to secure an agreement by sending a deputation 
of senators and knights to Preneste.|| Once again he failed. 
At length, encouraged by the wavering attitude of Antony’s The civil war. 
generals, Octavianus resolved to act, and determined to make an 
example of one of the numerous towns where the intrigues of 
the enemy were most active against him.{ At this moment 
we meet for the first time with his young friend, Agrippa ; 
our previous information concerning him is confined to the 
fact that he had accompanied Octavianus from Apollonia, and 
that he had been one of the accusers of the conspirators. He 
was to be pretor the following year, and Octavianus gave him 
the command of anarmy. When the time arrived, Octavianus 
left Lepidus at Rome with two legions, and attempted to 
surprise Norcia. He was unsuccessful and was obliged to lay 
siege to the town, and as these operations were protracted, he 
turned upon Sentinum, where he met with no better fortune. 
Lucius was encouraged by these failures and resolved to take 
the offensive and attempt an audacious stroke which was 

probably to be the signal of revolt throughout Italy. With the 
* Cp. Appian, B. C. v. 27. 

¢ Appian, B. C. v. 31. t Ibid. 
§ Appian, B. C. v. 52, says that Antony kept the ambassadors from 
the colonies at Alexandria during the winter ; rods mpéoPes . . . rods 

amo Tdv KAnpovxyiav. No previous mention of the departure of these 
ambassadors is found. It is probable that he kept them during the 
winter because the stormy season had then begun, and they doubtless 
started at the beginning of the autumn, 

|| Appian, B. C. v. 28. Dion, xlviii. 11, places this embassy before 
the judgment of Gabii. 

| Dion, xlviii. 13. I assume that Octavianus was actuated by this 
reason, but the history of this war is very obscure. 

Al B.C. 

The parody of 
the social war, 


approval of his partisans, he suddenly threw himself into Rome 
with a few troops, meeting with no opposition from Lepidus, 
who was a feeble character, and was possibly on bad terms 
with Octavianus.* Lucius reached the forum and delivered a 
great speech, in which he declared himself the supporter of the 
republican ideas so deeply cherished by the wealthy classes ; 
he said that he was fighting to destroy the triumvirate which 
had no reason for continuance after the defeat of Brutus and 
Cassius, and to re-establish the republic. He asserted that his 
brother, Mark Antony, was prepared to lay down his power, 
and would be content with a nomination as consul. Then he 
proclaimed Octavianus a public enemy.t On receiving the 
news of his surprise, Octavianus marched upon Rome with a con- 
siderable force, and Lucius, who was unable to offer resistance, 
left the city and returned to his army which was concentrated 
in some place unknown to us.{ In this strange and confused 
manner, the war began. Unfortunately, the accounts given 
by the historians of antiquity are so incomplete and obscure that 
I have been unable to evolve a comprehensible narrative. It 
can merely be said that at a certain moment, Lucius Antonius 
took the field with six new legions and advanced along the Via 
Cassia to meet Salvidienus, who was slowly returning from 
Gaul followed by Asinius and Ventidius. Agrippa, by clever 
manceuvres, was able to overthrow the calculations of Lucius, 
and forced him to retreat to Perugia about the end of the 
autumn, where Octavianus besieged him. Fulvia remained 
at Preneste and wrote to Ventidius, Asinius, and Calenus to 
hasten with their legions to the help of Lucius; she also 
attempted to precipitate the revolt among the Italian towns. 
The die was now cast. Lucius and Fulvia might well believe 
that the Italian towns would revolt and that Antony’s generals 
would no longer hesitate to make an end of Octavianus. 
Italy however, did not revolt, and Antony’s generals brought 
no support. ‘Tiberius Claudius Nero § made vain attempts in 

* Appian, B.C. v. 30; Dion, xlviii. 13. 

t Ibid. { Dion, xlviii. 13. 

§ Suet. T7b. 4 ; he asserts that Tiberius Claudius Nero was at Perugia, 
but this is refuted by Velleius, ii. 75. 


Campania to induce the landowners to take up arms, and even 
sought to raise the slaves ; equally unsuccessful were the attempts 
of Fulvia’s and Antony’s friends in Campania and elsewhere, to 
rouse the tearful protestations of the despoiled landowners 
and the empty republican aspirations of the wealthy classes to 
something like warlike fury. ‘Times had greatly changed since 
the social war; ease, culture, and so-called civilisation had 
refined these classes, but had also led to effeminacy ; they had 
forgotten how to wield arms, and thought more of commerce 
and of study than of war. After loud lamentations concerning 
the outrages which they had endured they preferred at the 
decisive moment to submit, rather than to risk what little wealth 
remained to them.* Amid the general apathy of the 
nation Lucius Antonius remained on the heights of Perugia 
as the solitary champion of a cause which attracted no sup- 
porters. ‘The beacon which he had lighted as the signal for 
insurrection throughout Italy burned slowly, faded and went 
out, without sending the fire of revolt from hill to hill and plain 
to plain. Agrippa, whom Octavianus had entrusted with the 
command of his army, constructed great entrenchments round 
Perugia during December and January and blockaded the 
town on either side, in spite of the vigorous and constant 
sorties made by Lucius ; he was able to starve Lucius out before 
the dreaded revolt broke out behind him. The war of Perugia 
was but a miserable parody of the social war. 

Though Italy did not rise in support of the turbulent demo- 
crat who had prematurely come forward as the leader of the 
conservatives, it did not seem likely that Antony’s generals 
with fourteen legions at their command (the eleven existing 
legions and the three new ones of Plancus) would allow their 
leader’s brother to be crushed by a little army of seven legions. 
Yet though the situation of Perugia became daily more critical 
during January and February, Calenus did not stir from Gaul ; 
Asinius, Ventidius, and Plancus approached the town, but 

* See Jullian, C. P. i. pp. 20-21, who justly points out that many 
historians have not realised the true meaning of this war. At the same 
time I am inclined to think that the resistance offered by Italy was not 

so great as he supposes ; in reality the country remained undisturbed. 
and very few outbreaks are noticed during the siege of Perugia. 

41 B.C. 


41 B.C. 


made no serious effort to liberate Lucius.* They were in a 
position, however, analogous to that of Octavianus and Hirtius 
under the walls of Modena when they came to relieve Decimus 
Brutus ; they were by no means sure of their soldiers, and did 
not know what construction would be placed upon this war ; 
they did not approve of the foolish policy of Lucius and Fulvia, 
who began the war for the purpose of depriving the veterans 
of their rewards at a moment when the fidelity of the legions 
was the sole basis of power. Under such circumstances Fulvia 
herself could not induce them to advance, nor would they have 
stirred for anybody but the conqueror of Philippi, who neither 
appeared in person, nor sent any instructions. While his 
brother and his army were starving within Perugia, Antony 
had spent the winter at Alexandria, after driving the petty 
chieftains out of Syria without difficulty ; he led an agreeable 
life of festivity and amusement within the royal palace, 
abandoned the insignia of a pro-consul, and wore Greek dress, 
as though he were a private individual, the guest and lover 
of the queen of Egypt.t ‘Thus the great danger vanished in a 
manner wholly unexpected. Lucius, who had exhausted 
his provisions, surrendered at the outset of March; 
Octavianus, anxious not to irritate Mark Antony, treated him 
kindly, gave him a safe conduct and pardoned his soldiers, 
inviting them to join his army. At the same time his fright 
and the danger he had run had greatly exasperated him, while 
the veterans were furious because the war had stopped the 
distribution of land. Octavianus, to satisfy the veterans, to 
terrorise Italy, and to secure final acquiescence in the supre- 
macy and the confiscations of the triumvirs, put to death the 
decurions of Perugia and some senators and knights who had 
been made prisoners in the town. Among them were Caius 
Flavius, the friend of Brutus, and Clodius Bithynicus. The 
town was promised to the soldiers for pillage, but a conflagra- 
tion, apparently accidental, destroyed it before they could 
begin the sack. ft 

* Appian, B. C. v. 33-35. 

TeeApplan, Bar yt. 

{ On the question of the ave perusing, an obscure and terrible 
episode, see Groebe, App. to Drumann, xii. p. 474 ff. 


By the irony of fate, during the conclusion of the year 41 
and the beginning of the year 40, Virgil was composing his 
Fourth Eclogue “ Upon the Golden Age” in honour of his 
friend Pollio, who was to be consul in the year 40, and to whom 
a son had just been born. In every time of storm and stress 
in a rising civilisation, there is a simultaneous rise of a desire 
for real knowledge, and of higher aspirations mystical in their 
nature. Certain ideas of the Stoics and Academics were then 
fashionable and seemed to harmonise with Etruscan super- 
stitions of long standing at Rome, and with the religious 
traditions of the Sibylline books, which stated that the world 
was to undergo a periodical rejuvenation. This “return of 
the Golden Age ” was a favourite subject of conversation, and 
the haruspex Volcatius had seen an omen of it in the comet 
which appeared at the games in honour of Cesar’s victory in 
44. Virgil made the birth of this child and the consulship of 
Pollio the occasion for using these vague philosophical and 
religious ideas as the subject of a melodious poem, predicting 
that this consulship would begin an era of peace, order and 
justice coincident with the child’s lifetime. Unfortunately, 
the poet’s prophecies were answered by the massacres and the 
burning of Perugia. 

The fall of the Roman aristocracy seemed inevitable and 
implied the fall of Italy and of her empire. Throughout the 
empire there existed but one organised force—the legions, or 
more properly, the horde of pillagers who continued to call 
themselves legions by force of habit. Their leaders, apparently 
the masters of the world, were in reality the slaves of these 
soldiers; under the reign of pillage and lawlessness, existing 
institutions decayed with appalling rapidity. Private and 
public wealth, law, tradition, and the constitutional machinery 
were alike disorganised ; literature alone continued to develop. 
Amid this vast confusion, poets and prose writers of admirable 
power began their work. Great poets, however, could neither 
unify nor govern an empire. One man alone began to think 
that something must be done to conclude this* disastrous 
situation and to check the universal dissolution. This was 
Antony, who is accused by ancient historians of having no 

4l B.C. 

Virgil’s Fourth 

The hopeless- 
ness of the 

Al B.C. 


thought after Philippi but for Cleopatra. He was studying 
the plans which Czsar had drawn up for his Parthian campaign, 
and which he had seized on the night of March 15; like 
Cesar, he told himself that only the conquest of Persia would 
provide him with sufficient wealth and reputation to dominate 
the situation upon his return. 


Egypt—Antony and Cleopatra—The Parthian invasion of 
Syria in the year 40 B.c.—Confusion in Italy after the fall of 
Perugia—Further violent action by Octavianus—Mecenas 
and Athenodorus of Tarsus—Antony in Greece—The marriage 
of Octavianus and Scribonia—The beginning of hostilities 
between Aniony and Octavianus—The treaty of Brundisium 
—The marriage of Antony and Octavia. 

Many historians have severely blamed the careless indifference Antony in 
which Antony displayed in remaining at Alexandria after the pe 
fall of Perugia; they assume that if he had then gone to Italy and 
taken command of his army, he could easily have overthrown 
Octavianus.* Historians, without exception, continue to relate 
the love-story of Antony and Cleopatra which is considered to 
begin with the interview at Tarsus, and describe his stay at 
Alexandria as a long series of reckless festivities, during which 
Antony devoted himself to pleasure and abandoned all else.t 
It must be observed, however, that the siege of Perugia began 
at the close of the autumn of 41, at which time navigation 
was suspended in the Mediterranean. Thus Antony did 
not learn of this event until the spring of 40, when the 
siege was already over. But it must be remembered that 
though he could not entirely abandon his nearest relatives, 
it was equally impossible for him to approve the reckless policy 
of his brother and his wife, who seemed to have forgotten that 
the popular party was now contained in the army and was, in 
fact, the army itself. Finally, while it is beyond doubt that 
Mark Antony during that winter plunged into the pleasures 
* Cp. Seeck, Kaiser Augustus, Bielefeld and Leipzig, 1902, p. 69. 

{ Cp. Plutarch, Ant. 28-29; Dion, xlvili. 27; Appian, B.C. v. 11. 

rh ae Kon 

Egypt: the 


of the vast and sumptuous palace of the Ptolemies, it is equally 
certain that his attention was occupied with more serious 
business, indeed with the gravest problem which could then 
confront the leader of the republic and the chief magistrate 
in the empire. If Cleopatra had invited him to Alexandria, 
her object was not merely to attract his fancy or to amuse 
him ; she also wished to repeat the proposal which she had 
probably made to Cesar four years before, when she came to 
Rome for that purpose. She offered him the possibility of 
becoming king of Egypt by marriage with herself. Doubtless 
Cleopatra used every means in her power to persuade Antony, 
but her project of marriage is not on that account to be re- 
garded as a mere attempt at seduction. The plan was based 
upon a highly ingenious policy, most creditable to Cleopatra’s 
intellectual power ; she hoped by this marriage to save Egypt 
from the common fate of the other Mediterranean peoples, 
the fate of servitude to Rome. Hitherto Egypt had been able 
to preserve its independence by pursuing an extremely adroit 
policy and buying its liberty in gold from the various parties 
who succeeded to power at Rome ; it was, however, impossible 
even at Alexandria to preserve any illusions upon this point 
for the future. The wealth of Egypt was too great not 
to arouse the cupidity of ruined Italy, while its government 
was too feeble and disorganised to offer any successful 

From the economic and intellectual point of view, Egypt 
was the only self-contained country in the ancient world ;_ her 
agriculture was prosperous, her manufactures flourishing, her 
commerce widely spread, her schools famous and her artistic 
life vigorous. From her fields, which were most fertile and 
admirably cultivated, was gathered all the flax which went to 
weave the sails upon the Mediterranean Sea; the country 
produced more grain than was required to feed her dense 
population, and much of it was exported. Egyptian manufac- 
tures were in the front rank of Mediterranean productions ; 
the numerous and clever artisans of Alexandria manufac- 
tured the most delicate fabrics, perfumes, glassware, papyrus 
and numbers of other articles, which were then exported by 


rich merchants to every country. Egypt was the country of 41 b.c. 
luxury and elegance ; it sent out everywhere, even to Italy, 
painters, decorators, stucco workers and anything which 
could contribute to the advance of luxury. It was a 
famous centre of learning and attracted students from the 
most distant countries in the world, even from Greece, who 
came to visit the schools of medicine, astronomy and literature, 
which were maintained at Alexandria by the royal government. 
Egyptian commerce was most widely spread and most lucrative ; 
not only did the country export its own productions in ex- 
change for the precious metals which it thus accumulated, 
but it also intercepted the greater part of the commerce with the 
far east, with India and China. 

Brilliant as is the picture of Egyptian wealth and culture, the The popula- 
conditions of social and political life were gloomy in the ex- “°™ 
treme. The old and glorious monarchy of the Ptolemies was 
in its last agony. Division of labour, the result of a high stage 
of civilisation, had been driven so far in Egypt as to quench 
every spark of social and national unity. ‘Trades, professions, 
families and individuals thought solely of their own interest 
and their own pleasure. Appalling selfishness and invincible 
indifference to anything but their own immediate concerns 
isolated social groups in every class, from the cultivators of 
wide estates, of crown property and royal domains, who 
lived in a subjection akin to slavery; from the free farmers 
whose industry was devoted merely to the increase of their 
private hoards; from the artisans and cosmopolitan plebs 
who were intelligent workmen, though turbulent and blood- 
thirsty, to the upper and wealthy classes who had settled in 
Egypt as the chief place of concourse upon the trade-routes of 
the world. These included the merchants and the rich land- 
owners who lived in marvellous luxury, regarding the court as 
the supreme model of refined taste, though they were in no 
sense a political or military aristocracy, and from indolence or 
pride allowed the eunuchs, freedmen, adventurers and strangers 
to monopolise the chief offices of State; the priestly caste 
which thought only of increasing its wealth and power; the 
bureaucracy, a numerous body well disciplined in theory but 

Ul Q 

AI B.C. 

The value of 
Egypt to 


in practice corrupt and rapacious, with little sense of duty; 
and finally the court, which opened its insatiable maw for 
wealth and treasure, wallowing in a welter of intrigue and 
crime and of petty dynastic revolutions, engineered by insigni- 
ficant factions, amid universal indifference, with iniquitous and 
vastly ingenious dexterity. Thus this decaying realm was at 
the same time torpid and in violent agitation. Magnificent 
were its schemes of administration, but even the Nile canals 
were allowed to fall into ruin; the members of this monarchy 
were worshipped as gods during their lives, while their dynasties 
were constantly overturned by palace revolutions which cut 
short their reigns and prevented any alleviation of the smallest 
political evils ; wealthy as the government was, it possessed no 
army and could only procure troops by recruiting slaves from 
other countries ; men of high culture and keen intelligence were 
numerous, but the country was unable to make head against 
Rome except by means of strange and complex intrigues.* 
By degrees its diplomacy had sunk so low as to offer its queen 
as the courtesan of the Roman proconsul. Cleopatra’s female 
government had many adversaries, especially among the upper 
class, for reasons which we do not know; possibly they were 
ashamed of her intrigues with Cesar and Antony, or were 
disgusted by her insatiable greed, her rapacious cruelty and by 
the incompetence of her favourites in office. t Feeling her 
existence threatened, she thought of saving herself and Egypt 
at the same time by an alliance with Rome and had attempted 
to secure this compact by a marriage with Cesar. When the 
plan failed she attempted to realise it by means of Antony; 
if he were king of Egypt and if the Egyptian government 
could use the Roman legions, the independence of Egypt 
and Cleopatra’s monarchy would be sheltered from all 

The weak point of this plan is not far to seek. Superficial 
as Antony may have been, he could not fail to perceive it. 

* See the fine study of C. Barbagallo, Le Relazioni politithe di Roma 
con l Egitto, Rome, 1901. 

+ Dion, li. 5 ; ro\Aods rv mporev, ate Kai det oi (Cleopatra) dyOopévar. 

This passage, though very short, is important and explains the whole 
policy of Cleopatra. 


The crisis in which the republic was struggling might place 
the guidance of the Roman empire for a few years in the hands 
of two or three military leaders; they might represent but 
they could not personify the State as could kings who reigned 
by dynastic right and therefore they could not conclude any 
alliance by marriage. A marriage between a proconsul and an 
eastern queen would have been regarded in Italy and by the 
soldiers as high treason or extraordinary foolishness. Not- 
withstanding this difficulty, Cleopatra’s plan had some chance 
of success, owing to the immediate difficulties of Antony’s 
situation and by reason of the new project which he had pro- 
posed, the conquest of Persia. Antony, to a much greater 
extent than Octavianus, was the pupil and political heir of Cesar. 
For the last six months of Cesar’s life, while Octavianus had 
been in Apollonia, Antony had been the most intimate of the 
dictator’s confidants at Rome; he had known his most 
secret thoughts and had seized his papers after his death, in- 
cluding the plans for the war which Cesar was preparing against 
Parthia. When the civil war was concluded and Antony found 
himself master of unusual opportunities, what could be more 
natural than the idea of resuming the great projects conceived 
by the dictator during the stormy twilight of his life, projects 
of which he, perhaps, was the only man who knew the details ? 
Among these projects, the Persian war necessarily seemed to 
him the most important. Cesar himself with all his genius 
and military reputation had thought it impossible to dominate 
the situation without some brilliant success in a foreign war ; 
how could Antony delude himself with the belief that he might 
succeed in a much more disastrous position? ‘The government 
of the triumvirs was utterly bankrupt in money and prestige. 
Nothing but the conquest of Persia, as Czsar had said, could 
provide his government with these necessary factors and make 
him the chief of the republic once and for all. Doubtless it 
was a difficult enterprise, but Casar, the greatest general of 
his age, had left a plan of campaign in which the details 
had been worked out, from the number of legions required to 
the route to be followed. Antony needed only to put this plan 
into practice with his wonted capacity and energy. ‘The proba- 

40 B.C. 

40 B.C, 

in Asia. 


bility of success might thus be reasonably regarded as high. 
In short, the greatest difficulty before the enterprise was the 
want of money, and precisely for this reason Cleopatra might 
hope for some partial success in her own plans. Egypt was still 
extremely rich and the royal family possessed the only great 
treasure of precious metals in the Mediterranean world, which 
Rome had not yet plundered. The alliance with Egypt, as 
proposed by Cleopatra, could provide Antony with the 
necessary means for executing Cesar’s great project. 
Cleopatra’s plan, however, was audacious and extraordi- 
nary in the extreme and it is not surprising that Antony 
could not be persuaded during that winter. An unforeseen 
event also disturbed negotiations during the spring of the 
year 40. As in the year 41 Italy had seen a parody of the 
social war, so Asia at the outset of 40 was troubled by a parody 
of the Mithridatic war. The petty princes of Syria whom 
Antony had driven out * together with Antigonus, whose 
claims to the throne of Palestine he had refused to support,t 
had arranged during the winter for an invasion of the Roman 
provinces with Parthian help; the Parthians were told that 
Syria and Asia would accord them a ready welcome, as they 
were terror-stricken by the enormous imposts with which 
Antony had overwhelmed them. ‘The son of Labienus had fled 
to the court of Ctesiphon after the battle of Philippi and 
proposed to command part of the Parthian army, following 
the example of the Italian exiles who had served in the army 
of Mithridates after the civil war.[ Antony was at Alexandria ; 
Syria was governed by Decimus Saxa and Asia by ‘Titus 
Munatius Plancus;§ these provinces were guarded only by 
the former garrisons of Cassius, which had recognised the new 
governor. A surprise might thus prove successful. In fact 
about the month of February, Antony was informed that an 
army under the orders of Labienus and Pacorus, the son of the 

* Appian, B.C. v. 10. t Josephus, A. J. XIV. xiii. 3. 

t Dion, xlviii. 24. 

§ Plancus, the Governor of Asia of whom Dion, xlviii. 24 speaks, 
cannot be Lucius, who perished in the war of Perugia. He must 
therefore be Titus, 


Parthian king, was invading Syria by way of Ctesiphon and 

Antony was thus obliged to abandon for the moment his 
magnificent dreams of an Asiatic empire and to leave Cleo- 
patra; he started from Alexandria at the beginning of March 
with a little fleet and sailed to Tyre, where he seems to have 
realised that strong reinforcements from Macedonia and Italy 
would be required to repel the invasion. He determined to 
abandon Syria to the enemy for the moment, to cross to Asia 
by way of Cyprus and Rhodes and thence to Greece; there he 
would gather a large army and return to the east to repel the 
Parthians. Upon his departure the little garrisons in the 
town, surprised as they were by superior forces, speedily 
surrendered. Decidius alone attempted to hold out at Apamea, 
but Labienus sought to seduce his soldiers, who were all of 
them former troops of Brutus and Cassius, and Decidius 
in fear of treachery soon fled to Antioch; Labienus on re- 
ceiving information of his flight, captured the little garrison 
and massacred it almost to a man; he then pursued Decidius 
to Antioch, besieged and captured the town and obliged his 
adversary to flee once more to Cilicia. Syria and Pheenicia 
were almost entirely in the power of the Parthians, with the 
exception of Tyre, where the Romans in the neighbourhood 
had taken refuge, as they had taken refuge at Chalcedon in 74 
when Mithridates was invading Bithynia. Pacorus, however, 
went to Palestine with part of his army, while Labienus ad- 
vanced with the remainder to the conquest of Cilicia.T 

* Plutarch, Ant. 30, says that Antony received the news from Syria 
and Italy simultaneously at Alexandria; Appian, v. 52, says, on the 
contrary, that he did not receive the news from Italy until he was already 
in Asia, probably at Ephesus. Appian’s version is the more probable ; 
in fact, Antony in Egypt could get news quicker from Syria than 
from Italy. On the other hand, the Parthian invasion had been 
prepared during the winter; thus he could receive timely information 
of it and start without delay, as the danger was serious. 

+ Cp. Dion, xlviii. 24-26. In xlviii. 25, he gives the real reason 
why Antony did not stay at Tyre; in Syria there were none but the 
former garrisons of Cassius, which were weak and scanty in number ; 
Antony’s legions were in Italy, Gaul, and Macedonia. However, after 
giving this plausible reason, Dion adds further absurd arguments, 

and persists in regarding Antony as a man whose love for Cleopatra 
deprived him of his senses, 

40 B.C. 

Antony sails 
or Asia. 

40 B.C. 

Events in 

Octavianus at 


At Ephesus Antony found messengers from Italy, who 
informed him of the siege of Perugia and of the appalling 
confusion into which his party had fallen after the capture of 
that town. The triumvir, already fully occupied by the 
Parthian war, was thus confronted by new and most serious 
difficulties. It seemed as if the edifice which he had reared 
with such toil at Philippi was about to crumble at a blow, 
though a few months before he had thought it secure against 
all the ravages of time. ‘The massacre of Perugia had terrified 
his friends and relatives, who were all in flight. Fulvia, es- 
corted by three thousand cavalry sent by her generals, had gone 
to take ship at Brundisium with the intention of sailing for 
Greece and awaiting Antony at Athens ; * Plancus had aban- 
doned his three legions and was in flight with Fulvia; his 
mother Julia had taken refuge with Sextus Pompeius, who had 
received her very kindly ; t Asinius Pollio had thrown himself 
into the delta of the Po with his army, where he proposed to 
remain on the defensive; { Ventidius Bassus seems to have 
been marching upon Brundisium.§ All were anxious to reach 
the shore in order to open communications with Antony ; 
many partisans of Fulvia and of Lucius had fled, some to 
Sextus Pompeius and others to Antony himself. ‘This latter 
included the son of Servilia, Marcus Junius Silanus and Tiberius 
Claudius Nero, who embarked secretly at Naples with his wife, a 
daughter of Livius Drusus who had killed himself at Philippi, 
and with a child little more than a year old, who by a strange 
caprice of fortune was afterwards to become the Emperor 

Octavianus remained the sole master of Italy, a cruel and 
terrible master, whose character seemed to grow worse day by 
day. In the prosecutions begun against the plebeians, freed- 

* Appian, B. C. vs 50. This flight could not have been very rapid, 
and hence we can understand how Fulvia and Antony met at Athens. 

t+ Appian, B. C. v. 52; Dion, xlviii. 15. 

+ Velleius, C. ii. 76. At this time the contributions of arms and 
money must have been imposed upon the Paduans, of which mention 
is made by Macrobius, I. xi. 21. I can hardly think, however, that 
Asinius had the seven legions which Velleius attributes to him. 

§ Appian, B. C. v. so. 
|| Velleius, ii. 75 ; Suetonius, Tiberius, 4. 


men and foreigners, he delivered sentences of torture, death and 
crucifixion with such readiness as to be nicknamed the execu- 
tioner ; * he frequented society of the lowest class and gambled 
desperately ; + he filled Rome with the scandal of his wild 
debauches, summoning to his house the fair matrons who caught 
his eye in the streets and forcing them to yield to his desires.} 
Morose and jealous of every one, notwithstanding his power, 
he would trust none of his supporters. He had begun to appre- 
ciate the cleverness of Agrippa and had made him pretor that 
year in spite of his youth, but Agrippa complained of his 
jealousy and was careful to give him no opening.§ The 
truth was that his triumph and the general disruption which 
followed it had stricken him with utter panic and fear made 
him cruel. Like every one else, he exaggerated Fulvia’s in- 
fluence over her husband and knew that she would urge Antony 
to vengeance. He knew that Antony was stronger than 
himself and possessed powerful armies and faithful friends. 
He was also aware that Sextus Pompeius was showering kind- 
ness upon the mother and supporters of Antony and this 
knowledge crowned his uneasiness by pointing to the possibility 
of a compact between Sextus and his colleague. He therefore 
attempted to defend himself by beginning a reign of terror, 
securing the fidelity of his soldiers by any means, regardless of 
consequences and hatching the most perfidious intrigues. He 
began by handing over Italy to the veterans. As if the dread- 
ful massacre of Perugia had not satiated his cruelty, he con- 
fiscated almost the entire territory of Norcia, because the 
citizens had raised a monument to those who had died in the 
defence of the town with an inscription saying that they had 
died for liberty, and thus marking the regret with which the 
Italian middle class looked back upon the old republic.|| He 
founded colonies with all possible speed, distributed bounties 
to all Cesar’s veterans and replaced Asinius Pollio by Alfenus 
Varus in Cisalpine Gaul. He now did his utmost to seduce the 

* Suetonius, Aug. 70; Seneca, De clem. 1. x. 4: im adulescentia 
caluit, avsit iva. 7 Suet. Aug. 70. 

{ Dion, lvi. 43; Zonaras, x. 38 (544). 

§ Cp. Dion, xlix. 4. || Dion, xlviii. 13; Suet. Aug. 12. 

