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By ISAAC HUSIK, University of Pennsylvania. 

105. (L. 62, fifth line from bottom) = (K. 136, 6) 

rrion vta O Kin "IPS 1XD means in so far as it is infinite, 
and not 'well es eben unendlich ist'. It is equivalent to the 
Greek to airtipov y airapov ayvworov, quoted by K. himself in 
a note (136, note 2). 

106. (L. 62, fin.) 

rvbn 1T1T xb nrh ,p!>nrw no ba pernio tow « re" iox . 

.(?npii>nni>) p!>nn!> 

(K. 136 fin.) 

Wohl aber begreift er die Teilbarkeit als solche (sc. das Prinzip, 
das Gesetz), und dass esfilr sie keine Grenze gibt. se 

This does not give the precise meaning of the original, though 
it renders it in a general way. A more precise translation is the 
following : ' [The mind in apprehending an infinitely divisible 
magnitude does not apprehend it as infinitely divided] ; it appre- 
hends merely that it is divisible into parts which are divisible in 
turn (pbnrcv no bit pbnrra), and hence there is no limit to the 
division '. 

107. (L. 63, 19) = (K. 138, s) 

Joitn B*tc nPN should always be translated 'ein beliebiges 
Individuum ', and not ' ein zufalliges ', as K. does here and, with an 
exception or two, passim. 

108. (L. 63, 22) = (K. 138, 10) 

VAtXW "llpm, K. translates, 'Bei eingehender Untersuchung '. 
B'lBn is a technical term, and corresponds to the Aristotelian 

88 Italics mine. 


hrayanyri = induction. It is defined as follows in Averroes's 
compendium of logic : 89 

pjj? by -\)nw ton mvxb D^snan nna-m jo pen nn /yienn 
D^pi>nn ana uatwn nt rwso? bhw in a*no 771a bb»03 ^a 
on be uibbw dbbwi nt p'cn ;?73n jyyn win rcnn> >wk 
.-win nt by owan an nx»je> "B7 srnno 
In our case G. first proved that the miwio are not universals 
by the deductive method. He now proceeds to prove the same 
thing by the method of induction. That is, he investigates the 
various kinds of Ir&SClD and shows that none of them is 

109. (L. 63, 22—64, 29) = (K. 138, 10—142, 2) 
The passages are too long to quote in extenso, and the reader 
is expected to have before him the texts in question. He will 
then see that the errors of the translator are numerous. The 
most fundamental error is that K. does not understand the 
meaning of niCN (63, 23; 64, 17), which he renders 'Wirklichkeit' 
(138, 13) and 'Wirkliches' (141, 5). This leads him to mis- 
understand G.'s entire attitude towards the universal (141, note 2). 
The contrast between 1VS and niDN is not a difference 
between idea and reality (' Vorstellung ' and ' Wirklichkeit '), and 
G. does not say that the ideal comes before the real ('und so geht 
die Vorstellung dem "Wirklichen" vorauf;' 141, 7). Both irx 
and niCN are here logical or, if you will, psychological, terms. 
They are subdivisions of the term bsWO, intelligibile (Kin 73E>inn 
niOK DK nrx DN). The difference is that *WX is the single concept 
('Begriff', or 'Vorstellung') whereas niOK represents the true 
judgement (wahres Urteil), especially as it appears in the con- 
clusion of a true syllogism. We shall prove this statement by 
quoting from Averroes's compendium of logic (jl'jnn D3N7D 73, 
ed. Riva di Trento, 1560). P. 2 a we find this statement : 

w nvaenon niaspDn 73a dwt nsDaan rwpiaen ... 
lnioxy t»jw noa lain ruan sin -ivxn n'ro /room nvx typbn 
ainn i>jj maya Wan sim nicxy *roy» KW awe noa w 

89 Hcb. translation, JWHH rDN?» 73, ed. Riva di Trento, J560, p. 58 a. 


nw ,B>wn tan noi yaon son no ij-iok ids no n^oa ni>nni 
loa o^nioa dn D'js ut? i>y nn ,inpmn ik nann ovp ton mosn 
pon nn cnine D^iyn dn lncx ids wna dsi nxoj mpnn uidn 
b mpn? Mto n^m ,dn r6oa ohyi> woo Wi aw n&»-nn }o 
.mtrfl dni ^sriQ dk nyn*no D^n w no^non Wx i^k wo nns 
d^ini rms^n ntan v^y n*vw no ton nan -tw6 ni»wi qSni 
prnan ipi>n xwi nann n D^prv new onaia n^n nan i!> ^yian 
triMno D^n "jbo cpaon 5>vk nosn y>» njn r\ivvb n-iB»nn dW 
.typnn i!j ijyien mdni D*3anno D^n 1k 

' The things we desire to know in all theoretical disciplines 
consist of two parts — conceptual and verificatory. By concept ("Wi) 
we mean the understanding of a thing through that which 
constitutes, or is thought to constitute, its essence. This is that 
which usually and primarily answers to the question " What ? " 
(n eon ;), as for example when we say, What is Nature ? What is 
the Soul ? Verification or true conclusion (niDN) is the affirming 
of a thing or denying it. This again may be of two kinds, 
(1) absolute, as when we say, A vacuum exists, or (2) conditional, 
as when we say, Whether the world is created. This investigation 
is always introduced by the question "Whether" (« «m). Each 
of these two must be preceded in the mind of the learner by two 
elements of knowledge — the efficient and the directive. The directive 
of the concept is that which is denoted by the single word. The 
efficient thereof consists of those things which constitute the thing 
in question, namely, the parts of the definition. As for the directive 
of a true conclusion, truth is arrived at in the mind of the investi- 
gator as a result of two opposite or contrary parts (judgements). 
The efficient of a " true conclusion " is the syllogism.' 

It is clear now that "IVX is the concept, i.e. the true under- 
standing of the essence of a thing. We start with a word, say 
' man \ We ask, What is man ? and the answer is, the definition, 
namely, ' rational animal '. The parts of the definition, ' rational ' 
and ' animal ', constitute the concept ("IVX). We ask next, whether 
man is mortal or not. We express our problem in the form of two 
contrary or opposed propositions — man is mortal, man is not mortal. 
One of these is true, the other is not true. We arrive at the true 


opinion (rilDN) by means of a syllogism. Our conclusion is, let us 
say, man is mortal. This true conclusion is niDN. 

The ' Categories ' in Aristotle's logic deals with "IVX primarily, 
with niCN secondarily only, in so far as m»K presupposes "Wt. 
You cannot have a judgement without a subject and a predicate, 
and the subject involves "IVX. Beginning with the De Interpreta- 
iione,y/e pass over to niDN, for here we are dealing with propositions, 
dividing them into affirmative and negative, contrary and contra- 
dictory, universal and particular, and so on. This is the first step 
in the direction of verification (nlON), or obtaining a true conclusion 
(niOK). After we have done this, we proceed to combine proposi- 
tions in a syllogism, which is the actual efficient or agent in 
producing the true conclusion. This is treated in the Prior 
Analytics. Thus we read in the same treatise of Averroes, p. 9 a : 

rbunh ^bn w i>x nnpi^ni ncpan nncsa jid d^id w niDKm 
33-non ncNen nnexa •obti JiDm Dno irea jmd nosn irrve> iy 

.cp!i3 rmson sim mosi' by)sif\ 

The second error of K. is that he renders the word TU by 
' Begriff ', which corresponds to IT'S. TU should always be 
translated 'definition', as K. does in the first part of the paragraph. 
P. 139, note 2, K. says, 'Hier scheint Gersonides platonische 
Bahnen im aristotelischen Sinne zu wandeln '. There is no warrant 
at all for such a statement in the present discussion, and least of 
all does it apply to the sentence in G. to which it is attached by K. 
What G. says in that part of the argument is that the definition 
cannot denote the universal (v?3), because if it does, it must refer 
to it (the universal) either in the sense of the unitary thing 
embracing all individuals, or in the sense of the sum of all the 
individuals. In neither case would the definition denote the 
essence of the individual thing, for the latter is not identical with 
either of these two senses of universal, and hence could not be 
covered by the same definition, for different things require 
different definitions. How any one can see anything Platonic 
in this argument I fail to understand. 

The other mistakes concern the misunderstanding and mis- 
translation of sentences and expressions of the discussion in 


question. Thus L. 63, 27 reads 13 p3*iriB> *15?SN vb2 iTfi nr^l 
!>!>13n Tti. This K. renders (139, 3) 'Deshalb kann bei ihr 
(sc. der Vorstellung) m die Universaldefinition iiberhaupt nicht 
Platz greifen '. The correct translation is, 'Therefore the definition 
of the universal cannot denote it (sc. the individual) '. 

L. 64, 4 reads : 

^poi &i3 tow to &wi> run nwe *ib>sn ti!>3 Nine "icnji 

.jid in jid nw -icn ivn sifii 

This K. renders (140, 5) : 

' Wir behaupten nun, dass der Begriff auch 91 nach der " urn- 
schliessenden, umfassenden " Seite ( Vielheitsseite), n also nach der 
Genus- und der " Artseite " hin, kein Universales bildet.' 

