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REVIEWS 129 

return, and that the state should effectively organize this work. 
While the practical measures recommended may have to be modi- 
fied for other lands, the carefully collected materials for a judg- 
ment must be useful and influential in all civilized countries, for 
the plague of vagabondage is universal. 

C. R. Henderson 



Principles of Pragmatism. By H. Heath Bawden. New 
York and Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910. Pp. 
x-f364. $1.50. 

Critics have complained of the fragmentary and unsystematic 
character of the pragmatic literature thus far. The complaint is 
inevitable in the beginning of any movement, especially one so wide- 
spread as pragmatism. The beginning of such a movment is intro- 
ductory to the more systematic work which follows. From the 
prefatory character of pragmatic writings thus far some have 
inferred that pragmatism is transitory, a "philosophic fad," and have 
professed that they already see signs of its disintegration. One of 
these "signs" is found in a decrease of the amount and temperature 
of controversy. This fact, however, may as well mean that pragma- 
tists, having stated their theses, are at work on more detailed expo- 
sition and application. "Systematic" in the Hegelian or Spencerian 
sense, pragmatism of course can never become. But there is a 
recognition of the need for detailed interpretation from the prag- 
matist's standpoint. 

At all events, Mr. Bawden's book, while it does not, and does 
not profess to, adequately meet this ' demand is a step nearer a 
systematic treatment of pragmatism than anything which has yet 
appeared. This shows in the chapter headings which are as fol- 
lows: i, "Philosophy"; ii, "Experience"; iii, "Consciousness"; iv, 
"Feeling"; v, "Thinking"; vi, "Truth"; vii, "Reality"; viii, "'Evo- 
lution and the Absolute" ; ix, "Mind and Matter." 

The substance of many of these chapters has already appeared 
in various periodicals, but the author has so worked over and 
arranged this material as to give it something of the unity of a 
treatise. 

The author's interest and training in biological science broadens 
and freshens the discussion throughout. Indeed many may find that 
it is here in the connection between the development of biological 



I30 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 

science and philosophy that the author makes his best contribution. 
The reviewer finds the first three chapters and the chapter on 
"Reality" the most suggestive. 

The introductory chapter on philosophy defines philosophy as 
"The general theory of experience"; "It is the science of the 
principles of science." The query which the special scientist here 
raises, viz., whether anyone who has not worked in the special 
sciences has a license to expound the principles of sciences and 
whether, therefore, this definition does not read the philosopher 
out of court, is summarily disposed of with the statement: "The 
searchlight of special science must be supplemented by the world- 
view of philosophy." Doubtless the author has a good answer to 
the special scientist's inevitable "Why must it?"; and some readers 
will miss this answer. 

The chapter on experience is no mere psychological analysis 
of a "stream of consciousness." It stretches from atoms to a 
theory of society and immortality. The exposition of the demo- 
cratic character of the social implication of pragmatism contains 
some excellent passages. The brief discussion of immortality will 
interest and stimulate, if it does not convince many. 

The author's critique of the parallelist's theory of conscious- 
ness is clear and conclusive. His own account of consciousness 
as arising out of the "conflict," "tension," "friction," etc., of un- 
conscious activities suggests that more might have been made of 
the distinction between immediate, unreflective and reflective, 
cognitive consciousness, and that perhaps the term "consciousness" 
is sometimes used where reflective consciousness is meant. The 
author sees that the statement that conflict, tension, is "a condition 
of consciousness" (of all consciousness?) has forthwith to meet 
the questions, What can be meant by "conflict," "tension," "friction," 
as the "condition of consciousness"? Do not "conflict" and "ten- 
sion" imply consciousness? Have they any meaning except as 
descriptive of consciousness, etc.? The author's answer is that 
"the conscious and the unconscious must be conceived as co- 
ordinate and supplementary functions within the process of experi- 
ence" (p. ii8). But would not the substitution of "reflective 
consciousness" for "consciousness" meet the point more directly, 
and recognize also the conscious character of instinctive action? 

In the same paragraph with the above citation there is another, 
and as the author says, a "better," statement which reads: "The 
so-called unconscious is a name for describing organized conscious- 



REVIEWS 131 

ness, capitalized or funded experience, the positive equipment of 
instincts and habits by which consciousness (reflective conscious- 
ness?) performs its function of mediating further experience." 
(Parentheses mine.) 

The author clearly shows the futility of the metaphysical 
opposition of pluralism and monism, materialism and spiritualism, 
since these are logical determinations, working conceptions within 
experience. 

In a few spots the style grows a little Spencerian, e.g., the 
definition of an organism (p. 103) and the sentence at the top of 
p. 109. But usually it is clear and forcible. 

A. W. Moore 

The University of Chicago 



Parenthood and Race Culture. By C. W. Saleeby, M.D., 
Ch.B., F.Z.R. Edin. New York : Mofifat, Yard & Co., 1909. 
Pp. XV -f- 389. 
In the words of the author, "the present volume seeks to supply 
what is undoubtedly a real need at the present day — a general 
introduction to eugenics which is at least considered and respon- 
sible." The book may be a responsible statement of what the 
eugenists are thinking, but it certainly is not "considered." Dr. 
Saleeby is apparently a man with one idea, so much so that his 
style is exceedingly bumptious, always intolerant, and sometimes 
downright vulgar. For egotistical cocksureness, we have rarely 
seen anything to surpass this supposedly scientific book. His scorn 
for "that lethal chamber," the English Parliament, and for the 
"politicians" (there are no statesmen, and will not be any until the 
eugenists are placed in charge) is exceeded only by his contempt 
for the economists. He constantly reiterates Ruskin's dictum that 
there is no wealth but life, and seems to suppose that every econo- 
mist will take issue. Dr. Saleeby's knowledge of economics and 
economists apparently comes to an abrupt conclusion with Nassau, 
Sr., and the Manchester School. It seems popular in some quarters 
to take a fling at the economists. It is an egregious error however 
to suppose that economists do not realize the value of human life — 
of the right kind — fully as much as any other group of thinkers. 
Who will more often be found, for instance, in the United States, 
among the advocates of a national health bureau, a national child 
bureau, or more modern accident liability, than the economists? 
But of all this the author is in dense ignorance.