40 B.C. 

40 B.C. 


legions of Antony from their fidelity. Agrippa had been able 
to induce two of the legions abandoned by Plancus to join 
him, but the cavalry had gone to Sextus Pompeius and a third 
legion had rejoined Ventidius.* It seems that Octavianus made 
an effort to corrupt Calenus, Ventidius and Asinius under 
cover of an attempt to conclude peace; +t he was, however, 
unsuccessful, for no one would trust him and Antony’s prestige 
was far greater. However, Antony was rapidly approaching 
Greece, where Fulvia was to meet him. The imminent arrival 
of his colleague caused him the utmost anxiety and at the end 
of May he applied to the mother of Sextus, the Mucia whom 
Pompey the Great had divorced on his return from the east 
for her suspected adultery with Cesar; he was anxious to secure 
her intervention with her son on his own behalf.[ He was 

* Appian, B. C. v. 50. t Ibid. v. 50-51. 

t The chronology of these intrigues is very obscure; I have at- 
tempted to restore it, starting from the only precise date, which is 
given us by Dion, xlviii. 20. This passage affirms that Octavianus 
started for Gaul at such a moment that Sextus, with a knowledge 
of his movements, was able to prepare an attack upon the Italian 
coast at the time of the Apollinarian Games, which was about the 
middle of July. This implies that Octavianus started in the second half 
of June. Dion, xlvili. 20,says that Octavianus started when he knew 
that his efforts with Sextus had failed, and they therefore must have been 
made in April or May. The overtures to which Dion alludes (xlviii. 20) 
are those which he has mentioned before (xlvili. 16)—that is to say, 
those which Mucia was asked to undertake; they seem to have been 
made at the moment of Scribonia’s marriage and, like this marriage, 
to have been the outcome of the alliance proposed by Sextus to Antony. 
Appian, B. C. v. 53, relates events somewhat differently ; he says that 
Octavianus learnt of the alliance proposed by Sextus to Antony on his 
return from Gaul, and it is after this return that he places the nego- 
tiations for the marriage without speaking of Mucia. Appian’s chrono- 
logy may be exact, for this marriage cannot possibly have been the 
object of the negotiations in May; these negotiations failed, as Dion 
himself states,so that at the end of June Octavianus knew that Sextus 
was preparing an attack upon the Italian coasts, and he would not 
then have celebrated a marriage which was perfectly useless. The 
negotiations must therefore have taken place at a later time. The 
contradiction, however, can be harmonised if we do not confuse 
the intervention of Mucia with the negotiations for the marriage, as 
Dion has done, xlviii. 16. In the monthof May Octavianus sent Mucia 
to Sextus to bring about a peace, but without result; in the month 
of June he went to Gaul, where he remained throughout July ; when 
he returned in August, he learnt of the negotiations between Sextus 
and Antony, and attempted to impede them by this marriage pro- 
posal. This hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that Appian speaks 
of these marriage negotiations without mentioning Mucia. 


thus willing to conclude an alliance with Pompeius rather 
than to humiliate himself before Antony and Fulvia. A 
monster incarnate, with all the hideous vices of a tyrant, 
cruelty, pride, luxury and treachery, Octavianus was the abomi- 
nation of Italy. Strange as the fact may seem in the case of a 
tyrant, he had some true friends, including his master Atheno- 
dorus of Tarsus and a certain Mecenas, descended from an old 
royal family of Etruria ; we do not know how Octavianus made 
his acquaintance. He kept these men about his person and was 
willing to listen to their advice. What is still more extra- 
ordinary in the case of a tyrant, he would listen patiently to 
their remonstrances, would sometimes recognise his faults and 
promise amendment.* Was this perversity the result of a 
nature incredibly bad, or was it merely the ebullition of a 
sickly youth, spoiled by power and hardened by hatred and 
fear? ‘This was the great problem which the future was to 

40 B.C, 

Octavianus was not anxious for war, but he did not wish to Antony in 

humble himself before Fulvia and Antony or to display any 
weakness to the gaze of the Italian public; he therefore pre- 
cipitated war as the best means of defence. In the second 
half of June he had learnt that Mucia had been unsuccessful in 
her attempt to secure the support of Sextus Pompeius and that 
the latter, emboldened by the increase of his forces and en- 
couraged by the exiles, was preparing to devastate the coasts 
of Italy; t he also learnt at the same time that Calenus had died 
in Gaul and that his young son had taken command of the 
eleven legions. He made a bold effort to extricate himself 
from the difficulties of this situation by entrusting Agrippa 
with the defence of Italy against Sextus and by going himself 
to Gaul for the purpose of seducing the legions of Calenus ; f 

* Dion, lv. 7; lvi. 43; Zonaras, x. 38 (544). These facts must 
belong to the first half of his life, for they are too discrepant with 
the moderation which Octavianus showed when he had taken the title 
of Augustus. t Dion, xlviii. 20. 

{ With reference to the departure of Octavianus, see Dion, xlviii. 20. 
Appian, B. C. v. 51, tells us that he left Rome after learning of the 
death of Calenus, which is likely enough. Dion, xlviii. 20, when he 
states that Octavianus had already attempted to seduce the army, 
is alluding to some previous vague attempts at corruption, which 


40 B.C. 


he hoped to find little difficulty in withdrawing their allegiance 
from their new leader, in which case the addition to his forces 
would counterbalance the probable alliance of Sextus and 
Antony. About this moment, shortly after the departure of 
Octavianus from Rome, Antony arrived at Athens, where his 
meeting with Fulvia took place; it was generally feared that 
this meeting would mark the commencement of the war. 
Antony, however, was no more anxious for war than Octavianus, 
for the situation in the east had grown far too critical. Cleo- 
patra’s empire was at present out of the question. lLabienus 
had invaded Cilicia and Asia, had killed Decidius Saxa and 
seized without difficulty all the towns with the exception of 
Stratonicea, Mylasa and Alabanda,* driving the governor to 
take refuge in the islands.t Hence, whatever the indignation of 
Antony with Octavianus, this eastern province which seemed 
likely to slip from his grasp, monopolised his attention for the 
moment. He seems to have reproached Fulvia bitterly for her 
foolishness [ and while awaiting the return of Octavianus from 
Gaul,§ he strove to reconcentrate his forces to be ready for any 
event, but yielded in no respect to the instigations of Fulvia 
and of the numerous enemies of his colleague. About the 
month of July his aged mother arrived at Athens ; she had been 
sent to him by Sextus with an escort of leading men, including 
the proscribed Caius Sentius Saturninus and Lucius Scribonius 
Libo ; this embassy came to propose a definite alliance between 
Sextus Pompeius and Antony against Octavianus. Resolved not 
to provoke war and not to run the danger of any surprise without 
full preparation, Antony replied that he was grateful to Sextus 
for his proposal and would be ready to join him if Octavianus did 
not keep the promises he had made at Philippi; if, however, 

Octavianus had made. When these failed, Octavianus went to the 
legions as soon as he heard of the death of Calenus. 

* Dion, xlviii. 26. On the subject of Mylasa, see the letter from 
Octavianus, which has been recovered from an inscription: Lebas 
Waddington, 3, Asie Minewre, 441. 

t Dion, xliii, 26. t Cp, Appian, B.C. v. 52: 

§ If we suppose that Antony arrived in Greece while Octavianus was 
on the road to Gaul, we have a clear reason for the absence of any 
trace of negotiations between Octavianus and Antony. Antony was 
awaiting the returnof Octavianus, and when he came back negotiations 
were impossible, as the revolt of the legions in Gaul was well known. 


Octavianus should observe his compact, he would do his best to 40 B.C. 
reconcile Sextus with his colleague.* 

Antony and Octavianus were thus suspiciously watching one Octavianus 
another ; neither was anxious for war but on the other hand ?**? ap ae 
neither would take the first steps to peace. Such a situation marriage. 
could not possibly continue. Octavianus had successfully se- 
duced the legions of Calenus in Gaul and after placing them 
under the command of Salvidienus, he returned to Rome at 
the end of July or the beginning of August in a state of great 
anxiety and fear. He wondered whether the revolt of Antony’s 
legions would be of real advantage to him, whether it would not 
provoke war and whether these troops would remain faithful. 

When he reached Rome he was able to gather fuller information 
of the negotiations between Antony and Sextus, though he 
could not be certain whether an alliance had been concluded 
or not. Sextus had begun to harry the coasts of Italy, but 
Octavianus did not know whether he was acting on his own 
initiative or in concert with Antony. However, to hamper the 
alliance which was in any case possible, he sent Mecenas to 
Lucius Scribonius Libo, the father-in-law of Sextus and, by 
reason of his long standing friendship with his father, his most 
influential adviser. He was commissioned to ask the hand of 
his sister Scribonia in marriage ; she seems to have been older 
than Octavianus and had already been the wife of two former 
consuls.t Scribonius, in high delight, immediately wrote to 
Rome, saying that so admirable a marriage should be celebrated 
without delay; the triumvir, who felt certain of Antony’s 
hostility, after the treachery of the legions, hurried on the 
marriage, which probably took place in the month of August 
and excited the derision of all Rome. At the same time 
Octavianus made efforts to persuade the veterans that Antony’s 
alliance with Sextus was designed for the sole purpose of re- 
storing to their former owners the lands which had been assigned 
to the troops ; t he also attempted to secure a reconciliation 
with Lucius Antonius, whom he made governor of Spain.§ 

*vAppian, Bs Co v.52: 
+ Appian, B. C. v. 53; fSuetonius, Aug. 62. 
PeAppiany Ba Gy Va 53. § Appian, B. G: vw: 54: 

40 B.C. 

The outbreak 
of hostilities. 


Lucius accepted; but from that moment he disappears ; he 
probably died shortly afterwards, though whether by a natural 
death we cannot say. 

On this occasion Octavianus was not mistaken. When it was 
known in Greece that Cesar’s son had deprived his colleague of 
his best army, Fulvia and the war party gained the upper 
hand.* Antony immediately assumed the offensive; he 
embarked some of the Macedonian legions upon the vessels 
which he had found in Asia and prepared to attack Italy. At 
this critical moment help came from another quarter. From 
his refuge in the delta of the Po, Asinius Pollio had opened 
negotiations with Domitius Ahenobarbus, the wandering 
master of the Adriatic, whose transitory kingdom was bounded 
by the planks of his vessels; Asinius had persuaded him to 
attempt to secure peace with Antony. The proposals of 
Domitius arrived most opportunely, as Antony required ships ; 
he therefore accepted, forgetting that Domitius was one of the 
conspirators condemned by the Lex Pedia ; t with this rein- 
forcement of vessels and with the two legions which Domitius 
commanded, he started in the month of September, after leav- 
ing Fulvia at Sicyon and writing to Sextus Pompeius to accept 
his alliance. Military operations soon began upon the two 
coasts. Antony seized Sipontum and proceeded to besiege 
Brundisium. Sextus disembarked a body of troops on the 
shore of Lucania and besieged Cosenza; he sent another body 
to attack Thurii in the Gulf of Tarentum and sent a fleet with 
four legions under the orders of his freedman, Menodorus or 
Menas, to attempt the conquest of Sardinia.t Octavianus 
replied by sending Agrippa to recapture Sipontum ; he started 
in person to relieve Brundisium and ordered P. Servilius Rullus 
to concentrate the remaining forces and to follow him.§ 

* No historian states that the revolt of the legions in Gaul was the 
cause of hostilities ; but there seems to be no other reason which could 
have induced Antony to abandon his waiting attitude. On the other 
hand, this reason is enough to account for his action. There is an 
allusion to it in the negotiations for peace as summarised by Appian, 
B. C. v. 60. Such is also the opinion of Ciccotti, A. p. 6. 

t+ Appian, B. C. v. 55; Velleius, ii. 76. 

{ Appian, B.C. v. 56. 

§ Dion, xlviliz 28 ; Appian, B, C. v. 57-58. 



However, Octavianus speedily perceived that his greatest 
difficulty in this war, as in the wars of Modena and Perugia, 
arose from the reluctance of the soldiers, who persistently 
demanded harmony between Octavianus and Antony and were 
reluctant to take up arms against the conqueror of Philippi. 
Agrippa had made a vain attempt to enlist the veterans to 
whom lands had been assigned in southern Italy ; Octavianus 
on his journey to Brundisium had persuaded many veterans to 
follow him ; but they obeyed only in the hope that they would 
induce him to conclude peace ; * Sipontum had been recovered 
by Agrippa, but Servilius was surprised by Antony near 
Brundisium ; he had been defeated and abandoned by nearly 
all his soldiers,t while Czsar’s troops were constantly exposed 
to the maledictions and reproaches of Antony’s force under 
the walls of Brundisium.{[ More serious yet was the fact that 
Salvidienus had, it seems, begun negotiations with Antony with 
the object of returning to him the army which Octavius had 
taken from him, as it appeared impossible to preserve the loyalty 
of the troops to their new master. With an army so little 
inclined for conflict it was difficult for Octavianus to begin 
vigorous action; if the triumvirs were the masters of the 
empire, they were also the slaves of the legions. On the other 
hand Antony was preparing to bring up reinforcements from 
Macedonia; Sextus Pompeius had successfully seized Sardinia 
and had won over the two legions of Octavianus.§ ‘Thus the 
situation began to seem desperate. 

Octavianus would gladly have begun negotiations, but neither 
he nor Antony was willing to take the first steps. Some 

40 B.C. 

Reluctance of 
the army. 

The death 
of Fulvia: 

intermediary was required, but no one would venture to begun. 

assume this office, for the fear which Fulvia inspired was 
excessive. By a strange chance, néws arrived in the midst of 
these difficulties that Fulvia_had_ died at Sicyon.|| One of 
Antony’s friends who was then with him, Lucius Cocceius, 
was bold enough to begin the task of restoring peace between 
Octavianus and Antony. He first visited Octavianus, went back 

* Appian, B: C. v.57. 

t Dion, xlviii. 28 ; Appian, B. C. v. 58. 

ft Appian, B.C. v. 59. § Lbid. 

|| Dion, xlviii. 28 ; Appian, B. C. v. §9; Plutarch, Ant. 30. 

40 B.C. 

The treaty of 


to Antony and again returned to Octavianus, drawing by degrees 
from either side justifications of past actions, proposals and 
answers. Octavianus commissioned him to tell Antony that he 
had been anxious to serve his interests in withdrawing the 
legions of Calenus, as he did not wish to leave a young man in 
charge of troops which Sextus Pompeius might have attracted 
to himself ; * Antony on his side requested him to tell Octavianus 
that he recognised the wrongfulness of Fulvia’s actions. T 
While Cocceius was discussing with Antony and with Octavianus, 
the soldiers were making great demonstrations in favour of 
peace. { It was impossible to resist their desires. Antony 
despatched Domitius to Bithynia and sent written orders to 
Sextus Pompeius to withdraw to Sicily ; § it was then possible 
to arrange for the discussion of a new agreement to be nego- 
tiated, not by the two triumvirs themselves but by Asinius 
Pollio and Mecenas, the first representing Antony and the 
latter Octavianus. || 

Thus, during the autumn of the year 40 an entirely new 
agreement was concluded at Brundisium. It was a new 
division of the Roman empire, including upon this occasion 
the eastern provinces, which had not been mentioned at 
Philippi. Octavianus was to have all the European provinces 
including Dalmatia, Illyria and therefore Gallia Narbonensis 
and Transalpine Gaul, which had formerly belonged to Antony. 
Antony received all the eastern provinces, Macedonia, Greece, 
Bithynia, Asia, Syria and Cyrene. Africa alone was left for 
Lepidus.41 Octavianus handed over the legions of Calenus to 
Antony,** but he received the two legions which Antony owed 
him, the three which Lepidus had not yet given, and retained 
the three which Plancus had just recruited. Thus he had an 
army of sixteen legions, as Sextus had taken two from him ; 

* Appian, B: C, v. 60-63, + Plutarch, Ant. 30: 

t Appian, B. C. v. 63. § Ibid. 

|| Appian, B. C. v. 64. 

4] Appian, B. C. v.65 ; Dion, xlviii. 28 ; Plutarch, Ant. 30. 

** Appian, B.C. v. 66; but the reason he gives is not accurate. 
Octavianus restored the army of Gaul, not because he suspected its 
loyalty, but because the stipulation formed part of the convention of 
Brundisium. It is impossible to suppose that Antony would have 
made peace if Octavianus had declined to restore his army. 


Antony retained the two legions of Domitius, thus raising his 
forces to nineteen legions and reserved the right to raise levies 
in Italy ;* Lepidus had the six legions recently recruited by 
Lucius Antonius. Sextus Pompeius was abandoned by Antony 
and Octavianus could begin war upon him without delay. 

In this convention, the importance of which has been 
strangely disregarded by historians, we may see the first conse- 
quences of Cleopatra’s intrigues. A year previously, after the 
battle of Philippi, Antony had claimed his share in the govern- 
ment of Italy and had required part of the country for himself ; 
now he was ready to leave Italy, the barbarous and poverty- 
stricken province of the west, to his colleague, taking for himself 
that part of the empire of which Egypt might be considered 
the centre, the rich and civilised eastern provinces and Cyrene, 
which was the best province of Africa. ‘This change of view was 
certainly the result of the discussions at the court of Alexandria. 
The outward splendour of Egyptian decadence had persuaded 
Antony, as it had persuaded Cesar towards the close of his 
life, that Europe, including Italy, was a poor and barbarous con- 
tinent, which could never be rich; since he could not have the 
whole of the Roman Empire, he would take the east and regard 
Egypt as its vital part. As master of Egypt, commanding Italian 
soldiers and eastern gold, he might complete the conquest of 
Persia and become the most powerful of men. He was obliged, 
however to abandon part of this proposal for the moment, 
namely his designs upon the realm of the Ptolemies, the com- 
mand of the Nile and the marriage with Cleopatra, who had just 
presented him withason. Fulvia’s death had been opportune 
but the troops invariably believed in the efficacy of marriage as 
a guarantee for peace, and, to confirm the recent compact, had a 
new marriage in view for him. Antony must agree to marry 
Octavia, the sister of Octavianus, who had been a widow for 
some months and had one young son; ft he was to amend his 

* Appian, B. C. v. 93. 

+ Weichert, Imp. C. Aug. scr. vel., p. 118, n. 13, and Moll, Zur 
Genealogie des Jul. Claud-Kaiserh., pp. 9-10, assert that Octavia who 
married Antony was the elder of the two sisters of Octavianus, and had 
been the wife of the consul Marcellus, in the year 49. Drumann, 
G. R. iv. 235, n. 83, says, on the contrary, that she was the younger. 
An inscription discovered at Pergamum (Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen 

40 B.C. 

of the treaty. 

40 B.C. 

The separa- 
tion of East 
and West. 


mode of life, to cease to live as an Asiatic monarch surrounded 
by concubines and eunuchs, and to become the pater famulias of 
Latin tradition, the husband of a simple Roman matron. 
Cleopatra, however, had introduced many clever and cunning 
Egyptians among Antony’s servants, who doubtless sent full 
information of all that he was doing or proposed to do, and 
also worked patiently upon the triumvir’s uneasy mind to retain 
his favour towards their queen and her projects.* Cleopatra, 
even from a distance, was stubbornly ‘working to change 
Octavia’s husband into an oriental monarch. 

In any case, this marriage shows that Antony had been 
induced to spend the preceding winter at Alexandria rather by 
his political plans than by his love for Cleopatra. When events 
obliged a temporary change of purpose, he did not hesitate to 
marry Octavia instead of Cleopatra. From another point of 
view however, the treaty of Brundisium is of far greater 
importance; it shows that the empire was menaced by other 
forces of dissolution than those of revolution and anarchy, by 
the antagonism between east and west. ‘This treaty, in short, 
anticipated by three centuries that division of the Roman 
world into the eastern and western empires which was finally 
accomplished in the reign of Diocletian ; a few strokes of the 
pen despoiled Italy of vast domains in the conquest of which she 
had spent two centuries. For two hundred years Italy had 
been living upon eastern plunder and whenever the delivery 
of these eastern tributes had been interrupted, she had 
experienced the utmost inconvenience, and was still suffering 
from that cause. What would be the state of affairs if these 
revenues, instead of reaching Rome, were intercepted at Athens 
where Antony proposed to establish his capital, until he could 
fix it at Alexandria. Great would be the disturbance and ruin 
of the economic system established for more than a century, if 
these revenues were expended in the east instead of in Italy and 

von Pergamon, 1880-1881, pp. 50-51), which refers toa certain Octavia, 
the sister of Octavianus, the wife of Sextus Apuleius, shows that the wife 
of Marcellus was not the elder, and that consequently Antony’s wife was 
the younger. Cp. Gardthausen, Augustus und seine Zeit, ii. 102, 

* Cp. in Plutarch, Ant. xxxiii., the anecdote of the Egyptian Diviner, 


Europe. Yet this profound revolution was a necessary conse- 40 B.c, 
quence of the great proposal for the conquest of Persia. It was 
obvious that if so vast an enterprise in the interior of Asia 
were to have any hope of success, the centre of the empire 
must be shifted eastward, the more so for the reason that Italy 
was now almost ruined and unable to offer any financial support 
to so great an undertaking. The Italian public had in any case 
divined that the conquest of Persia, following upon that of 
Pontus and Syria, would disturb the equilibrium of the pro- 
vinces to the eventual advantage of the east ; rumours had been 
in circulation that Cesar desired to transfer the capital to the 
east, to Ilium or to Alexandria, and these were but the ex- 
pression of apprehensions aroused by an obvious danger. The 
nature of this danger had hitherto been vague, but the compact 
of Brundisium defined it more clearly ; Antony was about to 
carry eastward the centre of his political and military activity 
and would retain but one feeble tie with Italy, the right of 
recruiting. Was it likely that Italy, which had been the head 
of the Roman power, would now consent to become one arm 
and to fight in defence of an empire, the best fruits of which 
were withheld from her? Antony’s enthusiasm for the 
Persian war steadily increased; he was carried away by his 
success, by his natural audacity and by the immense power 
which he was able to wield, thanks to the prevailing confusion ; 
he cast aside his hesitation and plunged recklessly into the 
dangers of the future. 

Italy made no effort at resistance. ‘The country had been Virgi’s Fifth 
overwhelmed by too many misfortunes. Disaster struck ®loste- 
every place and person, even the poet who sang the coming of 
the golden age. Averting his gaze from the dreadful realities 
about him to lose himself in the poetic contemplation of an 
ideal world, Virgil had written his Fifth Eclogue in that year as 
a continuation to the prophecies of the Fourth; it was an 
idyll of pure and tender imaginative power, full of exquisite 
country scenes and mystical longings, but marked by deep 
sadness, representing two shepherds who bewailed the death 
of Daphnis, the hero of country life, and sang his apotheosis. 
Stern reality, however, soon changed the poet’s dreams, 

Iil R 

40 B.C 


Alfenus Varus, unable to resist the avaricious demands of tf 
veterans, had been obliged to share among them the territory « 
Cremona as well as that of Mantua, and the small estate which 
Virgil had inherited from his ancestors was thus confiscated. 
The poet had appealed to Alfenus, who was his friend and who 
asked to be immortalised in poetry as Pollio had been; but he 
could obtain no redress: the veterans were the masters of 
Italy. Virgil was obliged to take refuge at Rome in the house 
of his old teacher of philosophy, Siro. 


The economic consequences of the civil war—Universal dis- 
content in Italy—Apathy of public opinion—The young 
Horace at Rome—The first popular revolt against the trium- 
virate—The popularity of Sextus Pompeius—Further em- 
barrassments of the triumvirate—Virgil introduces Horace 
to Mecenas—Sextus Pompeius master of Sicily—The treaty of 

As soon as peace was concluded Antony turned his attention Antony's 
to those of his provinces which the Parthians had invaded. eee 
He appointed Cnzus Domitius Ahenobarbus governor of ofpeace. 
Bithynia, L. Munatius Plancus governor of Asia, P. Ventidius 
Bassus governor of Syria ; he gave them such military forces as 
were then available at Brundisium and in Macedonia and bade 
them strain every effort for the liberation of the invaded 
provinces. * He then arranged for the transference to the 
east of the legions which he had in Europe and ordered Asinius 
Pollio to concentrate them in the valley of the Po and to march 
by way of Venice, Istria, Dalmatia, Illyria and Epirus to Mace- 
donia, of which province Asinius was to be governor in the 
year 39. Great festivals were then celebrated which 
showed how far Antony had yielded to eastern influences 
in the last two years. It was the general opinion that he had 
become an Asiatic in taste and dress. [ These festivities, 
however, were speedily disturbed. ‘The soldiers imagined that 
* Dion, xlviii. 39; Appian, B. C. v. 65; Plutarch, Ant. 33. Cp. 
Ganter, Die Provinzialverwaltung der Triumvirt, Strasburg, 1892, pp. 37 
a is we must interpret Servius, ad Virg., Ecl. iv.; 

Ecl. viii. 6-7. Cp. Ganter, P. V., p. 71. 4 
+ Dion, xlviii. 30. 

and ad Virg., 


40 B.C. 

results of the 
civil war. 


Antony had returned from the east loaded with gold and 
considered that the moment was favourable to claim the sums 
promised before Philippi and their arrears of pay. Antony, 
however, had been able to collect but very little money during 
the preceding year in the east, which had been already squeezed 
dry by Brutus and Cassius ; he therefore made excuses to the 
soldiers, telling them that it was impossible to accede to their 
demands; the soldiers declined to believe him and a revolt 
broke out. Antony and Octavianus could only calm the disturb- 
ance by fresh promises and by granting discharges and lands in 
Italy to those soldiers who had been longest under arms.* 
This revolt is a further proof of the fact that the loyalty of 
the armies was most precarious amid the general collapse of all 
tradition and all authority. Yet upon this unique foundation 
the power of the triumvirs rested. Apart from the armies, the 
triumvirs had alienated the sympathy of every class within the 
last three years, although, as in many other revolutions in 
ancient history, this civil war had allowed the middle and lower 
classes to seize the property of the aristocracy and plutocracy 
and to divide it. Czsar’s fortune and the fortunes of all the 
revolution leaders in the two parties from Decimus and Marcus 
Brutus to Octavianus himself, had been expended in paying 
soldiers, officers, spies and agents of every kind, who almost 
invariably belonged to the poor and middle classes. The 
fortunes of the greatest personages in Rome, such as Pompey, 
Lucullus and Varro, of the two thousand richest knights in 
Italy, had been partially or wholly confiscated and divided 
among ¢ribunt militum, centurions, soldiers and adventurers. 
Great profits had also been made by armourers, merchants 
of metals and military equipment, keepers of the taberne 
deversori@, the smoky inns on the high roads constantly fre- 
quented by soldiers, messengers, couriers, ambassadors, fugitive 
landowners, beggars and adventurers on the road to Rome; 
many had acquired wealth on these same roads who faciebant 
vecturam, or provided travellers with carriages, drivers and 
horses.t Moreover the prosecution of so many usurers, and 

* Dion, xlviii. 30. 
1 Cp. Varro, Re Rv aera seis: 


the confiscation of so much land, had annulled, in practice if 
not in law, a large number of debts and mortgages ; the repub- 
lic, or in other words the triumvirs who represented the credi- 
tors, had no time to call in or to examine the piles of syngraphe, 
and confiscated lands were sold or assigned to the new holders 
free of charges and of debt. The senatorial and equestrian 
orders had thus been impoverished; knights and senators 
became gladiators to gain a livelihood,* while the municipal 
middle classes, which had been increasing for forty years in 
wealth and power were swelled by disbanded veterans and 
by all who had succeeded in amassing a little wealth and buying 
some land or slaves amid these upheavals. In a word there 
were many who gained as well as many who lost in this, as in all 

At the same time discontent seemed to be universal for the 
reason that the number which had profited was insignificant in 
comparison with the victims of disaster. The poorer classes 
of Italy and of Rome, infuriated by Casar’s assassination, in- 
flamed by the wish for vengeance and inspired by chimerical 
hopes, had favoured the popular party in the years 44 and 43. 
But the triumphs had remained with the soldiers alone, and 
the poor freedmen, the artisans, the small merchants and land- 
owners had been bitterly undeceived. Not only had crushing 
taxation been imposed upon Italy to pay the troops, but all 
public works had been suspended ; the upkeep of sacred and 
secular buildings had been neglected, and these were falling 
into ruin, as were the high roads under the incessant trathc of 
armies; thus numerous artisans and small contractors were 
deprived of their daily bread. Many a merchant had been 
ruined by the confiscations of ships to provide the fleets of the 
triumvirs and of Sextus. The extermination of so many 
wealthy families destroyed certain branches of commerce and 
trade which had been very flourishing. ‘The stucco-workers, 
sculptors, painters, sellers of purple or perfumes and the anti- 
quaries were either struggling with debt or were bankrupt ; 
the heavy contributions extorted by the triumvirs had wiped 
out numbers of small landowners throughout Italy, who had 

* Cp. Dion, xlviii. 33; xlviii. 43. 

40 B.C. 


40 B.C. 

The movement 
to the towns. 

apathy and 


been deprived of their lands because they could not pay or 
borrow. Not only the aristocracy and plutocracy but also the 
small yeoman class was sacrificed to the greed of that middle- 
class section represented by the soldiers and politicians of the 
triumphant faction. 

In consequence the towns, and Rome in particular, were 
thronged by ruined farmers, bankrupt merchants, artisans 
and freedmen without work, who had been unable to enlist 
and were too timid to join the brigands who infested the whole 
of Italy ; to these were added the learned freedmen of the 
great families now extinct, including a large number of 
Pompey’s freedmen ; they were now reduced to living upon 
the savings they had made in happier times, for the new 
holders of wealthy estates did not know what to do with 
these learned men or with their rights of patronage over them. 
To the towns also came many young men, sons of Italian land- 
owners, who had studied philosophy and rhetoric, had been 
stranded in the general disorders at Rome and left behind by 
the throng pressing forward on the narrow road to fortune. 
Tinally, every one was suffering from the scarcity of money and 
the general depreciation of all securities. Those even who 
enlisted and were able to serve the triumvirs were often ill 
satisfied ; of their pay and promised rewards they received 
but small instalments, and those who had been able to seize 
fields or houses during the revolutions had no money; ex- 
pensive luxuries were therefore out of the question and they 
were forced to live quietly at Rome. Nor was any one certain 
of his ability to keep what he held. If it be asked what the 
triumvirs had done with their almighty powers during the 
last three years, the answer is that they had distributed lands 
to some three thousand veterans and that this, their sole 
achievement, had brought not the smallest advantage to the 
great mass of the people. 

Throughout Italy public feeling cherished a violent though 
secret indignation; the fire, however, smouldered beneath 
the ashes, for all were afraid. Antony’s power seemed infinite 
and Octavianus was said to have put to death or to have 
treated with appalling cruelty those whom. he suspected of 


opposition.* Courage was thus crushed beneath terror and such 
sparks of energy as remained were quenched by the struggle for 
existence in the majority of cases. The growing insolence of the 
soldiers increased the cowardice of those members of the middle 
and cultured classes who clung in any way to what they still 
possessed : all hope of overthrowing the tyranny of the armies 
and their leaders seemed lost and men swallowed their anger 
and prepared to make the best of the situation. The partition 
of the empire, which had deprived Italy of the fairest half of her 
conquests, does not seem to have aroused any public indig- 
nation but to have been regarded as a matter of little importance. 
Virgil himself, notwithstanding the loftiness of his intellect, 
had been unable to resist the solicitations of Alfenus Varus, 
who wished to be immortalised by his poetry after depriving 
him of his estate ; in the house of his old master, Siro, Virgil 
had felt a renewal of his youthful passion for philosophy and 
of his admiration for Lucretius and dedicated to Varus the 
Sixth or philosophical Eclogue which he then composed. This 
was a summary, presented under the form of a Greek fable 
about Silenus, of the Epicurean theory of the origin of the 
world, and the poet thus stirred the reeds of Theocritus with 
a breath of Lucretian poetry. 