This is not correct, for it is clear not only from the expression 
itself (sppBl ^13 NW 1X3 ^13^), but also from the sequence of 
the argument, that it is not the ' Vielheitsseite ' that is now being 
discussed, but the ' Einheitsseile '. The argument is this (L. 63, 
33 — 64, 4 ff.) : The definition must denote unity, for in defining 
man we do not say ' rational animals ', but ' rational animal '. If 
now we prove that the definition cannot denote the universal 
on its unitary side, it will follow that the definition cannot denote 
the universal at all. And in the sequel G. proceeds to give this 
proof, viz. that the definition cannot denote the universal on its 
general and embracing side (tfpch ??13 NWE> HX3), i.e. the unitary 
side (cf. also L. 63, 26; 13 tfpan S^isn rtar Nin man B»Nn '3 

,D*3-in D^Nn r!?1t p-M Nini, which shows clearly that &13n 
eppB n > as contrasted with D'Sin D'C'Nn, signifies unity and not 

The continuation of this argument K. disfigures beyond 
recognition. The Hebrew reads (L. 64, 5) : 

Nine 'jbd njn ,?an in JiDn Nini /!>W> "nan nvi iW nn 
b"i ,TU3 nip$> msiDxnn nt nwe 3 , in' 1 nan /eptavo ixn nro 
wa "\m nisntjxnn isyn tijo npit? 103 ,u w<w to b napnn 

.amaa icsn vta *m nn .jnxn pai 

90 Italics mine. 9I Italics mine. 


This K. translates as follows (140, 8) : 

'Ware n'amlich der Begriff n ein Universales, also eine Art 
oder ein Genus, so milsste er dies von seiten der Relation sein, 
denn gerade die Relation wird durch den Begriff gewonnenj* d.h. 
also die entsprechende Umschliessung, wie wir ja auch unter dem 
Begriffe " Knecht " die Beziehung verstehen, die zwischen ihm 
und dem Herrn besteht, etwas Derartiges aber ist bei den 
Definitionen nicht moglich.' 

G. says nothing of the kind. The correct translation is as 
follows : 

' If the definition denoted the universal, namely, the genus or 
the species, it would follow that since it is in this sense a relative 
(cf. L. 56, 2 ff. = K. 114, 20), this relative aspect should be 
included in the definition, namely, this aspect of embracing that 
which it embraces, as we include in the definition of " servant " 
the relation between him and " master "; but this is impossible in 

The meaning is that we should define man, for example, as 
' rational animal, embracing all individual men '. 

(L. 64, 17) 

rricvb fN "o nn ."hbJ? nw Nbc a^no p dj sin niDNn dS>ini 
dip nvvn rw m^>i ^"W no i>jj bbb>d dn *a (r. moan) 
run fyJ? tpwi jw nsann naat? rm p jyyn nwai .maun 

.^W> niDNn jw nwao Kin 

K. (141, 5) translates as follows : 

Aber auch als Wirkliches (sc. Wahres)^ kann es (sc. das 
Intelligibele) kein Universales sein. Denn das Wirktiche™ ist 
nur ein Urteil iiber die Vorstellung, und so geht die Vorstellung 
dem ' Wirklichen ' n vorauf. Wenn es sich aber so verhalt und 
doch erwiesen ist, dass die Vorstellung kein Universales ist, so 
kann auch das Wirkliche 93 kein Universales sein. 

02 Italics mine. •* Italics mine. 


To this he adds in a note (141, note 2) : 

' Auch diese Anschauung geht auf falsch verstandenen Plato- 
nismus zuriick, nach welchem die psychische und logisch-technische 
Organisation des Individuums ein Primares gegeniiber den Dingen 

As a matter of fact the argument quoted from G. has nothing 
to do with Platonism, true or otherwise. We should rather say of 
K.'s note, 'Diese Anschauung geht auf falsch verstandenen 
Gersonidismus zuriick, nach welchem niDN " Wirklichem " gleich 

We discussed the meaning of niDN before, and we found that 
T11DK and "IVX are both logical terms. 1VX denotes the single 
concept, to which the terms 'true' and 'false' do not apply, 
niDX denotes a judgement, the result of syllogistic proof, and 
may be spoken of as ' true ' or, if one finds fault with the 
syllogism by which it was arrived at, as ' false '. niDN is made 
up of "IVV, it is a judgement upon the "W, hence IVV comes first. 
The translation of the Hebrew quoted above is as follows : 

' [Having divided the intettigibile (baSJ'ID) into concept ("lW) 
and true conclusion (J11DK), and having shown that the former as 
expressed in the definition (to) does not denote the universal], 
we shall now prove that a true conclusion (niON) cannot denote 
the universal either; for the true conclusion is nothing else than 
a judgement concerning the content of the concept, and hence 
the concept comes before the true conclusion. This being so, 
and since we have proved that the concept does not denote the 
universal, it follows that the true conclusion does not denote the 
universal either.' 

Does any one see any Platonism here ? I do not. The entire 
argument is within the logical sphere, and there is nothing said 
here as to the relation between the ideal and the real. Accordingly 
the contradiction of which K. speaks in his excursus, p. 281, does 
not exist, and needs no solution. 

That niDS is a logical term like *n«f and the only difference is 
that given above, namely, the difference between the judgement 


and the single concept, is also confirmed by the argument imme- 
diately following the one just discussed. This new one is also 
intended to prove that niDN cannot refer to the universal. But 
instead of the a priori manner in which this was proved in the 
last argument, G. now uses an illustration. And what is the 
illustration of niOK ?— a universal proposition (n?713 mn). Here, 
too, K. commits several mistakes which must be rectified. The 
Hebrew text reads (L. 64, 20) as follows : 

noa hbin b» noBitr nr«B> rwyD inud n?7i3n man *3 min 
by mm wk vby ncaic x^n new xwnv "sb ^poi 7713 Nintr 
n3 new n>n dne> nn ,*pp»i (r. 7712) ne>u nw no3 77ian 
tone> no nanno na nav -133 nsn ,771a Nine nD3 77ian by nrm 
pin* w 73? mm -ia"io din 73 mow? 7e>Dm /mno 'nba 
ffwa jaion fwi dni 3a na»n mnn (r. nwn) n«r noenn nt7i 
nanno wn pone nsmo Nini ,n3-mD pen nr na aen» nan ,p»n 
new pne> r>77i3n rnna inud sin mbi /ibdd3 Mt? insc N71 
»a ,nnDnDn mwa payn nwe> aw (r. ntai) ntai ,eppoi 7713 ra 
.ie>bj3 nsi3D nn ^cw n«nw n3E>D noinn ps 

K. (141, n) renders this as follows : 

Und ferner : Aus dem Begriffe des generellen Urteils folgt, 
doss es nur insofern das Universale zum Urteilsgegenstande erhebi, 
als es selbst etwas Einschliessendes und Umfassendes ist, weil doch 
der Trager, fiber welchen es urteilt, nicht auf das entsprechende 
Universale hinweist. Wiirde namlich sein Trager auf das Gene- 
relle hinweisen, das er umschliesst, M so musste dasjenige als 
pluralisierbar angenommen werden, was gar nicht pluralisiert 
werden kann. So weist beispielsweise unser Satz : Alle Menschen 
reden — auf eine Mehrheit von Menschen hin; deshalb wurde in 
diesem Urteile das Wort ' alle ' gesetzt. Wird aber unter ' dem 
Menschen' die Art verstanden, so musste in ihm (sc. dem Urteile) 
die Art als pluralisierbar gesetzt werden, wahrend doch erwiesener- 
massen die Art nicht pluralisiert werden kann, und eine numerische 
Zweiheit nicht existiert. Mithin ist erwiesen, dass in einem 
generellen (allgemeinen) Urteile das Subjekt nichts Generelles und 
94 Italics mine. 


Umschliessendes ist (sc. kein Genus und keine Art), und so 
muss es ein unbestimmtes (IVDJID) Urteil seinf* denn der Umfang 
iindert nichts an der Bedeutung des Subjekts, und das ist selbst- 

The italicized passages are in every case incorrect. What G. 
says is this : It is clear from the nature of a universal proposition 
that it does not express a judgement concerning the universal as 
universal and embracing. For the subject concerning which the 
judgement is expressed does not denote the universal as universal 
and embracing. For if the subject of the proposition denoted 
the universal as such (lit. as universal), it would follow that that is 
multipliable which is not multipliable. Then follows the illustra- 
tion, which is clear. If we say ' all man is rational ', the plurali- 
zation is expressed by the word ' all '. If then the subject ' man ' 
denotes the species, it would follow that the species ' man ' may be 
pluralized, which is absurd. Then he adds, but the same thing is 
true (read ntai instead of ntai) of an indefinite proposition [for 
example, ' (some) man is rational ']. For the quantitative particle 
(noin) does not change the meaning of the subject, as is self- 

Having discussed all the difficulties of the passage referred to 
at the beginning of this number, and seeing that K.'s translation 
is unusually defective, I deem it proper to close this number by 
giving a correct translation of the entire argument in question. 