40 B.C. 

The generality of persons bore their sufferings as best they Signs of 

could, careless of the condition of others and following their 
respective destinies. Some sought oblivion in sensual pleasures 
and spent their time and money upon sumptuous banquets, 
courtesans and boys; others devoted themselves to study and 
philosophy, and religion or superstition found many devotees. 
Of religion alone there was no lack; those parasites of ancient 
civilisation, the astrologers, magicians, sorcerers and preachers 
of strange religions and doctrines, who had been driven from 
their countries by poverty and the ravages of war, now flocked 
to Rome to gather some morsels of bread from the pillage of 
their civilisations.t Stories of magic must have furnished 
abundant material for conversation in all grades of society 
since even a poet like Horace could turn his attention to 

* Suetonius, Aug. 27. 
{~ Agrippa drove them out in the year 33. Cp. Dion, xlix. 43. 


40 B.C. 

Horace at 


Canidia, the most fashionable sorceress of the time. Rome 
was full of vagabond philosophers in strange garments, who 
could find no shelter in the deserted and abandoned houses of 
the nobles and therefore wandered through the streets preach- 
ing doctrines akin to modern Nihilism and fulminating against 
luxury, wealth, power and pleasure.* Asceticism has invariably 
been a flourishing philosophy in times of want. 

These were anxious and painful years and their troubles 
were felt by no one more profoundly than by the young Horace, 
who had returned to Italy after the battle of Philippi; he had 
lost his father’s estate when Venusia was included in the towns 
given to Cesar’s veterans. He had therefore gone to Rome 
after saving from the wreck nothing but a few slaves, apparently 
three young men,t and a small amount of capital, with which 
he bought, probably at a low price, the post of scribe to a 
questor, in other words, a secretaryship to the treasury.t 
This was one of the few paid posts reserved to freedmen under 
the republic and could be bought and sold like many other 
offices under the old system. At that time the general un- 
certainty was such that the young man thought he could 
better invest his capital in this way than in the purchase of a 
house and land. He was the only son of a freedman and had 
received an education above his rank and fortune ; he was both 
proud and timid, indolent and refined. In no long time he 
found himself in difficulties ; he had known Plautius, Varius and 
other young men of letters, but with these exceptions, he was 
brought in contact with none but nonenities, actors, parasites, 
sophists, usurers and merchants,§ who outraged his aristocratic 
instincts. On the other hand he could not venture to make 
his way into high society, hampered as he was by his shyness 
and his political past, which his pride forbade him to disavow. 
He had had love-affairs with certain courtesans, but his health 
was too delicate and his fortune too modest for him to plunge 
into a life of sensuality, except upon condition of becoming a 

* Damasippus and Stertinius, so well described in the third satire 
of the second book of Horace, are two creatures of this kind. 

t Cp. Horace, Sat. I. vi. 116. t Suetonius, Vita Hor. 

§ Cp. Cartault, Etudes sur les Satives d’Hovace, Paris, 1899, p. 12 ff. 


parasite, a position which his pride refused to contemplate.* 40 B.c. 
He was fond of study and literature, but the task of writing 
was burdensome to him and he did not know what to do in 
these disturbed times. He had begun to compose Greek 
poetry but had grown disgusted with it.t At times he 
thought of an attempt to revive the style of Lucilius and to 
devote himself to the mordant satire of native Latin growth. 
If, however, he were to show himself worthy of his great pre- 
decessor, he would have to attack the vices and defects of the 
great, which were the vices and defects of the age, and to 
appear as a censor of public morality in opposition to the 
triumphant popular party and the triumvirate. For this 
task his courage failed him and he shuddered at the mere 
thought of reading his compositions in public or offering them 
for sale. Thus the first Satire (No. 11 of the First Book) 
which he composed, was a very modest and restrained com- 
position. Heconfined himself to mockery of some of his humble 
friends and instead of vehemently attacking some burning 
moral question, he decided with great cynicism the question 
whether it were better for a young man to pay court to 
married ladies or to courtesans. The prudent moralist pro- 
nounced in favour of the latter and the prevailing terror 
must have been great, if the successor of Lucilius could spend 
time upon such themes at a moment when the Roman world 
was in so tragical a situation. 

The peace of Brundisium caused great rejoicing throughout The first 
Italy and at the outset of October the people were delighted to phe: peake 
see | the two triumvirs return in friendship to Rome, where triumvirate. 
the marriage of Antony with Octavia took place.§ It seemed 
that there would now be a moment’s breathing-space. These 
hopes, however, were of short duration. Octavianus had little 
attention to spare for Italy ; as the agreement had been con- 
cluded, he was anxious to recover Sardinia without delay and 
had already sent his freedman, Helenus, to reconquer the 

* On this subject there are several passages in the Epodes, but the 
eleventh epode alone seems to me to refer to an actual occurrence. 

HEtdOLACe, Sar. 1. xy SY. 

{ Kromayer, in Hermes, vol. 29, pp. 540-561. 
§ Dion, xlviii. 31. 

40 B.C. 


island. Helenus had been defeated by Menodorus* and 
Octavianus therefore undertook the conduct of the war; he 
raised money by a tax upon legacies and a poll tax of fifty 
sesterces upon every slave.t It appeared that civil war was 
thus to break out once more for reasons of private animosity and 
because Octavianus wished to exterminate Pompey’s family.f 
Octavianus had gone too far; the timid and submissive public 
was seized by one of those sudden fits of rage which counter- 
balance the habitual weakness of feeble minds. At Rome a 
furious mob tore down the edicts announcing the new taxa- 
tion and made tumultuous demonstrations in favour of 
peace ;§ throughout Italy republican feeling, which though 
dormant was not dead, suddenly sprang to life ; public opinion 
immediately veered round in favour of Sextus Pompeius ;]| 
exaggerated respect was shown to the memory of his father, the 
great warrior and legislator, who had died in the defence of the 
republic and its institutions against the turbulent ambition of 
Cesar and his bands. Pity was universal for the tragical des- 
tiny of this family and its disastrous end, while its last survivor 
was regarded as a liberator. The said liberator, however, 
was master of Sardinia and the sea and proceeded to reduce 
Rome to starvation. In November a terrible famine pre- 
vailed,** but instead of reproaching Sextus Pompeius the people 
vented their increasing exasperation upon Octavianus ; on No- 
vember 15,1t the first day of the Circenses which were celebrated 
at the close of the Ludi Plebet, on the appearance of the statue 
of Neptune from whom Sextus claimed descent, the crowd 
burst into frenzied and interminable applause. The next day 
Antony and Octavianus ordered that thestate of Neptune should 
not be shown, but the people loudly clamoured for the idol 

* Dion, xlviii. 30; Appian, B. C. v. 66. 

+ Appian, B. C. v. 67; Dion, xlviii. 31. 

{ Appian, B. C. v. 67. § Ibid. 

|| Dion xlviii. 31. | Ibid. 

*~* Appian. GaVenOrs 

tt The Circenses to which Dion allndes (xlviii. 31) cannot be those 
which were given on the last three days of the Ludi Plebei, that is to 
say, on November 15, 16 and 17. These were the last of the great 
games of the year. Cp. the Calendario Maffeiano in G. Vaccai, Le 
feste di Roma antica, Turin, 1902, xxi.; and Kromayer in Hermes, 
vol, xxix. p. 557. 


and overthrew the statues of the triumvirs.* Octavianus 
attempted a bold stroke, appeared in the forum and began 
to speak, but the people almost tore him in pieces ; Antony was 
obliged to come to his help and also met with a very bad recep- 
tion. Riots broke out and it became necessary to bring 
soldiers to Rome to restore order.t 

40 B.C 

The disturbances were easily suppressed, though not without Concession 

some bloodshed; however, this joint military government 
was so weak and the two triumvirs were so intimidated by this 
sudden explosion of hatred that they suspended their military 
preparations and even attempted to give some satisfaction to 
republican feeling. The public were surprised to discover that 
threats and tumults were far more efficacious than tears and 
lamentations. The triumvirs looked about for new friends 
and as every post had been filled until the end of the trium- 
virate, they decided to reduce the length of the magistracies, 
so that they could appoint magistrates at least twice or 
even oftener every year.t Thus they divided amongst the 
needy and ambitious middle class the political inheritance of 
the extinct aristocracy, the republican magistracies which in 
Cicero’s time were still in the hands of noble families, however 
degenerate, and were held in high honour by the people who 
had been accustomed for centuries to look upon consuls, 
pretors, ediles and senators almost as demigods. ‘Though 
the end of the year was now at hand, the consuls and prztors 
were invited to resign; the new consuls were the Spaniard, 
Cornelius Balbus, Cesar’s former agent, and P. Canidius, who 
had worked hard to bring the legions of Lepidus over to Antony ; 
all the pretors were replaced.§ 

While they thus attempted to provide rapid promotion 
for their friends, they also endeavoured to intimidate those 
whom they suspected. Antony had revealed to Octavianus the 
fact that Salvidienus had proposed to transfer his legions to 
himself and Octavianus, whose fear and cruelty had been in- 

* Dion, xlviii. 31 ; Appian does not mention the fact. 

{ Appian, B. C. v. 68; Dion, xlviii. 31. 

{-Dion xlviii. 35. Cp. Dion, xviii. 43 ; he reports most important 

facts which have been passed over in silence by other historians. 
§ Dion, xlviii. 32. 

of the 

and Agrippa. 

40-39 B.C. 

difficulties of 
the triumvirs, 


creased by so many difficulties, wished to put him to death; 
he would not venture, however, to give orders to this effect, 
so he resolved to bring Salvidienus before the Senate which sat 
as a court to judge crimes of high treason, and the Senate as 
Octavianus foresaw, declared Salvidienus guilty of perduellio.™ 
Antony, on the other hand, was anxious to secure the fidelity 
of Agrippa and arranged a marriage for him with the only 
daughter of the aged Atticus.t A fact characteristic of this 
revolutionary epoch was the rapidity with which certain 
young men rose to wealth and power. Agrippa was only 
twenty-four years of age and descended from a poor and obscure 
family ; none the less he had held the pretorship and was about 
to marry the richest heiress in Rome. These concessions, 
however, and the cessation of hostilities were not enough to 
calm public exasperation ; the people persistently demanded 
a peace with Sextus Pompeius which would put an end to the 
famine, and the demonstrations became steadily more numerous 
and tumultuous. Neither Antony nor Octavianus could venture 
to leave Rome, though the position in the east was becoming 
critical. ‘Towards the end of the year Herod, in flight before 
the Parthian invasion, had reached Rome; his object was to 
secure his nomination as king of Judea by the triumvirs and to 
return to his states with the support of the Roman legions.{ 
Thus the year 39, when Lucius Marcus Censorinus and 
Caius Calvisius Sabinus were the first consuls, began amidst 
disturbances and uncertainties. When Octavianus and Antony 
found that public opinion was not to be appeased they displayed 
yet greater conciliation and attempted to cloak their arbitrary 
and tyrannical rule with the authority of the Senate. They 
brought before the Senate for approval all the acts which they 

* Velleius, ii. 76; Dion, xviii. 33 ; Appian, B. C. v. 66; Suetonius, 
Aug. 66; Livy, Per. 127. Historians have failed to observe that if 
Octavianus and Antony pursued a policy so obviously republican during 
these months, their action was dictated by public ill-feeling and by the 
popularity of Sextus Pompeius. 

t+ Cornelius Nepos, Att. 12; he does not state, however, that the 
marriage took place at that moment. Yet I am inclined to think that 
it must have been so, as this was the last stay which Antony made at 
Rome, and he was the harum nuptiarum conciliatory. Before Philippi 
the marriage was impossible, as Agrippa was then a nonentity. 

{t Josephus, A. J. XIV. xiv. 3. 


had performed as triumvirs ; * they seem to have obliged the 
Senate to decree the new taxation, though with some diminu- 
tion ; t finally they requested the Senate to settle the question 
of Judea. Herod had secured Antony’s support by valuable 
gifts and at the instigation of the triumvirs, of Messala, of L. 
Sempronius Atratinus and other leading men, the Senate 
decided that Judea should be reconstituted a kingdom and that 
Herod should be king.f Antony and Octavianus were thus 
making every effort to appear as good republicans who re- 
spected the authority of the Senate; this policy, however, 
did not prevent them from promising every official post to 
various nominees for the next four years ; § or from appointing 
a large number of senators chosen from men of obscure origin 
and of no reputation, from officers, centurions, old soldiers 
and even freedmen.|| The military despotism was thus 
beginning to give way; what we should now call the lower 
middle class were invading the Senate, from which the nobility 
had disappeared ; a crowd of nonentities was seizing the seats 
which had been occupied by Lucullus, Pompey, Cicero, Cato 
and Cesar; the dynasty of writers founded by Cicero was 
acquiring a growing influence amid the universal dissolution. 

Amid these wars and revolutions the public was astounded 
to see the rise of a man whose only weapon was the pen. For 
some time the name of Virgil, first known to the little cliques 
of vedrepor and young dabblers in literature, had been securing 
a wider reputation; his Bucolics had been recited in the 
theatres by many actors, including the famous Citheris, the freed 
—woman of Volumnius, who had been Antony’s mistress ; {| 

* Dion, xlviii. 34. 

+ Ibid.; but the text is obscure, 

+ Josephus, A. J. XIV. xiv. 4. 

§ In reality, Dion, xlviii. 35, says that they were chosen for eight 
years ; Appian, B. C. v. 73, says that after the peace of Misenum the 
consuls were appointed for four years, and he gives the names of the 
consuls from 34 to 31. This proves that the consuls for the years 
38 to 35 had been already appointed at the time of which Dion speaks ; 
he has confused two appointments of consuls for four years severally 
made at ashort interval of time and regarded them as one appointment 
for a term of eight years. 

|| Dion, xlviii. 34. 

| Servius, ad Virg. Ecl. VI. 11; 


Donatus, in vita, p. 60, R. 

39 B.C. 


39 B.C. 


Mecenas and Octavianus, whose tastes were fundamentally 
intellectual and who was anxious to make friends on every side, 
eventually patronised him and soon gave him land in Campania, 
to compensate for the confiscation which he had suffered. 
This patronage increased his literary fame and he became an 
important character in the midst of the disturbances. None 
the less he continued to improve his poetical art and composed 
two further imitations of Theocritus, the Seventh and Eighth 
Eclogues ; the first represents a conflict between two shepherds 
in brief couplets ; while the second, derived from the first and 
second idyll of Theocritus, represents two excessively cultivated 
shepherds, who met at dawn and sang with deep and har- 
monious fancy the unfortunate love of a young man and the 
spells practised by an enamoured woman who attempts to recall 
a lover who has left her for the city. Virgil, however, did not 
merely confine himself to poetry; he also attempted to use 
his influence on behalf of his poorer associates, his friends and 
fellow citizens. He had entertained some hope of inducing 
Alfenus Varus, with the help of the muses of Sicily, to rescind 
the edict confiscating the lands of Mantua; when this attempt 
failed, he helped Horace to improve his position by introducing 
him to Maecenas at the outset of the year 39. The occasion 
was opportune, as the triumvirs and their friends in trepidation 
were opening their doors to petitioners. Maecenas extended a 
kindly welcome to the young man, whose bashfulness allowed 
him only to stammer a few words,* but was unable to do any- 
thing for him at the moment. This counsellor of Octavianus 
was occupied by many other cares. The triumvirs had been 
mistaken in their idea that fresh concessions and the lapse of a 
short time would calm public excitement ; the scarcity of corn 
continued and the people raised their demands when they saw 
the hesitation of the triumvirs; demonstrators even sought 
Mucia, the mother of Sextus, to secure her intervention and 
threatened to set fire to her house if she did not consent to 
act.t The triumvirs were at their wits’ end ; Octavianus was 
anxious for resistance, but Antony understood that for the 
moment they must yield and requested Libo, the father-in-law 

* Horace, Sat. I. vi. 56 ff. t+ Appian, B. C. v. 69. 


of Sextus Pompeius and the brother-in-law of Octavianus, to 39 B.c. 
use his good offices for intervention.* 

Octavianus and Antony were thus unable to calm public The Sicilian 
eA ys : ‘ : : dominion of 
indignation even by the most abject flattery of republicanism ; sextus 
in strange contrast was the position of the young man who Pompeius. 
was regarded by Italian opinion as the champion of the republic 
and its liberty. He had established a despotic sea-power of an 
Asiatic type upon the three islands where his rule was para- 
mount. His ministers were the clever oriental freedmen of 
his father, Menodorus, Menecrates, and Apollophanes, who 
now acted as admirals and governors. Many of the nobles who 
had taken refuge with him, including Cicero’s son, chafed 
beneath this despotic government ; the consequences were dis- 
content, discord and suspicion, which sometimes drove Sextus 
to acts of cruelty and violence and had recently induced him 
to put Staius Murcus to death.t Sextus had also recruited 
nine legions, largely composed of slaves, from the Sicilian estates 
which had been held by Roman knights and were now in his 
possession ; his little circle of empire had become a refuge for 
every slave who was willing to enlist in hisarmy.[ The wealthy 
classes of Italy had thus reason enough for anxiety. Yet Italy 
_ hated the triumvirs and Cesar’s son so profoundly, and 
had set such hope upon Pompey’s son, that some modern 
historians have believed that Sextus might have avenged 
Pharsalia and eventually changed the course of events, if he had 
ventured to invade Italy with his army instead of confining his 
operations to harrying its coasts. But the spring of the year 
39 was now at hand and ten momentous years had elapsed 
since the crossing of the Rubicon. In great historical struggles 
the audacity or timidity of leaders is not the mere outcome 
of innate or acquired energy; these qualities also depend 
partially, at least, upon the confidence or despondency with 
which success or adversity may inspire their environment. 

Ten years previously Cesar had been able to cross the Rubicon 
with full confidence, not merely because of his native audacity, 

* Appian, B. C. v. 69 ; Dion, xlviii. 36. 
¢t Cp. Suetonius, T7b. 4; Velleius, ii, 77; Appian, B. C. v. 70. 
t Seeck, Kaiser Augustus, 74 ff, 

39 B.C. 

The policy 
of Sextus, 


but also because the whole nation had been lulled to rest by 
twenty-five years of domestic peace and declined to contem- 
plate the possibility of anew upheaval. Nor had Cesar himself 
any intention of beginning a ruinous civil war between the 
rich and poor; his object was merely to overpower his oppo- 
nents in a simple political conflict. But at the present time, 
men’s minds were profoundly depressed by the fearful disasters 
they had experienced ; Antony himself and the leaders of the 
victorious party were confronted by fresh difficulties at every 
turn; every one preferred to wait until the progress of events 
pointed to some definite conclusion. 

Thus no bold stroke could be expected from Sextus. In 
view of the tragical destiny by which his family had been 
crushed, only pre-eminent genius could have risen superior to 
discouragement at a decisive moment when all must be staked. 
Though, however, he could not imitate the audacity of Cesar, 
Sextus Pompeius was sufficiently intelligent to realise that 
Antony and Octavianus needed peace even more than himself 
at that moment ; his clever adviser, Menodorus, urged him to 
resist and to protract the struggle as long as possible; his 
threats and the continuance of the famine would increase the 
dangers which confronted his two rivals.* On the other 
hand, the leading Romans who had taken refuge with him, such 
as Libo and Mucia, argued on the opposite side and asserted 
that Italy would become hostile and would turn against him if 
he did not give way. t After lengthy negotiations an agree- 
ment was eventually concluded ; Sextus Pompeius was to be 
recognised as the master of Sicily and Sardinia and would be 
given the Peloponnese for five years, that is, until the year 
34.; in the year 33 he was to be elected consul, to enter the 
college of pontiffs and to receive seventy millions of sesterces 
as indemnity for the confiscation of his father’s property. In 
return he would undertake to cease ravaging the coasts of 
Italy, to receive no more fugitive slaves, to allow full freedom 
of navigation and to help in the suppression of piracy. Advan- 
tage would also be taken of the peace of Misenum to pardon all 
deserters and all survivors of the proscription, excepting only 

* Appian, B, C, vy, 70. + Appian, B. C. v. 70-71. 


those conspirators who had been condemned for Cesar’s 
murder; all their real property would be restored to the 
deserters and a fourth part of their wealth to the proscribed ; 
all slaves who had taken service under Sextus would receive 
their freedom, and the same rewards were promised to his 
soldiers as to those of Octavianus and Antony.* After this 
agreement, the two triumvirs set out for Misenum with an 
army in the course of the summer; Sextus also came with his 
fleet, and in this beautiful bay, under the eyes of the army, 
which thronged the shores of the headland,and of the fleet which 
covered the sea to its horizon, the sons of Cesar and Pompey, 
together with Antony, met upon ship-board, ratified their 
peace, arranged for a solemn banquet and for the marriage of 
the young daughter of Sextus with the little Marcellus, the 
son of Octavianus. The better to confirm the peace, a list of 
consuls was drawn up for four further years, that is to say until 
the year 31 B.c.f Sextus then went to Sicily while Antony and 
Octavianus returned to Rome, bringing with them a consider- 
able number of well-known men who had been proscribed and 
some former adherents of Lucius Antonius who had fled after 
the capture of Perugia ; these exiles now took advantage of the 
amnesty to abandon Sextus and his freedmen and returned to 
Rome to recover the remnant of their property. They in- 
cluded Lucius Arruntius, Marcus Junius Silanus, Caius Sentius 
Saturninus, Marcus Titius and Cicero’s son.{ Peace was 
then re-established, to the great delight of Italy, and appeared 
to be confirmed by a happy chance which most opportunely 
added fresh ties to the bonds of relationship uniting the three 
contracting parties to the peace of Misenum. Scribonia had 
_ just presented or was about to present Octavianus with a 
daughter, who was called Julia, and Antony’s wife, Octavia, 
was with child. 

The peace of Misenum marks the first surrender of the 

* Dion, xlviil. 36; Appian, B. C. v. 72. 

t+ Appian, B. C. v. 73; Dion. xlviii. 37-38. 

{ Velleius, ii. 77, is wrong, however, in adding to those who took 
refuge with Sextus and returned to Rome, Tiberius Claudius Nero, as 
he had returned to Rome after the peace of Brundisium. Cp. Dion, 
xlviii, 15, and Suetonius, T7b. 4. 

Wi $ 

39 B.C. 

Importance of 
the peace of 

39 B.C. 


triumvirs to the imperceptible force of public opinion. This is 
the real importance of the treaty, which denotes the beginning 
of a silent struggle between the wealthy classes of Italy and the 
military dictatorship of the revolution, a struggle in which 
the unarmed party gradually enforced its wishes upon the 
military party. Virgil, however, encouraged by the peace of 
Misenum, composed another Eclogue, the ninth, in which he 
ventured to place complaints in the mouths of his shepherds, 
concerning the confiscation of his estates and of the lands of 
Mantua, reproachfully recalling how he had saluted Cesar’s 
star and how ill he had been rewarded for the sympathy which 
he had expressed. 


The first victory of Ventidius over the Parthians—-The apo- 
theosis of Antony as Dionysus—Horace and Sallust—The 
success of Virgil’s Eclogues — Marriage of Octavianus 
with Livia—Fresh war between Sextus Pompeius and Octa- 
vianus—Antony wishes to force a peace upon Octavianus— 
Octavianus determines to continue the war—The disaster 
of Scylla—Crassus avenged—Octavianus sends Macenas to 
Antony—Horace’s account of Mecenas’ journey. 

In the month of September,* after the birth of his daughter,t 
Antony left Rome for Athens. Notwithstanding his marriage 
with Octavia, he had not abandoned his idea of shifting the 
political centre to the east and of making war upon Persia ; 
on the contrary, he cherished this project more ardently than 
ever before. The defects of the Latin institutions, insta- 
bility, corruption, incompetency and disorder, had merely 
increased since the triumvirs had opened the republican offices 
to the middle classes, had reduced the length of magistracies to 
six or even three months, and had filled the Senate with nonen- 
tities. It was impossible to employ, upon serious and difficult 
business, magistrates who were in office for so short a time, 
who were generally ill-suited for the difficult responsibilities of 
command, and did not possess the prestige of name which 
supported even the most degenerate descendants of the great 
families. With such instruments of government the leaders 
and the governing cliques stood in need of great authority and 
influence, if a general constitutional disruption was to be pre- 
vented. But the disturbances at Rome and the peace of 
Misenum which had marked the capitulation of the trium- 

* Kromayer, in Hermes, vol. 29, p. 561. ¢ Plutarch, Ant. 33. 


39 B.C, 

Victory of 
Ventidius over 
the Parthians. 


virate to the force of public opinion, had displayed the real 
feebleness of that combination. It was thus more than ever 
necessary to overcome the principal causes of this weakness by 
some great effort, or in other words to wipe out the disastrous 
record of the triumvirate policy by a brilliant and profitable 
success. Antony was well aware that the triumvirs had so far 
conferred no lasting or general benefit upon any party, that 
they had not even been able to maintain order throughout 
the country and had contented themselves with dividing land 
among four or five thousand of Czsar’s veterans. This was no 
great result in view of the long wars and massacres which had 
taken place, of the many illegal and violent acts which the 
triumvirs had committed, and of the extraordinary powers 
which had been conferred upon them. For these reasons the 
Parthian war became a necessity ; the expenses of the republic 
had increased while its revenue had diminished ; the triumvirs 
had recently been obliged to pay their soldiers, officers and tax 
collectors with promises instead of money; the deficit was 
growing greater and debts were accumulating ; * the proposed 
expedition was no easy task from a military point of view, but 
far more difficult was the business of procuring the financial 
resources for its preparation. 

During the second half of the year 39, Antony left Rome in 
charge of the consuls for that period, L. Cocceius and P. 
Alfenus, wittily known by the public as the “ little consuls ” ; 
he then went to Athens, fully intending to hurry on the 
preparations for the Persian campaign. The news which 
reached him from Asia shortly after his arrival in Greece only 
confirmed his resolve.t About the month of August, Ventidius 
Bassus by a clever stroke had surprised Labienus at the foot of 
the Taurus in some place unknown to us, had defeated him and 
driven him to flight with a weak escort ; he had then swooped 
down upon Cilicia and pushed forward to the range of the 
Amanus and the passes leading to Syria; he had there en- 
countered a second Parthian army led by a general of uncertain 
name and had defeated this force.{ ‘The Parthians, excellent 

* Dion, xlviii. 34. + Plutarch, Ant. 33. 
{ Dion, xlviii. 39-41; Frontin, Strat. I. i. 6 ; II. v. 35-36; Orosius, 
Vilevill, 23, 


defenders of theirown country, but useless at conquest, retreated 
to the banks of the Euphrates ; Syria was open to the Romans 
and Antigonus alone held out in Palestine in hopes of Parthian 
reinforcements. Antony was highly delighted by this news * 
and proceeded forthwith to spend the last months of the year 
39 in rearranging the political map of the east; his mode of 
procedure shows a growing distaste for Roman governors and 
Italian forces and a growing preference for the bureaucratic 
institutions of oriental monarchs. Not only did he recognise 
Herod as King of Judea, but in Pontus, where Pompey had 
organised republics, he re-established the national dynasty 
in the person of Darius, the son of Pharnaces and nephew of 
Mithridates.t| He made no attempt to subdue the Pisidians, 
a hardy race of mountaineers, excellent soldiers and terrible 
brigands, but gave them a king and chose for this position 
Amyntas, a secretary of Deiotarus.[ A certain Polemo, 
the son of a rhetorician of Laodicea, who had improvised a 
force and defended the town against the Parthians, was 
rewarded with the throne of Lycaonia.§ Antony ordered 
these nominees to provide him with money and men|| and 
commanded Darius to reorganise the old army of the kingdom 
of Pontus @ for his support in the Persian war; Pollio’s army 
he divided into three bodies and recaptured as he went Salona, 
which had revolted ; at the same time he inflicted a defeat upon 
the Parthini.** One part of this force he sent to winter in 
Epirus and the two remaining divisions were employed in 
small expeditions against the He then made 
efforts to collect money in Greece, especially in the Pelo- 
ponnese, the province promised to Sextus Pompeius ; tf and to 
secure the property of the richest landowner in the Peloponnese, 

* Plutarch, Ant. 33. tj Appian, B. C. v. 75. 

+ Appian, B. C. v. 75. Cp. Strabo, XIV. v. 6 (671), who thus 
explains the foundation of the kingdom of Pisidia without attributing 
it to Antony, but as the kingdom was founded by Antony it is probably 
this fact that he had in view. 

§ Appian, B. C. v. 75 ; Strabo, XII. viii. 16 (578). 

|| Appian, B.C. v. 75. 

q This is confirmed by the fact that for the Persian expedition for 
the year 36 he had a contingent of soldiers from Pontus. 

** Servius, ad Virg. Ecl. IV. i, and vili. 12; C. 1. L. i. 461. 

+} Appian, B. C. v. 75. tt Dion, xlviii. 39. 

39 B.C. 

39 B.c. 

Horace and 


a certain Lachares, he ordered the man to be beheaded, a demo- 
cratic custom highly fashionable among the monarchs of ancient 
times.* Finally he wished to enjoy the divine adoration 
paid to Asiatic monarchs. Octavianus had been content with his 
position as ‘son of the divine ; ’ Antony wished to be called 
a god and a second Dionysus.t In the religious ceremonies 
he took the place of the statue of the god and celebrated a kind 
of mystical marriage with Athene at Athens, obliging the un- 
fortunate town to pay him a dowry of one thousand talents.f 
Then, when the stormy season began, he settled in this famous 
and beautiful city and spent his time in festivals, games and 
conversations with philosophers and rhetoricians, thus flattering 
the Hellenic spirit and‘attempting to pose as a successor of 
Alexander, even in his patronage of the arts and sciences.§ 

Meanwhile Octavianus had gone to Gaul, where the Aquitani 
had revolted ; || but he returned after a short stay, leaving 
Agrippa to crush this revolt, which it was hoped would be the 
last.’ Thereupon, on October 25, Asinius entered Rome 
and celebrated his triumph over the Parthians ** and Maecenas 
towards the close of the year found leisure to remember the 
young poet who had been introduced to him nine months before, 
and informed him that the doors of his palace were open to 
him. Horace was transported with delight, threw off his 
habitual indolence, and wrote the third satire, in which he cele- 
brates friendship and all its virtues, with a warmth of feeling 
which certain critics have regarded as the expression of his 
gratitude to At the same time he does not seem to 

* Plutarch, Ant.67. Cp. Bulletin de correspondance hellénique, 1896, 
pe 155. + C. 1. A, ii. 482, v. 22-23. *Avroviov Geod véov Avovicou. 