' It seems as a result of an inductive investigation that these 
intelligibilia are not universals. For (1) an inielligtbile is either 
a concept or a true conclusion. Now it is clear that the concept, 
i.e. the definition, does not denote the universal, for if it did 
denote the universal, it would have to do this either in the sense 
in which the universal is one, or in the sense in which it is many. 
And whichever it be, it would follow that the definition does not 
denote the essence of the individual thing, for the individual thing 
is not the universal embracing it, nor is it the many individuals. 
Therefore the definition of the universal could not be connected 

95 Italics mine. 

R a 


with it, for different things require different definitions. And in 
general, as the definition of house does not pertain to the brick, 
and the definition of the number ten does not apply to the number 
two, so, according to this hypothesis, the definition could not 
apply to the individual, as is evident But it is clear from the 
meaning of definition that it does denote the essence of every one 
of the individuals to which the particular definition applies. 
Hence it is clear that the definition does not denote the universal. 
Again (2), if the definition denoted the universal, it would have to 
do so in the sense in which the universal is a unity, for we see no 
plurality in the definition. We do not say in defining man, he is 
" rational animals ", but " rational animal ". Hence it appears that 
the object of a definition is a unitary definitum. This being so, if 
we now prove that the definition cannot denote the universal 
in the sense in which it is a unity, it will be clear that the defini- 
tion cannot denote the universal at all. We shall now prove that 
the definition cannot denote the universal in the sense in which 
it is universal and embracing, i.e. the sense in which it is a genus 
or a species (sc. the universal as a unity). For if the definition 
denoted the universal as genus or species, then, since it (the 
universal) is in this sense a relative, it would follow that this aspect 
of relation would have to be expressed in the definition, I mean 
the fact that it embraces what it does embrace ; as we include in 
the definition of " slave " the relation between him and " master ". 
But this cannot be done in definitions. Again, it is clear that 
each of the parts of a definition is necessarily predicable of the 
thing defined. Now if the definition denotes the universal, 
the result would follow that the species is identical with its genus, 
which is utterly absurd. For example, as man is "rational 
animal ", man is " animal ", and the species is identical with its 
genus. It would result further from this assumption that the last 
species is identical with the highest genus. For as man is 
" animal " and the definition of animal is " nutritive sensitive ", 
man would be identical with "nutritive"; and as the definition of 
"nutritive" is "growing body", it would follow that man is identical 
with " body ", and so the matter would go on until the result would 


be that " man " which is the last species is identical with the highest 
genus, which is utterly foolish and absurd. 

'But neither can a "true conclusion" refer to the universal. 
For a conclusion is nothing more than a judgement concerning 
the object of the concept ; and hence the concept is prior to the 
conclusion. This being so, then, since we have proved that the 
concept does not denote the universal, it is clear that the con- 
clusion does not denote the universal either. Again, it is clear 
from the nature of a universal proposition that it does not denote 
the universal as universal and embracing, because the subject 
concerning which the judgement is expressed does not denote the 
universal as universal and embracing. For if the subject denoted 
the universal qua universal, it would follow that that which is not 
multipliable is multipliable. For example, the proposition, "all 
man is rational " denotes plurality in man. This is the function 
of the word " all " in this proposition. Now if " man " denotes 
the species, the species is pluralized in this proposition. But we 
know that the species cannot be pluralized and cannot be numeri- 
cally two. Hence it follows that the subject in a universal pro- 
position is not universal and embracing. But the same thing 
is true of an indefinite proposition, for the quantitative particle 
[" all "] does not change the meaning of the subject, as is self- 

The paragraphing in the Leipzig edition is wrong, and it seems 
to have misled K. L. 64, 4 should not begin a new paragraph, 
neither should line 6 from the bottom of the same page ; whereas 
line 17, beginning niONn D71X1, should be the beginning of a new 

no. (L. 65, 22) 
na«n m?n i>s3 p run y nuxj wi> nw iww yao '3 nw 
paw neb i>s3 ii> ivbn jw no rrm jrbin ^a ton ncs n&un 

.niam hoan *wo» rm ,<b rvbn 

(K. 144, 2) 

'Und ferner: Da doch seine Winkel zwei Rechte betragen, 
und die Doppelheit der 2 R gkichfalls eine unendliche Zakl{sc. von 


Einzelwinkelri) einschliesst^ so ware doch die eine Unendlichkeit 
gleich dem Doppelten der anderen Unendlichkeit, was offenbar 
absurd ist.' 

The italicized passage is evidently incorrect. What G. says is 
that if we say that the angles of the infinite triangle are equal to 
two right angles, they are double the one universal right angle 
which is also infinite, and then we have one infinite double 
another infinite, which is absurd. Whether K.'s criticism in his 
note (144, note 2) will apply now is not clear to me. For G. is 
not arguing about a theoretical double, but about an actual one. 
This infinite universal triangle, if its angles are equal to two right 
angles, does actually contain the double of two universal infinite 
right angles, hence the absurdity. 

in. (L. 66, 4) = (K. 145, 10) 

In the text K. has Ilepi Kocr/xov, in the note (note 1) De Caelo ! 
Cf. above, No. 32. 

112. (L. 66, 6) 

d^d bun nnwa ntw tftrawm Dwew i^n m dxv pnoi 
pn pen by jidd mtw: rr»n ,nrunn nxro a^no twit? ica D's'poi 
y 3T3 t\ Nine onN3 mot* jywa tit t rvrv< mh uid nw t6 pon <a 

,S>i&an nwao nn 

(K. 145 fin.) 

Ferner : Waren die Subjekte und Pradikate in diesen Schlflssen 
Generalia, wie sich solches aus der Annahme ergibt, so ware die 
Pradizierung des Genus fiir die Spezies falsch, denn die Spezies ist 
nicht mit ihrem Genus identisch, sons/ muss/en wir beispielsweise 
sagen : Der Mensch ist ein liignerisches Lebewesen ; das ist aber 
offenbar absurd. 

The italicized passage is incorrect. What G. says is this. 
If the subjects and the predicates in general propositions denoted 
universals, we could not predicate a genus of its species, for they 
are not the same. For example, the proposition, ' man is animal ', 
would be wrong an /n tone D1N3 moN ptro "jm ,nw. The 

96 Italics mine. 


Hebrew sentence quoted is an illustration of the statement just 
made, and 3T3 goes back to nvr and is not connected with »n. 

113. (L. 66, 26) 

f V?sr\ by ncaie nbbtsn rnnn |iNe -inud ton ,p p»n nvnai 
onto bbbw by ^m nw -ik»n ivn n!>i inN in sine nxa n!> 
i>i»i3n i»» noeie rkban man nrvn dn pnn> mbi • in 1 ' inx obcd 
,ono inx nns i>y Baeo Nine i»» a»m Nine' noa vi»» dbbw 

(K. 147, 1) 

Wenn es sich aber so verh'alt, so trifft das allgemeine Urteil 
offenbar iiber das Allgemeine keine Entscheidung, weder nach 
der Einheits- noch nach der Vielheitsseite hin, obgleich m es iiber 
sie eine einzige Gesamtentscheidung fallt. Entscheidet deshalb 
das allgemeine Urteil iiber das Allgemeine, so trifft es diese 
Entscheidung nach der Vielheitsseite hin, obgleich 98 es iiber jedes 
einzelne Individuum urteilt. 

The two phrases beginning with 'obgleich' in the above 
passage are incorrect. ' Obgleich ' is the wrong word and destroys 
the meaning of G. Similarly, ' Trifft deshalb, &c.', the beginning 
of the sentence following immediately upon the passage above 
quoted, is incorrect, and obscures the connexion of the thought ; 
and the wrong use of ' obgleich ' is again repeated below (147, 15). 

It is clear from the Hebrew text and the argument that the 
possible signification of a universal proposition is classified by G. 
in the following way: It may express a judgement concerning 
the universal as (1) a unity embracing all individuals, or it may 
refer to the universal as (2) a plurality of individuals. This latter 
mode of signification may again be of two kinds. It may refer to 
a plurality of individuals (a) collectively, or (6) distributively. The 
Hebrew expressions for these different modes of reference are as 

follows: mi nwc iva ^an (2) ,-inN in Nine nxn bban (i). 

This latter is again divided into by D»3"i Kin -)2*N 1V3 (a) 
nrr inn oseo arvby oaene, and (6) Nine 5>y ran Nine noa 

97 Italics mine. 98 Italics mine. 


DTOO iriN iriN by QB&O. Now what G. says in the passage 
above quoted is this : Summarizing the preceding argument, he 
says, This being so, it is clear that the universal proposition refers 
to the universal neither (i) in so far as it is a unit, nor (2 a) in so far 
as it is a collective plurality. It follows, therefore, if the universal 
proposition refers to the universal, that (2 b) it refers to it as 
a distributive plurality. For, he goes on to say, in the passage 
immediately following upon the one quoted above, a universal 
proposition has the following possible modes of reference, &c. 
(giving precisely the classification mentioned above). 

114. (L. 67, 2) 

rta? vby bbbw pn' baio pbn D'mn )bt6 fM3 put? 's^ 
jw dSni .one &tn b»n i>3 by r>BBrc> rrnne> T\n< run ^ttn 
-1N130 xin ew r6ir vby bdbw pw !>3jid piri W2~\n ibxb 

JN33 pN 13 ,1310 DIN b WlOtO ,P"inN p» WH DNBW nilM 

om -ik*w pre jnxpo Dnsp o^ru d^djid d^3 dihti wxb 

."m* DflO ^3 ^3 by nW BBPQrie> 

(K. 147, 18) 

' Da aber die Vielheit als abgegrenzten Teil des moglichen 
Urteils nur das Individuum enthalt, so kann es nur iiber jedes 
einzelne Individuum urteilen. Dass aber die Vielheit als Gegen- 
stand des Urteils keinen anderen bestimmten Teil als das Indivi- 
duum enthalt, lasst sich aus jenen Urteilen erweisen, deren Subjekt 
die hochste " Art enthalt, wie unser Satz : Jeder Mensch redet ; 
denn die menschlichen Individuen unterscheiden sich nicht durch 
organische Bestimmtheiten derartig von einander, dass iiber ihre 
verschiedenen Klassen ein einziges Gesamturteil gefdllt werden 
kann ...'"» 

Before taking up the meaning of the argument, I wish to say 
that ' hochste Art ' as a translation of jnnN p» is liable to mis- 
understanding. One might suppose it meant in our case the 
highest species, namely, the human species, which is given in the 
example. Needless to say, it means nothing of the sort. It 
means literally the last species, i.e. the one which does not in 

* 9 Italics mine. 


turn embrace a narrower species. It is equivalent to D'J'on po, 
and means rather the lowest species than the highest. 

Now as to the general argument. It is this : G. has come to 
the conclusion that a universal proposition expresses a judgement 
concerning a plurality taken distributively. Being a rigorous 
analyst, he does not at once jump to the conclusion that therefore 
it refers to the individuals taken distributively. It may con- 
ceivably refer to some other unit higher than the individual. 
No, says G., the unit in the denotation of the universal proposi- 
tion cannot be anything higher than the individual. This is clear 
if we take as our universal proposition one in which the subject 
represents the last species, such as, ' all man is rational '. What 
unit can there possibly be here, to the plurality of which taken 
distributively the proposition can refer ? There is not any except 
the individual. In a proposition having a genus as its subject, 
such as ' all animal is mortal ', it is conceivable that the unit may 
be not the individual but the species, but, as G. says in the sequel, 
if so, all the absurdities shown above would result here again 
from this supposition. Hence it is proved that a universal pro- 
position refers to the plurality of individuals taken distributively. 

To the credit of K. be it said that he understood the argument 
correctly, though there are some difficulties in the Hebrew text, 
which obscure it. There is one sentence in the Hebrew which, 
as it stands, cannot be rendered so as to give the desiderated 
meaning. I refer to the following (67, 6) : 

?3iv jnspD onvp cppbni a^aaio o^a m«n wt6 jtoa px 'a 

.11? D.10 V?i bbl *?V 1T1T DBPDnP DTO IDN't? 

This can only be translated as follows : 

'[That there cannot be in this plurality any other definite 
part to which the proposition can refer except the individual, is 
clear in a proposition whose subject is a last species, for example, 
all man is rational], for in this case the individual men have no 
definite organs distinguished from each other, so that we might 
say that the reference [of the proposition] is to the individual 
groups of them [sc. the organs].' 


But the translation gives very poor sense. It might seem to 
signify, taken by itself, that G. desires to guard against the possi- 
bility that the unit of reference may be something less than an 
individual, — an organ of an individual. But in the context this 
cannot be the meaning. K., once more be it said to his credit, 
felt the correct meaning, and despite the bad text endeavours to 
get the following translation, italicized above : 

' Denn die menschlichen Individuen unterscheiden sich nicht 
durch organische Bestimmtheiten derartig von einander, dass 
iiber ihre verschiedenen Klassen ein einziges Gesamturteil gefallt 
werden kann.' 

The only difficulty is that the Hebrew will not bear this 
translation. jnvpD DDVp D'p^m refers to D^a of any given in- 
dividual man, and not to organs of one individual as differing 
from those of another. And the words nru and Dno 773 773 
similarly must refer to D'73 and not to msn W<. 

The solution, I think, is a very simple one, and moreover one 
which will be seen to be correct the moment it is mentioned. 
D'73 is a corruption for D'773. The unit of reference in a 
universal proposition whose subject is a last species cannot be 
anything higher than the individual, for in the proposition, 'all 
man is rational', there are no groups of individual men distinct 
from one another to which the proposition may refer in a 
'collective-distributive' manner (irr> DTO 773 773 ?]}). The meaning 
of the last phrase is that the group, say Chinese, Japanese, 
Hindus, &c, or white men, black men, yellow men, &c, be taken 
collectively, whereas ' man ' as consisting of these groups be taken 
distributively as per these groups and not per the individual men. 

This is clearly the true solution, and is vouched for, too, by 
67, 12: 

.Drr>7X prrT 1 new D^aion D'773to -inx 773 sinn p?nn mm 
115. (L. 68, 1) 

naa-yio nnvn? no Man ?» mine ri77i3n mm m mp D71K1 

.ennro iwno 


(K. .51, 9) 

* Dagegen kommt es vor, 1<M dass im allgemeinen Urteil auf die 
bestimmte Mehrheithmgemesen wird, die sich m in der Zusammen- 
setzung des Intellekts rnit den Sinnen vollzieht.' 10 ° 

' Dagegen ' for cbvtl in this case is too strongly adversative to 
be correct. B7IR1 continues the argument, trying to show wherein 
the plurality resides in a universal proposition if not in the 
intelligibile as such. But the more serious error is the translation 
ofmaniD nnvni' by 'die sich . . . vollzieht'. The Hebrew words 
agree with mtt and not *OT . The German should read, ' weil es 
aus dem Intellekt und den Sinnen zusammengesetzt ist '. 

116. (L. 68, 19) = (K. 152, 5) 

Concerning m»N (K. ' Realitat'), see above, number 109. 

117. (L. 68, 24) 

nm 7 pnrn b»n firx nvto> non c'n^ wn bivrsorw »»d nam 

.Tiwnh Dy cnnno bzwcn mpw 

(K. 152, 13) 

' Da nun das Intelligibele nur fur das zufallige [better ' belie- 
bige 'J Individuum gilt, so gewinnen wir das Intelligibele aus den 
Sinnen in Verbindung mit den Perzeptionen? m 

K. reads rVUETtn, but it seems to me that L. is correct in 
reading nwnn, repetition. The meaning is that the fact that we 
acquire the intelligibile as a result of repeated sense perception, 
and not from a single perception, is another proof that the 
intelligibile does not denote a definite individual but any indi- 
vidual at all; the idea being that if the intelligibile denoted 
a definite individual, one perception of an individual should be 
sufficient to give us the intelligibile. G. probably has in mind 
Aristotle's statement in the Metaphysics, i, ch. 1, 980 b 29 at yap 
iroXXal fivijfiai rov avrov irpay/taros jtuas e/t7r«/Mas Svvap.iv diroTt- 
Xowriv. Also ibid. 981 a 5 yivtrai St Ttyyq, orav Ik ttoWwv 
ti}s ifiirtipias iworjpaTiav p.ia Ka&6\ov ytvrfrai irtpl iw 6/u.oiW 


100 Italics mine. 101 Italics mine. 


118. (L. 68, 25) 

.nimnnn onaya onix 

(K. 152, 16) 

Dies geschieht aber so, dass der Intellekt von dem sinnlich 
wahrnehmbaren Individuum jene von ihm begriffetien 102 Attribute 
abstrahiert, um derentwillen sich die Pluralbildung vollzog. 

The italicized words form a wrong translation of j'SWi. The 
word means here to pertain to as an attribute, and its subject is 
nmnnn, not ?3E>. The correct translation is as follows : [The 
intelligibile is acquired from sense perception by dint of repetition 
(see last no.)], by the intellect abstracting from the material 
attributes of the sensible individual, through which attributes 
multiplicity attaches as an attribute (J'KTi) to them (sc. sensible 

119. (L. 69, 5) 

b$n -arm dw ninom J? new nwon wn Vyan jnont? -iiyi 

•OSD bv^2 XXDJ NW 13 nON' 1 "03E> ^"n ,^jnS3 KS03 TIlnDn 

.1^ "ie>x ninon 

(K. 153. 8) 

Und ferner : Das Universale bildet doch sein Wesen, <&w 
Wesen jedoch, das eine Sache zum Trager des Wesens macht, existiert 
in actu, d. h. man kann deshalb von ihm sagen, dass es aktuell 
existiert, weil es ihr (sc. der Sache) Wesen bildet}"* 

The italicized passage is incorrect. The correct translation is 
as follows : ' Again, the universal forms its essence (sc. of the 
individual), and the essence makes the thing possessing the 
essence an actual existent, I mean that we say it is an actual 
existent by reason of its essence '. G. is not saying yet that the 
essence is an actual existent, but that the thing possessing the 
essence is an actual existent by virtue of its essence. Then he 
argues in the sequel, that that which makes another an actual 

102 Italics mine. 103 Italics mine. 


existent must a fortiori be itself an actual existent. According 
to K.'s translation the rest of the argument in G. would be 

In a note (153, note 4), K. attributes to L. the reading niPlDPl 
(69, 1 1 last word), which would be wrong, and adopts the correct 
reading roneno, which he attributes to MSS. O and P. He is 
evidently mistaken, for L. has the correct reading ninoriD. 