+ Dion, xlviii. 39. 

§ Plutarch, Ant. 33; Appian, B. C. v. 76. If we examine all that 
was done during the year 34 we cannot possibly support the assertion 
of a German historian, who merely repeats the general belief of his- 
torians, that Antony passed this winter thatenlos und in unwtirdigem 
Genussleben (Schiller, Geschichte der R mischen Kaiserzeit, Gotha, 
1883, i, 101.) There is a legend on the subject of Antony which leads 
historians astray and blinds their eyes to the most obvious facts. 

|| Appian, B. C. v. 75. 

§| This is a natural inference from the statement of Eutropius, vii. 5, 
which mu.t be connected with the statement of Appian, v. 65. 

** C0 L. i. 461. 
Tf Cp. Cartault, Etude sur les Satives d’Horace, Paris, 1899, 28 ff. 


have profited in the least by his friendship or even to have 
received any encouragement for his poetry. The young man 
was too timid and too fearful of intrusion * to ask for help ; 
he wrote but little and would publish nothing, showing his 
poems only to his intimate friends. Maecenas seems to have 
regarded him rather as a future politician than as a great poet. 
Agitated by the retorts of the nonentities whom he had men- 
tioned in his second satire, he composed the fourth satire in his 
defence, invoking the authority of Lucilius and asserting that 
in any case he had no intention either of selling his poems or of 
reading them in public.t However, the opportunity of mixing 
with the literary and cultured classes was a great advantage 
to Horace, for writers of scanty means could only gain a hearing 
through the patronage of the rich and powerful; the best of 
them were obliged to secure this help if they desired reputa- 
tion, for unfortunately all of them were not great lords and 
masters of their own time, power and ability like Sallust, who 
continued to avenge himself upon the conservatives by the 
composition of his fine Jugurtha, the history of the first great 
aristocratic scandal; in the Historie he gave a detailed account 
of the crimes, the errors, the scandals and the fall of Sulla’s 
party, from the death of the dictator to the year 67, and seized 
every opportunity of invective against Pompey. Few writers, 
again, were so fortunate as Virgil, who was now freed from the 
burden of poverty, patronised by the rich and admired by the 
public; he continued to work at his ease and composed his 
tenth and last Eclogue to console the love troubles of one of his 
friends. Caius Cornelius Gallus t was born of an obscure 
family of the equestrian order in Cisalpine Gaul ; a member of 
the political clique of Octavianus, he was one of those numerous 
Italians who struggled to secure the posts which the annihila- 
tion of the aristocracy had left vacant ; he was an intelligent, 
pushing man, anxious to secure a reputation and to advertise 
himself at any price, a distinguished writer, a politician and a 
soldier ; at the same time he found leisure for love and women 

* Horace, Sat. I. iii. 63 ff. t+ Horace, Sat. I. iv. 71 ff. 

t An inscription recently discovered in Egypt proved that his 
prenomen was certainly Caius. Cp. Sitzb. Berl. Konig. Preuss. Akad., 
1896, vol. i. p. 478. 

39 B.C. 

39 B.C. 



and his mistress had been that Citheris who recited Virgil’s 
Eclogues at Rome ; when she abandoned him, the young man 
begged Virgil to compose an Eclogue to console him for his 
loss and to inform half Italy that he had been the lover of the 
most famous courtesan of his age. * Virgil was kind enough to 
perform this service. He disguised himself as an Arcadian 
shepherd and depicted the mountains and forests, the laurels, 
the tamarisks, the flocks and herds and even the gods 
themselves mourning for the grief of Gallus; Gallus replied 
that he wished to abandon the world and live with the shep- 
herds of Arcadia in the forests and caverns, to sing their country 
songs, hunt wild beasts and write the name of his lady upon the 
bark of the trees. 

With this poem Virgil concluded his Eclogues, which were 
then read and admired by the Italian public chiefly for the 
reason that they corresponded with the tendencies of the age 
and met the wants of the more varied and numerous public, 
which now followed the study of literature in place of the old 
cultured class, the vanished aristocracy. These little poems, 
composed in the style of Theocritus and of other Greek bucolic 
poets who were then fashionable, placed on the lips of 
imaginary shepherds, nymphs, fawns and gods, the new ideas 
which the mixture of many civilisations had brought to Italy 
amid so long a series of disasters and calamities ; these mouth- 
pieces expressed the desire for peace, the hope of a better 
future, a wistful affection for country life, philosophical 
curiosity awakened by the mystery of the world’s origin and the 
first movements of a mysticism which was beginning to invade 
social and political life; thus every member of the reading 
public could find something to delight his fancy, though very 
few could appreciate the exquisite delicacy of form and the 
refined and imaginative sensuality of which the Eclogues 
are full. Moreover they were short; but little time was 
required to read or hear them; they were easily learnt by 
heart and these were great advantages in appealing to anumerous 
and superficial public of political adventurers, busy speculators, 
centurions and military tribunes in pursuit of wealth, young 

* Servius, ad Ecl. x. 1. 


students and cultured freedmen who wished to read something 
but had neither time nor inclination for the interminable epics 
of Ennius and Pacuvius. . 

A soldier abandoned by a courtesan and attempting to 
console his grief by commissioning a fashionable poet to adver- 
tise his name and his adventures throughout Italy, would have 
aroused the scorn of the ancient Romans. But amid the 
universal confusion men also lost that sense of dignity which 
formerly restrained government officials from displaying their 
weakness to the public gaze. ‘The god Eros showed his brazen 
visage both in the general’s tent and in the Senate house, 
and public opinion was now inclined to deal with this weak- 
ness as indulgently as with all others. At the outset of the year 
38 the impetuous and lascivious Octavianus was suddenly seized 
with a violent passion for the wife of Tiberius Claudius Nero ; 
he forthwith divorced Scribonia, secured the divorce of Livia, 
the object of his adoration, and, though she had been six months 
with child, married her in spite of the prohibitions of the old 
priestly code at Rome. * The obliging pontiffs had pronounced 
that the old religious rules did not apply in such cases as this. 
Great was the astonishment, the ridicule and the scandal at 
Rome when it was learnt that the husband had given Livia a 
dowry as if she had been his daughter and had been present 
at the marriage feast.t| Whether Octavianus acted or not in 
one of his characteristic fits of impetuosity, there is no doubt 
that he had political reasons for divorcing Scribonia. Timid 
and hesitating, with no self-command in a dangerous crisis call- 
ing for immediate decision, Octavianus none the less possessed 
real strength, though his energy could be but slowly evoked. 
When he had time to reflect at his ease, he was able to foresee 
every precaution demanded by a dangerous enterprise, while he 
possessed the tenacity to carry out pre-determined plans and 
to triumph over his uncertainty and vacillation. After the 
capitulation of Misenum, Octavianus, like Antony, had realised 
how far his prestige had sunk. Unable to undertake any such 
enterprise as the conquest of Persia, he had at least resolved 

* Dion, xlviii. 44; Suetonius, Aug. 62. 
} Dion, xviii. 44. 

38 B.C. 

marriage with 

38 B.C. 

Octavianus and 


to crush Pompey’s son lest popular admiration should restore 
this rival family to its ancient power. Octavianus therefore had 
been seeking pretexts for quarrel at the end of 39 and the be- 
ginning of 38 ; he had written letters to Pompeius reproaching 
him for sheltering fugitive slaves, for failing to suppress piracy, 
for continuing the maintenance of his armaments and for 
breaking certain conventions in the treaty of Misenum.* 
Thus his divorce of Scribonia was a means for accelerating his 
rupture with the master of the islands. Granted these political 
reasons for the divorce, no reason of any kind is forthcoming to 
explain his precipitate marriage with Livia, which wounded 
the superstitions of the multitude and exposed himself and his 
new wife to popular ridicule. A daughter of Livius Drusus, 
an aristocrat of the old stock which had perished at Philippi, 
Livia was a young woman of marvellous beauty, high intellect 
and attractive character. It is likely enough that the young 
man who was intelligent but nervous, impressionable and 
constantly alternating between hesitation and rashness, irrita- 
tion and weakness, should have fallen in love with this woman, 
both for her marvellous beauty and even more for that clear 
intelligence and certainty of judgment, which are often to be 
found in well-balanced women. This hasty marriage must 
therefore be reckoned among the impetuous acts to which his 
weak and headstrong character drove him at this time. 

About the time when Octavianus concluded this extraordinary 
marriage, an event occurred which precipitated the breach 
with Sextus Pompeius. Menodorus, who had been appointed 
governor of Sardinia by Sextus, quarrelled with his patron 
and went over to the enemy, surrendering the island, a fleet of 
sixty ships and three legions to Octavianus.t Delighted thus to 
recover Sardinia without a blow, Octavianus received him with 
open arms, but as soon as Sextus had heard of the treachery 
he sent a fleet to ravage the coasts of Italy.[ Thus at the 

* Appian) 8. Gove ie 

t Dion xlviii. 45; Appian, B. C. v. 78; Orosius, vi. 18, 21. 

{ According to Appian, B. C. v. 78 and 81, the treachery of Meno- 
dorus did not take place until the war had begun. However, Dion, 
xlviii. 45-46, tells us that the treachery was the immediate cause of the 
war. The second version seems to me the more probable; indeed, 


outset of the spring of 38 the war had broken out anew. 
Octavianus immediately wrote to Antony, begging him to come 
to Brundisium and discuss the situation ; * he asked Lepidus for 
help; t he ordered the fleet anchored at Ravenna to sail to 
Brundisium and to await Antony,{ while the fleet of Meno- 
dorus was sent to join the other vessels on the Etrurian coast ; § 
he began the construction of new triremes at Ravenna and at 
Rome ; || he recalled the legions from Gaul and Illyria, sending 
some to Brundisium and others to Naples @ that he might 
attack Sicily upon two sides if Antony approved his design.** 
Antony, however, was greatly irritated by this news from 
Italy and by the request that he would leave Greece for Brundi- 
sium. He had spent the winter at Athens much to his own 
satisfaction, and, as spring approached, had energetically resumed 
the execution of his plans and was then busy transferring to Asia 
the army which had been quartered in Epirus upon the borders 
of Macedonia ; he also proposed to follow the army in a short Now Octavianus was recalling him to Italy to begin a 
new war with Sextus Pompeius! Antony was not inclined to 
interrupt his eastern plans and to postpone his revenge for 
the capitulation of Misenum, in order to help Octavianus to his 
vengeance ; he therefore started with a few ships and a small 
following tt for Brundisium, resolved to prevent the turbulent 

Appian’s story is contradicted by another fact which he himself relates, 
namely, that Antony was aware of the treachery of Menodorus when 
he went to Brundisium (chap. Ixxix.). Antony’s voyage, however, 
must have begun some time before the commencement of hostilities. 
See note tt below. 

* Appian, B. C. v. 78. { Dion, xviii. 46. 

faAppian, 8. C. i. 78. 

§ Appian, B. C. iii. 78,says, at Puteoli; but in chap. 81, it appears 
that this fleet left the coast of Etruria. Appian is mistaken in chap. 
78, or the orders issued were changed for some reason unknown to us. 

|| Appian, B. C. v. 80. 

4, Appian, B. C. v. 78 and 80. ** Appian, B. C. v.78. 

+t So much is not directly stated by any text, but as we know that 
a considerable part of Antony’s army spent the winter 39-38 in Epirus 
and in Greece, and that the whole army was in Asia the following 
winter, we are bound to assume that the transportation of the troops 
was begunat that moment. Possibly an allusion to this work may be 
found in Appian, B. C. v. 76, which describes Antony’s military activity 
during the spring of 38. 

tt Appian, B.C. v.79; ovv ddtyouss The rapidity of this return 

38 B.c. 

38 B.C. 

of Octavianus 
for war. 


Octavianus from making war. He was the elder man, his repu- 
tation and authority were greater and he was inclined to regard 
his young colleague as his subordinate ; he therefore intended 
to arrange the matter as he pleased. However, when he 
reached Brundisium on the appointed day Octavianus was not 
there, for reasons unknown to us. Antony did not wait for 
him but started back without delay after writing two imperious 
letters, one to Octavianus ordering him to respect the treaty of 
Misenum, and the other to Menodorus warning him that if 
he did not preserve the peace, he would assert those rights of 
mastery over him which he had acquired with the estate of 

Octavianus, who was largely counting upon Antony’s help, 
was greatly undeceived ; in fact, the beginning of the war was 
beset with difficulties. Lepidus was angry because the peace 
of Misenum had been concluded without reference to himself 
and declined to stir. Popular feeling was entirely opposed to 
the war and was indignant with Octavianus. Agrippa was far 
away, conducting a successful campaign against the Aquitani. 
To oppose Sextus Pompeius alone was the height of rashness. 
Octavianus, however,understood that after Antony’s intimations 
and after the provocation which Sextus Pompeius had given, 
he would be utterly discredited if he showed himself afraid of 
his rival, or unable to act without his colleague; to restore the 
fading lustre of Czsar’s name and to obscure the growing bright- 
ness of the name of Pompey he required a second Pharsalia on 
sea or land. He also thought himself competent to conduct the 
war alone. Nervous characters often err as much by excessive 
audacity as by excessive prudence. Octavianus had heard that 
the Parthians were again invading Syria and believed that 
Antony, who was thus detained in the east, could not interfere 
in Italian affairs. He told himself that if he could crush 

and the letters sent to Octavianus and Menodorus clearly show that 
Antony reached Brundisium before hostilities were begun, with the 
intention of maintaining peace. Hence the story in Dion, xlviii. 46, 
that Antony proposed to join Octavianus in Etruria, but returned because 
he had been frightened by a wolf which had entered his pretorium, 
is but a fable. 

* Appian, B. C. v. 79. 


Pompeius his success would cover all shortcomings, and, after 38 B.c. 
asking help from every one, he resolved unaided to conduct 
an ingenious but complicated plan of campaign by sea and by 
land. He put Cornificius in command of the fleet already 
concentrated at Brundisium and ordered him to sail to Taren- 
tum. He entrusted the ships anchored in the Etrurian waters 
to Calvisius Sabinus, with Menodorus as vice-admiral and sent 
them to Sicily. Finally he led to Rhegium in person the army 
which he intended to transport to Sicily when the two fleets 
had destroyed Pompeius’ ships.* To calm the apprehensions 
of Menodorus at Antony’s threats, he had raised him to the 
rank of knight. 

The war apparently began about the end of July. Pompeius, The outbreak 
however, in place of Menodorus had appointed another Greek base 
freedman of equal intelligence, by name Menecrates, who 
cleverly turned the division of the enemy’s forces to account 
and proposed to destroy the two halves of the fleet of Octavianus 
before they could effect ajunction. He therefore left Pompeius 
with forty ships at Messina,t and sailed with the main body 
of the fleet to Naples, meeting Calvisius and Menodorus off 
Cumz on their way from Etruria. The fleet of Octavianus was 
perhaps smaller and Calvisius was an inexperienced commander. 
It therefore suffered severe loss. However Menecrates was 
killed in the battle and Demochares, the second in command, 
would not follow up his advantage and retired slowly upon 
Sicily, leaving Calvisius and Menodorus in the Bay of Naples, 
where they repaired their damages.t Meanwhile Octavianus had 
reached Rhegium, had established his army upon the shore and 
taken over the fleet of Cornificius. From Rhegium he watched 
Pompeius, scrutinising the horizon with anxious and irresolute 
gaze; from morning till evening he meditated plans of attack, 
but he waited for Calvisius and lost all the opportunities which 
should be seized at once in war. He would not even venture 

* Appian, B. C. v. 80. 

+ This seems to be established by the comparison of Appian, B, C. 
v. 81, which states that ‘‘ Pompeius awaited Cesar at Messina,’ with 
another passage, B.C. v. 84, which states that Octavianus had an oppor- 
tunity of attacking Pompeius at Messina with only forty ships. 

t Dion, xlviii. 46; Appian, B. C, v. 81-84; 

38 B.c. 

The defeat of 


to crush Sextus in the strait, when he appeared there one day 
with his forty ships.* After repairing damages Calvisius and 
Menodorus sailed to Sicily and this timorous admiral then 
committed an act of such imprudence that we are inclined to 
suppose he lost his head or that the ancient historians have 
neglected to state some vital point which would explain his 
action. Octavianus left Rhegium to meet Calvisius, leaving 
behind him at Messina not only the forty ships of Sextus, but 
the whole of the fleet which had returned from Cume. 
Demochares and Apollophanes immediately pursued him and 
attacked him in the rear off Scylla. 

The young admiral of twenty-five years was thus obliged to 
conduct his first naval engagement t and the results were most 
discreditable. Octavianus first attempted resistance in the open 
sea, concentrating his largest and heaviest vessels which were 
manned by the best of his troops; however, when attacked 
by Apollophanes, in fear that he might be sunk or captured he 
retreated to the coast and cast anchor. The enemy, however, 
continued their pursuit of the heavy vessels which were less 
easily able to defend themselves when anchored.{ The orders 
of the admiral became confused and contradictory and many 
soldiers threw themselves into the sea to reach the shore. 
Octavianus soon lost his head and committed an act of cowardice 
almost unexampled in a Roman general ; he disembarked and 
abandoned the command at the height of the struggle.§ This 
cowardice, however, saved the fleet from utter disaster, for 
Cornificius, when he was relieved of his admiral’s embarrassing 
fears, weighed anchor and resumed the conflict, holding out 
until the enemy retired upon Messina on observing the approach 
of Calvisius.|| By this time the evening was advanced, and 
the sun set before Cornificius perceived that the fleet from 
Naples was close beside him; thus while Octavianus spent the 

* Appian, B. C. v. 84) t+ Appian, B. C. v. 85. 

+ Appian, B. C. v. 85-86. Dion, xlviii. 47, adds some precise 
details on the first part of the battle, but for the second part gives 
only a few lines of confused description, and we must therefore rely 
upon Appian. 

§ Appian, B.C. v. 85 ; ‘O peév 5) Kaicap eénXaro Tis veds ml ras wérpas. 

|| Appian, B. C. v. 86. 


night on land in the midst of wounded and starving fugitives, 
Cornificius cast anchor, ignorant of the fate of his leader or of 
the presence of Calvisius and with no plan of action for the 
following day. The dawn brought comfort to every one; 
the cohorts which came up from Rhegium found Octavianus on 
the shore, no less exhausted than the rank and file; Cornificius 
perceived that Calvisius had arrived and reassuring messages 
passed between the two admirals and their fugitive general.* 
However, while their confidence was thus rising, a furious 
storm broke upon them which lasted all that day and the 
following night and destroyed the greater and the best 
part of the fleet. t The winds completed the work which 
the admirals of Pompeius had begun; Octavianus lost 
his fleet and the Sicilian expedition ended in miserable 

The blow was more serious for the reason that Antony had 
meanwhile been winning the most brilliant military successes 
in the east. The Parthians had once more invaded the Roman 
provinces in the spring under the command of Pacorus, the 
king’s favourite son, while Antony was still in Greece ; how- 
ever, Ventidius, with admirable rapidity and skill, had been able 
to concentrate all the Roman forces in Syria and Cilicia and 
had inflicted a memorable defeat upon the enemy, apparently 
on June 9, sixteen years after the disaster of Carrhe. Pacorus 
himself had perished in the conflict [ and Crassus was thus 
avenged. The death of a Parthian prince had expiated the 
death of a Roman pro-consul.§ The enthusiasm at Rome was 
so great that the Senate decreed a triumph not only to Antony, 
the chief in command, but to Ventidius himself, |] an unpre- 
cedented measure. Antony had gone to Asia shortly after the 
battle of Gindarus and had taken command of the army of 
Ventidius, which had already opened hostilities against the 
king of Commagene, a great supporter of the Parthians, and was 
besieging Samosata ; Antony then continued the siege which 

* Appian, B. C. v. 87-88. 

t+ Appian, B. C. v. 89-90; Dion, xlviii. 48. 

at Dion, xiix. 19-20; Livy, Per. 128; Plutarch, Ant. 34; Oros. VI. 
Be intarch, dah 543 || Dion, xlix. 21 

38 B.C. 

The defeat of 
avenged by 

38 B.C. 

sends Mecenas 
to Antony, 


his general had begun.* Against these triumphs Octavianus 
could show nothing but the success of Agrippa against the 
Aquitani, and this was no compensation for the Sicilian disaster, 
which had caused merriment throughout Italy. Money was 
scarce and the state of public opinion forbade Octavianus to 
impose fresh taxation ; + Antony was likely to be furious with 
him and, to increase his embarrassment, the present year, 38, 
was the last of the five years of the triumvirate, which could 
only be renewed after discussion with his colleagues. In so 
difficult a situation, his lavish distribution of offices did not help 
him greatly, though he appointed as manyas sixty-seven pretors 
during that year. [ He had hoped for a moment that Antony 
would be detained in Syria by the campaign against the 
Parthians ; but towards the end of September he heard that 
Antony had made peace with the king of Commagene in return 
for a monetary indemnity and that he was preparing to return 
to Greece, § with the fixed resolve of interfering in Italian 
affairs. Antony left Caius Sossius as governor in Syria; he 
was another nonentity who had risen in Antony’s service and 
was now ordered to complete the conquest of Judea, to transfer 
the provinces to Herod and to capture Jerusalem, where Anti- 
gonus continued to hold out. || 

Octavianus then resolved to send to Athens as delegates to 
Antony, Mecenas,@ Lucius Cocceius and Caius Fonteius 
Capito** with the object of soothing his indignation and arrang- 
ing a friendly agreement for the renewal of the triumvirate. 
Horace, who was invited to accompany Mecenas as far as 
Brundisium, has given us a fine description of this journey in 
the fifth satire of the first book. He left Rome by carriage, 
probably during the second half of September, and accom- 

* Plutarch, Ant. 34; Dion, xlix. 21. It was natural that Antony 
should assume command upon his arrival. The supposed jealousy of 
Ventidius is thus netitious. 

+ Appian, B. C. v.92. Possibly at this moment the revolt against 
the publicani occurred, to which Dion refers, xlviil. 43. 

{ Dion, xlviii. 43. 

§ Plutarch, Ant. 34; Dion, xlix. 22 (he is wrong in saying that 
Antony started for Italy). 

|| Dion, xlix. 22. q Appian, B. C. v. 92. 

** Florace, Saf. I. v. 32. 


panied only by a friendly Greek rhetorician, Heliodorus, 
he reached Aricia in the evening and spent the night with 
his companion in a modest inn; the next day they started 
early and in the evening reached Appii Forum on the edge of 
the Pontine marshes, whence the canal was to take them to 
Terracina during the night. Horace was unable to drink wine 
owing to a disease of the eyes, and as he did not care for the bad 
water of the village he resolved to go without food for that 
evening ; while the other travellers were dining, he went to 
watch the boatmen and their young slaves who were preparing 
the boat and embarking the luggage. The first stars were 
twinkling in the sky. In the evening the boat, drawn by a 
mule on the tow path, started to the songs of the boatman 
and the passengers; by degrees the voices were silent, the 
passengers went to sleep and the boatman alone continued to 
sing until sleep overcame him also. At dawn a traveller per- 
ceived that the boat had stopped and that the boatman was 
asleep. He therefore woke him unceremoniously. On the 
third day at ten o’clock in the morning the two travellers were 
able to wash their faces and hands at the inn of the Fons Feronia, 
whence they set out for Terracina, three miles distant. There 
they found Mecenas, Cocceius and Capito, and Horace bathed 
his eyes with collyrium. ‘The fourth day they set out together 
for Capua, passing Fundi, where the pretor, the mayor of the 
age, came to meet them with great ceremony and caused them 
much amusement ; they reached Formiz, where they spent the 
night and were entertained by Lucius Lucinius Murena in 
his villa. The next morning Plautius, Varius and Virgil arrived 
from Naples ; Virgil possibly came from the Campanian estate, 
which Octavianus had given him. The company thus increased 
started in carriages and spent the evening of the fifth day at a 
little inn on the Bridge of Campania. The next day they 
stopped at Capua where Macenas, who had a passion for 
physical exercise, played a game of ball. On the seventh day 
they reached the Caudine Forks and went to the magnificent 
villa of Cocceius, where dinner was prolonged far into the night 
and enlivened by a stage quarrel of buffoons. The next day 
they reached Beneventum, where the innkeeper nearly set the 
1ogs a 

38 B.C, 

38 B.C. 


house on fire while roasting thrushes for them. Mecenas 
and his friends were obliged to help him to extinguish the con- 
flagration. From Beneventum on the ninth day of the journey 
Horace was delighted to see the mountains of his native country, 
but was obliged to spend the night at Trevicum in a smoky 
inn where he madea vain attempt to seduce a serving-girl, whose 
modesty, however, was not remarkable. Two days later they 
were at Canusium, where Varius left them ; on the twelfth day 
they reached Rubiz over roads made difficult by the rain, and 
though when they came to Barium on the thirteenth day the 
weather had mended, the roads were worse than ever. On the 
fourteenth day they reached Egnatia and saw in the temple the 
miraculous incense which burned without being lighted; the 
poet was much amused by this superstition which, as he said, 
was good enough for the Jews. For himself, he did not believe 
that the gods troubled about such foolishness. On the fifteenth 
day, after a journey of three hundred and sixty miles from 
Rome, almost entirely by carriage, they reached Brundisium, 
where Mzcenas embarked for Greece. 

The narrative of this voyage is an interesting document. 
We see Mecenas, one of the greatest personages of his time, 
obliged on several occasions during this short journey from 
Rome to Brundisium, to stay at abominable inns. Thus upon 
this high road there were few rich landowners at that time 
able to give hospitality to these illustrious travellers, and upon 
the ancient Appian way there were numbers of deserted and 
abandoned villas, gloomy memorials of the vanished pluto- 
cracy and of the fallen grandeur of the Roman aristocracy. 


Antony’s reply to Octavianus—Agrippa builds a fleet—The 
meeting and convention of Tarentum—The slow transforma- 
tion of Italy—The return to tradition—The De re rustica of 
Varro—The fundamental ideas and the inconsistencies of 
the book—Town and country according to Varro—The 

On November 27 of this year, 38 B.c., Ventidius entered Rome Antony’s 
amid the applause of the people and celebrated the triumph *4ensemen* 
over the Parthians; * immediately afterwards (the precise Octavianus. 
dates are unfortunately wanting) Mecenas returned from 

Greece and Agrippa from Gaul. + Octavianus had hoped to 

secure a triumph for Agrippa to counterbalance the triumph of 
Ventidius and to show that Antony’s generals had no monopoly 

of victory. Agrippa, however, understood that a triumph de- 

creed through Octavianus for comparatively unimportant ex- 

ploits in Gaul, would have seemed futile in comparison with 

that of Ventidius, which had been decreed by the loud voice of 

public opinion, after the glorious battle of Gindarus ; possibly 

he also feared to arouse the jealousy of Octavianus and asserted 

that he had no wish for a triumph in view of the recent disaster 

at Scylla. { There was also more serious business at hand. We 

have no direct evidence of the message which Maecenas brought 

to Octavianus, but succeeding events incline us to believe that 

it must have been nearly as follows: Antony declared himself 

ready tohelp Octavianus in thewar against Pompeius and to give 

Cll ppyd40l, 475. t Appian, B. C. v. 92. 

t Dion, xlviii. 49; these motives for Agrippa’s refusal are merely 
conjectural, but that given by Dion was certainly not the pretext 
alleged by Agrippa. 


38 B.C. 

constructs a 


him part of his fleet ; in exchange he required a contingent of 
soldiers for the conquest of Persia, apparently a valuable con- 
tingent, not composed of such raw recruits as Antony could 
have enlisted in Italy without reference to Octavianus, but tried 
soldiers taken from his colleague’s army. Antony had now 
resolved to attempt war with Persia in the following year (the 
year 37); but part of his army was then besieging Jerusalem, 
his fleet was useless for the conquest of Persia and he was short 
of money; he therefore considered that this exchange would 
enable him to save naval expenditure. * With reference to the 
renewal of the triumvirate, he would postpone the matter until 
the spring, when he was coming to Italy to conclude the ex- 
change; this was a further expedient obliging Octavianus to 
adopt a conciliatory attitude. In fact, as the triumvirate was 
not renewed until the endof the year, if Octavianus did not wish 
to return to private life or to act illegally, he would be obliged 
to leave Rome on January 1 of the year 37, for a fundamental 
principle of the Roman constitution allowed every leader to 
retain his command by interim beyond his term of office, when 
his successor had not been appointed or was not upon the spot, 
but in that case he was obliged to remain outside the pomerium. 
Thus the triumvirs would retain their imperium over the 
armies in the provinces, in other words the vital part of their 
authority, as long as their successors were not appointed, on 
condition that they remained outside of Rome; t this was a 
matter of indifference to Lepidus and Antony, who were in 
Africa and Greece, but was most embarrassing to Octavianus, 
who was in charge of the government of Italy. 

Antony, in short, wished that his colleague’s forces should 
share the probable wastage of the Persian campaign, though 
he proposed to monopolise the resulting glory and power. 
His proposals were thus naturally the subject of great con- 
sideration and discussion for Octavianus and his friends. Should 

* That this was one of the objects which Antony had in view in 
proposing the change is expressly stated by Appian, B. C. v. 93: rf 
Te yap xopnyla Tod vavTLKOD Kamar. . 

+ Cp. the acute arguments of Kromayer, Die Rechtliche Begriindung 
des Principats, Marburg, 1888, p. 7. I entirely share his point of 


they yield or resist ? If they resisted, how could they avoid a 
civil war? Doubtless under the advice of Agrippa and Mace- 
nas, Octavianus immediatelyset about the construction of a new 
fleet and did not shrink from the necessity of burdening the 
landowners with further taxation in money and slaves ; * he 
wished, when Antony returned in the spring, to be able to 
reply that he had no need of his ships and thus to bargain for an 
exchange less onerous to himself. Agrippa, who was an active 
and resourceful man, undertook the construction of the new 
fleet. He immediately went to Naples, enlisted workmen, 
ordered his soldiers to take the pick-axe and the hatchet and 
conceived the idea of digging a canal between Puteoli and Cape 
Misenum and of connecting the lake of Avernus with the Lu- 
crine lake ; he also proposed to change the narrow strip of land 
which separated the Lucrine Lake from the sea into a break- 
water with openings. tf At the beginning of the year 37 the 
shores of the beautiful bay of Puteoli were crowded with 
navvies, masons, smiths and shipwrights at work upon the 
harbour and the fleet. 