120. (L. 69, 18) = (K. 154, 2) 

K. translates "MltC a posteriori. If a posteriori is used in 
German as it is in English, it is decidedly an inappropriate 
translation of ~nnK3. "1VW3 is here opposed to PiTTin, in other 
cases it is opposed to nCHpS , neither of which means a priori. 
Predication may be of three kinds, synonymous (iTD3Drn), homony- 
mous (P|inco), and what for want of a better term may be called 
analogous (j?1BD3 or "WiNI PtBHp3). The first two Aristotle defines 
in the beginning of the Categories. If we apply a term to two 
things homonymously (o/moku/mds), it signifies that the two things 
are quite different in essence, but they happen to have the same 
name. The example Aristotle gives is the word animal (^£ov) as 
applied to a real man and to the picture of a man (oiav £<pov o t« 
avOpunros kcu to yeypa/t/ttW). A term predicated of two things 
synonymously has exactly the same definition in the two cases, 
because the two things to which it is applied have the same 
essence, generic if not specific. Thus the same word animal 
(f«w) is predicated synonymously of man and ox (olov £$ov 5 t« 
dcflponros Kat 6 /JoSs). The third mode of predication Aristotle 
discusses in the Metaphysics, iv. 2. He calls it jrpos b> as 
opposed to synonymous predication (naff h>) on the one hand, 
and to homonymous predication (o/wovv/mos) on the other. It is 
intermediate between the two. Thus the term ' existent ' (oV = 
NXDJ) is predicated of substance (own'a = DXy) as well as of the 
various qualifications and affections of substance (jra^, <j>6opai, 
OT«/oiyo"«ts, irotonp"ts, TroirfriKa, ytwiyriKa. — oiKrias). In this case 
the term is applied primarily (jrpwrws = r6nn or HB'Hpn) and 
properly (xupiios) to substance (ouo-ia), secondarily (linNa) to the 


other things mentioned above.' 04 While the predication is here 
not synonymous, for the definition of the term existent would not 
be the same in all these cases, it is not homonymous either, for 
the things in question involve one and the same nature — substance 
(to . . ov Xeytrcu (lev 5ro\Xo^<ls, dXXa Trpos cv koI fiiav Tiva <f>v<riv, kcu 
ovx o/juovvfitos . . . ovTto Sk Koi to ov Xtyerat iroXXa^Ss fitv, o\X airav 
irpos pJav ap)(r)V' rd [lev yap oti owrlm, 6Vra Xcyerai, to 8' art irdOrj 
ovtri'as, to. 8' oti 6Sos «ts ovo-iav, tj <f>0opal rj o-Ttprqo-us rj TTOvoTqris 17 
TronjTiKa. rj ytvvrjTiKa ovalas, rj tuiv jrpos Ttjv ovo-iav Xtyofitvutv, r) 
tovtwv twos diro<j)do-(ii 17 ovo-iai)- 

This is what G. means in this place, and it is clear at the same 
time that the reference in G. to Aristotle is not to Metaphysics 
vii. 3, as K. thinks (153, fin.), but to iv. 2, as just indicated. 
In vii. 3, the discussion is what is meant by substance (DXV = 
ovo-la). Here the question is in what sense the term existent 
(oV = KXfM) is applied to substance as well as to the accidents of 
substance. Aristotle sums up the same thought in vii. 1, 
p. 1028 a, 13-15, especially in the words, Too-avraxios 8e Xcyofiivov 
tov ovtos <j>avtpbv on tovtiov ttoIotov ov to ti ianv, oTrtp o-rjpaivti ttjv 

121. (L. 70, 3) 

/ivbvn Nin rnpoa *)xh "\mi irotwoMP not? w dnb> *w 
yt6vnn bivh jw new ^aenen vvben nwts> nrh a<w nan 
(r. mcnn) ntwnnn nw "o won 1 - one* m .^j)isn 5>at?n we>na 
DniN-voa roans on -ipk ntatwn i^n natwi bx nnw'soa nans 

.rooxya "Kith icoj Kin nan btt 

(K. 155, 10) 

Und ferner : Geben sie zu, dass dasjenige, was in seiner 
Existenz mit einer Veranderung akzidentell zusammenhangt, 
hylisch ist, so kann dieses Hylische nur dadurch ein sich im 
hylischen Intelkkte realisierendes Intelligibele werden, dass es der 
aktive Intellekt perzipiert. m Nach ihrer Meinung bedarf namlich 

10< Cp. Husik, Judah Messer Leon's Commentary on the Vetus Logica, 
Leyden, 1906, p. 84. 
105 Italics mine. 


eine derartige Perzeption fiir ihre {sc. der Intelligibilia) Existenz 
der Perzeption solcher lw Intelligibilia, die wiederum fiir ihre 
Existenz auf eine solche Sache angewiesen sind, die substantiell 
mit einer Veranderung zusammenhangt. 

The passages italicized by the present writer in the above 
translation are incorrect, and whatever they may mean do not 
represent what G. desires to say. The correct translation is as 
follows : ' Besides, if they admit that a thing whose existence 
depends upon a certain change per accidens, is material, it will 
follow according to them that the intelligibile which the material 
intellect acquires when it comprehends the active intellect is also 
material. For they believe that this comprehension (sc. of the 
active intellect on the part of the material intellect) requires for 
its existence the apprehension of these intelligibilia (sc. the sub- 
lunar intelligibilia), which in turn require for their existence 
a thing dependent upon a change essentially.' 

122. (L. 70, 20) 

ton "bbsb n\T ntw rmoxem ,nv&j on nbavnan tbm wn 

(K. 156, 4) 

Und zweitens : Weil die Intelligibilia Universalia sind, die 
Existenz der Universalia jedoch nach ihrer individuellen Seite hin 
ausserseelisch ist. 107 

The italicized words are incorrect. The correct translation 
is : ' Secondly, because these intelligibilia are universals, and the 
existence of the universal is dependent upon the particular, 
existing extra animam.' 

123. (L. 71, 9) 

nwR^n ntatnon )ba n:»mv nrunn nwo ^Tirv laac ,nro 
Nin roannnn dne> nn .icbn Tta rm ,~m* nntbvn vibi 
rww nro mp' ,owi-\rm ennnn isw wxn t\\bn ^bd bapim 
mno nrn tnnnn dn ,tbdd3 ins* mi immn $>xk -iew bamsn 

105 Italics mine. 10 ' Italics mine. 


*rfo ton w-n ntt? n»i ^aia isdd3 nns rprrY .anns ovpk 
,D»ana nsooa nnx nvw »»i>win nana icas 'x »a ;n6fn 

,npt? nr /itAvn rrn nasi 

(K. 157. ") 

Ferner : Nach dieser Annahme mussten doch die Intelligibilia 
gleichzeitig hylisch und nichthylisch sein, das ist jedoch nicht 
moglich. Wenn namlich das Intelligibele deshalb einer Plurali- 
sierung zuganglich sein soil, weil seine Entstehung auf der Emp- 
findung verschiedenartiger Individuen beruht, so mtisste bei einer 
Vielheit von Menschen das Intelligibele eine numerische Einheit 
bilden, obgleich es bei ihnen durch die Empfindung anderer 
Individuen entsteht (se. weil doch die Intelligibilia Identitdts- 
charakter besitzen), m dann aber ware es trotz der Vielheit (der 
perzipierenden Subjekte) eine Einheit. Was aber derartigen 
Charakter besitzt, ist nicht hylisch, denn das Hylische kann nicht 
in einer Vielheit eine Einheit bilden, und doch soil es hylisch 
sein, mithin ist die Annahme falsch. 

The trouble with this translation, which follows the 
Hebrew text, is that the argument is a non sequitur. The 
assumption of the opponents, which G. is trying to reduce 
ad absurdum, is that the intelligibile is material because like other 
material forms it is multiplied with the multiplication of the 
subject, i. e. since the intelligibilia are dependent upon the extra- 
mental particulars, different extra-mental particulars give rise to 
different intelligibilia. In other words my idea of man would be 
different, say, from that of Gersonides, because his was built upon 
the individual men of his generation, and mine is based upon the 
individual men of to-day. 

Now G. argues from this (according to K. and the Hebrew 
text as it is) that the intelligibilia of different persons would form 
a numerical unit, even though these intelligibilia were formed 
in the minds of the different persons on the basis of the 
perception of different individual men (i.e. as objects of per- 
ception) ! And G. gives no reason for such an extraordinary 
108 Italics mine. 


inference. It is just like saying, if you maintain that a is b, 
it follows from your assumption that a is not b, without giving 
any reason. Here K. comes to the help of G. by adding in 
parenthesis, 'so weil doch die Intelligibilia Identitatscharakter 
besitzen'. But surely G. would not have omitted what is so 
essential to his argument. But this reason is no reason at all. 
The 'Identitatscharakter' is the very point at issue. The 
opponents of G. claim that the intelligibilia have no ' Identitats- 
charakter' because, like other material forms (nVtt&Vll nmx), 
they are multiplied with the multiplication of their subjects 
(DfiWU nvnnm riUino). Cf. L. 54, 16 ff. and especially 55, 
22 ff., and above, numbers 95 and 96. 

The solution of the matter is extremely simple, and the error 
of K. reminds me of a frequent saying of a teacher of mine when 
one of his pupils blundered and blamed it upon a mistake in the 

book. feeo niyti ,*1BD3 JTOD, he used to say in his quaint way, 
with emphasis upon 1SD and \?3&. In our case too there is 
a ISM nwD. The "1 in DnriK is a mistake for a *T. The word 
G. wrote is Q , 1C?<, which he uses in the sense of 'same'. See 
above, No. 50. 

The meaning is now clear. If the pluralization to which the 
intelligibilia are subject is due to the difference of the extra- 
mental individuals they perceive, then it will follow that the 
intelligibilia of different persons (as subjects) will be one, if they 
were formed in their minds on the basis of the same extra-mental 
things. The rest of the argument is now clear and needs not 
to be repeated. 

There is still a word to be said about the words tnnnn *1B»N 
KM-lilD (1. n). The sequence demands DtWin DDD B^nnn ItW, 
and it is possible that the D fell out and the two words read as 
one DtWinno. The next copyist threw out the superfluous n. 

124. (L. 72, 24) = (K. 159, 26) 

DnriN should be D^riK, cf. last number. K.'s translation 
based on the reading D'inN makes no sense. 



125. (L. 73, 3) = (K. 160, 14) 

In my mind the text as it is is corrupt and makes no sense. 
The statement, moreover, D'KK'lJn JTQinm nmno DHB> "<sh con- 
tradicts the statement at the bottom of the preceding page (72), 
rvo'DDfi nt ijqd owun nmnna nia-ino ntatpicn nvnn vb run 
tnmtn btt nrb NXDin. I should therefore read UXVB0 instead of 
Dnt5>. Cf. below, No. 127. 