However, at the end of the year 38 Octavianus had left the 
pomeerium {; on January 1, 37, the powers of the triumvirs 
expired and Rome was once more administered by the old 
republican magistrates already appointed ; their numbers had 
been increased during the last year. Not only a large number 
of pretors butalso an extraordinarynumberof questors had been 
appointed.§ As Octavianus could not undertake the war against 
Sextus Pompeius until he had secured an agreement with 
Antony, nothing was done until the month of May, when 
Antony reached the port of Tarentum with three hundred 
ships || to effect the proposed exchange. Octavianus, however, 

* Dion, xlviii. 49. 

+ Dion, xlviii. 48-51 ; Velleius, ii. 79 ; Florus, IV. viii. 6 ; Suetonius, 
WT Faronisen: Die Rechiliche Begriindung des Principats, Marburg, 
1888, p. 7, on the subject of this conjecture, necessary to explain the 
events of this year. § Dion, xlviii. 53. 

|| Appian, B. C. v. 93. For this year again we can only determine 
the dates approximately. The date of May 37, for Antony’s arrival 
is proposed by Kromayer, Die Rechtliche Begriindung des Principats, 

Marburg, 1888, 56-57, who relies upon excellent arguments. However, 
I cannot understand why Antony went to Tarentum instead of Brun- 

37. B.C, 

Antony and 
Octavianus ; 
the agreement 
of Tarentum., 

37 B.C. 


was not there and had sent no message. Antony was forced 
to send out messengers in every direction to look for him and ask 
for a reply, and to spend a long time in waiting, as Octavianus 
showed no inclination to answer. At length the reply came in 
the negative, to the effect that Octavianus did not require 
Antony’s ships, as he had now built a fleet. Antony was greatly 
exasperated. He may easily have understood that this was 
merely a pretext to secure better conditions, but none the less 
he saw his expedition against Persia hampered by a fresh 
obstacle. On the other hand he could not use force or begin a 
fresh civil war to oblige his colleague to accept part of his ships, 
notwithstanding the absurd idea which had induced Octavianus 
to build a new fleet while Antony’s ships were rotting in the 
waters of Greece. It was therefore necessary to wait and bring 
Octavianus to reason by othermeans. Antony, who was always 
ready with an expedient, made use of his wife on this occasion ; 
he frightened the gentle Octavia by threatening to make war 
upon her brother, induced her to intervene and sent further 
envoys. Octavianus, however, did not hasten to reply and 
Antony was kept waiting during June and July. At length 
Octavianus appears to have resolved in the month of August to 
visit Tarentum with Agrippa and Mecenas. Octavia came 
to meet them and begged Octavianus not to make her the 
most unhappy of women now that her happiness was complete, 
by provoking a war in which she would lose her brother or her 
husband,* and her brother heard her prayers. Such at any rate 
was the story believed by the public, which was now accustomed 
to see women in charge of political business. In reality, 
Octavianus, Agrippa and Mecenas understood that they must 
give Antony some partial satisfaction and carry out the 
exchange, which in any case was worth their while; if they 
exasperated the triumvir beyond all bounds, they might drive 
him into an alliance with Sextus or with Lepidus. This 

disium. Plutarch, Ant. 35, says that the inhabitants of Brundisium 
would not allow him to enter, but he does not explain the reason. 
They could only have acted thus upon the orders of Octavianus ; but if 
Octavianus would not admit Antony to any large harbour, why did he 
not give the same orders to Tarentum ? 

* Plutarch, Ant. 35; Dion, xlviii. 54; Appian, B. C. v. 93. 


necessity, even more than the prayers of Octavia, facilitated 
an agreement at Tarentum. Antony showed greater modera- 
tion in his demands and Octavianus consented to yield; it was 
agreed that a law should be presented to the people renew- 
ing the triumvirate for five years, from January I of the year 
37; * Antony gave Octavianus a hundred and thirty ships and 
received twenty one thousand men in exchange.t It was also 
decided that Julia, the daughter of Octavianus, should be 
betrothed to Domitius. { Finally the treaty of Misenum was 
cancelled. Antony immediately started for Syria, leaving a 
hundred and thirty ships at Tarentum. 

This compact, however, did not arouse the general satis- 
faction which had followed the peace of Brundisium. The 
disturbances, the riot and confusion of the year 39 had been fol- 
lowed by silent exasperation or gloomy indifference. After the 
first momentary excitement a general feeling of despondency 
supervened ; it was supposed that the power of the triumvirs 
was impregnable and that prospects of improvement or change 
were hopeless. No one suspected that the triumvirs themselves 
regarded their position as extremely dangerous and unstable. 
Thus, apart from men who aspired to official posts, it seemed 
that public interest in politics was dead. Yet beneath this 
universal despondency and indifference lay hid the first impulse 
to salutary reform, the first timid national effort at self-adapta- 
tion to the new order of things which had followed the storms 
of the revolution, and the first attempt to make the best of the 
dreadful desolation as of the happy and prosperous age of Czsar 
and Pompey. Such is the eternal law of life—ceaselessly trans- 
forming good into evil and evil into good. By degrees, beneath 
the patient toil of individuals striving to secure a share of pros- 
perity for themselves, the scourges of the revolution became so 
many benefits ; even the division of land and capital, which the 

* Dion, xlviii. 54; Appian, B. C. v. 95; Appian, iii. 28. In the 
second passage Appian says that the law was approved by the people, 
while in the first he says it was not. The second statement is the 
more likely ; the triumvirs had no interest in neglecting a formality 
which cost them nothing and gave legal significance to their authority. 

+ Appian, B. C. v. 95; Plutarch, Ant. 35, says, on the contrary, 
two legions and a thousand men in exchange for a hundred and twenty 
ships. + Dion, xlviil. 54. 

37 Boy 

The progress 
of social 

37 B.C. 

The reaction to 
simplicity of 


revolution had executed with such injustice and violence, began 
to produce salutary effects. ‘The veterans who had received a 
share of the great estates after their division, the new land- 
owners who had bought land cheap during the civil wars, and 
the original proprietors who had lost part of their domains, set 
to work under the stimulus of the economic crisis ; their increas- 
ing necessities, the taxation laid upon them and their desire to 
repair the losses they had suffered as rapidly as possible, were 
impulses which finally completed a change begun a century 
before, and transformed the old clumsy style of agriculture to 
new and more scientific methods, in which capital was invested, 
slaves employed and eastern agricultural science turned to the 
best account. 

If, however, there was no lack of land, money became very 
scarce when the Roman world, already devastated by civil war, 
had been divided into two parts by Antony; it seemed that 
Italy must resign herself to do without even the smallest tribute 
from Asia. For the moment, however, this want of money was 
a real benefit. In Ceasar’s time credit had been too easily 
gained, with disastrous results ; every one had abused the oppor- 
tunity by plunging into rash speculations and enterprises, and 
by expenditure often wholly unreasonable. The difficulty of 
borrowing money at the present time forced men to husband 
their resources, obliged them to turn what they had to the 
best account, and introduced greater foresight and prudence 
into the social and commercial temper of the time. Public 
feeling was also undergoing a change; the time was long past 
when Italy rejoiced over the vast conquests of Cesar and 
Crassus and the huge expenditure of Pompey; the time when 
fortunes were speedily acquired, when luxury was unrestrained 
in public and private life, when ambition was unscrupulous and 
debt was lightly incurred, when successful rapacity or fraud 
was tolerated or even admired by the nation which plundered 
the world to adorn its country seats and to provide good cheer 
for its free citizens, living on the work of slaves and on the 
tribute of the conquered. But now the panic spread by a 
succession of disasters had overcome the leisured and cultivated 
class; they had experienced during the revolution the des- 


potism which they had long exerted over others; they now 
remembered the insignificant beginnings of the great empire 
and regretted the virtues of the old agricultural age which the 
vices of the mercantile epoch had destroyed. After the 
extravagances of the revolutionary spirit, old-time tradition 
became once more fashionable ; there was a revival of ancient 
habits and customs in those departments of life where the 
revolution had left the individual the power of choice—private 
life and domestic government. As luxurious display had been 
formerly fashionable, so now was ostentatious poverty and 
simplicity. When Mecenas urged Horace to enter political 
life and to seek office, the poet answered by the sixth satire of 
the first book, boasting that his father had been a good and 
honourable freedman, declaring himself content with his 
poverty and his humble ancestors, and desirous of nothing more.* 
Back to the land, the healthy and fertile mother of all things, 
was universally regarded as the wisest of precepts. Sallust 
had put his pen, his tongue and his sword at Cesar’s service 
and had supported the party which had done its best to foster 
the revolutionary spirit of the mercantile age; yet he now 
based his philosophy of history upon the theory that nations 
were corrupted by wealth, luxury and pleasure, for the reason 
that these influences destroyed the sterner virtues of the 
rustic age. The dissension of the triumvirs, the possibility of 
further civil war and confiscation were indeed current topics, 
but in the upper and middle classes at Rome and in the small 
Italian towns, in the palace of Mzcenas and in the houses 
which Czsar’s veterans had taken from their lawful owners, the 
most serious subject of discussion was agriculture, the new 
methods of its pursuit and the profit to be gained from it ; 
books and advice upon this question were in the greatest 
demand. During those years a treatise upon agriculture had 
been already published by a Roman senator, Cnzus Tremellius 
Scrofa, who, like many others, had spent his life in the cultiva- 
tion of his fields to the neglect of his political work.t Among the 

* Horace, Sat. I. vi. 100 ff. As regards the time and age when this 
satire was produced, see the fine study of Cartault, Etude sur les satires 
d@’ Horace, Paris, 1899, 29 ff. + Schanz, Gesch. Rom. Lit. i. 301. 

37 B.C. 

a7 B.C. 

Varro upon 


professional writers who were then becoming a class recruited 
from the freedmen of noble families and from middle-class 
citizens, several were naturally found who imitated the example 
of Scrofa, though not themselves agriculturists, and began to 
compile treatises from the works of the Greek writers on the 
subject, intended to meet the needs both of the old and the 
new classes of landowners. Such was the case of Caius Julius 
Hyginus, a slave who seems to have been taken from Alex- 
andria by Cesar in his youth ; he had received his freedom and 
had been bequeathed to Octavianus.* He composed, probably 
in the year 37,a book entitled De agricultura and a treatise upon 
bee-keeping, the first ever written in Latin. t The freedman’s 
humble compilation met the needs of the moment so entirely 
that two greater intellects began the composition in that year 
of a comprehensive treatise upon the technicalities of country 
life and of a great poem upon agriculture. 

Varro had escaped the proscription with the loss of a great 
part of his large property ;{ at the age of eighty, towards the 
end of the year 37, § he resolved to collect his wide experiences 
as an agriculturist and a politician, his knowledge and his 
reflections as a practical man and a scholar,|| in a book of the 
utmost importance for the history of ancient Italy, though it 
has been strangely neglected by historians. Of all the writers of 
this epoch whose works have come down to us, no one, not even 
Cicero himself, has striven harder than Varro in his dialogue De 
re rustica, to secure a general outlook amid the confusion which 
then overwhelmed his country. Was Italy in a state of pro- 
gress or of decay? Should she boldly proceed to a better 
future or retrace her steps? Varro attempts to find some 
general formula which will solve the antagonism then arising 
from the contrast between the old agricultural tradition and 
the mercantile spirit which pervaded even agriculture; an 

* Suetonius, iii., Gr. 20. 

+ Columella, IX. xiii. 8. Cp. Schanz, Gesch. Rom. Lit. ii. 218. 

+t When Varro in the De r, r. speaks of his property, he always uses 
the imperfect. For example, II. ii. 9: mihi greges in Apulia hiber 

§ Varro, R. R. I. i. 1: annus enim octogesimus admonet me... . 

\| Varro, R. R. I. i, 11: que tpse in mets fundis colendo animadverti, 
et que legi, et qu@ a peritis audit. 


obstinate and silent struggle had continued between the great 37 3.c. 
owners of the Jatifundia who had undergone severe trials in 
recent years, and the middle class which did not stop short of 
revolution and violence ; the object of the latter was to divide 
Italy into moderate-sized holdings of thirty, forty or fifty acres, 
which, when cultivated by slaves, would provide their owners 
with the necessary resources for the pleasures, the duties, 
and the functions of municipal life in the numerous Italian 
towns. Varro professed what we should now call the theory of 
progress ; he does not agree with the philosophy of the Greek 
poets, who regarded the history of the world as a gradual 
decadence from the ancient golden age; he believes that 
humanity is ever changing and improving; in consequence, 
that men first lived on the fruits of the earth and then began the 
primitive barbarism of pastoral life ; scattered amid the solitude 
of the country they next began cultivation in common and 
eventually united in towns, where the arts and trades, the 
pleasures and also the most refined and deadly vices * were 
developed and perfected. He wishes, therefore, from a philo- 
sophical point of view to study the needs of his own age, which 
he regards as a period of inevitable transition. 

When, however, these personages, who are all rich landowners The subject 0 
consider the phenomena of this transition in isolation, they fall faa 
into strange contradictions, nor does Varro escape this danger 
when he speaks under his own name in the introduction or in 
the dialogue. Varro’s father-in-law, C. Fundanius, the knight 
Agrius and the tax-farmer Agrasius examine a map of Italy 
painted upon the wall of the temple of Tellus; they exclaim 
that Italy is the best-cultivated country in the world t and has 
become almost entirely one vast garden.f On the other 
hand Cnezus Tremellius Scrofa states with greater modesty 
that Italy was better cultivated in his time than in preceding 
centuries.§ Moreover, Varro always repeats the pessimistic 
outcry so common at his time, which complained that men had 
grown too effeminate, preferred to applaud actors in the 
towns rather than to till the soil, and neglected the art of Ceres, 

* Varro, R. R. ii. Pref. 3-43 Th ViAITO sav sa tee, 1022. 
HOV ALLOW ts EX. Ls it. Os SU Varto, ke Ke vil, 2. 

27, BC. 



with the result that Italy could no longer produce sufficient 
for her own consumption as before, and that Rome was fed 
upon imported corn.* The methods of agriculture were 
changing, but the results of the first attempts were so variable 
that it was difficult to decide whether failure was due to the 
inexperience of the farmers or to the insuperable difficulties of 
their situation. ‘Thus Varro offers no direct contradiction to 
the statement of an idea then widely spread, that vine cultiva- 
tion was unprofitable in Italy. | The characters of his dialogue 
knew by experience that a rich landowner can grow wealthy 
by rearing asses for farmers and horses for carriages, for chariots 
and for the army, by keeping great flocks of goats in the pas- 
turages of southern Italy and Epirus under the guardianship of 
Illyrian or Gaulish slaves ; each slave was in charge of some 
eighty or a hundred animals, under the direction of a more 
experienced and intelligent foreman. Goats’ hair was wanted 
for engines of war and goats’ skin was required for bottles ; 
sheep’s wool could be sold profitably, as the low class popula- 
tions of the little towns increased, for the reason that this 
class could not make their own clothes with the wool of their 
own sheep. Yet even Varro preserves some tinge of the old 
animosity of the Italian peasants, who feared a century earlier 
that they might be driven from the fields of their ancestors to 
make room for sheep and goats. He sometimes complains that 
the old laws restricting the rights of pasturage and the number 
of flocks should have fallen into disuse. | Faithful to the great 
Roman traditions, Varro detests the towns, which he regards as 
schools of corruption, idleness and luxury. He praises the pure 
austerity of country life, which maintains bodily health without 
the artificial labour of gymnastics, and moral virtue without 
the wearisome toil of philosophy ; he regrets the age when the 
nobles were accustomed to spend the greater part of their lives 
in the country and maintained a protectorate over a small band 
of free farmers, breathing pure country air instead of the 
pestilential odours of slums and alleys. § 

Yet Varro devotes the whole of the third book in his treatise 

* Varro, R. R. ii. Pref. 2 ff. t Varro, R. oR, 1. yay 7 
{ Varro, R. R. ii. Pref. 4. § Ibid, 1 ff. 


to showing how agriculturists may profit by the vices, the orgies 
and the debauches of the great towns in general and Rome in 
particular. He explains how profit can be made in the neigh- 
bourhood of Rome as a result of the frequency of public ban- 
quetsand the general desire for good living, by rearing thrushes, 
geese, pigeons, snails, fowls, peacocks, venison, wild boars and 
indeed any animal, the flesh of which could break the monotony 
of pork, lamb and kid, the only meat commonly consumed at a 
time when the ox was almost entirely a draught animal. Varro 
enumerates and studies these sources of profit with the utmost 
care. One of the speakers relates what he had heard from a 
freedman who kept the accounts of a villa belonging to Marcus 
Seius near Ostia; all kinds of animals were there reared for 
sale to Roman merchants and brought in a profit of fifty thou- 
sand sesterces a year.* Varro adds that his maternal aunt, 
by rearing thrushes on a Sabine estate, twenty-four miles away 
on the Via Salaria, had made sixty thousand sesterces in oneyear, 
during which she had sold five thousand thrushes at an average 
of twelve sesterces apiece, about two shillings and three pence 
of our money ; an excellent farm belonging to Varro at Reate, 
containing some two hundred acres, only brought in thirty 
thousand sesterces or three hundred pounds a year.t The 
first speaker resumes with a further quotation from the case of 
Marcus Seius, to show that a muster of a hundred peacocks, 
which could be looked after by an intelligent procurator, either 
a slave or a freedman, would produce about forty thousand 
sesterces a year by the sale of eggs and chickens.t The members 
of the party utter exclamations of surprise and admiration ; 
and the old writer then forgets his austere theories to explain 
with the utmost care the means of extracting these great profits 
from the muddy waters of town vice and luxury. 

Are we then to conclude, as many historians have done, that 
this admiration for past simplicity so loudly professed by 
Varro and many of his contemporaries, was merely a meaning- 
less anachronism? Ido not believeit. Notwithstanding the 
numerous and profound influences which were changing the 

* Varro, RK: Ro UIT iu. 14. {} Varro, R. R. III. it. rs. 
+ Varro, R. R. iii. 6. 

37 B.C. 

The land 

37 B.C. 


old customs, these virtues, modified to greater refinement than 
before, were still necessary to the class of small Italian land- 
owners. Warro fully realised the ultimate reason of the diffi- 
culties under which this class was struggling. In earlier 
centuries when the head of the household under the protection 
of rich patrons cultivated his land by his own labour and that 
of his children, numerous families were able to gain a living 
from small allotments, provided that they were ready to work 
hard and to be content with little; similarly, large estates 
worked by slaves would produce some small monetary revenue 
to the owner if the land were fertile and the slaves cheap. 
The holding of moderate size, however, cultivated by slave 
labour, from which the master expected to gain an ample 
revenue without any labour of his own, was an impossibility, 
for a reason which Varro then perceived, and which the political 
economy of the last hundred years has made plain ; this was the 
great expense of slave labour, which speedily swallowed up the 
income from a small holding. Varro quotes from Cato’s 
account, which showed that an olive plantation of two hundred 
and forty acres required thirteen slaves, a bailiff and his wife, 
five ploughmen, three labourers, a donkey driver, a swineherd 
and a shepherd, while a vineyard of a hundred acres required a 
bailiff and his wife, ten ploughmen, a labourer, a swineherd and 
a donkey-driver, fifteen slaves in all. He points out, however, 
with justice that these figures are applicable to farms of a 
certain acreage, but that for smaller holdings the expense is 
relatively greater, as the bailiff and his wife are indispensable 
and the number of slaves cannot always be reduced in propor- 
tion to the smallness of the holding; hence the smaller the 
holding, the more expensive the slave labour.* Varro also 
points out a further inconvenience of slave labour, which 
brought far greater loss upon the small holding than upon the 
large estate, namely the sickness or death of the slaves. The 
loss of one slave might in certain cases absorb the whole of a 
year’s income, if the holding were a small one.t He explains 

* Varro, R. R. i. 18 (this chapter is most important). 
{+ Varro, R. R. I. xvi. 4: non nunquam unius artificis mors tollit 
undi fructum, 


a further difficulty of the same nature in reference to the ac- 
quisition of the implements necessary for cultivation. Formerly 
most of these implements were constructed at home by some 
member of the familia ; Varro says that this method becomes 
more difficult if slaves are employed instead of children. 
Slaves are usually capable only of one kind of labour, and a 
large estate would therefore require a number of artisan 
slaves, trained in their own special branches of labour. The 
maintenance of so many slaves and the risks of death and illness 
would be far too great for a moderate holding to support. 
Varro therefore advises the purchase of land in the neighbour- 
hood of a town where free artisans can be found, or near large 
estates worked by familie of numerous and specially trained 
slaves from which a slave could be hired from time to time for 
some special work.* Finally he urges that free labourers should 
be used as much as possible, especially for unhealthy work or 
for such temporary occupations as harvesting or the vintage ; T 
he urges that a clever slave should be placed over the servants 
as bailiff ; this must be an experienced and faithful man, other- 
wise the estate will cost more than it bringsin.[ Above all, he 
advises economy and simplicity and that the management of 
estates should not follow recent examples, but long-standing 
tradition ; the mania for outward show should be avoided, 
and in starting a farm the model should be the old Romans 
and not men like Lucullus; otherwise the income will be 
swallowed up by the interest upon capital sunk in the under- 
taking. § He is thus led to criticise with good reason the reck- 
less prodigality which had infected Italy in Cesar’s time and 
he understands, even if his views are somewhat confused, that a 
yeoman class of landowners cannot confront the great expenses 
of slave cultivation except upon highly fertile land; in any 
case the holder must be able to sell his produce at a good price, 
be careful in his expenditure and be able to buy the implements 
necessary for his work in the towns. In Cezsar’s time a tem- 
porary rise in prices, caused by the influx of booty, the ease 
of credit and general extravagance, had produced a fictitious 

PAV ALLOW Rn tay 2V 1034's } Ibid. xvii. 2. 
t Ibid. xvii. 4. § Ibid, xi. 1; xiii. 6. 

37 B.C. 

34 B.C. 

The Georgics, 


golden age but no permanent prosperity ; greater prudence was 
now required; expenses and profits, the sale of produce and the 
cost of agriculture must be balanced; in short, farmers must 
return to certain wise principles of the old domestic economy, 
which had been unduly neglected by the former generation. 
Virgil, who was a poet only, had no idea of writing so learned 
a treatise upon agriculture. Some surprise may be felt that 
after the ten Bucolics, he should have begun the composition of 
the Georgics, a work wholly different in matter and in form, in 
this year 37; but it should be remembered that Tremellius 
Hyginius and Varro were writing or publishing their treatises 
at that time. For his new work the poet chose the subject 
which was then in all men’s minds, that of agriculture; in 
this choice he was guided less by the advice of Mecenas than 
by his desire for fame and by his artistic instincts, which 
naturally directed him to the question of the hour. The vitality 
of literature then depended not merely upon the patronage of 
some great aristocratic families, but also upon success and fame 
with the public at large. The admiration of the great for an 
author did not become serious until his popularity was assured. 
Moreover, a poem upon agriculture would strongly appeal to 
Virgil, who was a farmer’s son, had spent his childhood in the 
country, had deep feeling for natural beauty and was also a 
poet and a philosopher, professing the doctrines of Epicurus. 
As a poet and an agriculturist he had studied the theories of 
Greek agriculturists, had seen his father tilling the soil, and 
possessed the necessary knowledge to write a serious treatise 
upon the subject, while his poetic talent gave his work life and 
colour and enabled him to avoid a dry enumeration of theories. 
He proceeded to develop his art of agriculture in a series of 
delightful pictures of country life, and gave it poetic power by 
contrasting the painful labour of those who till the soil with the 
vast background of universal life as he had learnt to contem- 
plate it in the schools of philosophy, while he idealised the 
virtues and the happiness of country life, admiration for which 
had then become almost fashionable. The Georgics are not 
cold imitations of Greek poems, elaborated by a scholar with no 
love or experience of agriculture; they are a kind of national 


epic, singing the revival of agriculture in Italy—the great 
achievement of the hundred and fifty years which had elapsed 
since the death of the Gracchi. Virgil found poetic inspiration 
to sing the story of this great work, while Varro, an agriculturist 
and economist, attempted to show its difficulties and hazards. 
In his poem Virgil composed an immortal hymn to the plough, 
an implement which, quite as much as the sword, enabled the 
Romans to conquer Italy. 

Til U 




THE EVENTS AT ROME ON MARCH 15, 16 AND 17, 44 8.c. 

Tue historical sources for the events which occurred at Rome between 
Cesar’s death and the first session of the Senate held after ue death 
of the dictator, are as follows : 

Appian, B. C. il. 119-152. 

Nicolas of Damascus, Bios Kaicapos, 26-27. 

Dion Cassius, xliv. 28-35. 

To these chief sources of information must be added scattered notices 
in various works, especially in Cicero’s Philippics and Letters and in 
Plutarch’s Lives of Cesar, Cicero, Brutus and Antony. Cicero in 
Phil. II. xxxv. 89, informs us that the session of the Senate in the 
Temple of Tellus took place on March 17: Post diem tertium venti in 
@dem Telluris. ‘The accounts, however, which have been given are so 
confused and contradictory that this episode of ancient history has well 
been called an inextricable tangle. We propose to attempt the discovery 
of the guiding thread and will, therefore, return to the moment when 
the conspirators had barricaded themselves in the Capitol. 

Let us first of all take the account of Appian. Appian regards the 
occupation of the Capitol and the convocation of the Senate as separated 
only by one night. (Chapters 120-126.) He relates that after the 
occupation of the Capitol : 

(a) The conspirators convoked in the forum a contio of people whom 
they had hired to make a demonstration in their favour and the 
pretor Cinna delivered a speech against Cesar in the forum (chap. 

(2) Dolabella hired a band of veterans, appeared in the forum with the 
insignia of a consul, made a violent speech against Cesar and invited 
the conspirators to come down from the Capitol (chap. 122). 

(c) Brutus and Cassius therefore came down from the Capitol and 
Brutus made a speech to the people in the forum (chap. 123). 

(d) After Brutus and Cassius had returned to the Capitol the con- 
spirators were visited by their most eminent friends in Rome and 



sent an embassy to open negotiations with Lepidus and with Antony 

(chap. 123). 

(e) Antony and Lepidus replied by a declaration intended as a blind 
(chap. 124). 

(f) Then Antony (chap. 125) ras pév dpyds €xéXevoe vuxtopudakeiv 
(this is the first allusion to the night) and made other arrangements 
for the night; during that same night (rs d€ airas vuxrds) he seizes 
Cesar’s money and papers. The next day the Senate was convoked ; 
Oudypappa vuKtos aveytyvooKketo “Avt@viov tiv Bovdjy cvvKadodyTos 
ére mpd nuéepas és TO THS Ts tepdv. 

It is obvious that as there were two nights between the assassination 
and the senatorial session, namely, the night of the 15th—16th and 16th— 
17th, Appian leaves out a day and relates events as if everything had 
happened as on the 15th and 16th and as if the Senate had been convoked 
on the morning of the 16th. I am therefore tempted to suppose that 
the events related in chapters 121 to 124, which happened between the 
assassination of Cesar and the evening of the 15th, really occupied a 
longer time and extended over the days of the 15th and 16th. This 
supposition is confirmed by the fact that Cesar was killed at an advanced 
hour of the morning and that the flight to the Capitol, where the con- 
spizators barricaded the entrance and made their necessary arrangements, 
required a certain time; it is therefore unlikely that they could have 
come to any decision before the afternoon. 

One of the events related by Appian certainly happened on the 
afternoon of the 15th; this was the visit to the conspirators of the 
leading members of the conservative party. Dion, who says that the 
citizens came to the conspirators in the evening, agrees with Appian 
on this point; while this testimony receives irrefutable confirmation 
from the direct evidence of Cicero, who was present at the meeting ; 
Cic. A. XIV. x. 1; Memuinistine me clamare, illo ipso primo Capitolino 
die senatum in Capitolium a pretoribus vocari? ‘This phrase certainly 
alludes to the meeting of which Cicero gives other details in his letter A. 
XIV. xiv. 2: Illum sermonem capitolinum mihi non placutsse, tu testis 
es. Quid ergo? Ista culpa Brutorum? Minime illorum quidem: 
sed aliorum brutorum, qui se cautos ac saptentes putant: quibus satis fut 
letart, non nullis etiam gratulart, nullis permanere. 

Thus, during the afternoon of the 15th, a meeting of the conservative 
leaders took place at which the position was discussed. The passages 
from Cicero above quoted show that the meeting was numerously 
attended in the Capitol and that the discussion was lengthy; it is 
very unlikely that every one should have met merely because all had 
been seized by the idea of visiting the Capitol precisely at the same 
moment. On the other hand, we have to consider the position of the 
conspirators and to remember that they had intended to speak to the 


Senate and induce it to decree the restoration of the republic immediately 
after Cesar’s death, but that this plan had been prevented by the flight 
of the senators ; as soon as they had recovered from their agitation and 
had barricaded themselves in the Capitol, one of their first ideas must 
obviously have been to secure an understanding with the leading members 
of the conservative party. This idea was so inevitable in the case of 
men who wished to restore pure republicanism, that they could not 
have waited for these personages to come of their own accord but must 
have sent slaves to them and appointed an hour for their meeting. 
Cicero was naturally one of those invited. 

Thus a meeting was held in the Capitol, on the afternoon of the 15th, 
of the most eminent conservatives, who had probably been summoned 
by the conspirators. What subjects were discussed at this meeting? 
This is a matter of considerable importance, as it may help us to solve 
another problem, the question at what moment Dolabella delivered 
his speech against Czsar and went up to the Capitol with his consular 
insignia. We have already seen that Cicero claims to have proposed at 
this meeting (A. XIV. x. 1), senatum in Capitolium a pretoribus vocart. 
He gives further details in the second Philippic; xxxv. 89; Dicebam 
illis in Capttolio liberatortbus nostris, cum me ad te (scil. ad Antonium) 
tre vellent ut ad defendendam rempublicam te adhortarer, quoad metueres, 
omnia te promissurum: simul ac timere destsses, similem te futurum tut. 
Itaque cum cetert consulares trent, redirent, im sententia manst. 

Even supposing that Cicero slightly exaggerated his far-sightedness 
in this passage from the Philippics, it is obvious that the chief point of 
the discussion was the attitude to be observed with regard to Antony. 
Before Czsar’s death the conspirators had already discussed the advisa- 
bility of killing the dictator’s colleague in the consulship at the same time, 
and this question now appeared in another form; should they treat 
with Antony and request him to convoke the Senate, a duty which was 
his by the constitution, or instead of applying to him, should they con- 
voke the Senate in an irregular manner, for example through the prztors 
Brutus and Cassius, as Cicero proposed ? Now the discussion would 
not have taken this form if it had occurred after Dolabella’s declaration 
of himself as consul and his visit to the Capitol to pay his respects to the 
conspirators. In that case Dolabella would have taken part in the dis- 
cussion and the question would have been asked whether he could be 
commissioned to convoke the Senate. There is, however, no allusion 
to anything of the kind and this clearly proves that Dolabella’s usurpation 
was not carried out until the 16th. This first consideration is supported 
by various facts which incline us to believe that the meeting in the 
Capitol lasted almost till the evening. Nic. Dam. xxvii. tells us that 
the messengers of the conspirators brought their message to Antony 
in the evening. As this message was the first action undertaken by the 


conspirators after the sessio capitolina, this meeting could not have 
concluded until the evening. The fact is only natural; before the 
conspirators had barricaded themselves, had agreed upon their action 
and had summoned the senators, several hours had elapsed, so that the 
meeting could not be held until the afternoon; and a comparatively 
short discussion would bring them to the evening before Dolabella had 
declared himself. 

Dolabella therefore proclaimed himself consul on the 16th. To com- 
plete the narrative of the conspirators’ action during the 15th, we have 
yet to consider whether they held a popular meeting in the forum 
on that day. This meeting must have taken place before the sessto 
capttolina, since this latter lasted until the evening and so it is indeed 
asserted by App. B. C. ii. 122; Dion, lxiv. 21; Nic. Dam. xxvi. 
Plutarch, on the contrary (Brut. 18), puts the speech in the forum after 
the meeting in the Capitol, but this obliges us to regard the speech as 
given on the 16th, since there weuld be no time for it on the evening 
of the 15th. J am therefore inclined to regard Plutarch’s version as the 
most probable. It is impessible that men who were so afraid of the 
people and veterans as to barricade themselves in the Capitol, would 
have ventured to go down to the forum and harangue the people, unless 
they had arranged some guarantee for freedom of speech and their 
personal safety. Their fears were certainly exaggerated, but the his- 
torian must not forget that his characters are for the most part mistaken 
in their judgment of events and act upon their own opinion rather 
than upon the actual situation. Plutarch relates that Brutus and 
Cassius went down to the forum to speak, surrounded by a large escort 
of eminent citizens; I regard this information as accurate because it 
harmonises precisely with the state of affairs and with prevailing feeling, 
and because Brutus and Cassius would certainly not have ventured 
to appear before the people without this precaution. In that case, 
however, the great meeting must have taken place on the 16th; 
the idea of the escort was perhaps borrowed from the escort which 
accompanied Cicero, when Catiline’s accomplices were executed, and 
the conspirators could not have organised such a following until they 
had arranged for the co-operation of the leading conservatives in 
Rome. We have therefore to conjecture that this demonstration 
for the 16th was decided in the sessio capitolina during the afternoon 
of the 15th. 

To sum up, during the afternoon of the 15th the conspirators were 
entirely occupied by their great meeting in the Capitol and they spent 
the whole of the afternoon, first in summoning the meeting and after- 
wards in discussion. ‘The discussion was prolonged and it was resolved 
ainong other measures to send ambassadors of peace to Antony and to 
prepare a great demonstration for the following day. 


We now turn to Antony and to his action during the afternoon of 
March 15. 

Our first notice of him belongs to the evening and refers to the am- 
bassadors of the conspirators and their visit to him. (Appian B. C. ii. 
123; Nic. Dam. xxvii.) We have no information of his movements 
from the moment when he fled from the Senate until the evening. 
This lack of information is probably not accidental, but is very simply 
explained by the fact that Antony did nothing of importance that day. 
Our sources of information are silent upon certain elementary facts 
which the historian can certainly affirm by deduction from the details 
of the position. Here we are confronted by one of those facts which 
can easily be neglected, but which are none the less of great importance ; 
during the hours immediately following Czsar’s death, Antony knew that 
the dictator had been killed, but he did not know the names or numbers 
of the conspirators, their object or their intentions. Hence it is certain, 
though we find no mention of the fact in our sources, that as soon as 
Antony recovered from his agitation, he attempted to procure informa- 
tion, and sent out people for the purpose, while he also sought the counsel 
of his friends ; it is also certain that this procedure must have occupied 
several hours. It is not impossible that he may have sent for certain 
Czsareans who were then with the conspirators in the Capitol, to hear 
their views ; he certainly did not suspect that so many members of his 
party were involved in the assassination. 

Such then was Antony’s first action. What was the result of it? 
What information did he obtain? What friends came to see him? 
As to the information he procured, it was probably confused, contra- 
dictory and exaggerated in the extreme, as has always been the case 
after sudden catastrophes. With regard to the friends who came to 
him, we have a notice which enables us to make a reasonable conjecture. 
Nic. Dam. xxvi. and App. B. C. ii. 123, 124, say that the embassy 
was sent to Antony and to Lepidus and that they both replied simul- 
taneously, according to Nic. Dam., by asking for time for consideration 
until the evening of the next day; while according to Appian they 
declared themselves ready to deliberate with the conspirators before 
the Senate and asserted that they were both agreed to re-establish 
harmony among the citizens. I consider that this information is not 
accurate but is the distortion of a plain fact. Lepidus was not a person- 
age of any great importance ; Czsar’s death deprived him of his post of 
magister equitum ; as we shall see, in contradiction to the habitual asser- 
tion, he had no army in the neighbourhood of Rome; it is therefore 
difficult to understand why the conspirators should have sent ambas- 
sadors to him and not to Dolabella, Calenus, Piso and other illustrious 
Czsareans. Antony’s position was different; he was consul. On the 
other hand, the statement that Lepidus and Antony gave a joint answer 


and were agreed in their views is too definitely stated by the two his- 
torians to be disregarded, and is also confirmed by the fact that during 
the following days we see Antony and Lepidus acting together in agree- 
ment. These contradictions can be solved in a satisfactory manner by 
one conjecture, namely, that Lepidus came to Antony on his first 
invitation and that he was the only man who came; hence when the 
envoys of the conspirators arrived, they found the two men discussing 
their joint action. This will explain how they could both return an 
identical answer upon the same evening, nor is it surprising that Lepidus 
alone should have responded to Antony’s invitation; we know that 
Cesar’s death caused a terrible panic among his friends ; Hirtius, Pansa, 
Calenus and Sallust all fled and did not reappear until later. 

The ambassadors of the conspirators thus found Antony and Lepidus 
occupied in consideration of their future action. In my narrative I 
have made a further conjecture which every thoughtful reader will 
accept as a fact almost demonstrated, so entirely does it seem confirmed 
by the logic of events; I assume that it was during their conversation 
with the ambassadors of the conspirators that Antony and Lepidus 
learnt the rea] nature of the conspiracy and understood that the leading 
members of the Czsarean party were involved in it, in alliance with the 
remnants of the Pompeian party and with many who had joined their 
side. ‘The ambassadors were in fact bound to give the utmost possible 
importance to the conspiracy by stating the number and the names of 
the conspirators in order that Antony might be induced to co-operate 
with them for the restoration of the republic. It is also likely that the 
embassy and the information which it gave, aroused the utmost fear 
and distress on the part of Antony and Lepidus. The alliance of so 
large a number of Czsareans with the Pompeians and conservatives 
hopelessly confused the disposition of political parties and profoundly 
embarrassed such Czsareans as remained faithful. The extent of their 
panic and uncertainty seems to me sufficient explanation of the answer 
given by Antony and Lepidus, in which, as we know, they requested 
a day for consideration ; it is, to my thinking, precisely because they 
learned the names and number of the conspirators in this conversation 
with their ambassadors that we have no notice of the movements of 
Antony and Lepidus except for the evening of that day. When they 
knew that Cesar had fallen at the hands of a coalition of the moderate 
Cesareans and the conservative party, they agreed to call in the help 
of the popular and revolutionary party, the remnants of the party of 
Clodius and the veterans, and in short to adopt the line of conduct 
which they pursued. 

As for the actions of Antony and Lepidus during the evening of the 
15th and the night of the 15th—16th, modern historians have been too 
ready to accept traditions which seem inaccurate. ‘Thus it is commonly 


asserted that Antony went off in the evening (ris d¢ airas vuxrés, 
App. B. C. ii. 125) to the domus publica and took Cesar’s money and 
papers from Calpurnia, that he then seized the State treasury and carried 
it to his house. Now it must be observed in the first place, with regard 
to Cesar’s papers and money, that modern historians, following the 
ancients, who represent Antony as a reckless adventurer, have been in- 
clined to consider this action far more violent and arbitrary than it 
really was. As Czesar’s colleague, he had some implied right to take his 
papers in order to protect them from the enemies of the dictator, who 
might attempt to seize them; this is so true that Cesar himself (App. 
B. C. iii. 5) had left certain documents in his hands. In any case, 
could he leave such important documents in the hands of Calpurnia, and 
as this was impossible, who could take charge of them in the prevailing 
confusion, if not Czsar’s colleague? The same observations are true of 
the money ; Antony rendered a service to Calpurnia by taking charge 
of it and spared her the danger of seeing her house plundered. Possibly 
as Appian says (B. C. il. 125), it was Calpurnia herself who begged the 
consul to take charge of these dangerous possessions. In any case the 
fact is not unlikely. As for the treasury of the republic, it is absolutely 
false to say that Antony went in the night of the 15th—16th to take 
it from the Temple of Ops, where it had been laid up ; thus, historians 
who relate this exploit have misunderstood certain passages in the ancient 
writers which speak of embezzlements of public funds perpetrated in 
the course of several months; Cic. A. XIV. xiv. 5 (letter written 
probably in the month of May) Rapinas scribis ad Opis flert ; Cic. A. 
XIV. xviii. 8 (during the month of May). O hominem pudentem ! 
(Dolabella) Kal. Fan. debuit ; adhuc solvit, presertim quum se maximo 
aere alieno Faberit manu liberavit et Opts opem petiertt. "Thus the public 
treasury had not been emptied on March 15, since money could be 
stolen from it in that month of May. This is confirmed by Cic. Phil. 
li. 14, 15. 

As for Lepidus, equally inaccurate is the statement that he had an 
army outside the pomcerium which he was gathering in view of his early 
departure for his province. Dion, xliv. 22, speaks vaguely of orparidra 
and Appian B. C. ii. 125, of the orparid, but neither tells us what these 
“ soldiers ” or this “‘ army ” of Lepidus was. Nic. Dam. xxvili. is more 
definite and says that during the night Lepidus collected a orparid 
émikovpoy : now the érixovpo. are the “ body-guards of the sove- 
reigns.” ‘The statement therefore could not refer to military cohorts, 
but to a body hastily gathered for purposes of defence, which Nicolas 
truthfully compares with the king’s body-guard. This, moreover, is 
far more probable, for it is impossible that Lepidus should have been 
collecting an army in the neighbourhood of Rome with the intention 
of going to Gallia Narbonensis. Lepidus was only to go and take over 


the command of legions already stationed in the province ; in any case 
if he wished to augment his army, he certainly would not have recruited 
new legions in the neighbourhood of the metropolis, where serviceable 
recruits were scarce, but in Gaul itself ; and if he had recruited them in 
central Italy, he would not have concentrated them near Rome, but 
would have issued the usual order to the recruits to betake themselves 
separately to some frontier town. For some time previously no army 
had been organised in the neighbourhood of Rome. Moreover, only 
upon this supposition is it possible to explain the statement of Dion, 
xliv. 34, that on March 17, when peace was concluded, the soldiers 
no longer obeyed Lepidus. This would have been impossible if the 
soldiers had been legionaries, bound to the pro-consul by the military 

The conjecture is thus probable in itself that Lepidus spent the night 
of the r5th—16th in recruiting soldiers, Antony in finding the leaders 
of the Cesarean party and in raising the veterans, the conspirators in 
preparing demonstrations for the next day. In fact, Nicolas of Damascus 
says that the next day, that is the 16th, Lepidus occupied the forum 
with soldiers and that Antony appeared there certainly for the purpose 
of fulfilling his duty as consul. He must have been one of the very few 
magistrates who appeared that morning, for the majority were among 
the conspirators in the Capitol. The appearance of Antony and the 
escort of Lepidus doubtless produced the desired effect and induced 
the people to believe that the Cesarean party was not destroyed by the 
death of its leader. In fact, Nic. Dam. xxvii. adds that, as soon as he 
appeared, the soldiers of the numerous collegia of workmen, éraupiat, 
who had previously been hesitating, recovered courage, hastened to take 
up arms and entered the forum to swell the escort of Lepidus. This 
fact enables us to regard the morning of the 16th, after the occupation of 
the forum by Lepidus and his troops, as the moment when the first 
successful demonstration on behalf of the conspirators took place and 
when Cinna delivered the speech to which Appian refers, B. C. ii. 
121. The érepo. who intimidated the demonstrations, could be no 
other than the soldiers of Lepidus and the collegia acting with them. 
These demonstrations thus took place on the morning of the 16th, a 
natural time to choose, as the conspirators would be anxious not to 
lose time, and our belief that the demonstrations were prepared during 
the night is thus confirmed. In the following chapter (122) Appian 
relates the usurpation of Dolabella. This succession of events seems 
too natural to be open to objection. Accordingly, in my narrative 
on the morning of the 16th I have begun with this demonstration on 
behalf of the conspirators and followed it by the speech and usurpation 
of Dolabella. Here it should be noted, as an indication of the prevailing 
temper, that the veterans and the artisans in the forum, who had gathered 


at the orders of Lepidus, allowed Dolabella to speak without hindrance, 
as they also had allowed Cinna to speak, an obvious proof that the 
original fear which the demonstrators entertained of the people was 
unfounded, and that the Cesareans themselves and Lepidus were wholly 
undecided and irresolute like their adversaries, during the morning 
of the 16th. When Nic. Dam. xxviii. tells us that Lepidus on the 
morning of the 16th appeared in the forum to “ avenge Cesar’, he 
s crediting Lepidus by anticipation with plans only formed in the 
evening and subsequent to the events of the day. 

Meanwhile, what were Antony and the conspirators doing? A 
passage from Cicero (Phil. II. xxxv. 89) seems to allude to negotiations 
continued during the 16th ; /taque cum cetert consulares trent, redirent 
(to Antony’s house), 27 sententia manst, neque te (Antony) illo die neque 
postero vidi. With what object? To solve this problem it is necessary 
to examine a document of first-rate importance, the only first-hand evi- 
dence which we possess of these famous days, the letter from Decimus 
Brutus to Marcus Brutus and Cassius in the collection of Cicero’s 
letters 4d familiares, xi. 1. 

* * * * * * * 

Schmidt deserves the greatest credit for his discovery (the term is 
by no means too pretentious) that this letter was written on the morning 
of March 17 before the senatorial session ; it is but rarely that a historian 
of antiquity sees so clear a ray of light illumining the darkness amid 
which he journeys through the distant past. 

The date given by Schmidt is as certain as if it had been written at the 
foot of the letter, because it 1s the only date possible. It is true that there 
are historians who regard this letter as belonging to the end of March or 
the month of April, but they merely display their lamentable ignorance 
of the history of this period. In truth it was absolutely impossible 
that after the vote upon the amnesty of March 17 and after Cesar’s 
funeral, Antony should have said to Decimus through Hirtius: Se 
neque mihi provinciam dare posse atebat, neque arbitrart tute in urbe esse 
quemquam nostrum. Cisalpine Gaul then definitely belonged to Decimus 
Brutus and no one, not even Antony himself, could utter so insolent a 
phrase, s¢. . . provinciam dare non posse, as if the province had belonged 
to himself. A senatus consultum of the gravest importance had been 
delivered, in the literal application of which a large number of people 
were interested, from the veterans to Cesar’s murderers. Moreover, 
in the midst of the disturbances which followed Czsar’s funeral, it would 
have been ridiculous for Antony to tell Decimus that he had some 
doubts of his safety at Rome. ‘This was obvious to everybody, as some 
men were fortifying their houses and others were taking flight. ‘The 
phrase, therefore, must have been uttered before the disorders broke 
out and at a time when Antony was uttering gloomy forebodings to 


intimidate his adversaries. Hence the letter was written after Czsar’s 
death and before the session of March 17. If we wish to fix the date 
more precisely, we must carefully study the phrase at the outset of the 
latter: Quo im statu simus cognosctte. Hert vesPERI APUD ME Hirrius 
FUIT ; gua mente esset Antonius, demonstravit ; pessima scilicet et infidelis- 
stma...non dubtto quin his de rebus ante HORAM QUARTAM Hirtius certiorem 
me sit facturus. ‘The letter was thus written in the morning after day- 
break, otherwise we should not have the words hert vespert and before 
the hora quarta, that is to say, as we are in the month of March, between 
six and ten o’clock in the morning. ‘The 15th is out of the question as 
Cesar was then living and we must choose between the 16th and the 
17th. If it was the 16th, as Groebe (App. to Drumann I. ii. 411 ff.) 
assumes the words hert vespert would indicate the evening of March 15 ; 
that is to say, upon that evening Antony must have sent Hirtius to tell 
Brutus that he could not give him Cisalpine Gaul. This is difficult to 
believe and, in fact, contradicts the clear statement of Nic. Dam. xxvii. 
who asserts that Lepidus and Antony on the evening of the 15th met in 
answer to the proposals of the conspirators, who asked time for reflexion 
until the evening of the next day. Now it is obvious that this embassy 
was an answer to proposals of peace made by the conspirators, a counter 
proposal offering acceptance of their proposals if Decimus would 
renounce his province. If, on the other hand, we admit that the letter 
was written on the morning of the 17th, the phrase bert vesperi agrees 
admirably with the text of Nicolas of Damascus and refers to the evening 
of the 16th when the delay requested by the conspirators had expired. 
Moreover, it is not likely that on the evening of the 15th, when the posi- 
tion was still uncertain and when Antony and Lepidus were without 
means of defence, they could have replied to the request of the con- 
spirators, asking consideration for their vested rights by a claim which 
would impose upon the conspirators the renunciation of their best 
provinces. Such a statement would have been tantamount to an open 
declaration of war. It must also be noticed that when this letter was 
written Decimus Brutus had left the conspirators at the Capitol and 
had gone away, probably to his own house. His movements must be 
explained by some conjecture ; as we shall see, I have a theory which 
seems fairly plausible if we admit that bert vespert means the evening 
of the 16th, whereas if it be taken for the evening of the 15th, con- 
jecture is at fault. Finally, the letter is an answer to one from 
Brutus and Cassius in which Decimus is asked for his view of the situa- 
tion ; Quid ergo est tut consilii? ‘The answer is one of deep sadness. 
Now during the afternoon of the 15th and the night of the 15th— 
16th, nothing had happened which could explain this general despon- 
dency among the conspirators, as is shown by the fact that they were 
preparing the demonstrations which took place on the following 


day, during which the negotiations with Antony were also con- 

The letter in Cicero’s Correspondence F. xi. 1, was therefore written 
on the morning of the 17th, probably about dawn, towards six o’clock ; 
it was written in reply to a letter from Brutus and Cassius which had 
arrived that morning and asked Decimus for his view of the situation. 
Let us now see what conclusions can be drawn from this letter; we 
will begin by stating the most important facts which appear from it. 
They are as follows : 

(1) On the evening of the 16th Decimus Brutus was no longer in the 
Capitol with the other conspirators. 

(z) On the evening of the 16th, when Antony gave his answer to the 
conspirators, he laid down as a condition of peace that Decimus should 
resign his claim to Cisalpine Gaul. 

This idea, however, cannot have been suddenly conceived by Antony 
on the evening of the 16th. It is far more probable, as I have stated in 
my narrative, that Antony considered in the night of the 15th and 16th, 
that this plan would be highly advantageous for himself, if he could suc- 
ceed insecuring Cisalpine Gaul. The reason is very simple, and is as I 
have given it in my narrative; Decimus inCisalpine Gaul would have been 
the strongest support of the conservative party in the Senate. Thus it is 
not surprising that in the night of the 15th and 16th Antony should have 
conceived the idea of securing this renunciation from the conspirators 
as the price of his agreement with them, and that on the morning of the 
16th he should have made every effort to secure this concession. It 
would have been a great advantage to him if Decimus could be sepa- 
rated from his friends ; in isolation he could be more easily induced to 
renounce his province and this would relieve Antony of the necessity 
for any violent or illegal measures, which are always dangerous. So 
much being admitted, the very probable conjecture follows, as I have 
given it in my narrative, that on the morning of the 16th, the negotiations 
were resumed which led to much coming and going of senators, and that 
Antony’s object was to induce Decimus Brutus to leave the Capitol. 
Finally, the conjecture that in the course of the 16th Antony resolved 
to extort from his adversaries a renunciation of Cisalpine Gaul, is con- 
firmed by a short and obscure passage of Appian, which would seem a 
great blunder and a great anachronism, if we did not possess this letter 
from Decimus Brutus. Appian B. C. ii. 124, after relating the embassy 
of the conspirators which belongs to the evening of March 15 as we have 
seen, and before giving Antony’s reply, tells us, EddsKeu re - « - reyvdtew 
el Sévawro repirmdoa mpos éavrods Thy orpariay tiv Aéxpou, It seemed 
good to them (Lepidus and Antony) to see if they could secure 
for themselves the army of Decimus. If we did not possess the letter 
of Decimus, we might have thought that Appian was here confusing 


present events with Antony’s later action in July ; on the other hand, 
admitting our hypothesis, everything becomes clear. Appian found in 
his sources of information and related very obscurely the same fact of 
which the letter of Decimus provides first-hand evidence, the fact that 
Antony thought of taking Gaul from Decimus before the senatorial 

With these secret intentions Antony therefore set to work on the morn- 
ing of the 16th. The failure of the conspirators’ demonstration during 
the morning was doubtless an encouragement to him and to the Czsa- 
reans, whose vacillation was still great. This advantage, however, 
was soon counterbalanced by the treachery of Dolabella, which was 
dangerous to the Cesareans. I have therefore followed Appian (B. C. 
il, 122) who says that the conspirators resolved to make a great demon- 
stration in the afternoon after Dolabella’s treachery ; with regard to this 
demonstration, I have assumed as true the statement of Appian B. C. 
ii. 122 that Cassius and Brutus were the only conspirators who came 
down to the forum. It is, indeed, likely that two leaders of the party 
alone came down, and that the other conspirators remained in the 
Capitol, as the defence of the whole body would have been a task of great 
difficulty for the senators. It is also evident that the conspirators 
expected to make a display similar to that which Cicero had made in 
the streets of Rome, after the condemnation of Catiline’s accomplices, 
in order to impress the public. 

The accounts of Plutarch, Appian and Nicolas of Damascus show us 
that Brutus was allowed to speak undisturbed and that Antony and Lepi- 
dus made no effort to interrupt the demonstration. We have already seen 
that in the morning, when the first demonstrators on behalf of the con- 
spirators appeared in the forum, the soldiers and artisans offered no 
opposition. If it be remembered that Brutus enjoyed a high reputation, 
that the treachery and usurpation of Dolabella could not fail to cause 
Antony great anxiety, and that the colonists and veterans were only then 
beginning to reach Rome, it is not unreasonable to assume that Antony 
must have been greatly perplexed during the afternoon of the 16th when 
Brutus and Cassius came down from the Capitol, and that he resolved 
to wait quietly and see in what direction events would turn. 

Plutarch (Brutus 18) says that the speech of Brutus, though delivered 
before a Cesarean audience, was received in silence, and that when 
Cinna attempted to speak after Brutus, the people began to hiss and to 
make so great a disturbance that the conspirators were obliged to return 
to the Capitol. The account of Appian (B. C. ii. 123) is entirely 
different ; according to him, after the speech of Brutus the conspirators 
returned to the Capitol, but he does not say with any precision what 
had happened but merely adds that ov« €@dppovvy mw rots mapovor, they 
did not feel themselves secure. Nicolas of Damascus (xxvii.) also make 


no reference to the speech of Cinna, which is said to have followed that 
of Brutus, but merely says that when Brutus had finished speaking, the 
conspirators returned to the Capitol. On the other hand, as the demon- 
stration had been organised beforehand, it is not likely that a second 
speech of Cinna should have been arranged to follow one of Brutus, as 
Cinna was a man of no importance. It is equally improbable that if 
the speech of Brutus was a failure, Cinna would have ventured to follow 
him on his own initiative. We may therefore assume that Plutarch is 
confusing the speech delivered by Cinna on the morning of the 16th 
and the hisses with which the veterans welcomed him on the morning of 
the 17th, as he went to the Senate. Basing my narrative, therefore, 
for the most part upon Appian’s text, I said that the speech was coldly 
received and that the conspirators therefore returned to the Capitol, 
their demonstration being a failure. This explanation seems to me 
to be entirely confirmed by the change in Antony’s attitude. ‘The letter 
from Cicero’s correspondence (F. xi. 1) has shown us that, though 
Antony did not venture to interrupt the demonstration in the forum 
during the day, he, none the less, issued a demand in the course of the 
evening that Decimus Brutus should renounce his provinces as a condition 
of peace. There is yet a further point; this kind of ultimatum is 
obviously connected with the convocation of the Senate for the morning 
of the 17th. The summons was unexpectedly issued on the evening of 
the 16th, probably a short time after Antony had given his answer. 
Appian (B. C. ii. 126) says, in fact, that the edict for the convocation 
of the Senate was issued yverés and (iil. 125) that the conspirators 
during the night earnestly begged the.senators favourable to themselves 
to be present at the session. The session took place on the morning of 
the 17th and the night in question is therefore that of the 16th and 
17th. Antony, therefore, who had deluded the conservatives through- 
out the 16th with his negotiations, suddenly resolved to convoke the 
Senate for the morning of the 17th. 

This implies that on the evening of the 16th Antony thought himself 
able to dominate the situation and to impose his will upon the Senate. 
What could have been the reason for this rapid change of view? The 
arrival of numerous veterans and colonists and the growing excitement 
of the people were certainly not without interest. I see, however, 
another reason for the failure of the great demonstration organised by 
the conservatives. As I have said, the demonstration must have shown 
many people that the conspirators were afraid. In times of revolution 
the most fleeting impressions are generally the strongest ; it is thus not 
surprising that Antony in his excitement, encouraged by the failure of 
the conservatives, should have issued his ultimatum and have convoked 
the Senate, resolved to profit by the despondency of his enemies before some 
new event should have revived their courage. 

Ill x 


The result was that Decimus Brutus, surprised and unsupported, 
‘gave way and declared himself ready to renounce his province. He 
asked for a legatio libera, with the condition that it should also be 
granted to those of his comrades who might wish to leave Rome. So 
much is clear from letter F. XI. i. 2. 

Thus we can also explain another and more complicated intrigue of 
Antony, by the attempt to discover for what reason Decimus wrote the 
letter F. XI. i. on the morning of the 17th. This letter is an answer 
to one from Brutus and Cassius in which, as can be seen from the answer, 
they asked Decimus for information upon two points : 

(1) If it was true that he had declared to Antony his readiness to 
abandon Cisalpine Gaul. 

(2) What was his view of the situation. 

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the letter contain a justification for his renuncia- 
tion. He must, therefore, have been questioned upon the subject. 
The reply to the second question begins with paragraph III., quid 
ergo est, inguts, tut consilit ? Hence we may conclude with much prob- 
ability that Brutus and Cassius had learned of the negotiations between 
Antony and Decimus during the night, and that they sent to ask for an 

How had they procured this information ? Possibly Antony, to induce 
them the more readily to agree with his demands, informed them that 
the man chiefly interested was ready to renounce his province; Brutus 
and Cassius, expecting some deceit, may then have written to Decimus, 
to know if the information was correct. 

Antony and Lepidus must have spent the night in raising the people 
and the veterans, gathering them round the temple of Tellus to intimi- 
date the conservatives and in collecting the leaders of the Czsarean 
party to arrange for their action during the senatorial session. ‘The 
meeting of Czsareans must have taken place at daybreak on the 17th; 
I confidently accept the verified hypothesis of Schmidt, that paragraph 
vi. of letter F. XI. i. is a post-scriptum, and that the words post novis- 
simum Hirtit sermonem allude to the visit paid by Hirtius to Decimus 
on the morning of the 17th, while the senators were on their way 
to the Senate; Hirtius came to tell Decimus of the discussions held 
in the Cesarean meeting, which had taken place a short time before 
and are reported with much probability by Nicolas of Damascus (xxvii.). 
It must be noted that at this meeting Antony declared himself opposed 
to all violence or illegality, a declaration which confirms our rumours 
concerning the prudence he had shown during the preceding days ; 
in other words he feared a coup d’¢tat as too dangerous. It must also 
be remarked that on the morning of the 17th, even when Hirtius had 
told him that the majority of the Casareans were anxious for peace, 
Decimus did not demand his province back again; he regarded it as 


lost and was satisfied with the power to remain at Rome and with the 
right to a body-guard. 
* * * * * *% 

Here an objection may be raised, and it may be asked why, in the dis- 
cussion before the Senate, Antony did not refer to Cisalpine Gaul and 
made no proposals on the subject, though the amnesty was eventually 
approved and all Czsar’s acts were ratified ? 