126. (L. 73, 8) = (K. 160, 23) 

JMM NW HD2 blWQ )£> n'.W 1B>BK vbl IWP mn ^>331 

.tcqn Kins' no iro ib>dn ixd 

Here, too, it seems that a word has fallen out before no. 
I should read "TOO 3»03 NW rt02 ^>3K>1D ui> n^iTt? 1B>BK Tli>3 
"IB>SN Nine no 1VO ,1X0 ICSN. The same applies to the similar 
statement on the preceding page (72, 19). And the translation 
would be, 'In general it would be impossible, in reference to 
a thing which is in one sense possible, in another impossible, 
to have an intelligibile of that thing in so far as it is possible '. 

127. (L. 73, 22) 

aw vh ran y nv&j ru«nne» miwiDa umn dni utokp iiyi 
1N13D kwb> nn .nunno nwint? tysn ^n Dni> law no'oon yso 
«i> ixn ntoi ^sn nt kw noa tmn $>k 13dd< D3DN an 13 ib>bj3 

.B^tO '•131 n\T 
(K. 166, 1 ) 

Und ferner: Geben wir schon zu, dass die Intelligibilia 
Universalia sind, so brauchen sie sich trotz ihrer Berufung auf 
die Individualist (sc. ausserseelische) nicht zu vermehren. Denn 
offenbar beruhen sie nur insofern auf der Individuality, als es sich 
gerade um eine bestimmte handelt, von dieser Seite aus gibt es 
jedoch keine Pluralisierung . . . 

Upon this K. remarks in a note, 'Nach Riva und Leipzig. 
P u. O haben folgende Lesart : nD3 fc»Kn bt< 13»D S D3DN Dn 13 
e»Nn nr kwb» no3 vb pirn b»k nm torn?. Da der Schluss 

falsch ist, so kann nur die Lesart von R. L. richtig sein '. 


How K. arrives at this conclusion is a mystery to me. On 
p. 63, 18, G. says, nD3 xb wvb am yi6win ben ruen d^ini 
pn nvd3 lan nti ,|Ditn b«n nm tone noa ioa /id k*k Nine 
»3in ,nt inae no3 niD$>e3 m "wan* thi ewn i>"n h>sa vab 
joitn b*n nrx i<w noa b»n{> can nibeione. 

On p. 67 fin., we read likewise : E»N3 "iH ^OCinn fystt ] y H »3 

hpn Nine nxD vwe* djdn Kin »a nti ;mn leax « [nw iao 
ew nt Nine tod n!> jontn k*k. 

On p. 68, 20 we have again : DHD inN pNB> TK3nn "I33e ffffl 

jmtn e'N nPN Nine noa K*t6 wn !>3N ^b. 

And similarly, 1. 24, Nine noa wvb ton beione 'jbd njm 

{Dim e*« nr>N. 

Finally, on p. 72 fin., we read : mbeicn i"Wnne UTOn DN D^1N1 

nt Nine no tod vb ,D*N»Mn d'pwid jontn e^N row i>N maew 
nt "obd QiNeun niainna nmno rrfaeion ru*nn t6 ran ,wtin 
D^xn !>n ark NXDJn nWDon. 

It is quite clear from all this that G. is of the opinion that in 
so far as the intelligible denotes sublunar extra-mental things (his 
own view is that the primary reference of the intelligibile, or at 
least the cause of it, is the intelligibile in the active intellect), 
it refers not to a definite individual, but to any individual at all. 
And it is also clear from the passages quoted that in so far as the 
intelligibile refers to any individual at all, no plurality attaches to 
it by reason of the variety of the individuals. That is, the intelli- 
gibile of man is one and the same in A and B, yesterday and 
to-day and to-morrow, just because it does not denote, and hence 
is not dependent upon, any definite individual. The only state- 
ment contradicting this is that on p. 73, 3, which was discussed 
in No. 125. And we were forced to change Dne to DJ'Ne. Now 
in the face of all this, when there is a choice between two 
readings, one of which is in accordance with good sense and 
logic, and in conformity with G.'s opinion as expressed elsewhere, 
and the other the reverse of all this, K. adopts the latter on the 



ground that ' der Schluss falsch ist ' ! What ' Schluss ' is ' falsch'? 
If we adopt the reading of the MSS. P and O, everything is all 
right. Moreover, G.'s example in the sequel proves beyond a 
doubt that the reading of P and O is the only correct one. He 
uses as an illustration the number ' three '. If we say the number 
three is small we are establishing a relation between the number 
three and all other numbers greater than three. But it does not 
follow from this that the intelligiUle ' small ' as applied to the 
number three is multiplied with the variety of numbers with 
which the number three stands in relation. The idea ' small ' is 
one and the same whether we compare three with four or with 
five. And why is this so ? Because, says G., when we speak of 
three as small we are putting it in relation with all numbers 
greater than three, not as definite numbers, say four or five, but 
merely as numbers greater than three. In this respect one 
number will do as well as another provided it is greater than 
three, and the idea 'small' will not change with every new 
number taken for comparison. 

Now whither does this illustration point ? Surely to the reading 
of P and O. The intelligiUle ' man ' never changes or multiplies 
with the introduction of new individual men, because it is not 
affected by the individual as a definite individual. All individuals 
look alike to the intelligiUle provided they are men. 

To be sure K. misunderstands the illustration also. He adds 
a long note (167, note 1) on the concept of infinity, which, so far 
as I can see, has not the least bearing on the question at issue. 
What G. says in the illustration which he adduces from the 
number three, does not commit him to any theory on the nature 
of infinity, and is something that any one might say who never 
heard of infinity. There are also some errors in K.'s translation 
of that passage, hence we must examine it more carefully in the 
next number. 

128. (L. 73, 26) 

aw vb\ ,om cnan bn mpm tpav -na nnsn eptrcen >a 
,-ibdbto nnxn pent? iwm .nanno rww wnn spttvoa n »aao 


mpon tpDX* run ,bi>» tnreo -ikiitbo n:n ^tw tti nefoyn mm 
nanno n»rw nt ^so aw «h ,uoo twin Dnaccno ins Jo ^n 
if» "itw maiDxnn 13 ^an^x *pt«D sin *ib>n D<-iain -ibdb3 
•rao udd 3i nnv ton ns?x nsDon i>N ton -ixnn nt nxo nicxm 
.neon in njaiK Kins? no ixd «!> ,i:idd a*i "inv sine no 

(K. 1 66, 8) 

Denn da sich die Relationseinheit mit einer Vielheit von 
Dingen akzidentell verbindet, so ergibt sich fur sie (sc. die 
Relationseinheit) keine Pluralisierung. Nehmen wir beispiels- 
weise die Drei als Zahleneinheit an. Wird sie nun in ihrer 
geringen Quantitat qualifiziert (sc. durch andere Zakkneinheiteri), so 
verbindet sie sich 109 akzidentell mit jeder der Zahlen, die grosser 
ist als sie. Daraus aber ergibt sich nicht dass sie sich selbst 
durch die Zahlen vergrossert, zu wekhen sie in Beziehung tritt, 
denn die Relation, die sie substantiell kraft dieser Eigenschaft zu 
der Zahl gewinnt, die grosser ist als sie, hat sie nur insofern, als 
die Zahl grosser ist als sie, nicht insofern sie eine vier oder flinf 
ist (sc. Also ist das bereits vorhandene Plus gegenuber der Relations- 
einheit die Bedingung der Relation, nicht aber bedingt die Relation 
das Plus. Aus diesem Grunde ist der absolute Wert der grosseren 
Zahl g/eichgultig. m 

I admit this translation is absolutely unintelligible to me. 
I do not know what is meant by ' Wird sie nun in ihrer geringen 
Quantitat qualifiziert (sc. durch andere Zahleneinheiten) '. I do 
not know what is meant by ' Daraus aber ergibt sich nicht dass 
sie sich selbst durch die Zahlen vergrossert, zu welchen sie in 
Beziehung tritt '. Does any one claim that the number three is 
increased by its relation to other numbers ? Quite the contrary. 
Any one would say that it is its relation to other numbers that 
makes it three and nothing else. Nor do I understand the mean- 
ing of the last remark in parentheses. And finally, I can see no 
coherence in the passage as a whole, and, what is more to the 
point, no resemblance to the meaning of G., which is quite clear 
to me. 

109 Italics mine. 


To take up the significant phrases in the Hebrew text first, 
-iNirveo run ,S>b>d yn rwbvn torn ,-eDDnD imn pent? i>twm 
,«dd mm onaDDiTD nnt< to i>K mpoa «pov» nan ,oj» sinea 
I understand to mean the following : ' If we take the number 
three, for example, and describe it as small, we put it into 
accidental relation with all numbers greater than it.' He clearly 
makes a distinction between essentia/ and accidental relation. 
Three as three is in essential relation with all numbers on either 
side of it. Three as ' small ' is not in essential relation with any 
number at all, as a definite quantity. It is in accidental relation 
with all numbers greater than three as definite quantities. In 
essential relation it is with all numbers greater than three, not as 
definite quantities, but only as greater than three. 