Appian (B. C. ii. 127-135) has given a very probable account 
of this session, which I have faithfully followed, but during it Antony 
speaks neither of Gaul nor of Decimus. What then had happened to 
his projects of the evening before? The contradiction is strange, but 
it may be explained by the attitude of the Senate as depicted by Appian 
(B. C. ii. 127). The Senate suddenly showed itself so favourable to 
Czsar’s murderers that Antony quickly realised the impossibility of 
passing his proposal in spite of the absence of the conspirators and the 
presence of the veterans who were shouting without. The proposal 
to call the murderers to the session and the discussion to which this idea 
gave rise, must have immediately destroyed his illusions. Moreover, 
everybody came to the session in great anxiety and the situation created 
by the civil war, the dictatorship and the death of Cesar, was so intricate 
and complex that the discussion could not fail to outrun the limits within 
which Antony may have wished to confine it; it did so pass these 
limits and went outside the other proposals of the consul. In other 
words, it seems clear to me that Antony, emboldened by the failure 
of the conspirators in the forum, imagined on the evening of the 16th 
that the majority of the Senate would not support them, though it was 
impossible to learn the feeling of the Senate beforehand. However, 
to his great astonishment, he discovered that Czsar’s assassination was 
universally approved. 



Tue question whether Cesar, in the arrangements previous to his death, 
assigned provinces to Brutus, Cassius, Antony and Dolabella, and the 
further question what these provinces were, is a highly complicated 
problem, so contradictory is the information given by the ancient texts. 
I have come to the conclusion that Cesar could not possibly have assigned 
Macedonia to Brutus or Syria to Cassius; on the contrary, I think 
that he did not assign any provinces to Brutus and Cassius, and that he 
had given Macedonia to Antony and Syria to Dolabella. My reasons 
for this conclusion are briefly as follows : 

¢ I do not believe that Cesar appointed Brutus and Cassius to Mace- 
donia and Syria for the reason that if he had done so, their deprivation 
of these provinces could only have been secured by some legal process 
or open deed of violence, which would have been a very serious event. 
The Cesarean party could have made no more open declaration of war 
upon the conspirators. As it is we find no trace whatever of any such 
provocation nor did the course of events show any attempt to follow 
such a policy. If Brutus and Cassius had been deprived of their pro- 
vinces, they could never have written to Antony in the month of May 
the letter F. xi. 2 in Cicero’s correspondence or the letter F. xi, 
8 in the month of August, in which they declared that they were 
not certain whether Antony meditated hostilities. Cicero constantly 
catalogues the outrages, illegal acts and the violations of Czsar’s will 
of which Antony was guilty, and how could he have omitted an outrage 
which the conservative party must have regarded as more serious and 
important than any other? We should therefore have to admit that 
the conservative party voluntarily consented to this spoliation, which 
was utterly impossible. Moreover, if Caesar had intended Syria and 
Macedonia for Cassius and Brutus, we cannot explain why Cicero should 
have rejoiced so emphatically in his eleventh Philippic (xii. 27 to 30) 
over the invasion of Syria and Macedonia by Brutus and Cassius: 7m 



Macedoniam alienam advolavit ; omnia sua putavit, quae vos vestra esse 
velitts . . . C. Cassius... profectus est ut probiberet Syria Dolabellam qua 
lege? quo jure? Eo quod Fuppiter ipse sanxit, ut omnia que reipublice 
Salutarta essent, legttima et justa haberentur. 

To cloak deeds of violence beneath legal fictions is so valuable a device 
even in revolutions, that if there had been the smallest sophistical argu- 
ment for the constitutional legality of Brutus’ and Cassius’ usurpations, 
Cicero would certainly not have ventured to defy legal superstitions 
by provocation of this kind, the more so as Calenus had vigorously 
opposed these proposals, stating that the usurpation of Brutus was 

There is, however, a further argument. In a passage hitherto neg- 
lected by critics so far as I know, Cicero clearly says that Cesar assigned 
no province to the two conspirators. In a letter to Atticus, when he 
had learned on June 5 that Antony wished to send Brutus and Cassius 
to buy corn in Asia and Sicily, Cicero says (A. XV. ix. 1); O rem 
miseram ! primum nullam ab 1stts, dein, st aliquam, hance legatoriam pro- 

Thus, previous to this provincia legatoria, 1stt had given nulla pro- 
vincta to Brutus and Cassius and the word zstz obviously refers to Czsar 
and the Cesareans. If Brutus and Cassius had been deprived of such 
important provinces by any means, Cicero would have complained in 
a very different tone. It therefore seems certain to me that Cesar, 
before his death, had given no province to Brutus or Cassius, nor is the 
fact surprising, for a man suddenly cut off would necessarily leave 
much business half performed. 

If then the provinces of Macedonia and Syria were not given to 
Brutus and Cassius, to whom were they given and how? Historians 
have almost all followed the account of Appian which states (B. C. iii. 
7, 8) that when Brutus and Cassius fled from Rome, Dolabella at the 
instigation of Antony and in spite of the opposition of the Senate, 
induced the people to pass a law, assigning Syria to himself and that when 
this law had been approved, Antony forced the Senate to give him 
Macedonia. Velleius Paterculus seems to allude to some event of the 
kind (ii. 60), but in a vague phrase which would be incomprehensible 
without Appian’s text; Dolabella transmarinas (provincias) decrevit 
sibt. Dion (xlvii. 29) merely says that Dolabella secured Syria, 
but he gives neither date nor details. Oérog (Dolabella) yap éréraxro pév 
ris Supias dpxev. .. . The only account in any detail is thus that 
of Appian. 

This account, however, is certainly false. Cicero (A. xiv. iv. 3), 
alluding to the rumours of an approaching war against the Parthians in 
Syria, says, [ta mihi videtur bellum tllud instare. Sed Dolabella et Nicias 
viderint. ‘Thus when Cicero wrote this letter Dolabella had been 


appointed pro-consul in Syria for the year 43. The letter, however, 
was certainly written at Puteoli in the month of April, as is proved by 
the allusion in paragraph 2 to certain Roman personages, such as Hirtius 
and Pansa, who were staying in the country ; the date is also proved by 
the further correspondence. Whether it was written on April 17, as 
some think, or on the 18th, or between the 22nd and the 26th, as others 
assert, is of little importance here. Brutus and Cassius had fled from 
Rome on April 13 and the events related by Appian must have taken place 
during the second half of April. ‘That, however, is impossible. In the 
first place Antony and Dolabella were still opposed to one another, 
and Dolabella was posing as a conservative consul, a fact proved by his 
destruction of the altar of Herophilus at the end of the month, by the 
great demonstrations which the conservative public made shortly 
afterwards in his favour in the theatre, and by the letters of congratula- 
tion which Cicero wrote to him upon the destruction of the altar. It 
was impossible that the conservatives could have seriously regarded this 
action by Dolabella as a real service to their party, if he had already 
been struggling with the Senate and had used the comitia to secure the 
gift of this province, a proceeding which the conservatives invariably 
regarded as one of the most detestable usurpations of the senatorial 
power which the people could commit. Moreover, it is equally im- 
possible that Dolabella could have applied immediately to the comitia 
in the month of April. At that moment he despaired so entirely of a 
reconciliation with the Cesarean party that at the end of the month 
he threw himself into the arms of the conservatives by destroying the 
altar of Herophilus. How then a few days before could he have ventured 
to ask the comitia for his province ? 

Appian’s account is improbable and an attempt has been made to 
correct it. A possible conjecture is that in the month of April the 
Senate, in gratitude to Dolabella for help given to the conservative party, 
had voluntarily assigned to him the province of Syria, to which Cesar 
had appointed no one; that Antony then demanded Macedonia for him- 
self, a province also vacant for the year 43, and that the Senate, having 
done this favour to Dolabella, could not refuse a similar favour to Antony. 
However, though it necessitates a complete rearrangement of Appian’s 
narrative, I think the best course is to adopt the simpler and more 
radical conjecture of Schwarz, and to admit that Cesar had assigned the 
provinces of Syria and Macedonia to Dolabella and to Mark Antony. 

The conjecture is in itself highly probable. It is, to begin with, 
unlikely that Antony and Dolabella, who were on terms of intimacy 
with Cesar, and saw him every day, should not have arranged for their 
pro-consulships for the following year as they wished with the dictator, 
who was to start upon a distant expedition three days later. ‘This 
omission could not be explained, whereas it is easy to explain why Cesar 


had not yet thought of Brutus and Cassius, who held aloof, and affected 
not to mingle with the “ rabble ” which had thronged about the dictator 
during the recent months. Moreover, Syria and Macedonia were most 
important provinces for the war which Czsar proposed to begin in 
Persia and to continue and conclude by a great expedition in the region of 
the Black Sea and a march across Gaul. It was therefore natural that he 
should have wished to entrust these provinces to friends upon whom he 
could rely if he needed their help. Finally this hypothesis enables us to 
explain another obscure point in the story; I refer to the manner in 
which the Macedonian legions came under the command of Antony. 
Appian referring to the Apollinarian games (the affair thus belongs to the 
month of July) says (B. C. iii. 25) that a sudden rumour arose of a 
threatened invasion of Macedonia by the Geta, and that Antony 
demanded that the Macedonian legions should be placed under his 
command, instead of being sent to Syria for the war against the Par- 
thians; in other words, he demanded that the Parthian war should be 
put off. Antony would thus have taken these legions from Dolabella, 
to whom he promised to give a legion as compensation. Finally, Appian 
adds that the Senate first hesitated and then sent an embassy to Mace- 
donia to examine the possibility of an invasion and resolved to grant 
Antony’s desire when he éeWydicaro, proposed the abolition of the 
dictatorship. Now, in Appian’s narrative we find a series of chrono- 
logical mistakes which must first be corrected to determine the date of 
these events. Appian defines this moment by quoting a definite and 
very probable fact, namely, that the decree concerning the Macedonian 
legions immediately followed Antony’s proposal against the dictatorship, 
for which proposal it was, so to speak, the reward. Antony dealt with 
the dictatorship upon two occasions, first to propose its abolition in the 
Senate, and secondly, to change this senatus consultum into law. Appian 
evidently alludes to the senatus consultum and not to the law; he uses 
in fact the term Wjducpa and not vduos. It will, moreover be under- 
stood that Antony produced a great impression when he appeared, to 
the general astonishment, for the first time in the Senate with a proposal 
so favourable to the conservatives; on the other hand, no influence 
of the kind could have been exerted when he afterwards proposed the 
same measure to the people coupled with revolutionary proposals, as 
we have seen in the text. The decree concerning the Macedonian 
legions was thus issued shortly after the decree abolishing the dictator- 
ship. This latter was passed during the first fortnight of the month of 
April, before the murder of Herophilus, as is proved by the passage in 
Cicero, Phil. 1.1, 3: Dictaturam (Antonius)... sustulit. ..1. 2,5 
Paucis post diebus . . . uncus impactustest fugitivo'illi qui in Mari nomen 
tnvaser at, 

Thus the decree concerning the Macedonian legions was passed 


in the first days of April. As, however, Antony was obliged to agree 
with Dolabella on the question of these legions and secure a compromise 
with him, it is clear that the two men were already regarded as the 
future pro-consuls of these two provinces during the early days of 
April. ‘This brilliantly confirms the argument deduced from Cicero’s 
letter, A. XIV. ix. 3 concerning Dolabella’s inability to attempt a 
popular agitation, and it also proves that the two provinces were not 
given to the consuls either by the people or the Senate ; had they thus 
been given, the moment of appointment would also have seen a decision 
on the question of the legions. 

On the contrary, everything becomes clear when we admit that it 
was Cesar who gave Syria and Macedonia to Antony and Dolabella. 
Under Cesar’s arrangements the question of the Macedonian legions 
could not arise, as Caesar was then to lead them to Persia. When the 
Senate partly ratified Czsar’s acts in the session of March 19, it retained 
the two consuls in their provinces, but obviously decided nothing con- 
cerning the legions which were thus left, so to speak, stranded in Mace- 
donia, without any information as to their destination or their future 
commander. Dolabella probably then hinted that Cesar’s measures 
intended these legions for himself, as they were destined for the Parthian 
war of which he, as Syrian governor, would have the conduct. Antony, 
on the other hand, intrigued with the Senate to secure part of the 
legions and proved successful, as he was then on good terms with the 

For all these reasons I support the conjecture that Czsar before his 
death had given no provinces to Brutus or Cassius, but had assigned 
Macedonia to Antony and Syria to Dolabella. 



ABYDOS, 197 

Acquez Statiellz, the, 160 

Acqui, 161 : 

Octavianus appointed to, 181; 
the proscription in, 187 ; petty 
civil war in, 211; Lepidus 
appointed to, 254 

Agrarian laws—see under Land 

Varro’s treatise, 298-304; the 
Georgics, 304-5 

Agrippa, Marcus Vipsanius— 
Arrival in Rome, 45; Cassius 
accused by, 175; given com- 
mand by Octavianus, 233; 
forces Lucius to retreat, 234; 
siege of Perugia, 235-36; 
made praetor, 247; entrusted 
with defence of Italy, 249-50 ; 
sent to recapture Sipontum, 

252-53; Antony’s proposal 
regarding his marriage, 268 
and note; expedition against 

the Aquitani, 278, 284, 288, 
Zine is) Heet, 202-53); at 
Tarentum, 294 

Ahenobarbus, Cnzus Domitius, 136, 
137, 209, 259 

Ahenobarbus, Domitius, 74— 
In the island of Nisida, 80; 
in the Adriatic, 200, 205, 223, 
252; mission to Sextus Pom- 
peius, 254 ; betrothed to Julia, 
daughter of Octavianus, 295 

Alabanda, 250 

Alba, 116, 121 

Alexandria, 256, 257 

Alfenus, P., 276 

Amanus range, the, 276 

Amnesty, the, of 44 B.c., 16-17; 
annulled, 174-75 


Amphipolis, 198 note, 200, 201 

Amyntas, king, 277 

Anagnia, 79 

Ancona, 220 

Antigonus, 210, 244, 277, 288 

Antioch, 245 

Antium, the meeting at, 66-68 

Antonius, Caius, 42, 54, 67, 75— 
Governor of Macedonia, 117, 
1227 130,00 hS7 aa Desiese min: 
Apollonia by Brutus, 138 ; 
policy regarding Brutus, 146—- 
47; letter of, to the Senate, 
147; influence over Marcus 
Brutus, 169-70; death of, 194 

Antonius, Lucius— 
Influence over Antony, 41-43, 
59-60, 73-74, 88, 119; attack 
on Dolabella, 51; presents 
Caius Octavius to the people, 
54 and note; Land Law of, 
69-70, 83; revoked, 129; 
in the commission of seven, 
75; the equestrian monument 

to him, 83, 97; attack on 
Octavianus, 147, 149; at 
Vado, 160-61; at Forum 

Julii, 162, 165; consul, 219; 
opposition to Octavianus, 221- 
23, . 220)3) ~detence Jor ‘the 
expropriated landowners, 223- 
243; preparation for a revo- 
lution with Fulvia, 230-34; 
retreat to Perugia, 234; sur- 
render of, 235-36; made 
governor of Spain, and death, 
Antony (Marcus Antonius)— 
His deliberations with Lepidus, 
3-5; visit to Calpurnia, 5-6, 
310, 314; negotiations with 
the conspirators, 7-9, 312-14 ; 



Antony (Marcus Antonius)—contd. 

his action on evening of 
March 16th, 11, 316, 319-23 ; 
his intervention in the Senate 
and speech in the forum, 14-15 ; 
his position on March 18th, 44 
B.c., 19; his character, 19-20, 
183, 190; invitation to Brutus 
and Cassius, 20-21; Czesar’s 
designs concerning, 22, 324-28 ; 
opens Cesar’s will, 22-24; 
arrangements for Cesar’s 
funeral, 24-27; his conduct 
during the riots, 28-31; his 
proposal in the Senate regard- 
ing Cesar, 31; his position 
after Czsar’s burial, 32-36; 
passes the senatus consultum to 
abrogate the election of the 
pontifex maximus by the people 
38 and note; his change of 
front, 41, 42-3; the first 
forgeries, 43-44; request 
to Cicero regarding Sextus 
Clodius, 46; his projects, 
40-47 ; journey to Campania, 
47-48 ; he collects the veterans, 
47, 48-49, 49 note, 50; his 
return to Rome, 58-61; his 
first interview with Octavianus, 
61; the sensational session of 
June ist, 64-65; dissension 
between Octavianus and, 66; 
reorganises the Cesarean party, 
69-71; his friends, 71-72; 
conservatives incite Octavianus 
against him, 74-75; the 
commission of seven, 75; 
war of intrigue between Oc 

tavianus and, 82-83, 85; 
promulgation of the “lex 
de permutatione,”’ 85-86; 

reconciliation with Octavianus, 
89-90, 90 note ; promulgation 
of the ‘‘ lex de tertia decuria ”’ 
and the ‘lex de vi et majes- 
tate,” 93; his threat regarding 
Cicero, 97-98 ; reply to Cicero’s 
first Philippic, 99-100; seeks 
to accuse Octavianus of at- 
tempted assassination, 101 
and note; goes to Brundisium, 
102, 104; his action regarding 

Antony (Marcus Antonius)—conid. 

the Macedonian legions, 104-6 ; 
his march upon Rome, 111-12 ; 
attacks on Octavianus, 114; 
atrives in Rome and stations 
his legions in Tibur, 115-16; 
abandons his design concerning 
Octavianus, 117-18; leaves 
for Tibur, 118; sets out for 
Cisalpine Gaul, 119-20; out- 
set of the Modena war, 125-27 ; 
embassy from the Senate to, 
129, 131-32; his proposal to 
the Senate, 132-33; siege 
of Modena, 139-141; corre- 
spondence between Octavianus, 
Hirtius and, during the siege 
of Modena, 141-143; battle 
of Forum Gallorum, 147-49 ; 
battle of Modena, 149-50; 
proscription of, 151-53; his 
retreat, 155-57; reaches Vado 
and joins Ventidius, 160-61 ; 
evades Brutus, 163-64; his 
overtures to the army of 
Lepidus, 165-67; agreement 
with Lepidus, 167-68;  re- 
conciliation with Octavianus, 
176-78 ; deliberations at Bo- 
logna —see undey Triumvirate ; 
effect of the disturbances on, 
193; preparations for war, 
194 ; his movements in 
January, 42 B.c., 196-97; 
crosses into Macedonia with 
twelve legions, 197-08 ; 
marches to Philippi, 200-201 ; 
the first battle of Philippi, 
203-5; second battle of Philippi, 
206-7; his position after the 
battle, 209-10; the compact 
at Philippi, 211; his reasons 
for choosing the East, 213-14 ; 
in the East, 226; progress 
through Asia Minor, 227-28 ; 
first meeting with Cleopatra, 
228-29; in Egypt, 236, 239- 
44; sets sail for Asia, 245 ; 
in Greece, 249-51; meets 
Fulvia at Athens, 250; receives 
embassy from Pompeius, 250- 
51; beginning of hostilities 
with Octavianus, 252-53; 


Antony (Marcus Antonius—contd. 
treaty of Brundisium, 254-55 ; 
marriage with Octavia, 255-56; 
his measures after the con- 
clusion of peace, 259-60; 
popular revolt against, 266-67; 
treaty of Misenum, 272-74; 
his intentions regarding the 
East, 275-78; apotheosis as 
Dionysus, 278; visit to 
Brundisium and return, 283- 
84 ; endeavours to make peace 
between Octavianus and Sex- 
tus, 283-84; Crassus avenged 
by, 287-88 ; his reply to Octa- 
vianus, 291-92; his projects 
regarding the Persian war, 292 ; 
the agreement of Tarentum, 

Apamea, 78, 245 

Apennines, the, 154-55 

Apollinarian Games, 248 note 

Apollonia, 44, 138, 220 

Apollophanes, 271; 
Scylla, 286-87 

Appian Way, 74, 130 

Appii Forum, 289 

Apuleius, Sextus, 256 note 

Apulia, 56 

Aquila, Pontius, death of, 149-50 

Aquino, 220 

Aquitani, revolt of the, 278 

Areus, Didymus, 193 

Argenteus, the, 166, 167, 168 

Arles, 144 

defeat of 

Army, the— 
Macedonian legions ordered 
into Italy, 93, 100; revolt 

of the two Macedonian legions, 
116 and note, 117; conse- 
quences of the revolt, 117-18 ; 
three legions of veterans dis- 
banded, 211; grants of land 
to Cesar’s veterans, 212-13 ; 
insolence of the _ veterans 
towards Octavianus, 224-26 ; 
intervention of the veterans 
between Octavianus and Lucius, 

230-31; revolt against An- 
tony, 259-60 

Arpinum, 62, 79; Cicero’s debts 
to, 58 

Arruntius, Lucius, 273 


Asia, 244-45, 254 
Asinius—see Pollio, Asinius 
Athenodorus of Tarsus, 193, 249 
Atteius, Greek freedman, 218 
Atticus, Pomponius, 57, 58, 218— 
Buthrotum question, the, 32, 
46-48, 73; the question 
settled, 76-77 ; correspondence 
with Cicero, 35 note, 46, 50-52, 
52 note, 55 and note, 74, 81-82 ; 
attitude towards the loan 
negotiations, 63 and note ; 
financial transactions with 
Cicero, 79, 92; urges Cicero 
to return, 87, 88; loan to 
Brutus, 91; attitude towards 
Octavianus, 113; financial 
transactions of, 120, 154; 
not proscribed, 188 
Attratinus, L. Sempronius, 269 
Avernus, lake of, 293 

BasBus, Cornelius, 8, 70— 
Puteoli, at, 39; conversation 
with Octavianus, 45; attitude 
towards Antony, 51; report 
of the senatorial session of 
June ist, 65 ; commission from 
Cicero, 84 ; consul elect, 267 

Barba, Cassius, 71, 72 

Barbatius, 230 

Barium, 290 

Basilus, 2 
Bassus, Czcilius, 78, 91, 107; at 
Apamea, 145 
Bassus, Ventidius, 71, 126, 139, 

Recruiting by, 135; plans to 
rejoin Antony, 149-50, 154- 
F5esme ProsctiptionssOfgn 153.5 
joined by Antony, 160-61 ; 
consul, 183-84; proposals of 
Fulvia, 230, 234; policy, 
235-36; march upon Brun- 
disium, 246; overtures of 
Octavianus, 248; governor 
of Syria, 259; his first victory 
over the Parthians, 276; 
defeats Pacorus, 287; his 
triumph, 291 

Benevento, 220, 289 

Bessi, the, 170, 175 

Bibulus, Lucius, 209 


Bithynia, 226, 254, 259 
Bithynicus, Clodius, 236 
Bocchus, king of Mauretania, 231 
Bologna, 139, 177— 

Antony at, 125; seized by 
Hirtius, 141; the convention 
at, 179-83 

Boni, excavations of, 26, 193 

Bosphorus, the, 197, 199 

Brizio, Prof., 132 note 

Brundisium, 44, 199— 
Troops punished by Antony at, 
104-5; siege of, 252-53; 
treaty of, 254-55; Antony 
ata so) BIC. a cod 

Brutus, Decimus, 59, 78— 
Antony’s policy concerning, 
7-8, 11; (20-21, 319-23); 
legatee of Czsar, 22, 61; 
leaves Rome, 34; arrival 
in Cisalpine Gaul, 46; his 
advice regarding Antony, 67-— 
68, 68 note; financial diffi- 
culties of, 72-73; deprived 
of Cisalpine Gaul, 85-86; 
recruiting, 119; refuses to 
recognise Antony, 123; the 
Modena war, 125-27, 135; 
battle of Modena, 149-50; 
honours voted to, 152 and 
note, 153 ; interview with 
Octavianus, 154-55; pursuit 
of Antony, 154-56, 160-61 ; 
tactics, 163-64 ; joins Plancus, 
168-69; fate of, 175-76; 
his letter to M. Brutus 
(Schmidt), 317-20, 322 

Brutus, Marcus— 
Speech of, March 16th, 9-10, 
309, 312, 320-21; threatened 
by thé mob, 28, 36; his 
depression during the riots, 
31; requests leave to quit 
Rome, 34-35; flight, 37; at 
Lanuvium, 39; in Campania, 
48-50; his inquiry of Antony, 
62; negotiations for a loan, 
63-64 ; commission to Asia, 
65; the meeting at Antium, 
66-68 ; the Ludi Apollinares, 
67, 76; in the island of Nisida, 
79-80; manifesto of, 87- 
89; interview with Cicero at 


Brutus, Marcus—continued 
Velia, 90-91; his despatch 
from Macedonia, 135-38; the 
counter-revolution in Mace- 
donia, 136-38; despatches 
from, April 43 B.c., 145-46; 
beginning of the dissension 
with Cicero, 146-47; goes to 
support of Cassius, 153; recall 
to Italy, 168-70; the amnesty 
annulled, 175; army of, 176; 
in the east, 194; the meeting 
at Smyrna, 195; conquest of 
Lycia, 195-97; beginning of 
the Eastern war, 199-200 ; 
his position at Philippi, 200- 
201 ; the first battle of Philippi 
203-5 ; the second battle and 
his death, 206-7 ; the province 
assigned by Cesar to, 324-28 
Bursa, T. Munatius Plancus, 71-72 
Burun Calessi, pass of, 199 
Buthrotum, colony of, 32, 73, 83 

Cacina of Volterre, I11 

Cesar, Caius Julius 
Will of, opened, 22; bequests 
to the people, 23-24 ; funeral, 
24-27; incident concerning 
Cesar’s Golden Chair; 55 
and note, 85; Czsar’s comet, 
85; imauguration of Cesar- 
worship, 94, 98; Julius de- 
claréd” to: “be: Divws; 726s 
influence on policy of Antony, 
243-44; assignation of pro 
vinces before his death, 324-28 

Cesar, Lucius, 129, 133 

Cesarean party, the— 
Position in December 44 B.c. 
120-121 ; attempt toreorganise, 

Calatia, 105 

Calenus, Fufius, 8, 60, 70— 
Policy of, 126, 235-36 ; speeches 
in the Senate, 127-28, 138; 
his proposal, 133; speech 
against lDolabella, 139-40; 
saves Varro, 188; proposal, 
of Fulvia, 230, 234; overtures 
of Octavianus, 248 ; death, 249 

Calpurnia, Antony’s visit to, 5-6, 


Campania, 187 ; mission of Tiberius 
Claudius Nero, 231-32, 234-35 

Campania, Bridge of, 289 

Campus Martius, the, 25, 27 

Canidia, sorceress, 263-64 

Canidius, P., 166, 187; consul, 267 

Canusium, 290 

Cannutius, Tiberius, tribune, 60, 113 

Capite censt, the, 56 

Capito, Caius Fonteius, 288, 289 

Capitol, the, meeting of the con- 
servatives, I-3 

Cappadocia, 195, 228 

Capua, 103, 220, 289 

Caracalla, baths of, 112 

Carfulenus, 60; march to meet 
Pansa, 148 

Carrhe, 287 

Carrinas, Caius, consul, 184 

Carteia, 74 

Casca, Publius Servilius, 22, 114, 
£72, 175 

Casilinum, 49, 105 

Cassius, Caius—see Longinus 

Cassius, Dion, cited, 27 note 

Cassius, Lucius, tribune, 60 

Castel-franco—see Forum Gallorum 

Cato, 70 

Caudine Forks, the, 289 

Censorinus, Lucius Marcius, 71, 

Governor of Greece and Mace- 
donia, 226 and nole; first 
consul, 268 

Charon’s senators, 82 

Cicero, Marcus Tullio— 
Note to Basilus, 2 and note ; 
his advice to the conservatives, 
2-3, 311; his proposal of an 
amnesty, March 17th, 44 B.c., 
16-17; position of, during 
the riots, 31-32; leaves Rome 
for Puteoli, 34; at Puteoli, 
39-41, 44; attitude towards 
C. Octavius, 45-46; on the 
“marvellous Dolabella,” 48 ; 

his reluctance to meeting 
Antony, 50-51; letters to 
Atticus, 55 and note; his 

financial position in 44 B.C., 
57-58; meets Hirtius at 
Tusculum, 62-63; appointed 
by Dolabella as his legate, 


Cicero, Marcus Tullio—continued 
66-67 ; the meeting at Antium, 
66-68 ; prepares to start for 
Greece, 73-74, 76, 79-82, 84- 

85; at the villa of Publius 
Valerius, 87-88; return to 
Rome, 90-92 ; Antony’s 

threat, 97-98 ; the first Philip- 
pic, 98-100; leaves Rome, the 
second Philippic, 103; the 
“De Officiis,” 108-10; cor: 
respondence between Octavi- 
anusand,i1i ; attitude towards 
Octavianus—distrust, 114-15 ; 
arrives in Rome to support 

Octavianus, 116; his last 
doubts, 122-124; third and 
fourth Philippics, 124-25 ; 

fifth Philippic, 127-28; sixth 
Philippic, 129 ; seventh Philip- 
pic, 130-31 ; eighth and ninth 
Philippics, 133-134; tenth 
and eleventh Philippics, 138, 
140; twelfth Philippic, 143; 
thirteenth Philippic, 144-45 ; 
beginning of dissension with 
Marcus Brutus, 146-147; 
fourteenth Philippic, 149; his 
motion concerning Pansa, 152— 
53; his recommendation of 
prudence, 157; proposal of 
Octavianus to, 165 ; demands 
proscription of Lepidus, 168 ; 
attitude regarding the demand 
of Octavianus, 169; his des- 
pair at the coup d’etat of Octa- 
vianus, 172; his death, 182, 
188 ; true historical importance 

of, 189-90 
Cicero, Quintus, 79 
Cilicia, 245, 276; invasion by 

Labienus, 250 
Cimber, Tullius, 21, 34, 78, 199 
Cinna, the pretor, speech of, 7, 13, 
309, 316, 320-21 
Cinna, the tribune, death of, 28-29, 
Citheris, courtesan, 72, 269, 280, 281 
Claterna, 131, 132 and note, 133, 135 
Flight from Rome, 38 ; designs 
of Cassius regarding, 195; 
helps the triumvirs, 197; 


first meeting with Antony, 
228-29; her policy towards 
Antony, 240-44, 255-56 

Clodia, 232 

Clodius, Sextus, 46 

Cocceius, Lucius, 253-54, 276, 288, 

Coloni, the, 56 and note 
Comitia, the, electoral rights 

abolished, 195 

Commagene, 287, 288 

Concord, Temple of, 98 

Conservative Party, the— 
Meeting of, in the Capitol, 
I-3, 310-12; financial diffi- 
culties of, 72-73; policy 
regarding Antony and Octa- 

vianus, 74-75; attitude to- 
wards Octavianus, 121-22; 
discord at Rome, 156-57; 

initial dissensions between Oc- 
tavianus and, 157-60; pros- 
pects of, 170 

Corcyra, 84 

Cornificius, Quintus, governor of 
Attica, 20, t3, 2 Lk 

Cornutus, Aulus, pretor, 144, 

Corvinus, Lucius Valerius Messala, 

Corvinus, Marcus Valerius Messala, 

Cosenza, 252 

Cotila, Lucius Varius, 83, 132 

Cotila, Varius, 125, 177 

Crassus, Marcus, 57; 
avenged, 287 

Cratippus, philosopher, 136 

Cremona, 220, 258 

Crete, 89, 209 

Critonius the edile, 55 and note 

Ctesiphon, 244, 245 

Cularo (Grenoble), 165 

Culleo, officer, 164, 166 

Curia Pompeii, the, 26, 27; closing 
of, 193 

Cyrene, 89, 254, 255 

his death 

DALMATIA, 254, 259 
Darius, son of Pharnaces, 277 
“De Officiis,’”? the, 108-10 


Cesar-worship inaugurated, 94, 
98 ; apotheosis of Antony as 
Dionysus, 278 

Deiotarus, King of Galatia, 32, 43, 

Demetrias, 137, 144 

Demochares, succeeds Menecrates 
in command, 285-87 

Diocletian, 256 

Divus, Julius, temple of, 28 

Dolabella, Cneius Cornelius— 
Speech against Cesar, 9, 309, 
311, 312) 316-17, 93205) nis 
intervention in the Senate, 15 ; 
Cesar’s designs concerning, 22, 
324-28 ; goes into hiding, 31 ; 
return to public life, 48; reply 
to L. Antonius, 51; appear- 
ance in the theatre, 55; atti- 
tude towards Antony, 60-62 ; 
appoints Cicero his legate, 66- 
67; the question of Tullia’s 
dowry, 84; promulgation of 
the “lex de permutatione,”’ 
85-86 ; journey through Mace- 
donia, 136; murder of Tre- 
bonius, 139-40, 142-43); his 
position in the east, 145-46; 
death of, 176 

Drusus, Livius, 157-58, 191, 208, 

Dyrrachium, 137, 199, 200 

East against West— 
Beginning of the war, 195, 
199-203 ; disorderly condition 
of both armies, 202-3 
Egnatia, 290 
expe ae 
Description, 240-41 ; 
lation, 241-42 ; 
Antony, 242-44 
Ennius, epics of, 281 
Ephesus, 227, 246 
Epirus, 259 
Eros, secretary, 58, 76 
Eubeea, 136 
Eutrapelus, Publius Voluminius, 72 

value of, to 

FABERIUS, Cesar’s secretary, 44 
Faenza, 15C¢ 


Fango,appointed governor of Africa, 

Favonius, 67 ; 
death of, 208 

Fermo, 220 

Flaccus, Caius Norbanus, 194, 195, 

Flaccus, Quintus Horatius, 136, 209 

Flavius, Caius— 
Negotiations for a loan for 
Brutus, 63 and note ; death, 236 

Florence, 220 

Fons Feronia, 289 

Formiez, 79, 190, 289 

Forum Gallorum, battle of, 147-49 

Forum Juli, 162 

Forum Voconii, 165 

Free labourers, Varro’s views re- 
garding, 303-4 

Fulvia, wife of Antony, 126, 128, 


Influence over Antony, 41-43, 
44, 46, 47, 59-60, 72, 88, 247; 
schemes of, 97; goes with 
Antony to Brundisium, 102, 
105 ; effect of the disturbances 
on, 193; her power over 
Lepidus, 210, 215-16, 219; 
first dissensions with Octavi- 
anus, 221-22; opposition to 
Octavianus, 223, 229; pre- 
paration for a revolution with 
Lucius, 230-34; sets sail for 
Greece, 246; meeting with 
Antony at Athens, 250; at 
Sicyon, 252; death of, 253 

Fundanius, C., 299 

Fundi, 289 

Furnius, C., 144 

flight of, 191; 

Gap, the meeting at, 231 

Galatia, 228 

Galba, messenger, 148 

Gallia Comata, 85, 181 

Gallia Narbonensis, 150, 169, 181, 
2TIeEs eA: 

Gallus, Caius Cornelius, 

Games, Roman, 55 and note 

Gangas, the, 200 

Gardthausen, 20 and note 

Gaul, 283; revolt of the legions, 
250 and note, 251 



Gaul, Cisalpine— 
Transferred from Brutus to 
Antony, 85-86, 181; the 
proscription in, 187; citizen 
rights for, 213 

Gaul, Transalpine, 254 

Geta, the, rumoured invasion of 
Macedonia, 32 and note—33 

Gindarus, battle of, 287, 291 

Glabrio, Manius Acilius, 21 

Greece, 254; Antony in, 


HELENUS, freedman, sent to recover 
Sardinia, 265-66 

Heliodorus, 289 

Herod, king of Judea— 
Relations with Antony, 227 ; 
reaches Rome, question of 
Judea, 268-69 ; recognised as 
king by Antony, 277, 288 

Herophilus) 425) 9275) LO 3)sem re- 
appearance of, 34; his exe- 
cution, 35-36, 94 

Hirtius, 70, 73— 

Proposal of, concerning the 

conspirators, ARS Cesar’s 
designs concerning, 22; fears 
during.) thes “riots;) 9304) at 

Puteoli, 39; attitude towards 
Antony, 51,60; leaves Rome 
for Tusculum, 62-63; illness, 
Ol, 135: s.consuly4308.C.8 27. 
leaves Rome to join Octavianus, 
129; progress of the Modena 
war, 132; correspondence 
between Antony and, during 
the siege of Modena, 141-43 ; 
battle of Forum Gallorum, 

147-49; death of, 149-50 
Horace, 137— 
Quoted, 202-3; at Rome, 

264-65 ; the first Satire, 265 ; 
patronage of Mecenas, 270, 
278-79; his account of the 
journey of Mzcenas, 288-90 ; 
sixth Satire, 297 

Hortensius, Quintus, governor of 
Macedonia, 21, 137 

Hostilius, Tullus, 71 

Hyginus, Caius Julius, De agricul: 
tura, 298, 304 


ILium, 257 

Illyria, 254, 259, 283; governor- 
ship of Vatinius, 137-38 

Insteius, tribune, 71 

Issre valley, 165 

Istria, 2509 

Disorganisation of society, 56 ; 
class antagonism, 57 ; economic 
conditions, 57-58; economic 
and moral crisis in, 94-97 ; 
the ideal of a perfect aristo- 
cracy, 108-10; the situation 
in, after Philippi, 214-15 ; 
decay of traditional institu- 
tions, 215-16; new currents in 

literature, 216-17; confisca- 
cations of land in eighteen 
towns, 219-24; Antony’s 
neglect of, 229-31; the new 

civil war, 230-34 ; the parody 
of the social war, 235; con- 
fusion in, after fall of Perugia, 
246; economic consequences 
of the civil war, 260-261 ; 
universal discontent, 261-62 ; 
movement to the towns, 262; 
apathy of public opinion, 262- 
63 ; signs of decadence, 263-64 ; 
progress of social change, 295- 
96; the return to tradition, 
296-98 ; town and country 
according to Varro, 299-304 
Ivrea, 165, 168 

JERUSALEM, siege of, 292 

Judea, 288; question settled by 
the Senate, 268-69 

Julia, mother of Plancus, flees to 
Sextus Pompeius, 246 

Julia, daughter of Octavianus, be- 
trothed to Domitius, 295 

Julie, founding of, 213 

Junia, wife of Lepidus, 30 

Jupiter Capitolinus, temple of, 26, 27 

LaBIO, 147, 172; suicide of, 208 
Labienus, son of Cesar’s general, 

t 196— 
\ Pursuit of Decidius, 244-45 ; 
* ' invasion of Cilicia, 250; de- 

f feated by Ventidius, 276 
Lachares beheaded, 277-78 

Land question, the— 
Law of Lucius Antonius, 69-70, 
83, revocation of, 129; the 
commission of seven, 70, 75; 
grants of land to the veterans, 
212-13, 222; confiscation and 
distribution of land by Octa- 
vianus, 219-24 ; Varro’s views 
on the land problem, 301-4 

Brutus and Cassius at, 37, 39; 
meeting of Atticus and Cicero 
at, 64 

Laodicea, 176 

“Lark ”’ legion, the, 93, 106, 112 

Laterensis, Juventius, 167 

Latium, 187 

Lavino, the, 177 

Lento, Cesennius, 71, 75 

Lentulus, 145 

Antony’s deliberations with, 
3-5, 313-14; recruits a band 
of soldiers and veterans, 7, 8 


II-I2, 315-16; his proposal 
concerning the conspirators, 
12; invitation to Brutus and 
Cassius, 20-21; governor of 

Gallia Narbonensis, 22; fears 
during the riots, 30 ; recognised 
pontifex maximus, 37-38; 
marriage of his son, 83 and 
note ; Antony’s reference to, 
in the Senate, 117; Cicero’s 
proposal for a golden statue 
128; letters to the Senate, 
144-45 ; in Gallia Narbonensis, 
150; founding of Lyons, 160; 
policy of, 164-65 ; agreement 
with Antony, 165-68 ; pro- 
scription of, 170 ; reconciliation 
of Antony and Octavianus, 
171, 176-78; deliberations 
at Bologna—see undey Trium- 
virate ; fortune of, 181-82; 
character of, 183, 190; effect 
of the disturbances on, 193; 
public opinion regarding, 209- 
10; spoliation of, 211 and 
note ; allows Lucius to enter 
Rome, 234; appointed to 
Africa, 254-55; refuses ta 
help Octavianus, 283, 284 


Lepidus, Manius, 209 and nole 

Leucopetra, 84, 87 

Lex de permutatione provinciarum, 
promulgation of, 85-86; ap- 
proval, 90 and note 

Lex de provinciis, approval, 66-67 

Lex de vi et majestate, 93-94 

Lex Falcidia, the, enactment of, 215 

Lex Judiciaria, the, 94 

Lex Pedia, the, 252 

Lex Titia, the, 184 

Libo, Lucius Scribonius, 81, 122, 
250, 251, 270-72 

Liguria, 154 ; mountains of, 160 

Livia, marriage with Octavianus, 

Livius, Titus, 216 

Longinus, Caius Cassius— 
March 16-17, 44 B.c., events 
of, 9-10, 309, 312; Antony’s 
invitation to, 20-21 ; opposes 
idea of a public funeral for 
Cesar, 22; threatened by the 
mob, 28-30; requests leave 
to quit Rome, 34-35; flight 
from Rome, 37; at Lanuvium, 
39; in Campania, 48-50; 
his inquiry of Antony, 62; 
negotiations for a loan, 63-64 ; 
his commission to Sicily, 65 ; 
the meeting at Antium, 66-68 ; 
projects) of, 78, O13 im the 
island of Nisidia, 80 ; manifesto 
of, 87-89; in Syria, 107 and 
note, 111; despatches from, 
April 43 B.c., 145-46 ; recalled 
to Italy, 168, 169; ammnesty 
annulled, 175 ; army of, 176; 
in the East, 195; conquest 
of Rhodes, 195-97 ; beginning 
of the Eastern war, 199-200 ; 
his position at Philippi, 200-202; 
the first battle, 203-5 ; death 
of, 204-5; province assigned 
by Cesar to, 324-28 ; 

Lucania, 252 

[ucca, 220 

Lucrine lake, the, 293 

Lucullus, 70; villa of, 80 

Ludi Apollinares, the, 67, 76, 77, 
82, 35 

Ludi Plebet, the, 266-67 

Lupercalia, festival of, 130 


Lupus, 122 

Lycaonia, 277 

Lycia, republics of, 195, 196, 197° 
Lyons, Colony of, 160 

Lysias the Athenian, 72 

Rumoured invasion by the 
Getz, 32 and note—33 ; Decimus 
appointed to, 85-86 ; counter- 
revolution of Marcus Brutus 
in, 136-38 ; invasion of, under 
the Triumvirate, 194-98 ; Asi- 
nius Pollio appointed gover- 
nor, 259 

Madiartope, hill of, 200 

Friend of Octavianus, 249, 251; 
treaty of Brundisium, 254-55 ; 
patron of Horace, 270, 278- 

79; his mission to Antony, 
288-90; return from Greece, 
291; at Tarentum, 294 

Mantua, 258, 270, 274 

Marcellus, son of Octavia and Caius 
Claudius Marcellus, 75 note 

Marcellus, son of Octavianus, 273 

Marcellus, Caius Claudius, married 
Octavia, 75, 103, 114 

Mars, legion of, 148, 205 ; revolt, 

Mars, temple of, 112 

Marseilles, question of territory in, 

Menecrates, Greek freedman, 271, 

Menodorus or Menas, ireedman, 

252, 266, 271, 272— 

Goes over to Octavianus, 282 
and note ; knighted by Octa- 
vianus, 285; at the disaster 
of Scylla, 285-87 

Messala, 269 

Messina, 285 

Misenum, Cape, 293 

Misenum, treaty of, 192, 269 note, 
272-74 ; cancelled, 295 

Siege of, 123, 131, 139, 141-42, 
145, 147 ; correspondence be- 
tween Octavianus, Hirtius and 
Antony, 141-143; battle of, 

338 INDEX 

Mucia, mother of S. Pompeius, 248 
and note-—49, 270, 272 

Murcus, Lucius Statius, 21— 
Movements of his fleet, 197, 
199-200, 205, 223 ; death, 271 

Murena, Lucius Lucinius, 289 

Mustela, Seius, 72 

Mylasa, 250 and note 


Neapolis, 200 

Nepos, Cornelius, 218 

Nero, Tiberius Claudius, 273 note— 
His proposal in the Senate, 14 ; 
mission to Campania, 232, 
234-35; flight from Italy, 246 ; 
divorces Livia, 281-82 

Nisida, island of, 80 

Norbanus—see Flaccus 

Norcia, 247 ; siege of, 233 

Nucula, retired actor, 71, 75 

Numidia given to Octavianus, 181 

Sister of Octavianus, 75 ; saves 
many of the proscribed, 188 ; 
marriage with Antony, 255 and 
note—56; mission to Octavianus, 
Octavianus (Caius Octavius)— 
Adopted by Cesar, 22 ; arrival 
in Rome, 44-46 ; his character, 
53, 183; his action upon 
arrival, 53-55; his first inter- 
view with Antony, 61; dis- 
sension between Antony and, 
66; incited against Antony 
by the conservatives, 74-75 ; 
war of intrigue between Antony 
and, 82-83, 85; reconciliation 
with Antony, 89-90 ; fictitious 
attempts at assassination at- 
tributed to, 100-101, 101 note ; 
in Campania, 103-4, 105; 
requests an interview with 
Cicero, 106; correspondence 
between Cicero and, III; 
reaches Rome with veterans, 
112; his speech to the people 
and its failure, 113-114; a 
critical day, 116-18; offers 
alliance with Decimus, 120-22 ; 
grant of gifts by the Senate, 

Octavianus (Caius Octavius)—con- 

126-28 ; progress of the Modena 
war, 132-35; correspondence 
between Antony and, during 
the siege of Modena, 141-43 ; 
defence of his camp, 147, 149 ; 
battle of Modena, 150; inter- 
view with D. Brutus, 154-55 ; 
initial dissensions with the 
conservatives, 157-60; mes- 
sage to the Senate concerning 
his soldiers, 158-59; receives 
the ambassadors, 162; again 
falls back upon the popular 
party, 163; his proposal to 
Cicero, 165 ; his double policy, 
165; takes command against 
Antony, 168; demands the 
consulship, 169-70; delibera- 
tions at Bologna—see under 
Triumvirate ; the coup d’etat, 
172-73; entry into Rome, 
173-174; as consul, 174-75 ; 
reconciliation with Antony, 
176-78; stories circulated 
about him, 183, 190-91; his 
panic and his cruelty, 193-94 ; 
expedition to Sicily, 197-98 ; 
called to Antony’s help, 199; ill- 
ness at Dyrrachium, 200; joins 
Antony at Philippi, 201; the 
first battle of Philippi, 203-5 ; 
public opinion regarding, 209 ; 
the compact at Philippi, 211 ; 
return to Italy, distribution 
of land, 219-21; first op- 
position of Fulvia and Lucius, 
221-22; difficulties confronting 
him, 222-224; execrated by 
the veterans, 224-26; treaty 
of Teanum, 229-30; secures 
the temple treasures, 231-32 ; 
the civil war, 233-34 ; further 
violent action, 246-49; leaves 
for Gaul and attempts to 
seduce the army of Calenus, 
249-50; return from Gaul, 
251; marriage with Scribonia, 
251; beginning of hostilities 
with Antony, 252-53; treaty 
of Brundisium, 254-55; war 
against Sicily, 265-66 ; popular 


Octavianus (Caius Octavius)—con- 

revolt against, 266-67 ; treaty 
of Misenum, 272-74; expedi- 
tion against the Aquitani, 278 ; 
marriage with Livia, 281-82 ; 
fresh war with S. Pompeius, 
282-86 ; the defeat of Scylla, 
286-87 ; sends Mecenas to 
Antony, 288 ; Antony’s reply, 
291-92; the agreement of 
Tarentum, 293-95 

Oppius, 8, 114, 116; fears during 
the riots, 30 

Ops, temple of, 46, 315 

Ostia, 173 

Pacorus, son of king of Parthia, 
244-45 ; death, 287 

Pacuvius, epics of, 281 

Palestine, civil war in, 210-11 

Panaghirdagh range, the, 200 

Panaro, 141 

Pansa, Caius Vicius, 8, 70, 73— 
Province assigned to, 22; at 
Puteoli, 39; attitude towards 
Antony, 51; consul, 43 B.c., 
127; work of recruiting, 129 ; 
convocations of the Senate, 
130, 132-33, 135; proposals in 
the Senate, 133, 134; Opposes 
Cicero’s proposals, 140-41; de- 
parture for Bologna, 143 ; battle 
of Forum Gallorum, 147-49 ; 
death of, 151 nole, 152-54 

Parma, 131; Antony’s descent on, 

Parmensis, Cassius, 209, 223 

Parthian, 196 and note— 
Cesar’s plans regarding, 243- 
44; Parthian invasion of 
Syria, 40 B.c., 245; victory of 
Ventidius over, 276; further 
invasion under Pacorus, 287-88 

Patras, 34 

Paulus, Lucius A2milius, 157-58 

Pedius, Quintius— 

' Heir of Cesar, 22; elected con- 
sul, 174; proposal to Octa- 
vianus, 177; commands of the 
triumvirate to, 182; death of, 

Peloponnese, the, 272, 277-78 


Perugia, siege of, 235-36; fall of, 
subsequent confusion in Italy, 

Pesaro, 71, 220 

Petissius of Urbinum, 72 

Pheedrus, 72 

Pharsalia, battle of, 137 

Plain of, 201-3; first battle 
of, 203-5; second battle of, 
206-7 ; the convention at, 211 

Philippus, Lucius Marcius, 45, 114; 
embassy to Antony, 129, 131- 

Philippus, Marcus Barbatius, 71 

Phrygia, 228 

Piedmont, 164 

Pinarius, Lucius, 22 

Pisidia, Antony founds the kingdom 
of, 277 and note 

Piso, father-in-law of Cesar, 


Demands a public funeral for 
Cesar, 21; joins the con- 
servatives, 86; speech against 
Antony in the Senate, 88-89 ; 
speech in the Senate, 129 ; 
embassy to Antony, 131-32 

Piso, Lucius, 126 

Placentia, 156 

Plancus, Cnzus, 46, 76 

Plancus, Lucius Munatius, 21, 244 

Plancus, T. Munatius, 70, 120, 131— 

Consul elect for 42 B.c., 22, 

183; letters to the Senate, 

144-4§ ; founds “Lyons, 160; 

policy, 164-65 ; /<ivertures of 

Lepidus, 166% tequested not 

to come to Lepidus, 167 ; 

retires on the banks of the 

Argenteus, 168; Antony’s 

overtures to, 171; abandons 

Brutus, 175-76 ; in Benevento, 

222; policy, 235-36 ; governor 

of Asia, 244, 259; flees with 

Fulvia, 246 

Plautius, 264, 289 

Plebs, the, Czsar’s legacy to, 22-24 

Polemo given the throne of ,Lyca- 
onia, 277 

Pollenzo, 161 

Pollio, Asinius, 21, 131— 
Letter from Octavianus to, 




Pollio, Asinius—continued 
165; Antony’s overtures to, 
171 ; disposal of his army, 175 ; 
caymina nova, 217 ; to supervise 
the land distribution in Cisal- 
pine Gaul, 221; proposals of 
Fulvia, 230, 234; policy of, 
235-36; Pollio and the fourth 
Eclogue, 237; in the delta of 
the Po, 246, 247; overtures 
of Octavianus, 248; negotia- 
tions with Domitius, 252; 
treaty of Brundisium, 254-55 ; 
governor of Macedonia for 
39 B.c., 259; triumph in Rome, 

Pompeii, 82, 84 

Pompeius, Sextus— 
Peace negotiations with, 38, 
46,—80, 8Y, 1073) capture: of 
Carteia, 74; honours for, 145 ; 
placed at head of the fleet, 
168; in the Mediterranean, 
170 ; condemnation of, 175 ; in 
Sicily, 186, 197, 199; army 

of, 222; cuts off corn-ships 
from Rome, 223; receives 
fuliay 246 Spolncy.. seeA7e: 

Octavianus offers alliance with, 
248 and note-—49 ; offers alliance 

with Antony, 250-51; seizes 
Sardinia, 253; abandoned 
by Antony, 254, 255; popu- 

larity of, 266, 268 and nole ; 
master of Sicily, 271-72; his 
projects; | 272; treaty of 
Misenum, 272-74; fresh war 
with Octavianus, 282-86 
Pontine marshes, the, 70 
Pontus, Darius established in, 277 
Portia, wife of Brutus, 67 
Preneste, 229, 231, 233, 234 
Propertius, family of, 220 
Ptolemeus, Prince of Chalcis, 210 
Cicero at, 39-41, 79, 81, 103, 
107; Agrippa’s canal, 293 


Reno, the, 177 
Republic, the ideal, 110 
Rhegium, 84, 87, 88, 285 


Rhodes, island of, 209 ; conquest of, 
by Cassius, 195, 196, 197 

Rimini, 220 

Situation after Cesar’s murder, 
March 15-16, 44 B.C., I-10; 
night of March 16-17, 11-12; 
anarchy in, during days follow- 
ing Cesar’s funeral, 28-36 ; dis- 
organisation of society in, 56; 
the last ten days of May, 44 
B.c.. 58-64; panic in, on the 
promulgation of the “lex de 

permutatione,” 86; situation 
after Antony’s departure, 
November, 44 B.C., 119-20; 
news of the battle of Modena 
received, 151-52; entry of 
Octavianus after the coup 
detat, 173-74; the amnesty 

of 44 B.c. annulled, 174-75 ; 
the proscriptions, 182; con- 
fiscation of property, 182; 
the first massacres under the 
triumvirate, 184-88; further 
confiscations and new imposts, 
190-91 ; speech of Lucius, 234 ; 
fall of the Roman aristocracy, 
237-38; social condition 40 
B.C. 202 

Rubiz, 290 

Rufrenus, officer, 166, 187; pro- 
posal regarding Julius Divus, 

Rufus, Quintus Salvidienus, 45 

Rullus, P. Servilius, 252-53 

SABINUS, Caius Calvisius, 268 
Sabinus, Calvisius— 
Governor of Ancient Africa,118, 
130, 143; the defeat of Scylla, 
St. Bernard road, the, 155, 165, 169 
Salassians, the, 168-69 
Sallust, 8, 70— 
Wealth of, 30 
“ Catiline,”’ 
toriz,’’ 278 
Salona, 277 
Ordered to Spain, 219, 223; 
return to Rome, 234; com- 
mands in Gaul, 251; over- 

and note; 
217-19; ‘“‘ His- 


tures to Antony, 253; found 
guilty of perduellio, 267-68 

Samoggia, the, 177 

Samosata, 287 

Sardinia, 253; plans of Octavianus 
regarding, 265-66, 283 

Sardis, 194; the meeting at, 197 

Saturninus, Caius Sentius, 250, 273 

Saxa, Decidius, 71, 120— 
in Macedonia, 194, 195, 197, 
198 note; flight to Antioch, 
245; death of, 250 

Saxa, Decimus, 244 

Scaptius, Marcus, 91, 107, 172 

Scribonia, wife of Octavianus, 251, 
273, 281-82 

Scrofa, Cnzus 
299, 304 

Scylla, the disaster of, 286-87 

Seius, M., 122 

Senate, the— 
Session in the Temple of Tellus, 
13-17, 309-10; vitality of 
the Republic, 18-19; session 
of March tgth, 44 B.c., 20-22 ; 
session of June ist, 64-65 ; 
approval of the agrarian law, 
77; scandal during the session 
of Sept. Ist, 44 B.c., 98; hasty 
division of the provinces, 117- 
18; session of Dec. 20th, Cicero’s 
third Philippic, 124-25; pro- 
posed grants to Octavianus, 
127-29; embassy sent to 
Antony, 129, 131-32; second 
proposed embassy, 141-43; 
the deputation from Lepidus, 

Sentinum, 233 

Serrheion, Cape, 199 

Servilia, mother of M. Brutus, 50, 
63, 66, 67, 91, 107, 140, 168, 

Servilius, Publius— 
Proposes grant of gifts to 
Octavianus, 127; opposes 
proposal of Pansa, 134; pro- 
ject concerning Cassius, 153; 
consul 41 B.c., 219 

Sestius (or Sextius) T., governor 
of Numidia, 143, 211-12, 231 

Sestus, 197 

Tremellius, 297, 


Sicily — 
Rights of citizenship granted, 
33, 43-44; conquest of, 199 ; 
war in, during spring of 42 B.c., 
197-98 ; the Sicilian domains 
of S. Pompeius, 271 

Sicyon, 252 

Silanus, Marcus Junius, 144, 166, 
246, 273 

Sipontum, 252 

Siro, philosopher, 258, 263 

Slave question, the, Varro’s views, 

Smyrna, 195 

Sossius, Caius, 288 

Strato, 206 

Stratonicea, 250 

Sulpicius, Servius, 122— 
Proposal of, in the Senate, 31 ; 
leaves Rome, 50; proposes 
grant of gifts to Octavianus, 
127; embassy to Antony, 129, 

131-32; memorial to, pro- 
posed, 134 

Sylla, Publius, 58 

Syria, 254, 259— 
Invasion by Cassius, 145; 

Brutus in, 195-96; petty dis- 
turbances in, 244-45 ; Parthian 
invasion of, 40 B.C., 245 

TARENTINES, the, 84 

Tarentum, meeting and convention 
of, 293-95; Gulf of, 252 

Tarpeian rock, the, 28, 37 

Tarsus, meeting of Antony and 
Cleopatra at, 228-29 

Taurus, the, 276 

Teanum, agreement of, 220 note, 
223 note, 229 

Tellus, temple of, Senate convoked 
there, 11-17 

Terracina, 289 

Tertulla, wife of Cassius, 67 

Thasos, island of, 200, 208 

Theocritus, 217 

Theomnestes, 136 

Thessalonica, 137 

Thurii, 252 

Tiberius, 246 

Tibullus, Albius, 220 

Tibur, legions of Antony at, 115-16, 


Tiro, Numisius, 72 
Tiro, slave, 76 
Titius, Lucius, 184 
Titius, Marcus, 273 
Tortona, 156, 161 
Governor of Asia, 21-22, 78, 

91; leaves Rome for his 
f province, 34 note, 38; his 
Treasure wiScIZed et 3On AG 

murder of, 139, 142-43 

Tremellius, Lucius, tribune, 82-83, 

Trevicum, 290 

Tributum, imposition of, 160, 168, 
172, 180, 192 

Triumvirate, the— 
Triumvivt vetpublice constitu- 
end@, 176-78; deliberations 
of the triumvirs, 179-83; 
sketch of their respective 
characters, 183; “the ““lex 
Titia,’’ 184; the first plunder, 
184-88 ; further confiscations, 
and imposts, 190-91 ; system of 
extortion, 191-93 ; effect of the 
disturbances on the triumvirs, 
193 ; abolition of the electoral 
tights of the comitia, 195 ; 
difficulties of the situation after 
the first war, 210-11; first 
popular revolt, 265-67 ; 
further embarrassments, 268— 
69; expiration of the powers 
of the triumvirs, 292-93 

Turullius, 209 

Tusculum, 62 

Tyre, 210, 245 


VADO, 155, 156, 160 

Valerius, Publius, 37, 141 

Varius, 264, 289, 290 

Varro, Marcus Terentius, 113— 
Proscription of, 182 note, 188; 
the ‘‘ De re rustica,’”’ 298-99 ; 

fundamental ideas and in- 
consistencies of the book, 
299-301 ; town and country 

according to, 301-4 

Varus, Alfenus, 247, 258, 263, 270 

Varus, Quintilius, 208 

Vatinius, Publius, 21, 137, 146 

Velia, 90 

Velleius, Caius, 232 

Velletri, 54 

Venice, 259 

Venosa, 220 

Venusia, 264 

Vercelli, 165, 168 

Verres, proscription of, 182 note, 188 

Vesta, temple of, 192; vestal 
virgins, 191 

Via Aimilia, the, 143, 148, 149, 177 

Via Cassia, the, 143, 234 

Via Egnatia, the, 197, 200 

Via Milvia, the, 156 

Via Salaria, the, 301 

Viollet, M., quoted, 181 note 

The Eclogues, 217; first Ec- 
logue, 224-25; fourth Ec- 
logue, 237; fifth Eclogue, 
257-58; Alfenus Varus and, 
263; rise of, 269-70; intro- 
duces Horace to Mecenas, 270 ; 
ninth Eclogue, 274; success 
of the Eclogues, 279-81 ; the 
Georgics, 304-5 

Volumnius, 120 

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