The next statement, nBDD2 naino iTW fir USD 3W vh) 
Drfba spovo Kin ne»x C-mn, means 'It does not follow (sc. 
because it is in accidental relation with so many other numbers) 
that it (the number three as small) is pluralized (not " vergrossert 
sich ") in accordance with the number of things with which it is in 
relation '. This means, that three as small is one idea, one intelli- 
gible, and it does not change its character as small according 
to the variety of the numbers with which it is compared ; because, 
as he goes on to say, ton nsnn nr nvc moxjn il> -ie>n nianosrin 
i6 ,1300 3-) -iw tone> no nvo udd m nnv ton nm -iadcm b» 

nEtsn IN njjniN NW no 1X0. 'The relation which the number 
three bears essentially by reason of this quality (sc. the predicate 
" small ") is a relation to the number greater than it qua greater 
than it, and not qua four or five.' 

The inference is that if the number three as small bore an 
essential relation to the numbers greater than it as definite 
numbers, as four or five or six, &c, the character of the 
inielligibile ' three as small ' would have as many forms as there 
are numbers greater than three with which it is compared. 

Now what is the point of this whole illustration? It is 
obviously this : that in every other inielligibile, since it concerns 
not the definite individual as this definite individual (no e*k), but 
any individual at all of a given species ((Dime b*n nps), it is 


always the same, no matter how many individuals are actually 
denoted by it. The bearing of this on the discussion in the 
preceding number is obvious. Why this harmless passage should 
have been chosen by K. for a lengthy disquisition on the concept 
of infinity is more than I can say. 

129. (L. 74, 9 and 10) = (K. 171, 6 and 8) 

We have here again PS?3, actus, mistaken for ?J?3 = agens. Cf. 
above, No. 64. 

130. (L. 75, i7) = (K. 175, 23) 

DH33 here is a weight, and means talents, not ' Brotlaibe ', 
which would be Dni> '"Ua. 

131. (L. 77, 1) 

'iN-i "irw Kin nwoin mixro t>yian byt/n van -ks>n bswanv 

.nwDin rnraro )J? ^atno rww 

(K. 178, 34) 

Dass . . . das Intelligibele welches der aktive Intdlekt von der 
vorstellenden Form gewinnt™ weit eher unser Intelligibeles sein 
muss als die vorstellende Form. 

The words italicized constitute a very serious error. How can 
any one make G. speak of the active intellect as acquiring his 
intelligibile from the form in the imagination ! Does not K. know 
that according to G., and in fact generally in the middle ages, the 
active intellect was regarded as the cause of the sublunar world 
and not the effect thereof? In particular would any one dream of 
making anything in the mind of the active intellect dependent 
upon the imagination in the mind of man? For that is what 
nWD*in n"11X is, the <£dvTao-/«i in the human faculty of imagination. 
G. of course does not say this. He speaks of the inielligibile 
in the mind of the active intellect which corresponds as a prototype 
or cause to the form in the human imagination. 1 " 

110 Italics mine. 

111 It is perhaps possible that I am doing injustice to Kellermann, 
and that his sentence should be construed ' Dass das Intelligibele von der 
vorstellenden Form, welches der aktive Intellekt gewinnt', &c. But the 
very word ' gewinnt ' is inapplicable to the active intellect, which does not 
acquire his ideas. He has them all the time. 


I 3 2. (L. 7 8, l) 

tin ni>ir bvww vvbvrm byth ncsx rrrw nto -wan* st> run 

(K. 181, 8) 

' [Wenn es sich aber so verhalt], ist hieraus nicht erwiesen> 
dass ihn (st. den akt. Intellekt) m der hylische Intellekt ohne m die 
sublunarischen Intelligibilia begreifen kann.' 

The word ' ihn ' is not represented in the Hebrew of L., and 
K. does not indicate that he has any manuscript authority for it. 
As a matter of fact such a conclusion as K. draws is an unexpected 
one. The preceding arguments do not merely not show that we 
can perceive the active intellect without the sublunar intelligibilia, 
they do not prove that we can perceive the active intellect at all. 
The conclusion therefore is a negative one, to be sure, but it is 
the following if we follow the text of L. ' It has not been proven 
that the material intellect can perceive anything except these (i. e. 
the sublunar) intelligibilia.' 

133. (L. 78, 11-12) = (K. 181, 24-27) 

The parenthetical remark, 'sc. obgleich sie zu ihnen direkt 
gelangen konnten', is beside the point. Those natural things 
which attain to their ultimate perfection by means of intermediate 
stages of lesser perfection cannot do otherwise. And in the 
material intellect, too, the argument is that the sublunar intelligi- 
bilia are not the final stage of its perfection, but only a way- 
station, so to speak, a ' Nachtasyl ', by means of which it will 
arrive at the Active Intellect. 

134. (L. 78, 23) 

}N33 rvn kS>i /wk ni»i>e> injo niD^e* bx yyun' dkb> nn 
nNtt> nw nb run /mx ni»,e> Tiajn nyunn nan nw xbw ni»S>t? 

.rvion nyunn 

112 Italics mine. 


(K. 182, 11) 

Wurde es sich namlich nicht 113 zu einer Vollkommenheit urn der 
anderen Vollkommenheit willen hinbewegen, — und es gibt heine 113 
Vollkommenheit, die nicht in der Bewegung um einer andern 
willen stattfindet — so ware diese Bewegung zwecklos. w 

The word ' nicht ' has nothing corresponding to it in the 
Hebrew of L., and K. does not indicate a variant. The intro- 
duction of the negative makes the argument a non sequitur. For 
if every perfection is not for the sake of another perfection, there 
is an ultimate perfection, which is the ' Zweck ', and we cannot 
draw the conclusion, ' so ware diese Bewegung zwecklos '. This 
conclusion can have validity only if we assume that there is no 
ultimate perfection, that every perfection is for the sake of another 
perfection. In this case we have indeed an infinite series, and 
the motion is ' zwecklos '. From this consideration it is clear, too, 
that the parenthetical passage in K., 'und . . . stattfindet', is 
also incorrectly rendered, and for the same reason as above. In 
fact, it is not a parenthesis at all in the original, it is part of the 
condition. Accordingly we should translate the passage as 
follows : ' If a thing moves to one perfection for the sake of 
another perfection and there is no perfection in this motion which 
is not for the sake of another perfection, then this motion has no 
end at all.' 

135- ( L - 79, 33 and 34) = (K. 184, 26 and 27) 
msn and njn mean here 'opinion' or 'idea' and not 
' Kenntnis '. 

136. (L. 8o, 2) = (K. 184, 33) 

nplPriD ]))& ah means ' // cannot escape division ', not ' es ist 
nicht unmoglich . . . durch folgende Alternative zu erklaren'. 
Cf. above, No. 45. 

137. (L. 83, 6) 

ios< /nro Nin rupjn bsm niK'TOt? no idsj rvneo "o nn 

,n:p:n bwn rnaro 

113 Italics mine. 


(K. 192, 13) 

Denn wenn etwas an der Existenz des erworbenen Intelkkts 
verganglich ist, so ist es nur von dieser Seite aus {sc. der physischen 
Perzeptioneri) j iu also muss der erworbene Intellekt verganglich 

This translation is incorrect. The correct translation is as 
follows : ' For if that upon which the existence of the acquired 
intellect depends is subject to dissolution, the acquired intellect 
itself necessarily is subject to dissolution '. This agrees with the 
immediately preceding context. 

138. (85, 19) 

ib'bk *rta nvri ,niio!snon i^n fe anw ib "ib>bx run ds pi 

.inx u Nin im ivn ymt? u 

(K. 201, 4) 

Und kann er nicht alle Intelligibilia (sc. die einzelnen) be- 
greifen, so kann er sie auch nicht nach ihrer Einheitsseite hin 

G. says, of course, nothing of the sort. What he does say is 
this. ' And similarly if he can perceive all sublunar intelligibilia, 
but cannot comprehend them in their unitary aspect [sc. then 
also he cannot perceive the active intellect]. 

139. (L. 87, 26-9) = (K. 206, 8-13) 

The parenthetical passage in K., 'sc. also der hyl. Intellekt 
wertvoller als der aktive ', strikes one like a bolt from the blue. 
One cannot see the motive of it, and one wonders what it has to 
do with Gersonides's argument, which it gives a stunning blow on 
the head. For surely a conclusion like the one expressed in 
the words in question can only be intended as a reductio ad 
absurdum, whereas G.'s words immediately preceding, :nnD n\"n 

yxoN verw rrmrro rnaaa "inv rvban nw mwn irrw, 'dann 

aber miisste die Endform (sc. in actu) wertvoller als das Mediale 
114 Italics mine. 


sein ', is not at all a reductio ad absurdum. It expresses G.'s own 
opinion. And the only conclusion to be drawn from it is that 
there cannot be two co-ordinate forms (.Wins? "lPSK Tli>3 NWS? 
nnN nyntyi nnran i^kid ow — 86, 26). 

As K.'s words can only be due to a confusion, it will be well to 
resume briefly G.'s argument in this chapter (12). The question 
is whether it is possible for man to comprehend the Active 
Intellect. Two conditions are necessary for such comprehension : 
(1) The material intellect must have a knowledge of all sublunar 
intelligibilia. (2) He must know them not as an aggregate of 
separate ideas, but as a unitary system. Now G. argues : In the first 
place it is impossible for man to know all sublunar intelligibilia. 
In the second place, granting that this is possible, he cannot 
know them as a unitary system. In order to prove the latter, G. 
tries to show in various ways that all nature, i. e. all the processes 
in the sublunar world, form one great teleological progress, in 
which the primitive matter endeavours to attain the highest form, 
viz. the form of man. Every detail in nature is a link in this one 
chain. This point he makes clear in his second argument, begin- 
ning in the middle of p. 86, where he shows that every single form 
in nature outside of the first and the last stands between two 
other forms, one above or antecedent to it, which is matter in 
relation to it, and the other below or subsquent to it, to which it 
stands in the relation of matter. There cannot be two co-ordinate 
forms. For, he goes on to say, if there are two co-ordinate forms, 
we have the following three possibilities. Either (1) they are 
both final ends of the series, or (2) they are both means, i.e. 
intermediate terms in the series, or (3) one is an end and the 
other a mean. He proves the first impossible (we need not go 
into the argument). He proves the second impossible by showing 
that the two supposed means must be in one motive process, and 
hence cannot be co-existent but successive (which is the reverse 
of the hypothesis). And from this follows the impossibility of 
no. 3. For if one form is an end and the other a mean in one 
and the same motive process, it follows as before that the end is 
superior to the mean, and hence they are not co-existent but 


successive, not co-ordinate, but the means is subordinate to the 
end (which is contrary to hypothesis). This is all that G. has 
proved so far, namely, that there cannot be two co-ordinate forces. 
There is not a word said or intimated so far about the relation 
between the material and the active intellect. His proof is not 
yet complete. He concludes his argument on p. 88, 6 ff. It is 
not, he says, in the power of man to understand the relation of 
every single form in this universal process. He may know in 
a general way that the inorganic is in the relation of matter to 
the plant, the plant to the animal, &c. He may even understand 
the relations of certain subdivisions in these three kingdoms, but 
he can never know the actual relation of every single intelligibik 
or form, and any knowledge short of this does not enable its 
possessor to comprehend the active intellect. 

140. (L. 87 fin.) 

anpc tod mivn *|i>nD ^m mpirt hx nnv a-ipp no twn 

(K. 211) 

Und das dem Diinnen naher stehende wtit eher den Weg der 
Form beschreitet als m das dem Dicken naher stehende . . . 

The italicized words are incorrect. The o of fiDD is not 
comparative. The expression , , . D mivn "jiriD ~]b)n is an Arabism, 
corresponding to ... ^ ijyi\ £Jp» JjjJ, and signifies that one thing 
is in the relation of a form to another thing : cf. above, No. 21. 

So in our passage the meaning is that the mixture which 
approximates ' thinness ' bears the relation of form fo the mixture 
which approximates ' thickness '. That is, the latter is like matter 
to the former. 

141. (L. 88, 10) 

ruTioa Nin re?n 'dti t xwr\ *rs-b '•bvnn ru-noa Kin nDnn wi 
.T^inn vnb ^rnn nmoa Kin t|Dwen vyv\ ^aiyon wi> ^rnn 

116 Italics mine. 


(K. 213, 15) 

Das unvollkommene Tier auf der Stufe des Hylischen gegen- 
iiber der gebttckten Gestalt™ die gebtickte Gestalt m auf der 
hylischen Stufe gegentiber der fliegenden, und die fliegende auf 
der Stufe des Hylischen gegenuber der gehenden. 

K. translates W as if it were niDT = ' Gestalt ', and nfe> as if 
it were n^or DOS', 'gebuckt'. It is clear from the context that 
'P7 means ' having blood ', and n't? means ' aquatic ', lit. ' swim- 
ming', contrasted with IBtyB, flying = aerial, and "i\T*n, walking 
= terrestrial. 

142. (L. 90, 22) = (K. 217, 26) 

m»nm means ' continuously ', not ' vervollstandigt '. 

143. (L. 90, 32) 

.t6aa *|ii>n s^nno u«na ma nvdj nm nmyn *a 

(K. 218, 20) translates: 

Denn die in unserem Leben sich geltend machende Annehm- 
lichkeit ist vonjener (sc. nach dem Tode) m weit verschieden. 

This does not seem to be correct, I mean especially the 
parenthetical remark. There would be no particular relevancy in 
making this statement at this time. What G. means is no doubt 
that there must be a great difference between the happiness arising 
from the knowledge of inferior intelligibilia and that caused by 
intelligibilia of a higher kind — after death, since the difference is 
so enormously great also in this life. The sequel confirms this 

144. (L. 91, 5) 

no ay pn V3 .Nan dry*? pbn orb e» tanc* 5»a iidn nth 
-KPN nt^BJn rrvznnn tint nfatPion pp{> rrnnn oniN rrwvw 
ntatpiono no -row one nann up' vbw -ib»sn *n ran ,na Nxon 
. . . ^toe* an nmoa ^nib" i»a diidn nwi nann dni bvd dn 

116 Italics mine. " 7 Italics mine. 



Deshalb sagen sie: Ganz Israel hat Anteil am kiinftigen 
Leben. Sie meinen namlich : Obgleich sie durch die Thora in so 
ausgezeichneter Weise zum Erwerb der Intelligibilia angeleitet 
werden, konnen dock viele von ihnen nur ein kleines oder grb'sseres 
Mass von Intelligibilien erwerben. ni Es steht also m ihr Ausdruck 
' Ganz fo) Israel ' auf der Stufe von den ' Meisten in Israel ' . . . 

K. also adds in a foot-note (219, note 1), ' Das Wort "ganz" 
soil darauf hinweisen, dass sich nicht j'eder in Israel einen Teil von 
Intelligibilien erworben hat.' 

K. gives an entirely wrong impression of G.'s meaning. He 
makes it appear that G. is trying to show that only a few Israelites 
and not all will get a share in the world to come, whereas G. says 
the very opposite ; namely, that by reason of the Torah, which 
exhorts to contemplation and study in so remarkable a manner, 
a great many Israelites cannot but acquire some measure of 
intelligibilia, whether it be much or little. To be sure, there are 
exceptions even in Israel. There are men who do not heed the 
law and do not acquire any intelligibilia. For this reason G. adds 
that the word 'all' (P3) need not be taken strictly. It means 
rather the greater number. This last remark is more or less 
incidental, and not a conclusion of what precedes. The main 
contention of G. is positive and not negative. He means to say 
that many Israelites do have a knowledge of intelligibilia rather 
than that a great many do not. 

145. (L. 91, 21) 

.iroiDxi> -\wv m potw »ob y\rv -oat? -woe ton nr »aSn 

(K. 219, fin.) 

Also muss der Gldubige offenbar solches mit seinem Glauben in 
Ubereinstimmung bringen. 11 " 

This is not the correct meaning of the Hebrew passage. The 
proper translation is as follows : 

' Therefore it is clear that the person who believes this (sc. that 
our conclusions are opposed to the Torah) should follow his faith 
i' 8 Italics mine. 1:9 Italics mine. 


(sc. and reject our theories).' The sequel shows also that this 
translation is the correct one. 

Conclusion : Our task is now done. We have examined the 
more glaring errors and misconceptions and tried to correct them. 
K. has also a number of lengthy and erudite notes, which we have 
left out of this discussion. After all, the first duty of a translator 
is to translate. The next thing incumbent upon him is to add 
brief explanatory notes wherever the text offers some difficulty, 
textual, terminological, or logical. Of these there is by far too 
little in K. The translator's own philosophical standpoint, and 
his criticism of his author from that standpoint, is quite a secondary 
matter. If he has done his duty properly and adequately by the 
first two requirements, we may be grateful to him for his additional 
criticism. But to indulge in the latter at the expense of the former 
is unjustifiable. And this is the charge we make against Keller- 
mann. We have examined his translation rather carefully, though 
not too critically, and found it wanting in a great many more 
instances than is allowed to a competent translator. A more 
critical search, and a consideration of the finer points would no 
doubt reveal a good many more instances open to question. 
K.'s defects as a translator of Gersonides may be classed under 
the following heads. 

r. He does not seem to be sufficiently familiar with the Hebrew 
style of the mediaeval Jewish philosophers. 

2. He does not in many cases understand the meaning of 
technical terms (cf. Nos. 74, 90, gi, 95, 96, 97, ior, 108, 109, 
118, &c). 

3. He exhibits a lack of imagination in failing to see the point 
of an argument or the sequence of thought (cf. Nos. 64, 80, 8r, 
82, 95, 96, 98, 102, 109, 113, &c). 

4. This makes it difficult or impossible for him to see in 
a number of instances evident corruptions in the text, which 
call for obvious and simple emendations (cf. Nos. 74, 79, 114, 
123, &c). 


5. Even though he had the advantage of several MSS., he failed 
to draw from them the benefit they were calculated to give, and 
for reasons stated before (Nos. 3 and 4) allowed in some instances 
a valuable reading to slip through his hands, the adoption of 
which made a difficult and obscure argument clear and transparent 
(cf. Nos. 62, 65, 66, 77, 88, 117, 127, &c). 

Dr. Kellermann intends to proceed with his translation of 
the Milhamot, of which he has given us so far about one-fifth. 
He also intimates that he may undertake to edit the Hebrew 
text on the basis of the MSS. We feel it our duty to advise 
Kellermann to proceed slowly and with caution in either of these 
tasks. The reader who has followed us to this point (I fear 
he is not very numerous) will, I think, agree that the volume 
here reviewed should have undergone a thorough revision 
before it was published. May we suggest in all humility and 
seriousness that in future Kellermann may join with a specialist in 
this line, and collaborate on the translation as well as on the 
edition of the text. A translation or an edition of a mediaeval 
Jewish philosophical text is a rare event in these practical days, 
hence we must see to it, in the name of Jewish science and its 
mediaeval heroes, that when they are presented to the modern 
world (none too favourable to them as it is) it should be in as 
nearly perfect a form as is humanly possible.